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“J'ai de sérieuses raisons de croire que la planète d'ou venait le petit 
prince est l'astéroide B 612. Cet astéroide n'a été aperçu qu'une fois 
au télescope, en 1909, par un astronome turc. Il avait fait alors une 
grande démonstration de sa découverte à un Congrès International 
d'Astronomie. Mais personne ne l'avait cru à cause de son costume. 
Les grandes personnes sont comme ça. Heureusement, pour la 
réputation de l'astéroide B 612 un dictateur turc imposa à son peuple, 
sous peine de mort, de s'habiller à l'Européenne. L'astronome refit sa 
démonstration en 1920, dans un habit très élégant. Et cette fois-ci 
tout le monde fut de son avis.”  
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry (Le petit Prince)  
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Preface 
“Les droits de l’homme n’existent pas. Ce sont les droits de l’homme blanc” 
The debate on the universality of human rights is not only an academic or a political 
one. It is a deep concern that lives at the grassroots level, as the abovementioned 
quote by Fadma shows.  
 
Fadma is a young French Muslim woman whom I met in a mosque a couple of years 
ago. When she learned that I was studying human rights law, she looked at me with 
surprise and gave me her critical opinion about my choice of study, using the above-
mentioned wording. “Human rights don’t exist. They are the rights of the white 
man”. Her words struck me and stuck with me. For a long time. I remember feeling 
extremely uncomfortable, not immediately knowing how I could best reply. In 
retrospect, I see two reasons for that.  
 
The first reason being that in front of me stood a young smart woman who had just 
explained to me that every morning she must remove her headscarf in front of her 
school’s doors in order to be able to pursue her education. She told me she felt 
humiliated and powerless; not only because she was compelled to remove her 
headscarf, but also because she felt that her perspective, her feelings, her voice and 
her conviction were of secondary importance since the rule was imposed on her and 
on many other young women without giving them a say. Hence, I could not be 
surprised at her opinion about human rights. I unfortunately have to admit that, in 
the past years, I have met various other women who thought like Fadma. This 
dissertation project was written at a time during which regulations prohibiting the 
wearing of religious signs in schools and in public and private workplaces were (and 
are still) mushrooming in my country, Belgium, but also in other countries across 
Europe. The paradoxical and maybe even perverse side of this situation is that the 
more visible Muslim women become in society and the more they try to participate 
in society through work, education and even volunteering, the more limiting 
measures are imposed on them. Because of this context, bright young students are 
making educational and career choices not only on the basis of their dreams, but 
also on the basis of a mental checklist containing the limitations they have to take 
into account among which are the jobs that they will not be able to exercise without 
putting aside a part of their personality and the educational programs that they have 
to cross off their list since the chances of being selected for an internship are low or 
even non-existent for someone who is visibly religious. (I am focussing here on the 
limitations for Muslim women; needless to say that the problems of discrimination 
are much broader) Today, working at the university, I cannot recount the number of 
times I have been asked by young girls whether they will be allowed to study at the 
university despite the fact that they wear a headscarf, let alone their surprise when 
8 
 
they hear about the fact that I work at a university. This is (in Belgium at least) not an 
issue at all, fortunately. However, receiving these questions made me realise that 
the many limiting regulations issued in the course of the past decades and the many 
confrontational societal debates held during the past years on the topic of religion 
and on Muslims in particular have created a climate which has instilled in the minds 
of many young women and men the idea that limitations are the rule and their 
freedom the exception. In addition, as a human rights lawyer, I was also often 
confronted with questions such as “what about our human rights?” “do our rights 
count?” and “what about the courts? Do we count for them?” On a positive note, I 
have also observed a growing number of people expressing their indignation about 
oppression, racism, discrimination and stigmatization. They use their pen, their voice 
and other democratic tools, such as the court system, to express their voice with the 
hope that it will be heard and taken seriously.  
This brings me to a second reason why I was experiencing feelings of discomfort 
when confronted with Fadma’s story. At the time I met her, I was following an 
advanced course in human rights law which focused partly on the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Every class had a particular human rights theme. I 
remember the class about the right to freedom of religion very well. It was my first 
confrontation with the Strasbourg Court’s case law on this topic. I learned that day 
that the Court was convinced that a person who experiences a dilemma between his 
or her religious duties and his or her professional obligations in the workplace, has 
the freedom to resign. What is more, the Court also found that this ‘freedom to 
resign’ is the ultimate guarantee for that person’s right to freedom of religion. I also 
learned that the Court thought that the headscarf is a symbol which is not 
reconcilable with important principles such as respect for others, tolerance and the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination. There I sat, in a university classroom, as 
a young ambitious student aspiring to become a human rights lawyer and who 
happened also to wear a headscarf. I was learning, as were all my fellow students 
(potential future lawyers, politicians, judges…), about the norms and principles that 
the supranational European human rights body was communicating to Europe about 
people’s individual right to freedom of religion, while outside the university building 
at that time a struggle by young women and human rights activists was going on to 
convince municipal authorities in Belgium to not introduce bans on the wearing of 
religious signs in the workplace since that would discriminate against an entire 
segment of the population. I went home that day hoping that the authorities did not 
know much about the Court’s freedom of religion case law and hoping that people 
belonging to religious minorities whose faith happens to be more visible would not 
know about these decisions of the Strasbourg Court. Indeed, I did not want the 
authorities to feel backed by the Human Rights Court’s case-law in justifying their 
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discriminatory regulations and I did not want young activists to feel discouraged in 
their struggle for human rights protection.  
My professor at that time, Eva Brems, who later became my PhD supervisor, always 
said that her role as a professor is not to give answers. Her role is to make students 
think critically. I took that pretty seriously. Many questions rushed through my head 
after this (and other) class(es). How can a supranational court that is supposed to be 
protecting human rights reason this way? Does the Court realize the problematic 
exclusionary aspect of the above-mentioned statements? Does the Court realize the 
message it communicates to many women across Europe and beyond with these 
lines of reasoning? Does it realize the message it sends to people who wish to 
participate in society through work, but at the same hope that they can do so 
without having to compromise their identity? Does the Court realize the impact 
these kinds of statements can have on people who are leading a democratic struggle 
to have their human rights recognized and respected? How often does the Court use 
similar exclusionary lines of reasoning in its case law? How can I convince people to 
trust courts and to rely on their fundamental rights to express their voice, while the 
Court is making statements that could actually sabotage their struggle for human 
rights protection? How can I, with the knowledge I received about the Court’s case-
law, convince Fadma that “les droits de l’homme” are also her rights?  
Today, I believe that I do not have to dissuade Fadma of her conviction. Her opinion 
is a legitimate reaction to situations that she experiences in her life and she has the 
right to think the way she thinks and to feel the way she feels. This is why, in the title 
of my work ‘Belief in Justice’, I am not using the verb ‘believe’ followed by either a 
question mark or an exclamation mark. I do not have the intention to tell people that 
they should believe in justice. I also do not have the ambition to determine in a 
general sense whether justice can be believed in. I start, however, from the 
assumption that people such as Fadma should be able to believe in justice. They 
should be able to trust in the fact that courts will take them and their rights seriously 
and that their voices will be respected and treated in a just and fair way. Hence, this 
work aims at finding out how courts, and the European Court of Human Rights in 
particular, could make sure that people need not question the legitimacy of the 
human rights system and the value of their fundamental human rights. 
 
“Only when human rights tribunals, attorneys and activists learn to patiently listen to 
the voices of the marginalized will the aneu logou [without a voice] realize their  
human rights”1 
 
                                                          
1
 William Paul Simmons, Human Rights Law and the Marginalized Other (2011), 2-3. 
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Articles of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is built around four articles, as allowed by Chapter IV § 14 of 
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PART I 
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
In the world imagined by both Williams and Locke, the majority does 
not say, “I’m the norm, now you fit in.” It says, “I respect you as an 
equal, and I know that my own religious pursuits are not the only ones 
around. Even if I am more numerous and hence more powerful, I will 
try to make the world comfortable for you.” It is the spirit of a 
gracious hostess. A good hostess needs a good imagination. 
— Martha Nussbaum1 
 
Contemporary Western Europe is undeniably characterized by religious 
diversity.2 This manifests itself in various aspects of public life. In the media, for 
example, topics related to religion regularly make the headlines. Whether in the 
labour market, schools or other public activities, individuals are also increasingly 
making religious accommodation claims. All the while, Western European societies 
are becoming ever more secular and anti-Muslim sentiments are on the rise.3 It is 
thus not surprising to find that people are increasingly relying on the justice system, 
including the European Court of Human Rights, to settle disputes related to religion. 
 
The existence of diverse religious and non-religious views and needs 
inherently contains a potential for conflict. Indeed, over the years numerous debates 
and controversies on the position of religion in society have been initiated. As such, 
public debates can be a healthy reflection of a dynamic and democratic society. Yet, 
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 Martha Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious 
Age, (Harvard University Press, 2012), at 96. 
2
 See also Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe, ‘Living Together: Combining Diversity 
and Freedom in 21st-century Europe’, (Council of Europe, 2011), at 9, who state that ‘Diversity is 
Europe’s destiny’ and it was always part of Europe.  
3
 See for example the report of Amnesty International, ‘Choice and Prejudice: Discrimination against 
Muslims in Europe’, (2012) at  
https://www.aivl.be/sites/default/files/bijlagen/Rapportchoiceandprejudice.pdf; the statement of 
Thomas Hammarberg, ‘Human Rights in Europe: no grounds for complacency’, (Council of Europe 
Publishing, 2011, at 36; the report of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia , 
‘Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia’, EUMC 2006 available at 
http:// fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Manifestations_EN.pdf; the ‘Observatory Report on 
Islamophobia’ of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, available at 
http://www.oic-un.org/document_report/Islamophobia_rep_May_23_25_2009.pdf; and respectively 
the recommendation and resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe , 
Resolution 1743 (2010) ‘Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe’, available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1743.htm and  
Recommendation 1927 (2010) ‘Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe’, para. 3.13, available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta10/EREC1927.htm (Sources last  
accessed on 28 April 2015) 
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they can also potentially lead to a disruption of social cohesion, since when religious 
issues are at stake, debates tend to be very sensitive, animated and often 
confrontational4 and polarizing.5 What is more worrisome is that they are often 
treated as outside the framework of human rights law and, rather, perceived as 
clashes between values and principles.6 Meanwhile the (religious) concerns of 
individuals affected by certain measures or decisions are simply brushed away.7 
Their voices go unheard, their religious perspective are not understood and their 
needs unmet.  
This religiously diverse context leaves society facing many challenges, but it 
also confronts one of its pivotal institutions, namely the justice system. It raises the 
important question of how religious diversity can be dealt with, including by 
courts, 8 so that social cohesion is preserved and at the same time all members of 
society are and feel included.9  
In fact religious individuals are increasingly turning to the courts with their 
religious claims.10 Hence, courts, and certainly the European Court of Human Rights, 
play an important role in this field. This study will focus particularly on the role of the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter the ‘Court’ or ‘Strasbourg Court’) in 
this debate.  
Being the supranational human rights body in Europe, the Strasbourg Court 
                                                          
4
 Marie-Claire Foblets and Katayoun Alidadi, ‘The RELIGARE Report: Religion in the context of the 
European Union: Engaging the Interplay between Religious Diversity and Secular Models’ in Marie 
Claire Foblets, Katayoun Alidadi, Jorgen Nielsen and Zeynep Yanasmayan (eds.), Belief, Law and 
Politics. What Future for a Secular Europe? (Ashgate, 2014), 28-29. The summary report is also 
available at http://www.religareproject.eu/content/final-summary-report-religare-project. 
5
 Among others: Thomas Hammarberg, ‘Human Rights in Europe: no grounds for complacency’, 
(Council of Europe Publishing, 2011), 41. 
6
 Marie-Claire Foblets and Katayoun Alidadi, ‘The RELIGARE Report: Religion in the context of the 
European Union: Engaging the Interplay between Religious Diversity and Secular Models’ in Marie 
Claire Foblets, Katayoun Alidadi, Jorgen Nielsen and Zeynep Yanasmayan (eds.), Belief, Law and 
Politics. What Future for a Secular Europe? (Ashgate, 2014), at 28. (in particular with regard to the 
face-veil controversy) 
7
 See for example the disdainful reaction of a Belgian MP — belonging to a respected liberal party— 
to a report issued by Amnesty International about discrimination against Muslims (see ref in note 3). 
One of the points in that report concerned the Belgian law banning the face veil in public spaces, in 
the drafting of which the aforementioned MP played an important role. The MP, Denis Ducarme, 
tweeted the following after the publication of the report: ‘Amnesty International condemns the 
Belgian law on the wearing of face veils. Well we don’t care!’ (translation by the author) See: 
‘Amnesty et port du voile : Denis Ducarme s’en moque’ at 
http://www.lavenir.net/cnt/dmf20120425_00150680. (Last accessed on 28 April 2015)  
8
 It can be argued, however, that this question should be examined in the first place by actors at the 
grassroots level and at the policy level.  
9
 See also Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe, ‘Living Together: Combining Diversity 
and Freedom in 21st-century Europe’, (Council of Europe, 2011), at 53, who represent this as the 
challenge for the Strasbourg Court.  
10
 See also Katayoun Alidadi and Marie-Claire Foblets, ‘Framing Multicultural Challenges in Freedom 
of Religion Terms. Limitations of Minimal Human Rights for Managing Religious Diversity in Europe’, 
30 Netherlands Q. Hum. Rights (2012), at 399, who refer to this as the ‘juridification of multicultural 
conflicts’. 
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too is inevitably confronted with important questions concerning law and religion.  
By its very nature the Strasbourg Court has an important role to play in 
debates on religious freedom in Europe.11 The Court’s case law not only examines 
cases after debates have taken place at the societal level, as in the recent case of 
S.A.S. v. France12 concerning the French face-veil ban. Occasionally it also ignites 
heated discussion with its judgments, as with the now famous Lautsi cases,13 which 
concerned the presence of crucifixes in Italian public schools.14 At the level of 
domestic legislative bodies, the Court’s judgments and principles are also regularly 
invoked in the legislative process.15  
The Court’s case law is closely followed and scrutinized by different actors,16 
especially when it relates to freedom of religion, which tends to involve public 
debate and have many conflicting and sensitive interests at stake. This can put a 
great deal of pressure on the Court, as became apparent in the Lautsi cases. The 
latter attracted an enormous response from States and a range of organizations — 
both in favour of and opposed to banning the crucifix in schools — leading to the 
highest number of intervening third parties ever witnessed in the history of the 
Court.17 Interventions came from the political realm, human rights organizations, 
scholars of law and religion and even the Vatican. This is surely a precarious and 
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 Silvio Ferrari, ‘The Strasbourg Court and Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights: A 
Quantitative’, in Jeroen Temperman (ed.): The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious 
Symbols in the Public School Classroom, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), at 15. 
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 ECtHR (GC), S.A.S. v. France, 1 July 2014. 
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 ECHR, Lautsi v. Italy, 3 November 2009 and ECtHR (GC), Lautsi and Others v. Italy, 18 March 2011. 
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 See discussion about the debate after Lautsi I: Susanna Mancini, ‘The Crucifix Rage: Supranational 
Constitutionalism Bumps against the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty’, 6 Eur. Const. Law Rev. (2010), at 
7. 
15
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a proposal to ban the wearing of headscarves in Flemish public schools. See transcription of 
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2005/c0m024ond3-21102004.pdf (Last accessed on 28 April 2015) In the UK, the Court’s judgment 
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in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights’, 32 Michigan J. Int. Law 60 (2011), at 
30-31.See also William Paul Simmons, Human Rights Law and the Marginalized Other, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), at 56-57, who criticizes the judgment in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, arguing that 
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 See e.g. the website of the Strasbourg Consortium, which comments on issues involving the 
freedom of religion at the ECtHR, http://www.strasbourgconsortium.org/. See also the Strasbourg 
Observers, who regularly comment on the case law of the Strasbourg Court: 
www.strasbourgobservers.com.   
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 Malcolm Evans, ‘Neutrality in and after Lautsi v. Italy’, in Jeroen Temperman (ed.): The Lautsi 
Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom, (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2012). 
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burdensome position to be in,18 especially as the Court cannot possibly meet 
everyone’s expectations. In the highly diverse context that we witness today in 
Western Europe, it will simply not be possible to accommodate all and everyone’s 
religious needs, despite the established fundamental right to freedom of religion.  
However, I shall argue that what the Court is always able to and should do, is 
to make a maximum effort to be fair in its decisions and consider the viewpoints of 
all parties involved in a respectful and neutral manner, taking their rights and 
concerns seriously. In fact, a wide range of social psychology research has shown 
that people focus not only on the outcome of cases, but also on the process in which 
the outcome is reached. This aspect of the decision-making process is called 
‘procedural justice’ or ‘procedural fairness’.19 What is even more interesting is the 
reason why people value the treatment of their case. The same social psychology 
research shows that people value being treated fairly and with respect, because this 
treatment signals that they are considered to be valued members of the group. In 
other words, it signals that they are included in the group.20 Hence, not only the 
decision but also the decision-making process is an important factor to be taken into 
account when considering inclusion. 
As a supranational human rights body, the Court should always aim to 
evaluate and examine conflicts from an objective point of view and address the 
concerns of all parties in its reasoning. Rather than a challenge, the Court’s position 
can also be considered one of great privilege.21 It is a position from which it can 
return to the essence of the debates and bring individuals and their rights back onto 
the map by offering a neutral and respectful context in which claims can be assessed. 
This is particularly important in cases related to freedom of religion that often 
involve minority voices, which are by definition less powerful or less likely to be 
heard by the mainstream.22 It is my view that the Court can and should make an 
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 See for example Carla M. Zoethout, ‘Rethinking Adjudication under the European Convention’, in 
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effort to include these voices in its case law through its application of the right to 
freedom of religion, and in so doing stimulate inclusivity in society as a whole.  
Although in some segments of its article 9 case law the Court has adopted an 
inclusive stance, thus far the Court has regularly failed to commit to the goal of 
inclusivity in its jurisprudence on the right to freedom of religion, and has been 
widely criticized for it. The Court has been criticized for not offering enough 
protection under this article,23 of favouring States’ interests above individual rights24 
and sometimes even of having double standards and being prejudiced.25 This critique 
is not only expressed in the scholarly field, but also became very tangible in 2006 in 
the case of Fazilet Partisi v. Turkey.26 
In 2006 a Turkish applicant, Fazilet Partisi, sent a letter to the Strasbourg 
Court asking for the withdrawal of its case.27 Fazilet Partisi was a political party 
inspired by an Islamic ideology and for this reason was dissolved by the Turkish 
authorities. This case was similar to one involving its predecessor, Refah Partisi, a 
political party dissolved for the same reasons. The judgment in the case of Refah 
Partisi v. Turkey28 in 2003, which found no violation, was widely contested, both by 
dissenting judges29 in the case itself and by law scholars.30 This judgment was one of 
the reasons for Fazilet Partisi withdrawing its claim. In their letter of withdrawal, 
they argue, referring to the judgements of Refah Partisi v. Turkey and Leyla Sahin v. 
Turkey (concerning a university student who challenged the prohibition on the 
wearing of religious apparel at her university), that these judgments show that the 
Court ‘has prejudices towards Muslim communities’ and that they are therefore 
‘convinced that they cannot have trust in the justice of [the] Court’.31 What makes 
this letter so interesting is that the majority of the arguments refer to the way Fazilet 
Partisi perceives the Court’s treatment of cases concerning Muslims, and much less 
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their (unfavourable) outcomes.32 They refer to the fact that the article 6 claim in the 
case of Refah Partisi is declared inadmissible ‘without motivation’. They also refer to 
‘arbitrary interpretations’ in the case of Leyla Sahin. They accuse the Court of being 
prejudiced and hostile towards Muslims. They conclude their letter by explicitly 
expressing their hope that this letter would encourage the Court to be ‘more 
respectful in the future in its application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ and ‘careful and just in its examination of claims introduced by all individuals 
living in Europe’.33 In other words, Fazilet Partisi in the first place distrusts the Court 
because of an alleged failure to treat applicants and their case in a fair way rather 
than for a failure to deliver favourable outcomes.  
 The Court cannot allow its functioning to be questioned like this, threatening 
its legitimacy as an important supranational human rights authority. The Court 
should prevent the alienation of people from the human rights system, especially 
when they belong to groups that are already marginalized in society.34 The present 
study will demonstrate that although the substantive aspect of human rights 
protection remains the first task of the Court, the importance of the ‘procedural’ 
aspect, i.e. the way a case is treated, cannot be underestimated.  
This introductory chapter will first discuss the aim and scope of the study. 
Secondly, it will situate the study in broader debates, at both the societal and legal 
levels. Thirdly, it will discuss the research questions and the premises underlying the 
study. Finally, it will explain in detail the chosen methodology and it will give an 
overview of the structure of the dissertation.  
1.1. Aim of the research 
The aim of this study is to explore what role the European Court of Human 
Rights can play in the context of religious diversity in Western Europe through its 
application of the right to freedom of religion (article 9) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). It will more specifically examine how the Court can 
contribute to social cohesion and to a deeper egalitarian understanding of inclusion. 
It starts from the idea that a full approach towards inclusion requires an inclusive 
approach towards religious claims not only at a substantive level, but also at a 
procedural level.  
At a procedural level inclusion entails that individuals are treated fairly during 
the process in which their (religious) claims are examined, and that their concerns 
are genuinely taken into account in a respectful and neutral way. This study wants to 
put both the human and the right at the centre, in a field where balanced debates 
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 ECtHR, Fazilet Partisi et Kutan v. Turkey, 27 avril 2006. 
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 See also: Eva Brems and Laurens Lavrysen, ‘Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The 
European Court of Human Rights’ 35 Human Rights Quarterly (2013), at 184. 
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are rather rare and emotions and symbolism risk transferring debates that are 
fundamentally human rights issues outside the human rights framework. 
The aim of this study is both critical-analytical and normative-constructive.  
At the analytical level this study aims to examine critically and thoroughly the 
Court’s approach towards religious applicants, their claims and their right to 
freedom of religion in the text of its article 9 judgments. In this analytical stage, the 
article 9 jurisprudence is approached broadly, with particular attention given to the 
treatment of religious minorities. This critical assessment is conducted from the 
point of view of inclusion. Part II of the dissertation will mainly focus on inclusion at 
the procedural level, inspired by the social psychological model of procedural justice. 
In part III, the analysis pays attention also to inclusion at the substantive level.  
At the normative level, the dissertation aims to formulate ways to improve the 
Court’s article 9 case law with the aim of contributing to the debate of inclusion in a 
religiously diverse context.  
At a methodological level, the dissertation aims to explore different and 
innovative methodologies that can contribute to a broader and deeper 
understanding of the case law of the Court. 
1.2. Scope and premises of the research 
1.2.1. Focus on improving the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights 
The research for this dissertation was conducted within the framework of the 
European Research Council-funded project entitled ‘Strengthening the European 
Court of Human Rights. More Accountability through Better Legal Reasoning’.35 This 
project aims to suggest how the case law of the Strasbourg Court can be improved 
and to propose innovative tools which can help with that process. Within the 
project, the research for this dissertation can be situated in a subsection entitled 
‘Mainstreaming diversity’, which aims at integrating the specific concerns of non-
dominant groups into the legal reasoning used by the European Court of Human 
Rights. 
 The case law of the Strasbourg Court is, in the framework of this project, a 
logical field of work. However, it is not the only or the main reason why the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights has been chosen as the subject of study for 
this thesis.  
It is undeniable that the Strasbourg Court plays, as the supranational human 
rights body in Europe, an important exemplary role both within the Council of 
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Europe and beyond. Horizontally, its jurisprudence reaches other important 
international bodies36 and vertically, the Court inspires domestic judicial bodies and, 
as pointed out earlier, it also impacts on public debates.37 Hence, although the 
Court’s jurisprudence is casuistic in nature, the impact of its decisions is much 
broader than the specific case in which the decision is taken.  
Nevertheless, the framework of the project within which this research is 
conducted is essential for understanding the overall working method in this 
dissertation. The aim of the overarching project and of the dissertation is partly 
pragmatic. As the title of the project suggests, it aims to advance ways in which the 
reasoning of the Court can be improved. In my research, I particularly search for 
ways in which the Court can improve its article 9 case law so as to approach religious 
diversity in a more inclusive way. This study must therefore be seen as both critical 
and constructive. At an analytical level it aims to examine the case law from the 
perspective of inclusion and to establish whether problematic exclusionary patters 
can be discerned. At the same time, it also tries to constructively suggest feasible 
and tangible ways in which potential problematic exclusionary aspects could be 
improved in order to strengthen the Court’s case law even more. 
1.2.2. Focus on the right to freedom of religion under article 9 ECHR 
The focus of this dissertation is on religious claims. Although several articles38 
in the European Convention on Human Rights allow claims concerning religion, this 
dissertation focuses on the right to freedom of religion protected by article 9 ECHR, 
which states: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
This choice is motivated by both methodological and practical considerations.  
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First, article 9 is the main and most important article in the ECHR, the lex 
specialis, in the domain of freedom of religion and most claims concerning religion 
are brought before the Court under this article.39  
Second, the methodology applied, especially in part II of this dissertation, is 
designed to enable a deep and broad legal analysis of the right to freedom of religion 
to be conducted, involving an intensive and extensive methodological approach 
inspired by grounded theory.40 Its aim is to acquire a comprehensive insight into the 
way the Court deals with religious claims. Including the other ECHR articles in the 
analysis would not have enabled me to analyse the case-law in the same rigorous 
manner within the time frame of the research project.  
Third, the perspective from which the analysis is conducted, namely a 
procedural justice perspective, has allowed me to focus on article 9 alone, since the 
normative arguments made are connected to the nature of religious claims rather 
than to the right to freedom of religion itself. In general, principles such as neutrality, 
respect and participation are universally applicable to all cases, no matter which 
article is invoked. In this study, I specifically examine how these principles take shape 
in the context of religious claims.  
1.2.3. Focus on inclusion and premises underlying this focus 
This dissertation is written against the backdrop of the religiously diverse 
context of Western Europe. It aims at examining how the Court can contribute to 
social cohesion and the inclusion of this religious diversity in the mainstream society. 
Inclusion can be interpreted in a multi-layered way. First of all, the most 
common focus on inclusion in a context of diversity relates to structurally or 
substantively creating conditions in which people can fully participate in society 
while keeping their own identity. Hirschl and Shachar, for example, use the concept 
of ‘diversity as inclusion’ to refer to ‘claims that can reasonably be construed as 
demanding inclusion in the public sphere’ and explain that inclusion ‘is about 
creating a shared space for manifesting group-based identities and practices’.41 
Foblets and Alidadi use the notion of ‘inclusive evenhandedness’, considering 
‘diversity [as] an integral part of people’s right to participation in society’.42 Hence, in 
a religiously diverse context, this aspect of inclusion refers to enabling people to 
participate in different aspects of public life, such as the workplace, school or the 
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public space, without having to sacrifice their own identity.43 In terms of equality, 
this perspective on inclusion can be linked to the view of ‘substantive equality’, in 
contrast to the approach of ‘formal equality’.44 While formal equality considers that 
equal treatment entails that all people are treated in the same way, substantive 
equality takes possible differences into account in order to reach true equality 
between people.45 It is in this context that some scholars advocate for applying the 
concept of reasonable accommodation of religious needs.46 Accommodation is 
described by some as promoting the ‘participation and inclusion ... [of] groups with 
different circumstances or forms of life . . . without shedding their distinct 
identities’.47 In other words this aspect of inclusion, which is structural in nature, 
aims at accommodating differences in order to reach true equality between people 
and is thus particularly relevant in majority-minority relations.  
A second focus on inclusion is a more subjective one, in the sense of creating 
a space where people feel included in the group and not marginalized.48 This aspect 
of inclusion should not be neglected, especially since structural inclusion is not 
always possible for all religious needs.49 For example, when a certain religious need 
cannot be accommodated in the workplace, for practical (and justifiable) reasons, it 
is still important to create a space where people feel included, despite the 
impossibility of structural inclusion. According to social psychology research, this 
aspect of inclusion depends on the social standing one receives.50 People feel they 
belong to the group when they feel valued and respected.51 This feeling of being 
                                                          
43
 This form of inclusion is sometimes also referred to as ‘social inclusion’. See e.g. Julie Ringelheim, 
‘Adapter l’entreprise à la diversité des travailleurs: la portée transformatrice de la non-
discrimination’, 1 Eur. J. Hum. Rights (2013), 73.  
44
 Fredman, Sandra, ‘Facing the Future: Substantive Equality under the Spotlight’, Oxford University 
Legal Research Paper Series, (2010), Paper No. 57. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 See for example Kristin Henrard, ‘Duties of Reasonable Accommodation in Relation to Religion and 
the European Court of Human Rights: A Closer Look at the Prohibition of Discrimination, the Freedom 
of Religion and Related Duties of State Neutrality’, 5 Erasmus Law Rev. (2012), 59–77 and Emmanuelle 
Bribosia, Julie Ringelheim and Isabelle Rorive, ‘Reasonable Accommodation for Religious Minorities: A 
Promising Concept for European Antidiscrimination Law?’, 17 Maastrich. J. Eur. Comp. Law (2010), 
137–161. 
47
 Iris Marion Young, ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, 99 
Ethics (1989), at 273, as referred to by Ayelet Shachar, ‘On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability’, 
28 Polit. Theory (2010), at 65. 
48
 Also referred to as the ‘affective dimension of inclusion’. See: Howard Kislowicz, ‘Law, Religion, and 
Feeling Included/Excluded: Case Studies in Canadian Religious Freedom Litigation’, Can. J. Law Soc. 
(2015-forthcoming), 1–26, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2560449. 
(Last accessed on 28 April 2015) 
49
 See e.g. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton University 
Press, 2005), at 138. 
50
 E.g. Tom Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal 
Authorities, 25 Law Soc. Inq. 983–1019 (2000), 990-991. See infra chapter 2 for a theoretical overview 
of the findings of procedural fairness research.  
51
 Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group Value Model, 57 J. Pers. 
Soc. Psychol. (1989), 830-831 and Yuen J. Huo, Kevin R Binning & Ludwin E Molina, Testing an 
29 
 
valued is, in turn, found to be influenced by procedural fairness aspects of the 
interaction with authorities.52 Although this aspect of inclusion is universally 
important, it is particularly relevant for people belonging to minority groups since 
they are more likely to be marginalized. It is noteworthy that contrary to the 
structural focus on inclusion, this aspect of inclusion starts not from differences, but 
from sameness. Indeed, people in general want to be valued and respected as part 
of their human dignity.53  
Legal research on the Court’s case law on freedom of religion mostly reflects 
on the Court’s reasoning from the perspective of substantive inclusion, criticizing, for 
example, the limited protection at a substantive level that the Court offers in cases 
concerning individual religious claims.54  
This dissertation aims at complementing this vast body of literature by 
offering an analysis of the exclusionary patterns at the procedural level in the Court’s 
article 9 jurisprudence.55 As will be argued, these shortcomings at the procedural 
level are in themselves exclusionary, independent of shortcomings at the substantive 
level. However, part III of the dissertation will also show through case-studies how 
procedural and substantive aspects of inclusion are very often intertwined. 
All religious claims under article 9 will be considered in this dissertation. All 
claims are valued, no matter whether the applicant is a Christian who wants to wear 
a cross at work, a Sikh pupil who wants to wear a turban in school or a Muslim 
woman wanting to be able to teach, wearing a headscarf.  
Yet, the context of religious diversity inherently requires special attention to 
religious minorities. Hence, although I start from the perspective of individuals 
making religious claims and having equal rights, I pay particular attention to minority 
status, when applicable, since belonging to a minority group intrinsically entails a risk 
of exclusion and marginalization.56  
I start from the premise that the human rights system, with the Strasbourg 
Court as one of the major institutions, has an important counter-majoritarian role to 
play, in correcting the inherent inegalitarian effects of a democratic system where 
people belonging to minority groups by definition have less weight in the scale and a 
voice less heard.57 I consider the Court to be in a position to objectively assess 
                                                                                                                                                                      
integrative model of respect: implications for social engagement and well-being, 36 Pers. Soc. Psychol. 
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religious claims and to transcend the so-called ‘tyranny of the majority’.58  
I will posit that in order to truly understand religious claims made by 
applicants belonging to religious minority groups and to come to a full understanding 
of inclusion, an awareness and recognition of these power imbalances is essential. I 
will argue that the Court’s counter-majoritarian role should not only be considered 
at the (substantive) level of protection, as traditionally argued (controlling whether 
measures are in accordance with people’s fundamental rights), but also at a 
procedural level, in the sense that the Strasbourg Court should offer a platform on 
which people are treated in an even-handed and fair way, and every voice is equally 
taken into account.  
1.3. The gap between religiously motivated claims and human rights norms: a 
reflection on the societal context  
In recent decades, debates on the place of religion in society, and more 
specifically religious practices, have increasingly emerged in the public arena. 
Besides the recent explosive controversy on face-veil bans,59 several countries have 
also discussed prohibiting the wearing of other religious signs, such as turbans and 
headscarves.60 Other practices, such as ritual slaughter,61 male circumcision,62 the 
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refusal to shake hands,63 religious holidays,64 dietary requirements,65 burial practices 
and the building of minarets66 have also not been spared from debate. Common to 
these debates is that they tend to be held in an emotional and often polarizing 
way.67 Caroline Evans refers to them as ‘shrill, heated, uninformed and simplistic, 
encouraging knee-jerk reactions’.68  
This increase in debates can be understood from the perspective of several 
social evolutions and realities.  
First, Western European countries are becoming increasingly religiously 
diverse.69 This religious diversity inherently means that different religious needs and 
views occur in society, which will also inevitably lead to a rise of religious claims. This 
diversity is partly due to the growing popularity of new religious movements and 
'spiritualities’,70 but its main origin is of course migration, not only because of the 
ongoing influx of migrants to Europe, but also because of the growing visibility of the 
already present European (religious) diversity.71 Paradoxically, the more one tries to 
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integrate into society through education or work, the more likely it is that a person 
will be faced with conflicts related to his or her religious background.72 Typical 
examples are prohibitions on the wearing of religious symbols in the workplace and 
requests concerning the adaptation of work schedules. Added to this is the backdrop 
in which the Western European societal order is still dominated by Christian 
influences.73 Or in the words of Grace Davie: ‘Europe is changing, but the legacies of 
the past remain deeply embedded in both the physical and cultural environment’.74  
Indeed, official holidays, for example, and days of rest still fall together with 
Christian holidays.75 In such a context, it is more likely that people who have 
particular needs will try to challenge these traditional mainstream norms, asking for 
accommodation of their own needs.76 In essence, this can be seen as a request for 
inclusion in mainstream society while at the same time keeping one’s own identity. 
Hence, the rise of religious claims is in the first place a mirror of the growing diversity 
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of society and shows the need of a diversity of groups and people to be included in 
society. 
Secondly, while Western European societies are becoming increasingly 
religiously diverse, religiosity is in decline. On the one hand, secularism is on the rise 
and on the other hand a process of ‘de-traditionalisation’ or ‘unchurching’ is taking 
place.77 In this context, tensions are inevitable,78 not only because of the differing 
views, but also because of what Davie calls a paradoxical situation in which this 
decline of religiosity in society also lead to a decline of knowledge and understanding 
about religion, while this knowledge is especially needed in a context where debates 
on religion are on the rise.79 This results in the ‘ill-informed’ and ‘ill-mannered’ 
character of some debates.80  
A third perspective from which the rise of debates on religion in Europe can be 
understood is related to identity. While some refer to secularism or ‘laicité’ to 
motivate limitations on the right to manifest a religion, others refer to the Christian 
heritage of Europe.81 As a result, debates surrounding religious practices are often 
motivated by a wish to protect the established Christian traditions or secular values 
against the ‘new’ and ‘other’.82 Added to this is the fact that often religious claims 
are made by people with a migration background.83 In this case this ‘other’ tradition 
is not only ‘new’ but also non-European or non-Western in the conception of ‘us’, 
the ‘original’ Europeans. The increase in religious diversity is therefore considered a 
threat to ‘our’ identity.84  
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This ‘other’ is very often also Muslim, which leads us to a fourth element that 
must be taken into account when analysing the debates on religion. Several reports 
show that islamophobia is on the rise in Europe and beyond.85 In this sense, when 
specifically Muslims are concerned — and this is often the case with most 
contemporary debates on religious practices— instead of being a purely identity 
matter, debates on religion can also take place out of a hostile reaction towards the 
Muslim-other.86  
In this context, two main observations can be made on the way debates 
concerning religious practices are held. The first concerns the inherently exclusivist 
character of the debates. Debates held from an identity perspective (whether 
motivated by hostility or self-protection) start from a dichotomy between ‘us’ (the 
Christian traditionalists, the secular ‘normativists’ or the non-Muslims) v. ‘them’ (the 
others who do not correspond to the ‘mainstream’ norms). Surely, this kind of 
dynamics is not beneficial for social cohesion and for the inclusion of people holding 
non-dominant religious viewpoints and having corresponding religious needs. 
Moreover, this dichotomy often also contains a power imbalance since people 
challenging (what is considered) the norm mostly belong to religious (and often also 
ethnic) minority groups.87 Against this background it is not self-evident that a debate 
can be held where all voices are equally taken into account and treated in a fair 
way.88 The voice for freedom ‘from’ religion will by definition resonate stronger than 
the one ‘for’ freedom of religion. This might partly explain why during recent years 
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calls for ‘de-accommodation’89 have occurred more often than minority claims for 
accommodation.90  
A second observation about the debates is that they often take place outside 
the realm of human rights. They are often formulated in ideological terms, using the 
language of, for example, laicité, pluralism and Judaeo-Christian values, which leads 
to a confrontational debate where little room is made for the concerns and 
fundamental rights of individuals.91 
However, recent decades have also shown that people are increasingly 
turning to courts, among which the European Court of Human Rights, with their 
religious claims in search of a legal answer.92 They frame their claims in terms of 
human rights such as freedom of religion and the prohibition of discrimination. This 
indicates a failure to deal with conflicts related to religion on a societal level, but at 
the same time this is also a positive evolution since it paradoxically also indicates 
that people rely on the judicial system to handle their claims in a fair way, which is a 
sign of integration into society.93 The way courts deal with these kinds of sensitive 
case is therefore crucial. How can courts, and the Strasbourg Court in particular, deal 
with these claims in an inclusive way? The primary role the Court can play, when 
contrasted with the way religious claims are generally dealt with in public debates, is 
to bring human rights back onto the map and at least to offer a space where 
applicants and their claims are taken seriously and treated equally and respectfully, 
and where they receive an opportunity to voice their concerns.  
In the next section, a closer look will be taken at how societal diversity 
translates into the case law of the Court under article 9 ECHR.  
1.4. Freedom of religion at the Strasbourg Court: a quantitative insight 
In this section I will first give a quantitative overview of the freedom of 
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religion claims brought under article 9 since the reform of the Court in 1998. The 
numbers are limited to this period because they are based on the database I 
collected for my research in part II of this dissertation. When collecting and reading 
the cases for my qualitative case-law analysis, I additionally classified the cases 
according to information which is not available in Hudoc, the database of the Court. 
The most important information for gaining an insight into the cases brought before 
the Court under article 9 concerns the religious background of the claims brought 
before the Court under article 9. To my knowledge, this information has so far not 
been documented.94  
Since the reform of the European Human Rights system of the Council of 
Europe in November 1998,95 claims concerning freedom of religion (under article 9 
ECHR) have multiplied. For the period of 48 years preceding November 1998, Hudoc 
gives 432 results for cases brought under article 9. From 1998 up to 1 July 2014 (16 
years),96 Hudoc gives 853 hits.97 This is clearly a significant increase in freedom of 
religion cases compared to the number of cases before 1998.98 After removing cases 
which were declared admissible,99 struck off the list and the cases which are 
translated in other languages, 565 single article 9 cases remain for the period 1999-
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Nijhoff Publishers, 2012).. 
95
 See for more information on the reform of the Court in 1998:  
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/reform&c=  
96
 The first of July is the date ECHR (GC), S.A.S. v. France was published. This landmark case was 
chosen as the closure of my analysis for this dissertation.  
97
 The selection of cases is conducted through the database of the Strasbourg Court, Hudoc 
(hudoc.echr.coe.int), where I selected only the article 9 cases. Only cases in English and French are 
selected. The numbers mentioned here are not single cases, since cases often (but not always) occur 
in both languages. In the next stage the double translated cases are kept out of the selection. 
98
 Compared to the case law under other articles, the case law under article 9 is and remains relatively 
small. See also Silvio Ferrari, ‘The Strasbourg Court and Article 9 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights: A Quantitative’, in Jeroen Temperman (ed.): The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary 
Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 
at 19 and Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘The ( Un ) protection of Individual Religious Identity in the 
Strasbourg Case Law’, 1 Oxford J. Law Relig. (2012), at 2. Moreover, when compared to the total 
number of cases brought before the Strasbourg organs before and after November 1998, we see that 
proportionally, the growth in the number of cases is less quick. (+/- 15500 cases in total before 1998 
v. +/- 70000 cases after 1998)  
99
 Cases declared partly admissible-inadmissible are double-checked in order to ensure that cases 
where the article 9 claim is declared inadmissible are included. 
37 
 
2014.100 And from these 565 cases, 299 cases contain religion-related claims.101  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of article 9 claims concerning the religious 
aspect of the right from 1999 to July 2014. As the graphic shows, the claims are 
averagely spread at between 20 and 30 claims per year.102  
 
Figure 1: Religion-related claims under article 9 over time 
 
 
 
 
 
The exceptions to the average number of claims can be found in 2001 and 
2002 with 50 and 79 claims respectively. However, this evolution can be explained 
by the numerous cases submitted by Turkish army officers concerning discharge 
from the army. These claims will be amply discussed in chapter III. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
100
 No judgments were issued during the months of November and December 1998.  
101
 The right to freedom of religion under article 9 ECHR protects the right to ‘freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion’. This dissertation only covers the cases concerning religion, this is why I use 
the term ‘religion-related’. No exact definition of religion exists (see i.e. Jeremy Gunn, ‘The 
Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in International Law’, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 
(2003), 191), therefore, to ensure that all relevant cases are covered, religion is interpreted broadly 
and cases concerning atheist claims are also included. Moreover, when naming the religion at stake I 
apply an applicant-oriented approach by citing the religion in the way the applicant does.  
102
 Note that all the information in the figures of this section includes only claims brought under 
article 9 concerning religion and non-religious beliefs (306 cases in total). Cases not related to religion 
and claims concerning political, ethnic or artistic convictions are not taken into consideration in this 
study (see also methodological chapter). Also, the number of claims in 2014 is put between brackets 
because it does not represent all the claims made in 2014, but only the claims until 1 July 2014. 
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Figure 2: Religion-related claims under article 9 - an overview of geographical 
spread 
COUNTRY CLAIMS 
Turkey 102 
France 27 
Greece 24 
Russia 20 
Bulgaria 14 
Germany 13 
Italy 8 
Romania 9 
UK 9 
Austria  8 
Ukraine 8 
Poland 7 
Moldova 5 
Sweden 5 
Armenia 4 
Latvia 4 
Spain 4 
Switzerland 4 
Croatia 3 
FYROM103 3 
Netherlands 3 
Hungary 2 
Luxembourg 2 
Czech Republic 2 
Azerbaijan 1 
Cyprus 1 
Denmark 1 
Finland 1 
Georgia 1 
Iceland 1 
Lithuania 1 
Norway 1 
San Marino 1 
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 Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. 
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The claims seem also to be geographically spread all over Europe, covering 33 
countries (see figure 2). This also entails a diversity of systems related to the 
relationship between religion and State.104 The most remarkable observation, 
though, concerns the large number of cases brought against Turkey (102), followed 
by France with many fewer cases (27). Taken together, France and Turkey supply 
almost half of the cases under article 9. 
The number of cases against Turkey should again be set in context, since 
more than 60 concern claims from discharged military officers. But even then the 
number remains relatively high compared with the number of cases against other 
countries. This cannot come as a surprise taking into account the widespread 
debates in both countries concerning regulations in light of the principles of 
secularism and ‘laicité’. This observation confirms one of the societal evolutions 
mentioned in the previous section about the tensions between religion and 
secularism.105  
 
The Court’s case law shows the wide variety of issues with which it has been 
confronted. It has had to deal with collective claims and individual claims and these 
claims cover a variety of fields, such as the recognition of religious organizations, the 
appointment of religious leaders and religion in the workplace,106 public sphere,107 
schools,108 prisons109 etc.  
However, until now, no information has been collected about the religious 
background to cases brought before the Court under article 9. This information is not 
available in Hudoc and was therefore gathered manually.110 The result can be found 
in figure 3. Several Christian groups are merged together in order to have a better — 
less scattered — overview of claims concerning Christian issues. Figure 4 shows of 
which faiths the category ‘Christian’ consists. The Jehovah’s Witnesses and the 
Orthodox Christians are, however, kept as separate categories, because of the 
relatively large number of cases concerning these groups and because these cases 
concern very specific segments of the Court’s case law.111 As for the Muslim 
                                                          
104
 See also Silvio Ferrari, ‘The Strasbourg Court and Article 9 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights: A Quantitative’, in Jeroen Temperman (ed.): The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on 
Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), at.who in his 
quantitative study classified the countries according to their religious profile. See also Françoise 
Tulkens, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Church-State Relations: Pluralism v. 
Pluralism’, 30 Cardozo Law Rev. (2009), who refers to the plurality of church-state systems. 
105
 See supra 1.3. 
106
 E.g. ECtHR, Sessa Francesco v. Italy, 3 April 2012 and ECtHR, Eweida a.o. v. UK, 15 January, 2013.  
107
 E.g. ECtHR (GC), S.A.S. v. France, 1 July 2014 and ECtHR, Ahmad Arslan and Others v. Turkey, 23 
February 2010. 
108
 E.g. ECtHR, Dogru v. France, 4 December 2008, ECtHR, Kervanci v. France, 14 December 2008, 
ECtHR, Jasvir Singh v. France ,30 June 2009, ECtHR, Ranjit Singh v. France, 30 June 2009. 
109
 E.g. ECtHR, Jakobski v. Poland, 7 December 2010 and ECtHR, Kovalkovs v. Latvia, 31 January 2012. 
110
 In categorizing the claims according to religion, I take the self-identification of the applicants as the 
criterion.  
111
 Orthodox claims most often concern collective claims and cases concerning Jehovah’s Witnesses 
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category, I have kept separate categories for Alevis and Muslims, since one of the 
common claims made by Alevis is that although they are related to Islam, they want 
to be differentiated from ‘traditional’ Islam.112  
  
 
Figure 3: Religion-related claims under article 9 - a view of their religious diversity 
Religion Cases 
Islam 122 
Christianity (see fig. 4 for details) 48 
Jehovah’s Witnesses 30 
Orthodox Church 24 
Other (religion)113 12 
Judaism 6 
Atheism 5 
Alevism 3 
Sikhism 4 
Scientology Church 3 
Buddhism 2 
Hare Krishna 2 
Roma Church 2 
Raëlism 1 
Not mentioned114 35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
most often concern conscientious objection. 
112
 In ECtHR, Sinan Isik v. Turkey, 2 February 2010, for example, the applicant did not want ‘Islam’ to 
be mentioned on his ID card, but instead ‘Alevi’. 
113
 In this category are included religious groups or organizations which are less known and do not 
appear to be affiliated with any of the religions mentioned in this list. E.g. a case concerning Yezidis: 
ECtHR, Katani and Others v. Germany, 31 May 2001 or a religious association who ‘claims affiliation to 
the Centro Eclético da Fluente Luz Universal Raimundo Irineu Serra’ in the case of ECtHR, Fränklin-
Beentjes and Cefluluz Da Floresta v. The Netherlands, 6 May 2014. 
114
 This category refers to cases where the religion was not mentioned but where the claim was 
clearly religion-related. An example concerns the case of Pichon et Sajous v. France, 2 October 2001, 
concerning the refusal of pharmacists to sell contraceptives. 
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Figure 4: Diversity of faiths within the Christian family 
CHRISTIAN CASES 
Catholic 17 
Other (Christian)115 14 
Christian 9 
Evangelical 4 
Adventist 2 
Protestant 1 
Baptist 1 
 
The most obvious finding here is the large number of cases concerning Muslims 
(122), which is more than twice the number of cases concerning Christians (48). 
These are followed by Jehovah’s Witnesses (30) and Orthodox Christians (24). When 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and Orthodox Christians are included in the Christian family, 
the Christian claims cover 122 cases as well, which is an ex-aequo with the Muslim 
claims. 
The large number of Muslim claims merits closer examination:  
 
Figure 5: Claims related to Islam: an overview by country 
Country Muslim claims 
Turkey 83 
Greece 11 
France 9 
Bulgaria 5 
Germany 3 
Switzerland 3 
Moldova 2 
Russia 2 
Azerbaijan 1 
Denmark 1 
FYROM 1 
Luxembourg 1 
 
The majority of Muslim claims, 83 of the 122, were brought against Turkey 
(see figure 5). More than 60 of these concern the aforementioned army cases 
against Turkey. Even if those claims are not taken into account, Muslim claims 
                                                          
115
 This category includes smaller less-known churches which are affiliated to Christianity. E.g. ECtHR, 
Deschomets v. France, 16 May 2006 (Brethren Movement) or ECtHR, Nolan and K. v. Russia, 30 
November 2006 (Youth Federation for World Peace). 
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remain a large category. Also interesting is that Greece is the second country and 
France the third country against whom Muslims have filed religion-based complaints. 
The Greek cases concern mostly the appointment of religious leaders;116 other cases 
concern the specific situation of Western Thrace.117 The cases concerning Muslim-
related claims against France, 9 in total, are of course also well-known; these 
concern mostly the bans on religious apparel in different contexts.118 Interesting, 
though, is that the Muslim-related claims against France (9) make up a third of the 
27 religion-related claims brought against France (see figure 3).  
The cases concerning Christians (except Jehovah’s Witnesses and Orthodox 
Christians) are far more widely spread across Europe (see figure 6). Turkey and 
France received only 3 complaints concerning Christian issues. This seems to suggest 
that rules motivated by the principle of secularism give less rise to claims issued by 
Christians than by Muslims.  
 
Figure 6: Claims related to Christianity: an overview by country 
 
Country Christian claims 
UK 8 
Germany 5 
Russia 5 
Bulgaria 3 
France 3 
Spain 3 
Turkey 3 
Ukraine 3 
Netherlands 2 
Romania 2 
Sweden 2 
Italy 2 
Poland 2 
Austria 1 
Croatia 1 
Hungary 1 
Luxembourg 1 
Czech Republic 1 
                                                          
116
 Such as the ECtHR, Agga v. Greece n° 4, 13 July 2006. 
117
 For example ECtHR, Ouzoun v. Greece, February 2003. 
118
 For example cases concerning the prohibition on the wearing of religious signs in public schools 
such as the cases of ECtHR, Dogru v. France, 4 December 2008; ECtHR, Jasvir Singh v. France, , 30 June 
2009 and a case concerning the ban on the wearing of face veils in public places: ECtHR, S.A.S. v. 
France, 1 July 2014. 
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This overview gives a clear insight into the diversity of cases concerning the 
religion-related claims with which the Court is confronted under article 9.119 It also 
reflects some of the societal tensions and trends. First, the large number of Islam-
related claims speaks for itself, despite the fact that the majority of claims concern 
Turkey. Another remarkable finding is that many claims were brought against France 
and Turkey (83 of the 105 cases) and many of those claims concerned Muslims 
(respectively 9 of the 27 cases and 83 of the 105 cases – see fig. 3 combined with fig. 
5). This reflects the tensions between secularism and Islam in particular.  
When the diversity of claims is examined through the lens of the outcomes of 
the cases, it is interesting to observe how the representation of the different 
religions (see fig. 3 and 4) is not mirrored in how the cases were decided.  
 
 
Figure 7: An overview according to outcome and religion 
 
Religion Violation Non-Violation Manifestly ill-founded 
Islam 8 6 81 
Christianity 8 3 23 
Orthodox Church 7 1 5 
Judaism 0 2 4 
Sikhism 0 0 4 
Jehovah’s Witness 12 1 3 
Atheism 3 0 2 
Alevism 1 0 1 
Hare Krishna 0 0 1 
Raëlism 0 0 1 
Roma Church 0 0 1 
Buddhism 2 0 0 
Scientology 2 0 0 
Other (religion) 4 1 3 
Not mentioned 5 2 19 
TOTAL120 54 16 148 
 
A first remarkable observation is the high number of cases concerning 
Jehovah’s Witnesses in which the Court found a violation. 12 violations means that 
                                                          
119
 See also Françoise Tulkens, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Church-State 
Relations: Pluralism v. Pluralism’, 30 Cardozo Law Rev. (2009). . 
120
 Only the violations, non-violations and cases declared manifestly ill-founded are represented in 
this grid. Cases declared inadmissible because of procedural reasons (e.g. non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies and claims inadmissible ratione temporis) are left out. Also cases in which the Court decided 
not to examine the article 9 claim seperately is not represented in this grid.  
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the Court found a violation in almost half of the cases brought by Jehovah’s 
Witnesses (see fig. 3, 30 cases in total). The second category with the highest 
number of violations found is shared by the Christians and Muslims. In cases 
concerning Christian issues, the Court found 8 violations, which is more than a fifth 
of all the claims brought by Christians (except Orthodox Christians and Jehovah’s 
Witnesses). For the Muslim claims, 8 violations out of 122 cases means that in only 
one in 15 cases was a violation found. The third place is filled in by the Orthodox 
Christians in whose cases the Court found 8 violations. This means that in one out of 
the 3 cases Orthodox Christians brought before the Court a violation was found.  
The high number of violations in cases concerning Jehovah’s Witnesses and 
Orthodox Christians can partly be understood from the perspective of the kind of 
claims involved. Often the claims concerning these religions involve claims of 
recognition or registration of a church or organisation. Interestingly, 7 of the 8 
violations in Muslim cases concern religious organisations or the appointment of 
religious leaders. The data in this study confirms observations made in the literature 
about the higher level of protection accorded to group claims.121 At the same time, 
the small number of positive outcomes in cases concerning Muslim claims will most 
probably have to do with the Court’s approach towards secularism, as will be 
discussed below. This is paradoxical since the number of claims shows how certain 
policies are clearly experienced as a problematic infringement in people’s rights, 
which in itself contains an alarm signal, while it is exactly in those cases that the 
Court has adopted a hands-off approach.  
As the foregoing figures show, the Court has increasingly dealt with a diversity 
of freedom of religion claims, brought by a diversity of religious applicants in a 
diversity of countries with diverse church-state contexts. However, an analysis of 
how the Court deals with this diversity cannot be made on the basis of numbers 
alone. In the next section an account will be given of how the Court deals with this 
diversity in its freedom of religion judgments, both at the level of principles and at 
the level of its actual reasoning.  
1.5. The gap between human rights principles and judicial reality: religious 
freedom at the Strasbourg Court 
In its case law concerning freedom of religion, the Court usually refers to a long 
list of general principles. Some argue that although these principles ‘have the 
potential to give useful guidance on religious freedom cases’; they ‘have not been 
sufficiently well developed to fulfill that role’.122 In practice there is often a gap 
between the principles and the practice. Carolyn Evans, for example, argues that 
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 See infra 1.5.2. 
122
 Carolyn Evans, ‘Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: 
Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture’, 26 J. Law Relig. (2010), at 340. 
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these principles ‘often appear to be little more than not-particularly-pithy 
aphorisms-incantations aired in every judgment but often strangely disconnected 
from the specific reasoning in the case and/or from the result’.123 In this section, a 
closer look will be taken at the principled position of the Court under the right to 
freedom of religion so as then to contrast these principles with the main criticism of 
the Court’s article 9 case law.  
1.5.1. Freedom of religion as a vehicle for inclusion  
The Court has said this many times:  
 
As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of 
the foundations of a “democratic society” within the meaning of the 
Convention. This freedom is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital 
elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of 
life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has 
been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.124 
 
Read through this paragraph, the right to freedom of religion seems to value 
religious diversity positively and even advocates an inclusive approach towards 
diversity. 
First, it recognizes the applicant’s perspective through the conception of the 
right to freedom of religion as one of the most vital elements for believers’ identity 
and their conception of life. At the same time it also refers to a diversity of non-
religious voices within the diverse religious context, namely the ‘atheists, agnostics, 
sceptics and the unconcerned’.125 Hence, from the outset the Court not only 
acknowledges the important — vital— meaning of this right for individuals, but also 
recognizes the diverse landscape when it comes to religion or beliefs. 
Secondly, the Court clarifies that freedom of religion is not only an asset for 
individuals, but also important to society.126 More particularly, the Court emphasizes 
that pluralism, which it considers indissociable from a democratic society, depends 
on the protection offered by the right to freedom of religion. Also, ‘[p]luralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness’, says the Court in another paragraph, are 
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 Idem. 
124
 ECtHR (GC), S.A.S. v. France, 1 July 2014. 
125
 See also Julie Ringelheim, ‘Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: The European Court of Human 
Rights in Search of a Theory?’, in Lorenzo Zucca and Camil Ungureanu (eds.), Law, State and Religion 
in the New Europe. Debates and Dilemmas, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 286. 
126
 See also Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘The ( Un ) protection of Individual Religious Identity in the 
Strasbourg Case Law’, 1 Oxford J. Law Relig. (2012), at 14 who argues that States are not considered 
to respect freedom of religion because they agree with people’s beliefs, but they are obliged to 
protect the right to freedom of religion because ‘it is an essential element of the democratic system’. 
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‘hallmarks of a “democratic society”’.127 Elsewhere, the Court calls pluralism ‘the 
basic fabric of democracy’.128 So while the right to freedom of religion serves 
pluralism, pluralism is considered in its turn to serve democracy.129 
The concept of pluralism clearly plays an important role in the Court’s 
conception of the principles guiding the right to freedom of religion.130 Calo writes 
that in the Court’s framing of religious pluralism it ‘is not one democratic virtue 
among many. It is the cornerstone of a human rights regime and the norm by which 
other norms are to be assessed.’131  
Being a goal of freedom of religion protection, the question arises what this 
notion of pluralism exactly means. The term pluralism is often interchanged with the 
term diversity;132 nevertheless, both terms have different meanings. While diversity 
refers to a factual situation, pluralism refers to a way in which this diversity can be 
dealt with.133 The Court makes this clear in Gorzelik v. Poland, a case concerning the 
refusal of recognition for an ethnic minority group organisation, where it says: 
pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only respect the ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging to a national 
minority, but also create appropriate conditions enabling them to express, 
preserve and develop this identity.134 
Hence, in the Court’s view pluralism not only implies respect for or mere 
tolerance of diversity, but also requires a more active and inclusive approach, an 
‘engagement that creates a common society from all that diversity’135 and where this 
diversity can truly be developed. Ringelheim interprets the Court’s reference to 
pluralism as ‘both an outcome and a condition of the exercise of certain individual 
rights’,136 stating that ‘it is also a value. It conveys the idea that in a democracy the 
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 ECtHR (GC), S.A.S. v. France , 1 July 2014 
128
 ECtHR, Holy Synod Of The Bulgarian Orthodox Church Metropolitan Inokentiy and Others v. 
Bulgaria, 22 January 2009, at §148) 
129
 See also Zachary R Calo, ‘Pluralism, Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights’, 26 J. Law 
Relig. (2010) and Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘The ( Un ) protection of Individual Religious Identity in the 
Strasbourg Case Law’, 1 Oxford J. Law Relig. (2012), at, 4. 
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 Some call it even the core principle guiding the Court’s religious freedom jurisprudence. See 
Zachary R Calo, Zachary R Calo, ‘Pluralism, Secularism and the European Court of Human Right’4, 26 J. 
Law Relig. (2010). 
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 Idem, at 261-263, with reference to Françoise Tulkens, ‘The European Convention on Human 
Rights and Church-State Relations: Pluralism v. Pluralism’, 30 Cardozo Law Rev. (2009). 
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 Diana L. Eck, ‘From Diversity to Pluralism, On Common Ground: World Religions in America’, (2013) 
available at http://pluralism.org/encounter/challenges. 
133
 Idem, where the author states that ‘[p]luralism is the engagement that creates a common society 
from all that diversity’.  
134
 ECtHR, Gorzelik v. Poland, 17 February 2004, at §93, where the Court refers to the Council of 
Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities) 
135
 Diana L. Eck, ‘From Diversity to Pluralism, On Common Ground: World Religions in America’, (2013) 
available at http://pluralism.org/encounter/challenges. 
Julie Ringelheim, ‘Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: The European Court of Human Rights in 
Search of a Theory?’, in Lorenzo Zucca and Camil Ungureanu (eds.), Law, State and Religion in the 
New Europe. Debates and Dilemmas, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 287. 
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diversity of opinions and worldviews individuals may hold as a result of the exercise 
of their freedoms should be respected and allowed to flourish.’137  
Pluralism therefore clearly entails inclusion;138 it requires states to ‘realize the 
inclusion and participation of all’ in the social, cultural economic and political 
context.139 This vision of pluralism is essential for the structural inclusion of religious 
minorities140 in society. It fosters a more egalitarian and reciprocal approach towards 
diversity, where inclusion takes place with respect for the personal identity of the 
members of society.141 Hence, there is no doubt that the Court carries — in 
principle— an open and inclusive approach towards diversity and that it considers 
‘[d]iversity of beliefs or convictions … a common good for the whole society’.142  
Furthermore, the Court makes also clear that diversity sometimes involves 
limitations ‘in order to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that 
everyone’s beliefs are respected’.143 Interestingly, the need for limitations is in this 
principle also formulated in inclusive terms since it aims at reconciling the interests 
of the various groups and respect for everyone’s beliefs.  
This part of the Court’s principle is therefore particularly interesting from the 
perspective of religious minorities, because when issues arise in a context of 
conflicting religious needs or concerns, minorities will mostly be the first expected to 
make concessions and to ‘conform to existing norms’.144 Here, however, the Court’s 
approach in this principle starts from a more egalitarian viewpoint, requiring that the 
interests of all are taken into account. Along the same lines the Court specifies that  
[a]lthough individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a 
group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must 
always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair treatment of 
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 Idem, at 286. See also in a similar sense Peter Danchin, ‘Islam in the Secular Nomos of the 
European Court of Human Rights’, 32 Michigan J. Int. Law (2011), at 57. 
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 See also Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘The ( Un ) protection of Individual Religious Identity in the 
Strasbourg Case Law’, 1 Oxford J. Law Relig. (2012), at 20, who states that pluralism is ‘by nature’ 
inclusive. 
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 Julie Ringelheim, Diversité culturelle et droits de l’homme. La protection des minorités par la 
Convention européenne des droits de l'homme (Bruylant, 2006), at 425. Quote translated by author. 
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 In fact it is relevant also for other minorities, such as cultural minorities, but because of the focus 
of this thesis on religion, only the viewpoint of religious minorities will be mentioned. 
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 Julie Ringelheim, Diversité culturelle et droits de l’homme. La protection des minorités par la 
Convention européenne des droits de l'homme (Bruylant, 2006), at 405. This approach can be 
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 Julie Ringelheim, ‘Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: The European Court of Human Rights in 
Search of a Theory?’, in Lorenzo Zucca and Camil Ungureanu (eds.), Law, State and Religion in the 
New Europe. Debates and Dilemmas, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), at 286-287. 
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 ECtHR (GC), S.A.S. v. France, 1 July 2014, at §126. 
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 Marie-Claire Foblets and Katayoun Alidadi, ‘The RELIGARE Report: Religion in the context of the 
European Union: Engaging the Interplay between Religious Diversity and Secular Models’ in Marie 
Claire Foblets, Katayoun Alidadi, Jorgen Nielsen and Zeynep Yanasmayan (eds.), Belief, Law and 
Politics. What Future for a Secular Europe? (Ashgate, 2014), at 19, with reference to Sandra Fredman, 
‘Disability Equality: A Challenge to the existing Anti-Discrimination Paradigm?’ in Lawson and Gooding 
(eds.), Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice (Hart, 2005), 203.  
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people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.145 
This quote shows that the Court recognizes the possible disparities between 
the majority — dominant — groups within a society and minority groups. In the field 
of freedom of religion, this is an important acknowledgment, since many 
accommodation claims involve rules that are shaped in a way that conforms to the 
needs of majorities, such as, for example, rules on holidays and work schedules.146 
Some also call this the ‘tyranny of the democracy’147 or the ‘tyranny of the 
majority’,148 which refers to the inherent power imbalance that a democratic system 
based on majority rule entails for minority groups.149 The structural or substantive 
inclusion of minorities in society will only be possible when awareness exists about 
this potentially exclusive nature of the system, which can lead to an a priori 
dominance of majority groups over minority groups.  
The inclusive character of the general principles under article 9 not only refers 
to inclusion at a substantive level — requiring states to create a space where 
religious diversity is fully included where possible — but also contains an inclusive 
approach at the procedural level. In the general principles the Court emphasizes the 
State’s duty of ‘neutrality and impartiality’, which is considered ‘incompatible with 
any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways 
in which those beliefs are expressed’.150 Thus, the Court also requires States to treat 
people and their religion in a neutral way, without expressing value judgments on 
their convictions and practices, which is particularly important in cases concerning 
less well-known religions. The Court also stresses the importance of taking the voice 
of people into account as it states that ‘[p]luralism and democracy must also be 
based on dialogue and a spirit of compromise’.151 With regard to the process of 
balancing, the Court says finally that ‘[i]t is precisely this constant search for a 
balance between the fundamental rights of each individual which constitutes the 
foundation of a “democratic society”‘.152 Hence, the Court’s emphasis on the search 
for a balance shows that the process of searching for a balance in itself is an 
important feature of democracy and not only what the result of this balancing 
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exercise will be.  
Hence, on a principled level the Court considers not only the substantive 
elements of inclusion, but also the procedural elements. It requires states to be 
neutral and impartial and to allow participation through dialogue, and it urges states 
to make an effort to search for a balance and for compromises. 
These elements can be compared to the elements put forward by social 
psychologists in the framework of procedural fairness research, which will be fully 
discussed in this work.153 Procedural fairness, the fairness of the decision making 
process, consists of involving the people concerned in the decision making process, 
in treating people in a neutral and respectful way and in genuinely make an effort to 
be fair in their case.154 The Court’s principles demonstrate its awareness of the 
importance of also striving for procedural fairness, through the procedural inclusion 
of people and their concerns, in the framework of fundamental rights. 
In conclusion, at the level of principles the Court seems to foster an inclusive 
approach in its interpretation of the right to freedom of religion, requiring States to 
apply inclusivity in their dealing with religious diversity, both at the substantive level 
and at the level of the process. Freedom of religion can therefore — in principle— be 
considered to be a tool for achieving pluralism and a strong vehicle for inclusion. As 
will be discussed in the next section, however, at the level of its own reasoning, the 
Court regularly falls short of applying an inclusive approach. 
1.5.2. Freedom of religion (un)protection: between principle and practice 
A growing body of literature on the Court’s article 9 adjudication has been 
published in recent years, in which the Court has often been criticized for not putting 
the principles mentioned in the previous section into practice155 in its own 
reasoning.156 Tom Lewis expresses his scepticism as follows: ‘Europe has tied itself to 
principles it does not believe in’.157 Calo in his turn speaks of a ‘failure of 
pluralism’.158 Malcolm Evans, criticizing the Court’s reasoning, calls the principles 
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referred to by the Court a ‘counter-intuitive mantra’.159 In what follows, some of the 
main areas of criticism of the Court’s approach to article 9 will be explored. 
Several authors note that it took the Court a long time before it started to 
examine claims under article 9.160 For many years freedom of religion cases were 
very rare and findings of violations of the right to freedom of religion even non-
existent.161 It was only in 1993 that the Court found its first violation under article 9, 
in the famous case of Kokkinakis v. Greece162 concerning the right to proselytize. 
Until then, all claims had been declared inadmissible or no violation had been 
found.163 Danchin attributes this ‘lacuna’164 of 48 years to a ‘history of avoidance’,165 
referring to the Court’s inclination to handle religious claims under other articles, 
especially when they concern minorities.166  
Although after 1993 more violations were found in article 9 cases and also 
more claims were handled by the Court under that article, the large number of 
inadmissibility decisions in contrast to judgments remains remarkable. For some 
claims, no interference was found while a large number of claims were declared 
manifestly ill-founded.167  
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The literature shows that the Court’s freedom of religion jurisprudence is still 
considered to be ‘un-protective’168 and ‘under-protective’, 169 since despite the 
robust protection the Court offers in certain fields of the case law,170 such as to 
group claims, other dimensions remain largely neglected or overlooked.171  
The majority of the critical observations on the article 9 jurisprudence deals 
with the Court’s reasoning in cases concerning the individual manifestation of 
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religion, especially when minority practices are involved.172 In particular, it is argued 
that the Court’s case law disfavours minorities, often excluding them from the 
Court’s protection under article 9. 
A first observation made by different authors in this regard is that the Court’s 
interpretation of article 9 privileges Christian religious experiences,173 in that it offers 
better protection to the inner and private dimensions of religion.174 For example, the 
traditional dichotomy between the forum internum and the forum externum 
primarily considers religion as ‘an inward feeling’,175 which suggests, according to 
Julie Ringelheim, that the outward manifestation of religion is seen ‘as of secondary 
importance’.176 Along the same lines, a distinctive protection is accorded to religion 
in the private sphere versus the public sphere, where the public manifestations of 
religion are less obviously protected.177 The primacy accorded to the internal and 
private dimension also neglects the fact that some people consider religion to be ‘a 
way of life’,178 something that cannot simply be left at the doorstep of one’s private 
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home but which can also be part of daily life activities, including in the workplace 
and in schools.179  
This conception of religion and religious practice as primarily an inner and 
private matter also a priori disfavours religious minorities whose manifestation of 
religion has an important external and public dimension, such as Sikhs and Muslims.  
Moreover, these minorities are more likely to be confronted with dilemmas 
between their religious dictates on the on hand and the expectations of public life on 
the other, since, as noted earlier, Western European society is inherently organized 
according to historical Christian traditions.180 For example, in the workplace context, 
this means that non-Christian employees will more likely be confronted with 
conflicting interests when it comes to work schedules and holidays, while Christian 
employees will not often be faced with similar dilemmas.  
Several authors therefore argue that the role religion plays in a person’s life 
must be better taken into account.181 Yet the Court has often been criticized for not 
sufficiently taking the individual’s interests into account and for doing exactly the 
opposite by granting States a wide margin of appreciation when it comes to sensitive 
issues relating to minority religious claims.182 Malcolm Evans, for example, states 
that  
[w]hilst the traditional focus of human rights thinking has been to ensure that 
the interests of the individual are not engulfed by those of the state, there 
appears to be a danger that it is the interests of the state which are now 
assuming a clear priority as against the religious rights of individuals and 
communities - and this is not what human rights protections are meant to be 
about.183 
Malcolm Evans is not alone with his concern. Different aspects of the Court’s 
reasoning are criticized for not taking the perspective of the applicant sufficiently 
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into account. A first aspect concerns the Court’s approach towards secularism and 
neutrality.  
Several measures limiting individuals’ right to manifest their religion are 
motivated by principles such as secularism and neutrality. The best known examples 
of this are rules banning the wearing of religious apparel, such as the Islamic 
headscarf. As discussed above, a large number of cases under article 9 were brought 
against France and Turkey, two countries where these principles play an important 
role.184 Authors especially criticize the Court’s uncritical approach towards the 
notions of secularism and neutrality underpinning bans on religious symbols 
introduced by several European countries,185 arguing that the reasoning in these 
cases insufficiently takes into account the applicants’ concerns and leads to a lack of 
protection for religious minorities.186 The Court indeed regularly stated that 
secularism is ‘undoubtedly one of the fundamental principles of the Turkish State 
which are in harmony with the rule of law and respect for human rights’187 and thus 
a priori endorses the view that secularism is compatible with human rights law, while 
applicants’ complaints concern precisely how the state’s application of those 
principles affects their individual rights. Malcolm Evans argues in this regard that 
with this approach the Court oversteps its duty of impartiality and states that the 
Court embraces a form of ‘secular fundamentalism’.188 Peter Danchin in turn argues 
that the Court’s acceptance of the perspective that secularism requires banning 
religious differences ‘defines neutrality in terms of the “essential” collective identity 
of the majority while denying public recognition of the “essential” collective identity 
of a religious minority’.189  
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A second concern deals with the Court’s non-recognition of the 
discriminatory impact of certain general rules that seem neutral at face value, but 
that in practice disproportionately affect minorities.190 Various scholars point to the 
Court’s reluctance to find an interference with article 9 in this kind of case. They 
criticize the Court for mainly putting the burden on applicants to find ways in which 
conflicts between their religious needs and general rules can be overcome,191 while 
passing over the fact that this burden in itself might already consist of interference 
with an individual’s rights.192 The non-recognition of the potentially restrictive 
nature of some neutrality rules affects in the first place religious minorities. Peter 
Danchin convincingly argues that ‘[t]he fact that the Court has fashioned an 
approach whereby “neutral” laws will automatically prevail, whereby the state is 
under no obligation to justify that its refusal to grant exemptions from the 
application of such laws is a measure that is “necessary in a democratic society”, 
constitutes a significant risk for the rights of minorities’.193 A typical example of cases 
where this occurs can be found in the field of religion in the workplace, where the 
Court has often found no interference with the applicant’s right to manifest his 
religion and where it has ruled that applicants are not limited in their right since they 
can find an alternative for fulfilling their professional duties in a way that they can 
still manifest their religion,194 or since they are always free to resign.195 This line of 
reasoning has been highly criticized, but recent developments in the case law, with 
the judgment in Eweida and others v. the UK, shows a shift in the Court’s 
reasoning.196  
Another important line of criticism concerns the Court’s approach to cases 
involving Islam. The Court has been criticized for being too lenient in cases 
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concerning individual Muslim claims, in accepting States’ arguments without 
requiring any evidence197 and in according too broad a margin of appreciation.198 In 
particular, the cases against Turkey, in which the Court showed ‘implicit support for 
the Turkish view on secularism’,199 and the cases against France, in which the Court 
endorsed ‘French policies aimed at restricting the use of religious garments in public 
schools, fueled by the interest in diminishing the visibility of Islam’,200 received a 
large amount of attention in the literature. Several authors argue that some cases 
reveal a prejudiced Court position towards Muslim applicants,201 or ‘at least 
insufficient familiarity with Islam’,202 and they criticize inaccurate statements made 
by the Court about Islam or Muslim practices.203 Indeed the (in)famous statements 
made in cases such as Refah Partisi v. Turkey,204 Dahlab v. Switzerland205 and Leyla 
Sahin v. Turkey206 remain a continuing subject of criticism.207 Others also refer to the 
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impact on the broader societal context of the ‘fear of Islam’ or ‘fundamentalism,’ 
arguing that ‘[i]n many of the judgments, particularly those dealing with Muslim 
applicants, there is an underlying sense that religion is more of a threat than an asset 
– a problem to be contained rather than something of inherent value.’208 
In sum, this overview reveals some problematic aspects of the Court’s article 
9 reasoning, which in particular affect religious minorities. The majority of this 
criticism refers to the inadequate protection of individual manifestations of religion 
and to exclusionary patterns in the Court’s case law. Hence, scholars in law and 
religion seem to agree that the Court should accord ‘a higher protection for 
individual conscience rights’209 and that ‘if the Court wants to be more effective in its 
objective of promoting and protecting religious pluralism, it must take stronger steps 
to protect the right to practice’.210  
1.5.3. Towards inclusive freedom of religion jurisprudence: a 
complementary procedural perspective 
In view of the criticism summarised above, which refers to the lack of 
protection accorded under article 9 and the exclusionary consequences of the 
Court’s reasoning, especially towards minorities, suggestions for improving the case 
law often focus on substantive aspects of the reasoning. The most obvious example 
is the many contributions in favour of introducing the concept of reasonable 
accommodation in the Court’s article 9 adjudication.211 These suggestions aim at 
redressing the exclusionary effects of the Court’s reasoning at a substantive level 
due to, for example, applying too wide a margin of appreciation or by privileging 
certain dimensions of religion above others;212 and instead advocate for a more 
protective approach towards individual religious claims under article 9, in particular 
when minority claims are involved. 
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Some scholars also highlight flaws at the procedural level of the Court’s 
reasoning, such as biased reasoning or neglect of applicants’ arguments. The entry 
point of this procedural critique is, however, often the substantive aspect of 
freedom of religion protection. Carolyn Evans, for example, strongly notes the 
absence of the applicant’s perspective in the headscarf cases, observing that:  
In the three headscarf cases, … there is no discussion of the religious beliefs 
of the applicants, no consideration of the considerable hardships that this 
ruling might cause them, and no serious justification for why the religious 
practice was considered inimical to other Convention values such as gender 
equality or State ideologies such as secularism. Individual religious freedom 
therefore tends to be compromised fairly easily when brought into conflict 
with other values that the Court implies (without explanation) are more 
important to the human rights agenda.213 
Hence, although Evans convincingly refers to serious flaws at the procedural 
level — e.g. the absence of the applicant’s perspective in the Court’s reasoning — 
this critique is ultimately coupled with the limitations she observes regarding the 
individual’s religious freedom. Without any doubt, procedural flaws in the reasoning, 
such as bias, inaccuracy or a neglect of the applicant’s perspective, risks affecting the 
substantive aspect of a case and curtailing the potential for coming to substantively 
fair and inclusive reasoning and outcomes in cases. 
However, complementing this approach, the study in this dissertation aims at 
going beyond the substantive entry point. It will offer a comprehensive analysis of 
the procedural aspect of the Court’s adjudication under article 9 and examine how 
this aspect of reasoning can in itself contribute to more inclusivity in a religiously 
diverse context. In other words, instead of examining how the case-law under article 
9 can be improved in order to advance the actual inclusion of a diversity of religious 
views and needs in society – something which should remain a primary concern of 
the Court — this study will look at how inclusion can be enhanced at the procedural 
level.  
An illustration of the different possible levels of exclusion/inclusion can, for 
example, be found in the case of Sessa v. Italy.214 This is a case concerning a Jewish 
practising lawyer who complained about the fact that the domestic court refused to 
adjourn a hearing of a case in which he had to represent his client, while the 
proposed new dates of the hearings fell on Jewish religious holidays. The Court in 
this case first questioned whether an interference with his right to freedom of 
religion took place, since the applicant in the end decided to celebrate the holiday 
instead of representing his client during the hearing. At the same time, the Court 
stated that even if it could be supposed that interference had taken place, no 
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violation could be found since the applicant could always look for replacement by a 
colleague at the hearing. This reasoning was in the first place exclusionary towards 
the applicant at the substantive level, in that it forced him to make a choice between 
his religion and his professional duties and as such, his right to freedom of religion 
was applied in a restrictive way. Hence, in practice the applicant was not 
accommodated and as a matter of fact the applicant as a Jew practising law in a 
society organized according to the precepts of the majority Christian tradition was in 
practice not truly included.  
But at the same time, another exclusionary aspect of this reasoning can be 
found at a procedural level, in the way the Court approached the applicant and his 
religious claim. The reasoning showed a lack of understanding of the applicant’s 
situation and it did not demonstrate that his arguments and concerns had been truly 
taken into account. Ultimately, what this reasoning said to the applicant was ‘this is 
how society is organized; you must find a solution yourself in order to be able to fit 
in’. No matter whether or not in this case an actual inclusive and accommodating 
solution was possible,215 insensitive reasoning like this is in itself already not 
communicating an inclusive message. 
In fact, actual substantive or structural inclusion will not always be possible in 
a diverse society,216 contrary to procedural inclusion, which can always be applied no 
matter what the outcome of cases will be. It is not always possible to accommodate 
everyone’s religious needs, but it is possible to have an understanding and genuinely 
caring approach towards everyone’s concerns.  
This study starts from the assumption that treating people in a respectful and 
unbiased way, regardless of their background and the religion they profess, is 
inherently inclusive, while the opposite, the use of biased and disrespectful 
statements in itself can communicate exclusion and should therefore be avoided. In 
fact, as will be explained in the next section, this is confirmed by a significant body of 
social psychology research on ‘procedural fairness’, which shows that in their contact 
with legal authorities, people not only care about the outcome they receive in their 
case, but also accord significant importance to the way this outcome is reached.217 
Therefore, the thesis I will argue in this dissertation is that a deeply inclusive 
approach towards diversity requires a focus not only on the substantive level, as 
many authors have already convincingly argued, but also on the procedural aspects 
in the case law itself. 
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1.6. Research questions 
This dissertation aims to complement the vast body of literature on law and 
religion by offering a comprehensive analytical and normative point of view on the 
procedural aspect of the case law under article 9 ECHR. 
At the analytical level, the study will investigate the following questions: How 
does the Court deal with religious claims in its case law under article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights? More particularly, it will examine how the 
Court approaches the religious applicants, their religious convictions and their right 
to freedom of religion.  
At the normative level, this study will examine the following questions: How 
can the Court improve its reasoning under the right to freedom of religion protected 
by article 9 of the ECHR so as to contribute to inclusion in a religiously diverse 
context? What techniques can be used for this improvement? What role can 
procedural justice criteria play in this process? 
1.7. Methodology 
The methodology employed in this dissertation is in the first place both legal-
analytical and normative. The dissertation primarily draws on the legal literature and 
in-depth analysis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Yet, this 
research is not conducted on a legal island, since, as Cotterrell says, research on law 
and religion cannot easily be seen as a ‘“purely” legal’ matter.218 Therefore, in this 
work I also draw on other disciplines, both at the theoretical and at the 
methodological levels. In this section I will explain why some methodological 
decisions were taken, turning then to a detailed account of the methods employed 
in each chapter. But first I will share some reflections on the research journey.  
 1.7.1. A preliminary reflection on the research journey and methodological 
decisions: a dissertation as a living instrument 
1.7.1.1. The living field of law and religion 
The European Convention is a living instrument, says the Strasbourg Court. 
Time changes, social reality changes and the interpretation and application of the 
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Convention — as a living instrument — should adapt to this change.219 This is 
especially true in the dynamic domain of religious diversity. Similarly, this dynamic 
context also influenced the way my research took its final shape.  
In recent years, important developments have taken place in the field of (law 
and) religious diversity, both in the case law of the Court through some important 
judgments (such as Eweida a.o. v. the UK220 and S.A.S. v. France221) and outside the 
case law where important societal debates about religion were (and are still) taking 
place in Western Europe. 
Doing research on the right to freedom of religion in a context where religion 
in society is subject to debate almost on a daily basis was both a challenging and an 
enriching task. It was challenging because despite the clarity and consistency of the 
research aims and questions, it required flexibility in research plan(ning). Moreover, 
it forces the researcher to present the research findings in a concise way.  
But it was above all enriching in that it obliged me as a researcher to 
constantly reflect on the strength and relevance of my arguments in light of societal 
developments. It was also enriching in the sense that it allowed me to try to 
participate as a researcher in ongoing debates on topics concerning law and religion.  
One of the most important developments in the field of religious diversity in 
the past five years in Europe that influenced my research has been the debate on the 
face-veil bans introduced by France and Belgium. The exclusionary nature of the 
debate, both at the societal and legislative levels — which disregarded the women 
concerned and their fundamental human rights — and the absence of empirical 
knowledge on the subject matter, led to the start of inter-university empirical 
research conducted by Eva Brems (UGent), Jogchum Vrielink (KULeuven) and 
myself.222 The aim of this research was to gain and to share first-hand knowledge on 
women wearing a face veil in order to encourage an accurate and fair decision-
making process in accordance with fundamental human rights.  
Additionally, during the course of my research I was privileged to follow the 
entire decision making process on face-veil bans, from the debates at the legislative 
level223 to the domestic judicial level224 and ultimately at the level of the Strasbourg 
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Court, where together with my colleagues at the Human Rights Centre of Ghent 
University I had the opportunity to play an active role in the proceedings of the case 
of S.A.S. v. France225 by submitting a third party intervention.226  
The research conducted on the face-veil bans exercised an important 
influence on my work, both at the substantive level, since it led to chapter VI of this 
thesis, and at the methodological level, since the empirical research conducted in 
the framework of the research on face-veil bans significantly influenced my 
analytical approach towards the Court’s article 9 case law in chapter III, as will be 
further explained below.227 
 
1.7.1.2. The benefits and challenges of a dissertation based on articles 
 The fact that the Law Faculty of Ghent University allows dissertations based 
on articles— a practice that is increasingly being applied — made room for creativity, 
enabling the research plan to be adapted to important developments. Moreover, an 
important benefit of writing a dissertation through articles is that it enables the 
researcher to disseminate the research findings at an earlier stage, a stage when 
these findings might be the most relevant. Moreover, the format of a dissertation 
through articles forces the researcher to write at an early stage of the research 
process, which very soon leads to insights into gaps in the research field and the 
need to explore certain domains further. This is how my research evolved from a 
general analysis of the case law (in the particular context of claims concerning the 
accommodation of religion in the workplace)228 to a specific focus on the procedural 
level of article 9 case law in the remainder of my research.  
The downside, however, is that working on a dissertation based on articles in 
a field where case law constantly change, implies that some already published works 
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need to be updated by the time the dissertation is submitted. This was especially the 
case with the publications in chapters IV and VI. Chapter IV, for example, concerns 
the Court’s case law dealing with religion in the workplace. At the time of writing, 
the important case of Eweida a.o. v. the UK,229 partly concerning the wearing of 
religious symbols in the workplace, was still pending before the Court. Publishing my 
critical analysis of the case law concerning that subject was therefore at that time 
most relevant. The same counts for the case of S.A.S. v. France,230 the subject of 
chapter VI. However, next to the fact that, as such, the publications appear at the 
most relevant time, this way of conducting research is also interesting from an 
academic perspective. Instead of critically analysing cases after they are issued, this 
methodology of working on articles offered the possibility to reflect on the judgment 
afterwards in light of the arguments made in the already published work and vice 
versa, reflect from hindsight on the arguments made in earlier work from the 
perspective of the new judgments. Indeed, it is interesting to examine how the cases 
of Eweida a.o. v. the UK and S.AS. v. France both contain certain lines of reasoning 
which are similar to certain arguments that were made in the articles. However, 
after the publication of the judgments both articles remain relevant, partly because 
not all their arguments were incorporated into the judgments. Respecting the format 
of a thesis through articles, I reflect on the judgments published in the fields of my 
case-studies and reproduced in chapters IV and VI of this dissertation in the form of 
addendums.231  
1.7.2. Social psychology and human rights law: an intuitive union 
The research on procedural justice, or procedural fairness, which played an 
important role in shaping the theoretical framework of my research,232 is probably 
one of the most developed research areas within the interdisciplinary field of 
psychology and law.233 The combination of law and psychology is not surprising 
since, as Tyler and Darley write: 
a better understanding of the psychology of human motivation is of great 
interest to legal authorities, members of the legal profession, and to those 
working within legal institutions such as the courts, the police, and prisons.234  
The work of social psychologists, including in the field of procedural justice, is 
mainly empirical; they examine the psychological underpinnings of law-related 
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behaviour and attempt to find an explanation for their empirical findings. Hence, 
their main concern is not normative in that it does not aim to explain how the legal 
system should function and how procedural justice findings should be 
implemented.235  
In this dissertation, the empirical findings of procedural justice research 
formed the foundations of my normative framework.236 I built on the work of Eva 
Brems and Laurens Lavrysen, who applied procedural justice findings to the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights in general. The study in this dissertation 
deepens their framework in the specific context of religious freedom claims.  
The way in which I apply a procedural justice framework in this dissertation is 
normative, not empirical. As a matter of fact, no empirical knowledge exists yet on 
procedural justice perceptions of the Strasbourg Court. However, the lack of specific 
empirical knowledge on the Strasbourg Court does not make the findings of 
procedural justice research less valuable, for several reasons. First, the procedural 
justice findings have been confirmed in an impressive body of literature, in different 
contexts within and beyond the judicial system.237 Secondly, Tyler and Mitchell, 
eminent social psychology researchers in the field, conducted wide-ranging research 
(with 502 respondents) on the American Supreme Court in the context of abortion 
rights to examine how people evaluate authorities in cases dealing with controversial 
and divisive issues. The findings of this research confirmed earlier findings that in 
their evaluation of authorities people care about procedural justice even more than 
about the favourability of the outcome.238 For the European Court of Human Rights, 
which, similarly to the US Supreme Court, is also confronted by controversial and 
sensitive issues and also deals with fundamental rights, these findings are 
particularly relevant.239 Thirdly, I also concur with Brems and Lavrysen in their 
argument that in any event the procedural justice criteria of neutrality, respect, 
participation and trustworthiness are inherent to the value system the Court 
represents.240 In fact, as mentioned earlier, the Court in its general principles under 
article 9 requires States to be neutral and impartial and to take people’s perspectives 
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into account through, for example, dialogue. As argued earlier in this introductory 
chapter, these principles are closely related to the procedural justice elements which 
shape people’s fairness perceptions about authorities.241 The least that can be 
expected is thus that the Court itself applies these principles in its own case law.  
1.7.3. Case law selection 
The study conducted in this dissertation is built around the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights, mainly the Court’s case law under article 9. The 
selection of case law is undertaken differently for each chapter.  
In Chapter III the case-law analysis is conducted in depth, covering all the 
article 9 cases issued since the reform of the Court in November 1998 up to 1 July 
2014, the day the judgment in S.A.S. v. France was issued. This landmark case was 
chosen as the closure of my research. The selection was conducted through Hudoc, 
the Court’s database. Both judgments and inadmissibility decisions242 were included, 
both in French and English. In a first selection round, I eliminated the cases declared 
inadmissible on procedural grounds such as non-exhaustion of domestic remedies or 
inadmissibility ratione temporis. The cases struck out of the list were also left out. 
The cases declared partly admissible-inadmissible were retained in order to make 
sure that the cases where the inadmissibility referred to the article claim are 
included in the analysis.243 Finally, the cases appearing in both languages were left 
out. After the first elimination round, I retained 565 cases for deeper analysis.244  
The case law in Chapter IV covers a segment of case law dealing with 
religious accommodation in the workplace with a focus on worktime-related cases 
and cases concerning the wearing of religious symbols in the workplace. These two 
categories were not predefined at the start of the research undertaken for this 
chapter. They were selected after a first round of analysis of the case law of the 
Court concerning the workplace, in which it was observed that the most important 
accommodation claims concerned these two domains. The method applied in 
selecting the case law was twofold. Contrary to the case law covered in Chapter III, 
Chapter IV also looks at cases of the former Commission of Human Rights. The 
Commission cases were selected on the basis of the general literature on article 9 
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and specific studies of cases concerning the workplace.245 Since the aim of the 
research was to examine how the case law concerning accommodation claims in the 
workplace evolved after the famous Commission cases in the field, the subsequent 
cases of the European Court of Human Rights were selected manually246 through 
Hudoc covering the period 2000-2010.247 Also here, cases in both French and English 
were covered and both inadmissibility decisions and judgments were taken into 
account. An addendum to the chapter includes an update of the cases of Sessa v. 
Italy248 and Eweida and others v. the UK,249 which were issued after the publication 
of this work.  
Chapter V revolves around one particular case: Suku Phull v. France.250 This 
chapter is written in the framework of the international conference ‘Mainstreaming 
Diversity: Rewriting Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights’. This 
conference was organized in Strasbourg in the premises of the Court and led to a 
book published with Cambridge University Press, in which the article on which 
chapter V is based is included.251 In the framework of this conference, authors were 
asked to select one specific judgment or decision of the Strasbourg Court concerning 
a diversity issue which the authors considered could be improved, and to rewrite it. 
My choice of Phull v. France, which was an inadmissibility decision, was motivated by 
the fact that this case represents various problematic aspects common in freedom of 
religion adjudication. One aspect was the fact that in freedom of religion case law, 
claims are often declared manifestly ill-founded, the perspective of the applicant is 
missing, the arguments of the applicant are not examined, etc. I also specifically 
made a choice of an inadmissibility decision, since those cases might in my opinion 
often be the most problematic. I analysed this case specifically from a procedural 
fairness perspective.  
The legal analysis also contains references to other Court cases selected on 
the basis of relevance to the arguments made. Additionally, this chapter also refers 
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 Amongst others, Lucy Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination at the Workplace (Hart 
Publishing, 2008) and Carolyn Evans, Freedom of religion under the European Convention on Human 
Rights, (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
246
 With manually, I mean that the cases were not selected through key words, but by going through 
the judgments and decisions published in Hudoc since 2000. This choice was made in order not to 
miss potentially important/relevant cases.  
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 2000 was chosen as the start of the selection since no workplace cases were issued between 
November 1998 (reform of the Court) and 1 January 2010. 2010 as an end date was not purposefully 
chosen, but happens to be the date of the presentation and publication of the research findings. (The 
article on which chapter 4 is based was presented at a conference in Leuven in January 2011: 
International Symposium “Religious Diversity in the European Workplace”, 13 January 2011, Leuven, 
Belgium.  
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 ECtHR, Sessa Francesco v. Italy, 3 April 2012. 
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 ECtHR, Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom, 15 January 2013. 
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 ECtHR, Phull v. France, 11 January 2005. 
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 Saïla Ouald Chaib, ‘Suku Phull v. France rewritten from a procedural justice perspective: taking 
religious minorities seriously’ in Eva Brems, Diversity and European Human Rights: Rewriting 
Judgments of the ECtHR, (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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to the case law of the Canadian Supreme Court,252 which dealt with a claim 
comparable to Phull v. France (limitation on the right to manifest one’s religion for 
safety reasons), from which inspiration was drawn for the rewriting exercise.  
The article incorporated in Chapter VI, co-authored by Eva Brems and myself, 
took a challenging but original path in that it builds its analysis in the framework of a 
pending case. This chapter deals with the controversy concerning face-veil bans and 
is based on a critical analysis of the bans and the debates surrounding them. It 
anticipates the (at the time of writing) pending Grand Chamber judgment in the case 
of S.A.S. v. France253 concerning the French ban on the wearing of the face veil. As 
noted earlier, the authors also submitted a third-party intervention to the Strasbourg 
Court in this case.254  
Other Court cases were referred to in this publication, based on their 
relevance to the arguments made. Moreover, this article also contains references to 
domestic jurisprudence concerning the face-veil bans.255  
Finally, an addendum is written to the article contained in this chapter, in 
which the judgment of S.A.S. v. France, which was issued on 1 July 2014, is broadly 
discussed in light of the arguments made in the article. The case of S.A.S. v. France, 
as noted earlier, closes the case law analysis conducted for this dissertation. 
1.7.4. Social science methods and tools in law 
This dissertation employs (next to traditional legal analysis, consisting of 
case-law analysis and literature review) literature and sociological methods and tools 
from other disciplines. As explained earlier, the social psychology research played an 
important role in my dissertation.256 Additionally, sociological sources have been 
used for several chapters in this dissertation. The introductory chapter contains, for 
example, sketches of the societal context of religious diversity in Western Europe. 
Other chapters of this dissertation, mainly chapter VI, also refer extensively to 
sociological reports and analyses. This research choice is made from the point of 
view that an understanding of social realities is essential in the field of law and 
religion.  
This is also one of the reasons why chapter VI partly draws on empirical 
research on the social lived realities of women wearing a face veil. This empirical 
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 Supreme Court of Canada, Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 
256, 2006 SCC 6. 
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 ECtHR (GC), S.A.S. v. France, 1 July 2014. 
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research contributed not only substantively to the study in this thesis, but also 
significantly influenced the methodology used in chapter III. In this section I will first 
give a short description of how the empirical research was conducted before 
explaining how it influenced methodological choices made in part II of this 
dissertation.  
1.7.4.1. Empirical research as inspiration for legal analytical research 
Between September 2010 and September 2011, 27 women were interviewed 
in the framework of an empirical qualitative research project on the face veil (ban) in 
Belgium.257 The in-depth interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way and 
additionally two focus group discussions were organized.258  
Of particular importance for methodological decisions made in this 
dissertation, in particular for chapter III, is the way the transcripts of the interviews 
and focus groups discussions were analysed. The analysis of the transcripts was 
inspired by the qualitative method called ‘grounded theory’. For this analysis, the 
data analysis program ‘Nvivo’, which is typically used for the analysis of interviews, 
was employed.  
Both elements of the analysis, (the analytical method inspired by grounded 
theory and the use of the software Nvivo) inspired me to reflect critically on the way 
legal scientists approach case law analysis.  
Central to grounded theory is the inductive approach, involving a bottom-up 
mindset where the theory emerges from the data259 instead of starting from a 
hypothesis to then deductively turn to the data in search of illustrations or 
confirmations of the hypothesis260 (an approach which is more common in the legal 
sciences). 
In chapter III, I decided to apply a similar inductive approach to analyse the 
Court’s case law. Instead of approaching the case law in a traditional way, starting 
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from certain arguments or a theory, I decided to conduct an in-depth and broad 
analysis of the article 9 case law asking the general questions ‘how is the Court 
approaching the applicant believer?’ ‘How is the Court approaching the religious 
aspects of the case?’ and ‘how is the Court interpreting freedom of religion?’. Only in 
a second phase did I analyse the results of the first phase through the concepts of 
procedural fairness. Additionally, I also decided to conduct my analysis through the 
data analysis software program Nvivo. A detailed account of how this analysis took 
place can be found under section 3.3. in chapter III. In the next sections I will attempt 
to give an impression of the benefits and limits of using Nvivo, based on my own 
experiences.  
1.7.4.2. Case law analysis in Nvivo 
Based on my experiences with Nvivo for the analysis of interviews, I decided 
to experiment with the program for case law analysis. In this section I will explain the 
potentials and limitations of the software based on my experience in using it for 
case-law analysis.261  
When I was using this program for the analysis of interviews I realized that it 
could be helpful for the analysis of case law in the legal sciences. The way interviews 
are examined can also be applied to the way case law is analysed. And in my view, 
Nvivo, as a qualitative analysis program, contains several aspects which can benefit 
legal scholars as well. It can be an excellent tool to organize, classify and analyse case 
law. With this motivation in mind I uploaded the body of cases which needed to be 
analysed for Chapter III of this dissertation into the program. I named the files 
starting with the date in order for them to appear in a chronological order since I 
wanted to read the cases chronologically: 
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 I found only one other researcher who used the program for case-law analysis. However, 
increasingly researchers in the legal field are using/exploring it, including at the research centre I work 
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Having the case law in one place facilitated access to the cases in that I could use 
search functions to look up the cases easily. Moreover, it also provided a way of 
organizing the cases according to particular themes or dates. For me this was more 
efficient than downloading judgments from Hudoc and save them in folders on my 
computer. The downside, however, is that sufficient storage space on the computer 
is needed, otherwise the program will crash or at least work very slow.  
 
Subsequently, I used the program both to classify and to analyse the case law.  
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A. Data classification 
With classification I mean attributing information to every case in terms of several 
criteria. For every case, I kept information about the Year, Chamber, Gender (‘Male’, 
‘Female’, ‘Parents & Children’, ‘Church’, ‘Religious Organisation’, ‘Political Party’ and 
‘Different Applicants’), Religion, the Vote (unanimous/majority), and on the decisions on the 
merits or inadmissibility. This classification is presented in a grid comparable to an Excel 
sheet and can also be exported to Excel: 
 
  
The classification of the cases had one main benefit for my research in that it 
allowed me to keep information which is not available in Hudoc in a structured form. 
Important and interesting information not available in Hudoc about freedom of 
religion cases is, for example, which religion is at stake in a particular case. I used the 
information from this classification sheet for the quantitative analysis in Chapter I.262  
A second motivation for my classifying the cases was that I hoped to be able 
to use it in the process of analysis. I wanted to be able to use the features of the 
program where results of the case-law analysis could be examined from the 
perspective of the classification criteria. For example, I wanted to explore whether 
procedural fairness shortcomings could be linked to particular religions involved in 
the cases. I realized, however, that because of the diversity and large number of 
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cases, this feature of the program was not useful for my research.263  
B. Data analysis 
Nvivo is a qualitative data-analysis tool, but it is still the researcher who 
decides how she wants to analyse the case law. The case-law analysis I conducted 
through this program for chapter III is inspired by the grounded theory method, 
which consists of an in-depth bottom-up (inductive) approach, as will be explained in 
the methodological section of Chapter III. The main benefit I experienced from using 
the program is that it made my analysis more efficient and the results of my analysis 
were easily accessible. As will be explained in chapter III, the analysis was conducted 
in a multi-layered way. First, an open approach was applied to interrogate the case-
law with general questions. In the very first stage, I analysed a selection of ten cases, 
both judgments and decision and concerning several aspects of the freedom of 
religion case-law, such as individual and group claims. At this stage I coded 
(highlighted) segments of the judgments which gave me information about the way 
the Court approaches the applicant, the way religion and religious practices were 
described, the way certain aspects of the proportionality analysis were undertaken, 
etc. This information was stored under categories, so-called ‘codes’. The initial open 
coding of the selection of ten cases gave me a first list of codes, a structure, which I 
deepened and broadened while coding the entire body of case-law in a chronological 
order. 
An example of the coding process is illustrated below. Under [applicant 
believer] for instance, I noticed several recurring themes: 
 
 
 
 
 
Every theme contains sub-themes in which the segments of the case law can 
be found: 
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In a second stage of the analysis, I analysed these observations from a 
procedural fairness perspective.  
A major interesting aspect that I encountered about this process is the fact 
that it allows the case law to be looked at blind. At first sight, the categories do not 
reveal information (for example: which religion is at stake?) about the selection of 
segments of cases that can be found behind the folder. In the example illustrated 
above, in the category [applicant not the problem] and the subcategory [Not 
directed against applicant’s religion], I have at first sight no idea from which cases 
this information comes.  
I realized that this way of working makes the process of analysis more neutral 
to a certain extent. Nevertheless, for me personally it was interesting and 
confronting to see how when I was analysing the findings from a procedural fairness 
perspective and selecting the segments of case-law that could be used for illustrating 
the arguments in my article, ultimately three kinds of cases came back in many of 
these categories: the cases concerning prohibitions on religious signs (the headscarf 
in particular), the Turkish cases concerning the dismissal from the army and cases 
concerning religious accommodation in prison.264  
  
1.8. Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is divided in three main parts comprising six chapters and a 
general conclusion.265 
 Part I consists of this introductory chapter, which lays the groundwork for 
the dissertation. The chapter aims at situating the research in a broader context. 
First, it situates the research in the broader societal context, describing the societal 
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 I will refer to the several parts of the dissertation in terms of ‘chapters’ and not ‘articles’. 
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debates surrounding (law and) religion in Western Europe. Second, it situates the 
research within the context of the article 9 case law of the European Court by first 
giving a quantitative insight into the case law and then by focusing on the principles 
the Court holds in the context of freedom of religion and diversity. The next part 
reveals how between principles and practice in the actual reasoning of the Court’s 
freedom of religion adjudication, a gap can be found. This is illustrated with the 
criticism by legal scholars of problematic aspects of the Court’s article 9 case law 
from a substantive point of view. Additionally, I make clear that my research aims at 
examining whether a gap can also be found between the inclusive principles of 
pluralism held by the Court and the procedural aspects of the reasoning. Finally, I 
reflect on my methodological approach in this dissertation. This reflection does not 
explain my methodology in detail, since every chapter contains more elaborate 
information on the methodology used. However, I explain how and why I build 
bridges in my dissertation between several disciplines, both at the theoretical level 
and at the level of methods of analysis and tools used for the analysis.  
Part II starts in Chapter II with an exploration of social psychology research 
on procedural justice. This chapter aims at giving insight into the research field of 
procedural justice and reflects on how these findings might also normatively apply to 
the human rights adjudication of the Court, in particular in a context of diversity. 
Next, Chapter III explores at a normative level how the procedural justice criteria of 
participation, respect, neutrality and trustworthiness can be applied in the context of 
the right to freedom of religion. This normative reflection is followed by an in-depth 
analysis of the freedom of religion case law of the Strasbourg Court. This analysis is 
conducted through an inductive approach, inspired by grounded theory. It reveals 
several problematic trends in the article 9 case law from a procedural fairness 
perspective. General suggestions for improvement of the case law will therefore be 
made on the basis of the results of the analysis.  
While part II gives a broad and deep analysis of the case law, Part III contains 
three specific case-studies covering several aspects of the Court’s freedom of religion 
case law. At the same time the approach in these case-studies is very tangible, since 
it makes concrete suggestions for improving the case law. The three case-studies 
look at the Court’s article 9 case law from a broad perspective. While chapter IV 
concerns a segment of the article 9 case law, chapter V covers one particular case in 
depth. Chapter VI, finally, uses an original perspective by anticipating a forthcoming 
case. In addition, the three case-studies employ comparative methods inside and 
outside the Court’s case law and include empirical research additional to the legal-
critical approach. The three case-studies highlight the importance of improving the 
procedural aspect of the reasoning in freedom of religion adjudication.  
In contrast to chapters V and VI, Chapter IV is not conducted in a procedural justice 
framework. The research in this chapter, however, shows, through an examination 
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of cases concerning religious accommodation in the workplace, the importance of 
the procedural aspect in the Court’s reasoning, additional to the substantive aspect. 
Although not formulated in procedural fairness terms, it uncovers serious procedural 
fairness shortcomings in the case law concerning the workplace. Being the first 
article written in the framework of this dissertation, the findings of this chapter 
confirmed the importance of a study focused on the procedural aspect of the 
reasoning in article 9 jurisprudence. This chapter also advances suggestions for 
improving the case law based on a comparative analysis with cases brought before 
the Court under other articles, but concerning similar issues.  
While chapter IV started from a segment of the article 9 case law, Chapter V 
starts from one particular article 9 decision, namely the case of Suku Phull v. France, 
concerning the Court’s reasoning in cases involving limitations on the right to 
manifest a religion due to safety measures. Drawing on procedural justice principles, 
this chapter argues that applicants and their religious claims should be taken more 
seriously. Besides making suggestions from a comfortable academic desk, this 
chapter also contains an attempt to redraft the judgment, which forces the writer to 
place herself in the shoes of the judge.  
Chapter VI anticipates a (at the time of writing) pending case, namely S.A.S. 
v. France, concerning the ban on face veils in France. In the first part, it uncovers the 
serious procedural justice flaws at the domestic level in that the decision-making 
process on the face-veil ban in France was characterized by inaccuracy, prejudice 
and a lack of recognition of the perspective of the women concerned. In the first 
normative part, Eva Brems and I therefore argue that the Court should redress this 
situation by pointing out the procedural justice flaws which occurred at the domestic 
level. Subsequently, we argue that the Court should do a better job in its own 
reasoning from a procedural justice perspective when examining the S.A.S. claim. 
This chapter is followed by an addendum which discusses the Grand Chamber 
judgment issued in the case of S.A.S. v. France on 1 July 2014. The reflection on the 
case is conducted in light of the procedural justice arguments made in the chapter. 
Finally, a general conclusion will be offered which recapitulates the main 
findings and suggestions made in the dissertation, followed by a reflection on 
potential questions for future research.  
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PART II – AN EXPLORATION OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION CASE-LAW IN 
LIGHT OF THE CONCEPT OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS  
 
Procedural fairness, also called procedural justice, concerns the degree of 
fairness displayed at the procedural level of the decision making process. As seen in 
the introductory chapter in Part I, the article 9 case-law of the Strasbourg Court has 
been widely criticized by legal scholars. This critique mostly refers to the lack of 
protection the Court offers under article 9, especially in cases concerning individual 
minority claims. Chapter I also highlights the religiously diverse societal context and 
the challenges it faces when it comes to debates on law and religion. In the past 
years, debates on the place of religion in society and restrictive measures towards 
believers have been on the rise. Unfortunately they are often conducted in polarizing 
and confrontational terms outside the realm of human rights law. It is also argued 
that the voice of the people concerned by certain measures is often neglected, as 
the recent face-veil controversy clearly shows. Chapter I further uncovers how the 
Court values pluralism as a principle and how this notion implies that society should 
not only offer a space that enables all people to participate at a structural level and 
express their identity, but that it should also create a space for dialogue to take place 
and where people’s concerns are treated in an unbiased way in search of balance 
and compromises. 
 
These three observations together all lead to one destination: procedural 
fairness. The study of the level of procedural fairness in the Court’s article 9 
adjudication and the normative model suggested for the improvement of procedural 
justice flaws is complementary to the existing literature on the substantive aspect of 
the Court’s freedom of religion jurisprudence. Additionally, the focus on procedural 
fairness is intended to highlight the importance of the procedural aspects of debates 
on religion in society and to show how this aspect, in addition to the substantive 
aspect of decision-making, is also important from a perspective of inclusion, as the 
Court has also repeated many times in its own general principles accompanying its 
article 9 case-law.  
 
This part will start in chapter II with an introduction to the research 
concerning procedural fairness. It will give an overview of how this notion was 
developed during the past decades and to what strong findings it led. It will further 
reflect on the importance this concept might have for the Strasbourg Court. Finally, I 
will explain how I consider procedural fairness to be particularly relevant in a context 
of religious diversity, specifically in cases concerning minority claims. In Chapter III, I 
first normatively explore how the four procedural justice criteria can be interpreted 
in the field of religious claims. I then submit the article 9 case-law of the Strasbourg 
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Court to in-depth analysis from a perspective of procedural fairness while making 
general suggestions for improvement. 
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CHAPTER II The Potential of Procedural Justice for Freedom of Religion 
Jurisprudence: The Inclusive Dimension of Belief in Justice 
 
One prediction that can be advanced with sure confidence is that 
human life on this planet faces steady increase in the potential for 
interpersonal and intergroup conflict. … It seems clear that the quality 
of future human life is likely to be importantly determined by the 
effectiveness with which disputes can be managed, moderated, or 
resolved.1  
 
This quote formed the starting point of Thibaut and Walker’s research2 in the 
1970s where they were searching for the forms of procedures3 that could be 
considered the most effective and just.4 In their search, they decided not only to 
focus on objective justice (is justice effectively done?), but also on subjective justice 
(is justice perceived to be done?). They considered that focusing on the latter ‘is 
crucial because one of the major aims of the legal process is to resolve conflicts in 
such a way as to bind up the social fabric and encourage the continuation of 
productive exchange between individuals’.5  
The prediction forming the starting point of Thibaut and Walker’s research in 
the 1970s is certainly applicable in today’s diverse context of Western Europe almost 
four decades later. Moreover, their aim of finding ways in which the ‘social fabric’ 
can be bound up coincides with the major aim of the study conducted in this 
dissertation. Thibaut and Walker’s research formed the beginning of a major field of 
study in the domain of social psychology called ‘procedural justice’ or ‘procedural 
fairness’.6 Research on procedural fairness focuses on the fairness of the process of 
doing justice, rather than the fairness of the outcome. Although Thibaut and Walker 
— respectively a lawyer and a psychologist — initially studied procedural fairness in 
the field of legal procedures, procedural justice research encompasses a broader 
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 John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural justice. A psychological analysis, (L. Erlbaum 
Associates, 1975), at 1. 
2
 Idem and John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, ‘A theory of procedure’, 66 Calif. Law Rev. 541–566 
(1978). 
3
 Thibaut and Walker focused on procedures in the legal process. See John Thibaut and Laurens 
Walker, Procedural justice. A psychological analysis, (L. Erlbaum Associates, 1975), at 1. 
4
 Idem.  
5
 Idem, at 67. 
6
 Both terms are often used interchangeably. The more ‘formal’ term ‘procedural justice’ will mostly 
be used to describe the research area, while the term ‘procedural fairness’ will be used more to 
describe the subjective experience of people about fairness. See also Robert J. MacCoun, ‘Voice, 
Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness’, 1 Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 
(2005), at 8. 
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range of contexts, such as the workplace, policing and the family.7 Evidently, in light 
of the aim of this dissertation, the research on the legal context will be at the centre 
of the study.  
In this chapter I will first give an insight into the research on procedural 
fairness, starting with a short overview of its history and evolution and situating its 
main research findings. I will then turn to an exploration of the potential of this 
concept for the European Court of Human Rights in the context of religious diversity.  
2.1. Situating the Findings of Procedural Justice Research  
The findings of procedural justice research inspired an important part of the 
analytical and normative framework in which the research of this dissertation took 
place. This section will therefore highlight, in a short historical overview, the main 
findings of procedural justice research and explain how these findings were 
developed in social psychology research and how they have been interpreted later 
by Brems and Lavrysen in the context of human rights adjudication. 
2.1.1. Thibaut and Walker: Process Control v. Decision Control 
The most important finding of Thibaut and Walker, which laid the 
cornerstone of future procedural justice research, was that people, in their 
perception of procedures, focus not only on the outcome of their case but also on 
the way this outcome is reached. In their research, they differentiated between 
process control (do people have control over the process leading to a decision? e.g. 
through presenting evidence) and decision control (do people have a direct impact 
on the decision?).8 They were the first to prove empirically9 that process control is 
important independently of decision control.10 Their research showed that 
procedures with higher process control were judged fairest and produced greater 
satisfaction, regardless of the favourability of the outcome in a case.11  
Coming from a distributive justice tradition (where the emphasis lies on the 
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 See for an overview of the different fields in which procedural justice findings have been tested: 
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, ‘The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts’, 63 Hastings 
Law J. 127–178 (2011), at 133-134 (with references). 
8
 John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural justice. A psychological analysis, (L. Erlbaum 
Associates, 1975), at 76. 
9
 Thibaut and Walker conducted their research through a controlled laboratory study of American 
students. See John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, at 69. 
10
 Robert J. MacCoun, ‘Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural 
Fairness’, 1 Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. (2005) and John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, ‘A theory of 
procedure’, 66 Calif. Law Rev. 541–566 (1978), 542-543 
11
 John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural justice. A psychological analysis, (L. Erlbaum 
Associates, 1975), at 80 and 118 and John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, ‘A theory of procedure’, 66 
Calif. Law Rev. 541–566 (1978), at 551. 
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fairness of the outcome),12 Thibaut and Walker explained these results from an 
instrumental perspective. They argued that people value process control out of self-
interest, believing that process control would lead to better decisions.13 Their 
hypothesis was that procedures with more process control, namely adversarial 
procedures, were preferred because of their potential to secure accuracy and to 
avoid decision makers (judges) being led by bias when making a decision.14 Thus, 
process control was only considered as a means to an end, not the end itself.15  
2.1.2. Leventhal: Six Rules of Procedural Justice 
Another important cornerstone for procedural justice research is the study 
conducted by Leventhal.16 Similar to Thibaut and Walker, Leventhal considered that 
both distributive (outcome fairness) and procedural justice (procedural fairness) 
shape people’s fairness perceptions of procedures. However, Leventhal opened up 
Thibaut and Walker’s research to a broader context than courts and he also 
expanded the criteria determining procedural justice perceptions.17 Leventhal 
advanced six procedural justice rules that in his opinion influence procedural justice 
assessments.18 The first criterion was ‘representation’, which refers to the need that 
procedures ‘must reflect the basic concerns, values and outlook of important 
subgroups in the population of individuals affected by the allocation process’.19 
Other criteria were ‘consistency’ (procedures must be applied consistently across 
persons and across time), ‘bias suppression’ (the decision maker must be 
independent and neutral), ‘accuracy of information’ (decisions must be based on 
accurate information), ‘correctability’ (opportunities to correct bad decisions) and 
‘ethicality’ (the general decision making process must respect moral standards).20 
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Fairness’, 1 Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. (2005).. 
16
 Gerald S. Leventhal, ‘What should be done with equity theory? New approaches in to the study of 
fairness in social relationships’, in Kenneth Gergen, Martin S. Greenberg and Richard H. Willis (eds.), 
Social exchange: Advances in theory and research (Springer, 1977). 
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 Allan Lind and Tom Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Springer, 1988), at 129. 
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 Gerald S. Leventhal, ‘What should be done with equity theory? New approaches in to the study of 
fairness in social relationships’, in Kenneth Gergen, Martin S. Greenberg and Richard H. Willis (eds.),  
Social exchange: Advances in theory and research (Springer, 1977), at 25-34. 
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Tom Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Springer, 1988), at 132. 
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 Allan Lind and Tom Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Springer, 1988), at 131-132 
and Tom Tyler, ‘What is procedural justice?: Criteria used by citizens to assess the fairness of legal 
procedures’, 22 Law and Society Review, (1988), at 104-105. 
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Like Thibaut and Walker, Leventhal also had an instrumental view of the value of 
procedural justice, linking the importance of procedural justice perceptions to the 
quality of the decision.21 22 Leventhal’s six rules formed an important basis for future 
empirical research, determining which elements would form procedural justice 
perceptions.23  
2.1.3. Tyler: Legitimacy of Authorities 
The most well-known and important empirical research conducted in the 
field is the Chicago study of Tyler,24 which built further on Leventhal’s research. Tyler 
is one of the most eminent researchers in the still-growing field of procedural justice 
research. In 1984 he conducted wide-ranging empirical research, the famous Chicago 
study, in which he interviewed 1575 people on their perception of courts and the 
police.25 The results of this study were published in his book ‘Why people obey the 
law’.26 As the title of the book indicates, the aim of the study was to understand 
what determines people’s compliance behaviour towards authorities and rules, since 
the good functioning of authorities, and thus also of societies, depends of the 
willingness of people to follow their decisions.27 Tyler wanted to propose an 
alternative non-instrumental model for maintaining social order, in contrast to the 
traditional model based on the assumption that compliance depends on 
deterrence.28 Deterrence assumes that people will comply with rules and decisions 
depending of the rewards and punishments they receive,29 while a non-instrumental 
model implies that people comply with the law on a self-regulatory basis.30  
Tyler’s main assumption was that compliance is influenced by people’s 
perception of authorities’ legitimacy. Legitimacy implies that people’s behaviour can 
be based on ‘the belief that some decision made or rule created by these authorities 
is “valid” in the sense that it is “entitled to be obeyed” by virtue of who made the 
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 Allan Lind and Tom Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Springer, 1988), at 134-135. 
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 It is noteworthy, however, that, contrary to Thibaut and Walker, Leventhal did not base his theory 
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about what makes a procedure fair’ Allan Lind and Tom Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural 
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 Tom Tyler, ‘What is procedural justice?: Criteria used by citizens to assess the fairness of legal 
procedures’, 22 Law and Society Review, (1988) and Tom Tyler, Why People Obey The Law (Princeton 
University Press, 2006). 
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 Tom Tyler, Why People Obey The Law (Princeton University Press, 2006), at 8. The study was 
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second round a random group of 804 people were interviewed a second time  
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 Tom Tyler, Why People Obey The Law (Princeton University Press, 2006). 
27
 Tom R. Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts’, 44 Court Rev. J. Am. Judges Assoc. (2007), 26-27. 
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 Tom Tyler, Why People Obey The Law (Princeton University Press, 2006), 269. 
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 Idem, 20-22. 
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 Idem, 271. 
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decision or how it is made’.31 The Chicago study confirmed this assumption; it found 
that ‘[p]eople who regard legal authorities as legitimate are found to comply with 
the law more frequently’.32  
Additionally, Tyler examined what shapes people’s legitimacy views of 
authorities and he found that the level of procedural fairness was the key to people’s 
legitimacy perceptions of authorities. 33 When people were treated in a procedurally 
fair way, meaning in a respectful, unbiased and caring way, they evaluated 
authorities to be more legitimate. Thus, procedural fairness was found to indirectly 
influence people’s law-related behaviour as follows: 
 
 
Procedural fairness was even found to be a more important determinant 
than the outcome of the case in people’s perception of authorities.34 In fact, when 
the procedure was perceived to be fair, the outcome was more easily accepted, even 
when the outcome in a case was unfavourable for the applicant.35 
Tyler also examined what determined people’s procedural fairness 
perception. He discerned four criteria that were found to be particularly relevant in 
the context of courts:36  
1. Neutrality (are people treated in an unbiased and equal way?) 
2. Trustworthiness (are authorities benevolent, can they be trusted?) 
3. Respect (are people treated with dignity and respect?) 
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32
 Idem, 64. 
33
 Idem, 103. 
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4. Voice/participation/representation (do people have the opportunity to 
express their side of the story?).  
These criteria will be fully discussed in the following chapters of this 
dissertation.37  
Now that the relevance of procedural fairness for courts was established, and 
the criteria underpinning procedural justice assessments determined, Tyler and Lind 
turned to the question why exactly people value being treated in a procedurally fair 
manner.38 
2.1.4. Lind and Tyler: The group-Value Model: Why Does Procedural Justice 
Matter to People? 
Why is it that people care so much about procedural fairness? Initially, in the 
research of Thibaut and Walker, it was assumed that people care about the fairness 
of the process for instrumental reasons, namely the belief that a fair process would 
lead to a fair outcome.39 Lind and Tyler, however, developed the so-called group-
value model, in which they advanced relational reasons to explain the psychological 
underpinnings of procedural fairness.40 According to this model, people value being 
treated in a respectful, neutral and caring way and having their voice considered in 
the process, because all these elements communicate to them that they are valued 
and respected members of the group.41 In other words, this treatment recognizes 
people’s inclusion within society.42 This in its turn has an impact on people’s feelings 
of self-worth.43 By contrast, when people are treated unfairly, authorities and Courts 
communicate that they are considered marginal members of society.44 The principle 
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176; Tom R. Tyler, ‘Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to Legal 
Authorities’, 25 Law Soc. Inq. 983–1019 (2000), at 1001; Tom R. Tyler, Peter Degoey and Heather 
Smith, ‘Understanding why the justice of group procedures matters: A test of the psychological 
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underlying the group-value model can therefore be represented as follows: 
   
In a further step in the procedural justice research, this model was tested in 
diverse (multicultural) contexts where several groups existed next to each other in 
society.45 Several research studies showed that in this context people belonging to 
minority groups and majority groups both care about procedural fairness equally and 
that they use the same criteria for their procedural fairness evaluation.46 Deeper 
research showed that this finding applies as soon as people identify with the 
superordinate group, e.g. the broader society.47  
These findings are particularly relevant in a context of diversity and in the 
context of the freedom of religion case law of the Strasbourg Court, as will be argued 
below.48  
In what follows, I will first summarize how Brems and Lavrysen apply this 
procedural justice framework to human rights adjudication, in particular in the 
context of the case law of the Strasbourg Court.  
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2.1.5. Brems and Lavrysen: Procedural Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights 
 Brems and Lavrysen explore the potential of procedural justice research in 
the context of human rights adjudicating bodies with a focus on the European Court 
of Human Rights.49 They start from the observation that ‘strengthening these bodies’ 
capacity to deliver justice in a way that strengthens their legitimacy as well as overall 
“customer satisfaction” is important’.50 Through procedural justice, the Court can 
strengthen its legitimacy and compliance with its decisions, which is essential for 
ensuring its adequacy in protecting human rights.51 Procedural justice could, 
according to the authors, contribute by creating a ‘reservoir of good will’, which is 
especially needed in cases concerning ‘controversial and divisive issues’, with which 
the Court is regularly confronted.52 Brems and Lavrysen additionally accord 
particular importance to the finding that ‘delivering procedural justice might be 
critical in preventing the alienation of minorities’.53 They also stress the importance 
of procedural justice for victims of human rights violations, where strengthening 
feelings of self-worth through procedural fairness might help in the psychological 
recovery process.54 The authors advance substantive reasons for stressing the 
particular value of procedural justice for a human rights court, since it comes close to 
the ‘core business’ of the substantive work they do.55 Finally, they argue that 
‘[r]egardless of its impact on legitimacy’, procedural justice should matter ‘simply 
because it is part of the value system they represent’.56 
Brems and Lavrysen propose a two-level model of procedural justice for 
human rights adjudicating bodies such as the Strasbourg Court. First, they argue that 
the Court should deliver procedural justice in its own proceedings. The Court should 
make sure to rule in a neutral, accurate, respectful and trustworthy way and to 
represent the voice of the applicant in its judgments. At a second level, the authors 
argue that the Court ‘could be a watchdog of procedural justice in human rights 
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 Eva Brems and Laurens Lavrysen, ‘Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The European 
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matters at the domestic level’ and should therefore also assess whether procedural 
justice has been done in their examination of human rights claims.57  
In what follows, I will further explore the potential of procedural justice for 
the Strasbourg Court in the particular context of religious diversity.  
2.2. Potential of the Concept of Procedural Justice for the Freedom of Religion Case 
Law of the Strasbourg Court 
Differences in viewpoints and values are inherent to every society and so are 
the debates and conflicts accompanying them. This is certainly the case in a 
religiously diverse context, such as in Western Europe, where different views and 
needs regularly lead to heated debates on whether or not to accommodate (or ‘de-
accommodate’58) religious practices.59 These developments pose challenges for 
courts,60 including the European Court of Human Rights, which is also increasingly 
confronted with individual religious claims.  
In this section, I will first reflect on how procedural fairness can play an 
important role in maintaining social cohesion in a religiously diverse context and the 
role it can play for the Strasbourg Court. Next, I will focus on the particular 
importance of procedural fairness in cases concerning people belonging to religious 
minority groups. 
2.2.1. Procedural Fairness: A Universal Bridge-Building Concept in a 
Diversity Context 
The diversification of society surely poses challenges for courts,61 including 
the European Court of Human Rights. In general, it is not always possible for 
authorities to reconcile the different viewpoints or to accommodate the particular 
needs of all. In this context, the findings on procedural justice are particularly 
relevant. If people were to question the Court’s legitimacy every time unfavourable 
decisions were taken, the good functioning of the Court would be constantly at risk. 
Also, it would be problematic if people refrained from turning to the Court with their 
human rights claims as soon as they evaluate previous decisions as unfavourable. 
Hence, the procedural justice model, stressing that people care not only about 
outcomes, but also, significantly, about the fairness of the process, advances a way 
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of dealing with conflicts which ensures that the legitimacy of the Court is not 
threatened and which avoids aliening people from the protection of the Court.62 The 
fact that people, when treated fairly, accord legitimacy to authorities independently 
of the outcomes received, creates a ‘reservoir of support’.63 This does not mean, 
however, that people need to agree with decisions; instead, it involves their keep 
their belief in the Court, despite the disagreement.  
In a diversity context, this is relevant from the perspective of people 
belonging to both majority and minority groups. On the one hand, authorities will 
not always be able to accommodate minority needs. It is, however, important that 
people understand why this is the case and that it is clear to them that the authority 
genuinely examined the claim and concerns. On the other hand, sometimes 
authorities will take decisions aimed at including people belonging to minority 
groups, such as affirmative action, which might not be well received by members 
belonging to majority groups.64 It is therefore important that authorities also make 
sure that these measures are well explained and that people belonging to the 
majority have an opportunity to voice their concerns.65 Hence, Tyler’s procedural 
justice model can be advanced as a ‘strategy [that] could potentially be very 
effective in reconciling individual differences in beliefs and values’.66  
Fortunately, as noted earlier procedural justice research shows that people 
belonging to minority and majority groups both value procedural fairness in the 
same way.67 This shows that the concept of procedural fairness is a universally 
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shared value. It is something people have in common, no matter what background 
they have. People in general expect or wish to be treated with respect and dignity, to 
have their voice considered by a neutral decision maker and to have their concerns 
taken seriously by courts. Procedural fairness is a concept that binds people, instead 
of exacerbating differences. While at a substantive level claims for structural 
inclusion (for example through accommodation) mostly revolve around the inclusion 
of one group by the other,68 this procedural aspect of the case is shared across group 
boundaries. As such, as Tyler argues, ‘procedural justice may be a better bridge 
across social and ideological groups than distributive justice’.69 70  
 
2.2.2. Procedural Fairness: A Concept Particularly Relevant for Religious 
Minorities 
Procedural justice matters for everyone and should thus be applied in all 
cases. Yet, several reasons can be adduced why a good procedural justice approach 
is particularly relevant when minorities are involved. These arguments are twofold. 
First, when minorities are involved, the Court should be even more attentive so as 
not to alienate them. Second, the underpinning factor of inclusion makes the 
relevance of procedural fairness in cases concerning religious minorities self-evident.  
2.2.2.1. To Avoid the Alienation of Religious Minorities 
‘We believe that we cannot trust the justice of the Court.’ With these words 
in a letter addressed to the Court, Fazilet Partisi withdrew its case from the Court’s 
jurisdiction, hoping that the Court would be ‘more respectful’ in the future and more 
‘careful and just in its examination of applications of all individuals living in Europe’.71 
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In their letter of withdrawal, Fazilet Partisi argues that these judgments show that 
the Court ‘has prejudices towards Muslim communities’. Hence, rather than 
referring to the outcomes in the cases, Fazilet Partisi refers to shortcomings in the 
reasoning. They refer to ‘arbitrary interpretations’ in the case of Leyla Sahin72 and 
they accuse the Court of being prejudiced, hostile and biased towards Muslims.73 
Hence, they motivate their distrust in the Court mainly by referring to procedural 
fairness elements.  
As argued earlier, this kind of situation should absolutely be avoided by the 
Court.74 This is not only for the benefit of the Court, in that it needs to keep a strong 
reputation as a prominent and trustworthy human rights institution and as the 
representative, or at least as the guardian, of European human rights norms, but it is 
also in the interest of the rights holder, who should be able to trust the Court in 
order to complain about human rights violations.  
This is of general importance, no matter which right is at stake or who the 
applicant is, but it is particularly relevant for disadvantaged groups such as religious 
minorities.  
The first reason why extra attention should be paid to procedural fairness in 
cases concerning people belonging to minority groups is that they are in general less 
trustful towards authorities than members of majority groups.75  
A second reason that can be advanced is that it is particularly important that 
the Court does not alienate minorities from its protection, since the Court can be of 
particular importance for them. As posited earlier,76 the Court has an important 
counter-majoritarian role to play in correcting the inherent inegalitarian effects of a 
democratic system where people belonging to minority groups by definition have 
less weight in the scale and a voice less heard.77 The importance of avoiding 
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alienation can be illustrated as follows:  
 
2.2.2.2. To Avoid Feelings of Exclusion  
As procedural justice research shows, people value being treated in a 
procedurally fair way because it has a positive effect on their feelings of self-worth.78 
Indeed, when courts treat people in a respectful, neutral and caring way and when 
people are given a voice in the proceedings, courts communicate that they are 
valued and respected members of the group79 and thus enhance the feeling of 
inclusion.80 Conversely, when people are treated with disrespect, this communicates 
that they are marginal members of the group.81 
Hence, when applying procedurally fair standards, the Court has an 
opportunity to contribute to the inclusion of minorities in society: 
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This is particularly relevant in the context of religious minorities, not only 
because minorities are more prone to marginalization in society, but also because 
claims made by religious minorities in the context of freedom of religion will often 
concern claims for inclusion. Indeed, when an applicant complains about an absence 
of adapted diets in prison,82 or a prohibition against manifesting religion through 
clothing at school or at work,83 or a refusal by employers to adapt work schedules,84 
these claims essentially ask for the ability to participate in public life without having 
to sacrifice personal religious identity. In other words, these claims can be 
interpreted as being motivated by the need to be included.85  
Evidently, as mentioned earlier, inclusion through the substantive 
accommodation of religious needs is not always possible. By contrast, taking an 
inclusive stance through procedural fairness is. And in cases where claims for 
substantial inclusion cannot be met, it can be argued that it is even more important 
to pay attention to the procedural fairness aspect in order to avoid people belonging 
to religious minorities feeling excluded all the way. Procedural fairness gives an 
opportunity to make clear to people that despite the fact that they cannot be 
accommodated in a particular context, they are considered to be valued members of 
society.86  
The Court also needs to take into account that although its judgments are 
applicable only to one case, the impact it can have is much broader. Applying a 
procedurally fair approach is not only directly relevant to one applicant in one 
particular case, but indirectly the Court can also reach a broader group of people 
who identify with the applicant or his or her claim.87 Thus, when the Court makes 
generalizing or biased statements in one case, this will resonate with other people 
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who identify with the applicant in that particular case.88 The Court therefore has an 
opportunity to send a message of inclusion to a broader group through the 
application of procedural fairness in one case. Also, from an institutional point of 
view, the Court should fulfil an exemplary role for other authorities, for example at 
the domestic level. When therefore the Court acts against procedural fairness 
standards, other instances could feel entitled to do the same. The opposite can be 
true as well. When the Court treats applicants in a particular context in a respectful 
way, courts at the domestic level may follow suit as well.89  
 
At the same time, as proposed in the model advanced by Brems and 
Lavrysen, the Court can also be a watchdog of procedural fairness at the domestic 
level, by examining the level of procedural fairness applied by domestic authorities 
in cases that reach the Court.90 As such, the Court can play a corrective function for 
the disadvantage minorities a priori have in society where their voice is by definition 
less powerful.  
2.3. Procedural Fairness: Not a Substitute for Substantive Fairness  
The benefits of procedural fairness, both for courts and for society and 
individuals, are clear. Sceptics might, however, object that procedural fairness could 
be used to cover for a lack of substantive fairness. In fact, the risk exists that 
procedural justice findings may be abused so as to make a lack of substantive 
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fairness acceptable. Tyler and other authors regularly warn against this (ab)use of 
procedural justice research:91 
focusing on the fairness of procedures can obscure the fact that nothing has 
changed in terms of structural inequality, even though people have received 
“symbolic” recognition of their status or rights.92 
The purpose of advancing a procedural fairness approach in this dissertation 
should therefore be made very clear. Procedural fairness is not a substitute for 
substantive fairness and it is not a tool for legitimizing substantive shortcomings. The 
role of courts such as the European Court of Human Rights is still in the first place to 
make sure that justice is done and that people receive the protection they are 
entitled to. Procedural justice is an additional tool which requires the Court also to 
pay particular attention to the way this substantive work is done. As Brems and 
Lavrysen perfectly illustrate, ‘the procedural justice principles are the procedural 
mirror of the substantive work [the Court is] trying to accomplish’.93 Thus, 
procedural fairness and substantive fairness can be examined separately from an 
academic point of view, but they should always be applied jointly for justice to be 
both done and seen to be done. 
In addition, it could even be argued that procedural fairness not only mirrors 
but can also potentially reinforce the substantive work of the Court. When 
applicants’ voices are taken into account, when their concerns are taken seriously 
and are approached in a neutral way, there is an increased likelihood of reaching 
better decisions based on accurate information and of a better understanding of the 
issue at stake. In contrast, when applicants’ perspectives are not taken into account, 
when they are not treated in a neutral way and when their claims and rights are not 
taken seriously, this will most likely also affect the quality of the decision taken.  
 
In the following chapter, the remainder of part II, the freedom of religion 
case law of the Strasbourg Court will be submitted to an in-depth analysis through 
the lens of procedural fairness. This analysis is inspired by the four procedural 
fairness criteria advanced by Tyler and builds on the work of Brems and Lavrysen. I 
will reflect on how these criteria can be shaped in the context of freedom of religion 
claims and subsequently analyse the case law from that perspective. Additionally, on 
a normative level I will also advance ways in which the Court could improve its case 
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law from a procedural fairness perspective.  
In part III of the dissertation, several case studies will be discussed from the 
perspective of inclusion. Chapter 4 will demonstrate how exclusionary aspects of the 
Court’s reasoning are not only found at the substantive level, but also at the 
procedural level. Chapters 5 and 6 will in concreto examine the potential of and 
apply the normative suggestions made from a procedural fairness perspective in the 
specific case-studies of Phull v. France94 and S.A.S. v. France.95 
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CHAPTER III - Procedural Fairness as a Vehicle for Inclusion in the Freedom of 
Religion Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court 
 
“Justice means making sure that this never happens again. 
Making sure that Muslims are respected, are protected, are 
cared for and are not left to live in fear.”  
Dr. Suzanne Barakat1 
 
The religious landscape in Western Europe is becoming increasingly diverse. 
Meanwhile, secularism gains more and more importance2 and anti-Muslim 
sentiments are on the rise.3 In this context, debates on the right to freedom of 
religion are never far away. These debates sometimes tend to be animated, 
polarizing, and ill-informed.4 As the supranational human rights body in Europe, the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereafter “the (Strasbourg) Court”) is inevitably 
confronted with these societal debates, the most recent example being the question 
of the French face veil ban.5 In diverse societies with differing views and interests, 
conflicts are generally unavoidable, including conflicts related to religion. The 
question is, however, how to approach such conflicts in a way that preserves social 
cohesion and inclusion for all. This paper looks at the role of the European Court of 
Human Rights in this respect.  
The first perspective from which conflicts involving religious issues can and 
should be approached is a substantive one, focused on reconciling conflict through 
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, such as article 9 (religious 
freedom).6 Yet inclusion through the finding of substantive solutions will in practice 
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 Suzanne Barakat is the sister of one of three Muslim students shot and killed near the University of 
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sister-American-Sniper-dehumanizes-Muslims-.html. Last accessed on 20 April 2015) This quote struck 
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Tom Lewis (eds.), Religion, rights And Secular Society (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012), 267. 
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p 36. Available at http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/source/prems/HR-Europe-no-grounds-
complacency_ en.pdf. (last accessed: 11 March 2015) 
4
 Grace Davie, ‘Understanding religion in Europe: a continually evolving mosaic’, in Cumper and Lewis 
(eds), Religion, rights And Secular Society, (2012) at 267.  
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 ECtHR, Grand Chamber, S.A.S. v. France, 1 July 2014. 
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 For example, through the application of the concept of reasonable accommodation. See e.g. 
Emmanuelle Bribosia, Julie Ringelheim and Isabelle Rorive, ‘Reasonable Accommodation for Religious 
Minorities : A Promising Concept for European Antidiscrimination Law?’ 17 Maastrich. J. Eur. Comp. 
Law (2010), 137–161. 
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not always be possible. What is always possible, though, is to approach those who 
turn to the Court in search of protection in an egalitarian and inclusive way, 
acknowledging their membership and their equal status in society and avoiding their 
alienation and marginalization. This procedural perspective on inclusion is not 
intended to substitute for a substantive perspective on inclusion; it is instead 
complementary and it is always applicable, regardless of whether favorable or non-
favorable outcomes are reached. 
 This article aims at an in-depth examination of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ article 9 case law7 from a procedural inclusion perspective, rather than from 
the more common substantive perspective. It starts from the assumption that 
treating people in a respectful and unbiased way, regardless of their background and 
the religion they profess, is inherently inclusive. In fact, as will be explained, this is 
confirmed by social psychology research on ‘procedural fairness’, which shows that 
in their contact with legal authorities, people not only care about the outcome they 
receive in their case, but also accord significant importance to the way this outcome 
is reached.8  
 
This article will in a first – theoretical – part list the main findings of social 
psychology research on procedural fairness and will explain how these findings are 
particularly relevant in the context of religious diversity and freedom of religion 
adjudication. In a second – normative – part, it will set out how the factors that 
determine procedural fairness perceptions, namely neutrality, respect, 
trustworthiness, and participation, can be applied to the freedom of religion case 
law of the Court. In the third − both analytical and normative − part, it will examine 
the Court’s case law from a procedural fairness perspective, uncovering procedural 
fairness flaws and making suggestions for improvement. This part will also explain 
the interdisciplinary methodological approach used for the analysis of the case law.  
3.1. Towards more inclusion through freedom of religion case law: a procedural 
fairness perspective 
3.1.1. Procedural fairness: a short introduction 
The Court’s case law under article 9 has been widely examined, debated, and 
criticized as regards its substance. The Court has been criticized for not according 
sufficient importance to article 9 in its adjudication and for having too restrictive an 
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 See infra III.A for an overview of the methodology used.  
8
 See for example one of the most influential works in the field of procedural justice research Tom R. 
Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton Univeristy Press, 2006). 
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approach to the application of the right to freedom of religion in individual claims.9 
The Court has also been accused of holding anti-Muslim bias.10 As a result, many 
authors plead for wider protection and more inclusiveness in the Court’s freedom of 
religion case law.  
While in general I join this plea for inclusion, in this article I explore how the 
Court can also play an inclusive role through procedural fairness. Rather than 
offering a critique of the substantive aspects of the Court’s reasoning relating to the 
level of protection the Court offers under article 9, I look at how the Court through 
its judgments approaches religious applicants and religious claims irrespective of the 
level of protection offered. For example, when the Court questions whether an 
interference takes place with the freedom of religion of a practicing lawyer who 
complains about the fact that the hearing of case is scheduled on a religious holiday, 
the Court is not only limiting the protection of the applicant’s freedom of religion, 
but it also shows a lack of genuine consideration of the applicant’s concern. In this 
study I will argue that that in itself is problematic from the point of view of inclusion.  
This article is inspired by the social psychology findings concerning procedural 
fairness.11 The research in this field shows that people care significantly about the 
way they and their cases are treated by courts. This concern is shown to be even 
more important than their concern with the outcome of their case.12 In the context 
of courts, Tom Tyler, a leading scholar in the field of procedural fairness research, 
discerns four main criteria determining people’s perceptions of procedural fairness.13 
A first criterion being ‘participation’, also frequently called ‘voice’ referring to the 
ability of individuals to express their side of the story and having their views 
considered. A second element is ‘neutrality’, meaning that individuals expect to be 
treated in an unbiased and neutral way. A third criterion is ‘respect’ which refers to 
the need of respecting people’s dignity and having respect for their rights. Finally, 
                                                          
9
 Javier Martínez-Torrón, ‘The ( Un ) protection of Individual Religious Identity in the Strasbourg Case 
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the fourth element concerns ‘trustworthiness’ , meaning that authorities are 
expected to care about people’s concerns and to strive to be just.14  
A central finding of procedural fairness research is that people’s perception 
of procedural fairness shapes their views about the legitimacy of the courts15 and 
influences acceptance of and compliance with decisions.16 Also important is the 
reason why people value procedural fairness. Initially it was assumed that people 
were concerned about procedural fairness for reasons related to the outcome of the 
case.17 However, Tyler and Lind show that relational rather than instrumental 
reasons underlie people’s procedural fairness concerns. People value procedural 
fairness because of the message of inclusion it communicates. Research also shows 
that the procedural fairness findings are universally applicable, irrespective of ethnic 
background.18 Treating people in a respectful, equal, and caring way communicates 
that they are valued members of the group and this message influences people’s 
feelings of self-worth.19 Therefore, applying procedural fairness is particularly 
important in a religiously diverse context in order to foster the inclusion for all and 
to strive for social cohesion despite possible conflicting views.  
3.1.2. Procedural fairness in a religiously diverse context 
Applying high procedural fairness standards in all cases and to all applicants 
the Court is confronted with is important, not least because procedural fairness 
standards are part of the value system the Court represents.20  
However, there are several additional reasons why in cases concerning 
freedom of religion these findings are particularly relevant. First of all, freedom of 
religion claims often concern applicants belonging to minority groups. Since 
minorities are generally less trusting in authorities than people belonging to majority 
groups,21 applying high procedural fairness standards can help to avoid the 
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Institutions?’, 19 Behavioral Sciences and the Law (2001) at 217. 
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 Allan E. Lind and Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Springer, 1988). 
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Court of Human Rights’ 35 Human Rights Quarterly (2013) at 185. 
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Yuen Huo, Trust in the Law, (Russel Sage Foundation, 2002), at 142-146; Tom Tyler, ‘Public Trust and 
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alienation of minorities from the Court.22 Securing the Court’s legitimacy and 
avoiding alienation is all the more important when it comes to more vulnerable 
groups such as religious minorities, because of the corrective function the Court 
should have in protecting “the rights of minority members against abuses of majority 
rule by the dominant group.”23 
Moreover, in the context of sensitive and polarizing debates on religion in 
Western Europe, the Court can act as a beacon of justice and peace, bringing back 
neutrality and accuracy to the debate.24 An example of this can be found in the 
recent case of SAS v. France.25 Although the judgment has been (rightly) criticized on 
a substantive level, among other things for not finding a violation, the Court should 
receive credit for the respectful way it dealt with the (controversial) subject of the 
face veil.26  
Additionally, by applying good procedural fairness standards in its own case 
law, the Court communicates that people are considered valued members of society. 
This is particularly important in article 9 cases since a segment of the claims made 
under this article concerns claims of inclusion. Religious accommodation claims, for 
example, express a need for full inclusion in society, through work and education, 
while at the same time being able to express one’s religious identity. Although 
religious accommodation is not always possible for practical reasons, the least the 
Court can do is to seriously examine the possibilities and to do so in a respectful and 
neutral way.  
These arguments are particularly important because of the broader impact of 
the Court’s decisions. They not only impact on the individual applicants in a case, but 
also affect other people or groups of people who identify with the applicant and/or 
his or her claim. A striking illustration can be found in the letter of Fasilet Partisi27 to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and Legal Institutions?’, 19 Behavioral Sciences and the Law (2001) at 217; Margaret Levi, Audrey 
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 See also Eva Brems and Laurens Lavrysen, ‘Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The 
European Court of Human Rights’ 35 Human Rights Quarterly (2013) at 184. 
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 Eva Brems and Laurens Lavrysen, ‘Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The European 
Court of Human Rights’ 35 Human Rights Quarterly (2013) at 184 with references to Young, James 
and Webster v. The United Kingdom, 13 August 1981 at para 63 and Koky v Slovakia, 12 June 2012. 
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the Court, in which they announce the withdrawal of their case because they had 
lost confidence in the Court after its decisions in Leyla Sahin and Refah Partisi. Fazilet 
Partisi argued, among other things, that the Court was biased against Muslims and 
did not show respect towards them.  
In sum, these elements show that procedural fairness is an important aspect 
to take into account in the Court’s adjudication, especially when people belonging to 
minority groups are involved. In what follows, I will elaborate further on the specific 
components of procedural fairness criteria, and how they can be translated to 
freedom of religion case law.  
3.2. Normative application of procedural fairness criteria in freedom of religion 
case law  
Tom Tyler developed a procedural fairness framework specifically for the 
context of courts based on four procedural fairness criteria.28 This model is applied 
to the case law of the Strasbourg Court in the work of Brems and Lavrysen.29 In this 
section I will further develop this framework specifically in the context of the Court’s 
freedom of religion case law.  
1. Voice30 
Voice refers to the importance applicants accord to being able to participate 
in a case through the expression of their views and arguments,31 irrespective of 
whether or not their voice will impact the outcome of their case.32 However, 
expressing one’s voice is not sufficient in itself; it needs to go hand in hand with 
genuine consideration by the courts.33  
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31
 Tom Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts’, 44 Court Rev. J. Am. Judges Assoc. (2007) at 30 and 
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and Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, ‘The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts’, 63 
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Although applicants’ personal contact with the Strasbourg Court is limited,34 
the Court can ensure this procedural fairness aspect by representing the facts of the 
case and the applicant's arguments in an accurate way in its decisions.35 In the 
context of freedom of religion case law, this includes an accurate representation of 
the applicant’s religious background and of his or her religious claim.  
Since it is also important that the Court genuinely considers the arguments 
made by the applicants, the Court should be transparent in its judgments about its 
reasoning and the way the arguments are taken into account.36 In this regard, mere 
standard formulations such as “having regard to all the evidence in its possession, 
and in so far as it has jurisdiction to examine the allegations, has not found any 
appearance of a breach of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention or 
its Protocols”37 are clearly insufficient if the Court is to take the applicant and his or 
her rights seriously. 
2. Neutrality  
Judges are also expected to be honest, impartial, independent and 
objective38 and to “make decisions based upon rules and not personal opinions.”39 In 
the freedom of religion case law, neutrality involves a representation of the religious 
aspects of the case without expressing value judgments, prejudices or 
generalizations about the applicant’s convictions. This also means that the Court 
should stay away from theological assessments.40 As criticized by many authors, the 
Court clearly fails to do so in cases such as Leyla Sahin41 and Refah Partizi,42 where it 
makes problematic and biased statements about Islam.43 A more recent example can 
be found in Jehovah’s Witnesses, where the Court observes “on a general note” that 
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“the rites and rituals of many religions may harm believers' well-being, such as, for 
example, the practice of fasting, which is particularly long and strict in Orthodox 
Christianity, or circumcision practiced on Jewish or Muslim male babies.”44 
Comparisons of this kind should obviously be avoided. Not only is this comparison 
redundant, but it also stigmatizes other religious practices which are not even at 
issue in the case. 
An additional element of neutrality is consistency. This includes consistency 
across people and cases45 and consistency across time.46 When the Court breaks 
away from a consistent line of case law, it should at least be transparent and 
motivate that decision.47 Comparing the cases of Lautsi and Dahlab, some 
problematic aspects of inconsistency come to the surface. In Lautsi for example, the 
Court states that “it cannot be asserted” that a crucifix on a classroom wall “does or 
does not have an effect on young persons” because there is no evidence that it “may 
have an influence on pupils.” In this case the Court refers to the crucifix as a “passive 
symbol.”48 Compare this with Dahlab, where the Court, referring to the headscarf as 
a “powerful external symbol,” states that “it cannot be denied outright that the 
wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of proselytising effect, seeing that it 
appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and 
which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender 
equality.”49 In the case of Lautsi the Court requires evidence that the crucifix has an 
impact on children, while in Dahlab a theological interpretation suffices for it to 
make strong statements on the wearing of the headscarf. Also, in the first case the 
Court speaks about possible influence or effect on pupils, while in Dahlab the Court 
immediately speaks of a proselytizing effect of the headscarf. The distinction made 
between a ‘passive’ versus a ‘powerful external symbol’ certainly does not suffice to 
explain these different nuances in the reasoning.  
Finally, another aspect of neutrality is the equal treatment of the parties. This 
applies not only across cases, as argued above, but also within a case. This is 
particularly important in the Court’s adjudication since the defendant party is a 
State. The Court should therefore be attentive that the claimant’s arguments are 
sufficiently weighed against the State’s arguments.  
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3. Respect 
While both voice and neutrality are linked to the quality of decision making, 
respect is related to the interpersonal aspect of the decision-making process.50 
People want to feel that their concerns and rights are taken seriously and they want 
to be treated with dignity and respect as individuals and as members of society.51 A 
minimum of respect would be to acknowledge an applicant’s religious concerns. This 
does not mean that the Court should necessarily agree with the applicants’ religious 
views or practices, but, following Heiner Bielefeld, the current Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of religion a starting point would be to have “respect for human beings as 
potential holders of deep, existential convictions.”52 This is particularly important for 
unfamiliar religious needs or claims that might seem ‘frivolous’ from an outsider’s 
perspective. The Court should in any event treat claims with respect, realizing that, 
as Tyler observes, “people come to court about issues that are important to them, 
irrespective of the strength of their legal case.”53 Additionally to showing respect for 
the applicant believer, it is also important that the Court takes the applicant’s rights 
seriously. Yet, as Carolyn Evans argues, in practice, the applicants’ individual right to 
freedom of religion tend to easily be compromised when a conflict with other 
interests arise.54 Like any other human right protected by the Convention, freedom 
of religion should receive appropriate consideration in every individual case. 55 
4. Trustworthiness 
The question whether or not an authority can be considered trustworthy is 
the central element influencing people’s perception of procedural fairness.56 People 
want to feel that judges care about their concerns, that they are “trying to do what is 
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right for everyone involved”57 and that they are making an effort to be fair.58 The 
element of trustworthiness is clearly intertwined with the other criteria. Voice in 
itself is not enough; authorities must also show that the voice is generally 
considered. An authority that is manifestly biased and non-neutral will have a hard 
time showing its trustworthiness.59 Moreover, when authorities do not show respect 
for people’s rights and concerns, this is hard to square with characteristics such as 
sincerely caring. 
This criterion requires the capacity of empathy from judges60 through an 
ability to act in the interests of the parties, taking their concerns at heart. Even when 
judges are not able to give a favorable outcome to one of the parties, they can still 
communicate that the concerns have been viewed, listened to and taken into 
account. An example of such an approach can be found in the case of Pretty v. the 
UK. Although the Court concludes that the applicant’s claim concerning assisted 
suicide does not fall within the protection of article 9, it observes at the same time 
that it “does not doubt the firmness of the applicant's views”,61 which clearly shows 
respect towards the applicant’s concerns. 
In the next part, I extensively explore the article 9 case law of the Court from 
a procedural fairness angle, using the previous four criteria as a guideline. Before 
going to the results of my analysis, I will first explain the methodology followed.  
3.3. An In-Depth Interdisciplinary Analysis of Freedom of Religion Jurisprudence 
3.3.1. Methodology 
 In this article an interdisciplinary approach is not only included at the level of 
the theoretical framework which, as seen above, is influenced by social psychology 
research, but interdisciplinarity also plays an important role at the level of the 
analytical methods used. This section will explain how the case-law analysis for this 
article was undertaken, first by showing how the case law was selected and then by 
uncovering the main principles and techniques employed in the case law analysis.  
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3.3.1.1. Selection of cases 
The corpus of case law that has been analyzed for this article includes those 
cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights under article 9 ECHR from 
November 1998 to July 2014.62 Both judgments and inadmissibility decisions63 are 
included. In a first selection round, the cases declared inadmissible on procedural 
grounds such as non-exhaustion of domestic remedies or inadmissibility ratione 
temporis, were eliminated. Also the cases struck out of the list are left out. After the 
first elimination round, 442 cases were retained for a deeper analysis.64  
3.1.1.2. Method of analysis  
The analysis of the case law took place in two stages. In the first stage the 
case law was explored in an inductive way, inspired by ‘grounded theory’, a common 
method of qualitative analysis in the social sciences. In a second stage the results 
were analyzed specifically from a procedural fairness angle.  
Central to grounded theory is the inductive approach, involving a bottom-up 
mindset where the theory emerges from the data65 instead of starting from a 
hypothesis and then deductively turning to the data in search of illustrations or 
confirmations of the hypothesis.66 The analysis is shaped through the process of 
coding.67 This is a deconstructing process68 in which segments of the data (in my case 
the Court’s judgments and decisions) are categorized under several themes and 
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subthemes that are formed and refined during the analysis.69 For example, under the 
general theme of ‘reasoning’, one of the codes is ‘Alternative’ and this code 
comprises several sub-codes such as ‘Applicant had an alternative’ and ‘Applicant 
could have found an alternative’. These codes were not defined before the start of 
the analysis, but were created during the coding process where it was observed how 
the Court used the concept of ‘alternative’ in diverse ways in its reasoning.70 The 
categorization of the case law already consists of analysis in itself, but the analysis 
also requires constant reflection and comparison during the process of coding.71 
The case law was approached with the following questions:72 how is the 
Court approaching the applicant believer? How is the Court approaching the 
religious aspects of the case? And how is the Court interpreting freedom of religion? 
Only in a second phase of the analysis an explicit examination of the material was 
undertaken from the perspective of the procedural fairness criteria, on the basis of 
the codes and the reflections written down during the coding process.73 In this stage 
it was explored where procedural flaws could be found and accordingly, how the 
judgments might have been improved.  
The combination of both the extensive selection of cases, which were 
examined in chronological order, and the openness of the method used, allowed the 
researcher to have a broader overview and gain a deeper understanding of the 
Court’s article 9 case law, as opposed to the approach of a selective reading of case 
law as a function of certain arguments. It was also helpful to detect procedural 
fairness flaws that are less obviously noticeable with a selective reading of the cases. 
With an examination of the case law limited by a procedural fairness focus, for 
example looking for signs of bias or disrespect, some of the observations made in the 
analysis below would probably not have seen the light.  
Moreover, as the following analysis of the article 9 case law will show, the 
procedural fairness criteria often appear in combination when procedural fairness 
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flaws occur. Therefore, in what follows I choose to present my analysis on three 
levels. First, I explore the Court’s decisions to not examine article 9 claims (B.1.); 
second, at the surface of the reasoning I look at how the Court approaches the 
applicant believer and his or practice (B.2); and third, I look more deeply into the 
reasoning of cases where the Court does proceed to the examination of article 9 
claims (B.3).  
3.3.2. Freedom of religion jurisprudence viewed through a procedural 
fairness lens 
3.3.2.1. Non-examination of article 9 claims 
The perception of procedural fairness depends, amongst other 
considerations, on people’s expectation that they will be respected, meaning that 
their rights and claims will be taken seriously. An interesting question that then 
arises is how this relates to the situation in which the Court does not examine an 
applicant’s article 9 claim. In this part I will explore the different situations in which 
the Court does not examine article 9 claims from a procedural fairness perspective.  
Two main types of situation can be discerned in which the Court decides not to 
examine an applicant’s article 9 claim on its merits. The first occurs at the start of the 
examination of a case (examination under another article alone) and the second 
after one part of the case has already been examined (no separate examination 
needed). 
To start with, often the Court decides to examine a case only under another 
Convention article, even though article 9 was also invoked. Mostly this has to do 
with the fact that the issue at stake does not fall under the scope of article 9, but 
rather under that of another article such as article 10 or article 11. This is a purely 
technical matter which is not necessarily problematic in itself.  
However, it becomes more complicated when the claim made by the applicant 
also contains an aspect related to religion. In the case of Yildirim v. Turkey, for 
example, the applicant, the parent of a stillborn child, claimed that the refusal of the 
hospital to hand over the corpse of the baby for burial according to his religious rites 
violated both articles 8 and 9. The Court decided to “examine these complaints 
solely from the standpoint of Article 8 of the Convention.”74 Putting aside the fact 
that the Court did not motivate why it would only examine the case in light of article 
8, it cannot be denied that burial rites are an important aspect of religious 
experience.75 This can also be deduced from the case, in which the applicant not only 
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asked to be united with his daughter, but also stressed that he wanted to bury her 
according to religious rites. Simply not examining the article 9 claim neither 
acknowledged nor showed respect for this aspect of the applicant’s concerns. The 
Court did the opposite, though, in Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, concerning the 
interference of the state in the appointment of a religious organization’s leader. The 
Court stated that it “does not consider that the case is better dealt with solely under 
Article 11 of the Convention, as suggested by the Government. Such an approach 
would take the applicants' complaints out of their context and disregard their 
substance.”76  
In other cases the Court decides that no separate examination is needed when 
other articles have already been examined. Often it is concluded that the 
examination under article 9 would lead to similar reasoning.77 However, in some 
cases the article 9 claim is different from the claims under other articles and still the 
Court does not examine it separately. In Riera Blume v. Spain,78 for example, a case 
concerning the deprivation of liberty and ‘deprogramming’ of members of a sect, the 
Court decided not to examine the case separately, observing that “the applicants’ 
detention is at the core of the complaints under consideration. Having held that it 
was arbitrary and hence unlawful for the purposes of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention 
(…), the Court does not consider it necessary to undertake a separate examination of 
the case under Article 9.”79  
Another striking illustration is the case of Kavakci v. Turkey.80 This case contained 
several complaints, among which were an article 9 complaint about not being 
allowed to wear a headscarf in parliament while having been democratically elected, 
and a complaint under article 3, Prot. 1 about the limitation of the applicant’s 
political rights. Finding a violation under the second complaint, the Court decided 
not to examine the article 9 complaint, even though this was a major issue for the 
applicant.81  
Not examining complaints for the sole reason that a violation has been found 
under another (unrelated) article can be considered problematic from a procedural 
fairness perspective, since it leaves the applicants’ concerns unanswered and 
communicates that this part of the complaint is less important. Although in the end 
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the applicants won their case, it is not unthinkable, in light of the procedural fairness 
finding that outcome is not the only element that matters, that the unwillingness to 
examine some important aspects of the claim leaves the applicant with an 
unfulfilling victory.  
3.3.2.2. The Court’s approach towards the religious believer 
One of the first things people notice when reading a case is who the applicant 
is and what he is complaining about. In freedom of religion cases this includes the 
applicant’s religious background and practice. As the Court’s description of these 
elements will shape the reader’s first impression of the case, it is therefore 
important commendable that the Court keeps procedural fairness in mind when 
describing these aspects of the case. In this section I will argue that from a 
procedural fairness perspective the Court should remain as neutral as possible and 
should take the applicant’s voice into account when describing the applicant and his 
or her religious practice.  
A.  Naming the religious applicant 
 A detailed analysis of the case law reveals that the Court describes the 
applicant’s religious background or affiliation in multiple ways. 
A first prominent distinction can be observed in the perspective from which the 
Court describes this religious background. Often, the Court announces it as a simple 
fact in an abstract informative way, from an outsider’s perspective, for example that 
the applicants “are Christian.”82 Sometimes, however, the Court incorporates an 
applicant’s perspective. Examples are “the applicant submits that he is a Christian”83 
and “[t]he applicant, who considers himself a member of the Muslim Turkish 
minority.”84 In principle, these different approaches are not problematic in 
themselves. However, when distinct formulations are used in different cases, this 
may raise an issue of neutrality across cases. Consider, for example, the three 
following sentences:  
  A. the applicant is a Buddhist 
  B. the applicant considers himself a Buddhist  
  C. the applicant submits that he is a Buddhist 
Read on their own, all three formulations seem convenient and neutral. But when 
read together, they can come across differently. Sentence A (outsider perspective) 
confirms the applicant’s religious affiliation confidently, while B and C (applicant’s 
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perspective) reflect more reluctance, as if there is doubt about the applicant’s 
religious conviction.  
This perception can be avoided if one of the formulas is consistently used. 
Although both approaches are adequate and neutral when used consistently, in my 
view, literally including the applicant’s self-identification through his or her own 
voice, as in C, brings additional benefits. The approach of sentence C guarantees that 
the formulation used by the Court is an exact reflection of the applicant’s voice, 
which guarantees the Court’s neutrality in the matter.  
A second interesting finding concerns the way the applicant is positioned in 
relation to his or her religious group or community. The applicant believer is 
sometimes described with reference to his or her community, for example as a 
“member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses in Austria,”85 while at other times, the 
applicant is represented as an individual believer, for example “[t]he applicants are 
Jehovah's Witnesses.”86 Here also, both formulations can be considered acceptable 
as long as they reflect the applicant’s voice accurately in how he described him in 
relation to the religious community. In fact, some people consider themselves to be 
believers without necessarily identifying themselves with a community, or what 
Grace Davie calls “believing without belonging.”87 Besides ensuring an accurate 
representation of the applicant’s voice, the use of an insider formulation is also a 
helpful tool for ensuring the Court’s neutrality in personal religious conviction 
matters. Examples of this approach can be found in the case of Sinan Isik v. Turkey, 
where the Court notes that the applicant “stated that he was a member of the Alevi 
religious community.”88  
A third noteworthy observation concerns the use of particular adjectives, such as 
practicing and active when describing the applicant believer, or the use of 
expressions such as deeply or strong to describe the way he believes. For example:  
 
“Mr Harry Hammond, …, was an evangelical Christian … His religious beliefs were 
deeply held and he had a desire to convert others to his way of thinking.”89 
And: 
“The first applicant, …, is a practising Coptic Christian.”90  
 
It is not clear whether these expressions were used by the applicants in their 
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submissions or whether they were added by the Court.91  
Obviously, when these are not the applicants’ words the Court cannot, just by 
deduction, add its interpretation to the case, since the level of practice or whether 
someone holds strong beliefs is a subjective matter which is difficult to objectively 
assess. Some may, for example, practice regularly and others only occasionally.92  
Even if the presentation of the facts is based on the submission, the additional 
question arises whether the Court consistently mentions the reference to, for 
example, ‘practicing’ in all cases where the applicant defines himself as such in his 
application. If the Court only selectively refers to whether or not an applicant is 
practicing (when mentioned by the applicant) the Court risks creating a perception 
of bias.93 It cannot be denied that information about a (positive) level of practice or 
the fact that the applicant’s beliefs are deeply held impacts the impression about the 
applicant in a positive way, which can be problematic where practice is inconsistent. 
If, however, the Court consistently reproduces this kind of description when 
mentioned by applicants, there is less of a problem. Nonetheless, to avoid any doubt 
about the neutrality of the Court and to ensure an accurate representation of the 
applicant’s voice, it should preferably be clear from the judgment that these 
descriptions come from the applicant. The easiest way to achieve this is through a 
phrase such as ‘the applicant states that he is a practicing Christian’.  
B.  Naming the applicant's religious practice 
The Court has repeated time and again that article 9 “does not protect every act 
motivated or inspired by a religion or belief.”94 Nevertheless, the criteria it uses to 
determine what it considers a manifestation of religion are not very clear.95 For a 
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long time the criterion seemed to be that an applicant should prove that a certain 
practice was required by his religion,96 but in other cases the Court applied a 
subjective approach in which the applicant’s experience was centrally placed.97 In 
more recent cases the Court has broadened its viewpoint by only requiring an 
intimate link to the religion or belief.98  
In this part I will identify how the Court defines religious practices, in particular 
focusing on the perspective from which it does that, and I will analyze from a 
procedural fairness angle what are the benefits and pitfalls of the different 
approaches.  
 
In its representation of the manifestation of religion, the Court distinctively uses 
an insider and an outsider perspective. 
With the insider or subjective approach, the Court puts the applicant’s voice at 
the forefront. It is the applicant’s view that determines whether a certain behavior is 
a manifestation of religion. In Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey,99 for example, a case 
concerning people wearing religious apparel in the public space, the Court stated 
that “the applicants were members of a religious group named Aczimendi and they 
considered that their religion required them to dress in this way.”100 As such, the 
Court showed respect for the applicants’ agency in defining their own religious 
practice and through this formulation reflected the applicant’s voice in the 
judgment. Moreover, this approach takes away the risk of not being neutral since by 
repeating how a certain practice is considered by an applicant, the Court does not 
venture into theological issues and avoids expressing value judgments on the 
particular practice.  
Although this approach at first sight seems procedurally fair, an important 
qualification needs to be expressed. An insider approach will only truly guarantee 
neutrality when used consistently across cases. When we look, for example, at cases 
concerning the wearing of religious apparel, it is interesting to see that all cases 
involving Muslims use the insider approach when defining the religious practice.101 In 
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Kurtulmus v. Turkey, for example, the Court stated that it “will proceed on the basis 
that the rules … constituted interference with her right to manifest her religion, as 
she considered that Muslim women have a religious duty to wear the Islamic 
headscarf.”102 This reasoning was inspired by the judgment Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, in 
which the Court found that the applicant’s “decision to wear the headscarf may be 
regarded as motivated or inspired by a religion or belief” because she “said that, by 
wearing the headscarf, she was obeying a religious precept” and the Court did not 
want to make statements about “whether such decisions are in every case taken to 
fulfill a religious duty.”103 Although the applicants’ agency is given a prominent place 
in these judgments, the formulation used communicates, as Evans argues, a certain 
reluctance to acknowledge “the value and religious importance” of the wearing of a 
headscarf,104 as if the Court is not entirely convinced it is required by Islam.105 This 
finding is even more apparent when compared to cases concerning the Sikh turban, 
in which the Court considers wearing a turban to be a manifestation of religion since 
“the Sikh religion indeed imposes on [male Sikhs] the wearing of a turban in all 
circumstances.”106 Seen in this light, the insider approach used in some cases does 
not necessarily guarantee neutrality, especially because of the inconsistent approach 
of the Court. Nor, however, is the outsider approach unproblematic.  
 When an outsider approach is used, the applicant’s voice is not included when 
describing a manifestation of religion. The most obvious example is the one 
concerning the Sikh turban already mentioned above.107 Another illustration can be 
found in Kuznetsov a.o. v. Russia where the Court stated: “It is undeniable that the 
collective study and discussion of religious texts by the members of the religious 
group of Jehovah's Witnesses was a recognised form of manifestation of their 
religion in worship and teaching.”108  
Although the claims made by the applicants in these cases are individual ones, the 
Court makes general statements about what a religion requires or recognizes as a 
manifestation. Not only is the lack of participation problematic from a procedural 
fairness perspective, but also the fact that by making this kind of generalizing 
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statement the Court enters into the theological field.109 This approach inherently 
contains a risk of excluding practices that are less well known, whether from less 
familiar religions or from minority or dissident voices within religions, and it neglects 
the diversity of interpretation that is present within them.110 Potential future 
applicants who represent minority voices within a religion might feel less inclined to 
go to a Court that interprets their religion in terms of the majority interpretation.  
The problematic nature of this approach becomes clearer in cases in which the 
Court, from an outsider perspective, decides that a certain practice is not required by 
a religion. In Jones v. The UK,111 for example, a father complained about the fact that 
he was not allowed to incorporate a photograph in the stone on his child’s grave. 
The Court rejected the claim “ratione materiae,” stating: 
[I]t is irrelevant for this purpose that the church of which the applicant is a 
member permitted such photographs, for it cannot be argued that the 
applicant’s beliefs required a photograph on the memorial or that he could not 
properly pursue his religion and worship without permission for such a 
photograph being given.112  
Here, the Court not only made a statement about what the applicant’s belief 
required, it also decided for the applicant whether or not he could “properly pursue” 
his religion without that particular practice. Hence, in this case the Court clearly 
failed the representation and neutrality test and did not show respect for the 
applicant’s claim. 
 Another illustration can be found in Kovalkovs v. Latvia,113 a case concerning a 
prisoner following the Hare Krishna movement, where the Court considered “that 
restricting the list of items permitted for storage in prison cells by excluding items 
(such as incense sticks) which are not essential for manifesting a prisoner’s religion is 
a proportionate response to the necessity to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others.”114 Here also it was decided for the applicant what elements were essential 
for manifesting his religion. However, the Court’s conclusion was based on an expert 
opinion gained from a religious authority within the Hare Krishna movement.115 
Expert evidence might make the Court’s reasoning more objective, since it is not 
the Court that makes the theological assessments. However, basing the assessment 
solely on the advice of a religious organization might not solve the problem of 
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possible exclusion of minority voices.116 There might be divergent interpretations 
within one religion and the authorities’ interpretation would logically be the 
dominant one. Hence, the choice of one particular authority might inherently 
contain bias.  
From this analysis it follows that, from a procedural fairness perspective, an 
insider approach, if used consistently, should be favored. As argued by Evans, this 
approach is to be favored over the Court determining what is or is not required by a 
religion, especially so as to guarantee neutrality towards minority voices.117 In its 
recent S.A.S. judgment, the Court applied this to the wearing of the face veil in 
stating, referring to the principles set in Eweida: “It cannot therefore be required of 
the applicant either to prove that she is a practising Muslim or to show that it is her 
faith which obliges her to wear the full-face veil. Her statements suffice in this 
connection.”118  
3.3.2.3. Religious applicant weighing less in the Court’s scale 
While the previous section focused on the approach of the Court towards the 
religious background and practices of the applicant, this section will go more deeply 
into the Court’s reasoning and aims at uncovering more structural problematic 
aspects from a procedural fairness perspective. Firstly, it will show how the Court 
sometimes fails to recognize the issue at stake and secondly, it will examine 
procedural fairness flaws at the level of balancing. 
A. Non-acknowledgment of applicant’s religious concerns 
People want to be taken seriously. Therefore, they expect judges to show care for 
their personal concerns119 and to genuinely consider their arguments. This involves 
in the first place a full recognition of the issue at stake. However, the Court regularly 
fails to do so, as I will reveal in this part.  
a) “It does not concern the applicant’s religion or religious practice” 
In multiple cases the Court states that it is not the applicant’s religion or religious 
belief that forms the basis of certain restrictive measures, but broader principles 
such as secularism, the protection of public order, and the rights of others, or even 
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the conduct of the applicant him/herself. For example, in Dahlab v. Switzerland,120 a 
case concerning a prohibition on teachers on wearing a headscarf, the Court stated 
that “the decision in issue was based on [the requirements of protecting the rights 
and freedoms of others and preserving public order and safety] and not on any 
objections to the applicant’s religious beliefs.”121  
Similarly, in Kurtulmus v. Turkey,122 this time concerning a veiled university 
professor who was prohibited from teaching, the Court found that secularism was 
“the paramount consideration underpinning the rules”123 and not “objections to the 
way a person dresses as a result of his or her religious beliefs.”124  
The Court seems to be missing the point here, since the question at stake is not 
whether the state has objections to the applicants’ religion or religious practice, but 
the limitation the regulations place upon the applicants’ right. Hence, by focusing on 
the motives of the authorities, the Court is shifting attention away from the 
applicants’ concerns. At the same time, the Court is also denying or at least 
minimizing the issue at stake, since the applicants are in fact undeniably limited 
because of their religious clothing. This could be compared to saying that someone is 
not fired because of her political conviction, but because of the neutrality rules of 
her employer. Both concern the same issue, and only the perspective from which the 
issue is described is different. This kind of reasoning contains a lack of recognition of 
the applicant’s concern and does not give the impression that the Court is 
considering all the interests at stake equally.  
A striking illustration can also be found in a case concerning the discharge of a 
military officer. The Court similarly reasoned that the decision “was based not on the 
applicant’s religious beliefs and opinions, nor on the fact that his wife or relatives 
wore an Islamic scarf, nor on the manner in which he performed his religious duties, 
but on his conduct and activities in breach of military discipline and the principle of 
secularism,”125 while the State implicitly acknowledged that these elements were in 
fact part of the reasons leading to the applicant’s discharge.126 This raises questions 
about the seriousness with which the Court approached this (and other similar) 
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cases.127  
In other cases the Court even puts the responsibility of the rights-restrictive 
measures on the applicant. In Dogru v. France,128 for example, the Court accepted 
that the expulsion of girls from school for wearing a headscarf “is merely the 
consequence of the applicant's refusal to comply with the rules applicable on the 
school premises – of which she had been properly informed – and not of her 
religious convictions, as she alleged.”129 Here also the Court did not acknowledge 
what the real issue at stake was and even worse, blamed the applicant for the 
limitations on her own rights, while it was exactly about this limitation that she had 
complained.130 
This kind of reasoning can hardly be perceived as procedurally fair; it shows a lack 
of acknowledgement and understanding of the applicants’ concerns and interests 
and does not give the impression that their rights are taken seriously. Moreover, the 
main perspective adopted here is that of the authorities implementing the rules 
rather than that of the applicant whose rights are limited because of the rules.  
b) “The applicant can practice his religion in an alternative way”  
The Court sometimes refers in its reasoning to the existence of alternative ways 
of manifesting one’s religion. I will argue, however, that the proposed alternatives 
cannot always be considered real and will show how the reasoning concerning 
alternatives sometimes contains procedural fairness shortcomings.  
i. Fake alternatives to manifesting religion 
 Non-comparable alternative 
When applicants have at their disposal alternatives for manifesting their religion, 
it is reasonable that the Court takes them into account in its analysis. However, the 
Court should be careful that the suggested alternatives are at least comparable to 
the way the applicant has to or wants to manifest his religion.  
Take, for example, the case of Astrianu v. Romania,131 in which the applicant 
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complained about the confiscation of religious cassettes and a cassette player in 
prison. The prison authorities admitted only to confiscating the player and claimed 
to have offered Astrianu the opportunity to listen to his cassettes on a player 
provided by the prison. Because of this proposed solution, the Court found no 
appearance of a violation and also noted that the applicant “had been allowed to 
attend religious seminars, and … could read religious books.”132 It is perfectly 
understandable that the Court referred to the available alternative cassette player; 
the second part of the reasoning is, however, problematic.133 The Court seems to 
have suggested that these religious practices can be considered substitutes for 
listening to the cassettes, especially since the applicant did not complain about not 
being able to attend religious seminars or read religious books.134 The Court was 
deciding for the applicant how he could practice his religion and was, moreover, 
comparing non-comparable alternatives.  
Another illustration of the reference to non-comparable alternatives can be found 
in Indelicato v. Italy,135 in which a detainee falling under a strict detention regime 
complained about not being allowed to attend mass. The Court reasoned that since 
the applicant could follow the mass from his prison cell (by hearing it), “he was not 
deprived of the possibility to practice his religion.”136 It is perfectly defensible that 
prisoners’ rights can be limited for security reasons; the problematic aspect of this 
reasoning is, however, that the Court gave the impression that listening to the mass 
from a cell was a fully comparable alternative to attending the mass in person, which 
is an embellished representation of reality. The fact that the Court considered this 
non-comparable alternative as proof that the applicant was not prevented from 
practicing his religion showed very little sensitivity towards his concerns and in fact 
denied the real issue at stake.  
 Free inside and outside limits imposed  
In some cases the Court suggests that the applicant turn to an alternative 
way of manifesting his or her religion, either by adapting to the restrictive context or 
by moving the manifestation to another context.  
A first illustration can be found in the reasoning that people are free within 
some limits to practice their religion. This reasoning can be found in numerous 
cases137 against Turkey concerning the discharge of military officers138 and also in 
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Leyla Sahin, where the Court stated that “it is common ground that practicing 
Muslim students in Turkish universities are free, within the limits imposed by the 
constraints of educational organisation, to manifest their religion in accordance with 
habitual forms of Muslim observance.”139 
This approach did not show a genuine understanding of the applicant, especially 
because the limits imposed were exactly what she was complaining of as they 
infringed her rights. It is needless also to explain that “being free within the limits 
imposed” contains a contradiction. Moreover, by stating that Sahin could manifest 
her religion “in accordance with habitual forms of Muslim observance,” the Court 
was crossing the neutrality line. The Court was not only saying what the applicant 
could do as a practice (habitual forms of observance), it indirectly also said that 
wearing a headscarf did not constitute a habitual form of Muslim observance, which 
brought the Court into the theological domain.  
In a case against France, Pichon and Sajous,140 concerning religious pharmacists 
who refused to sell anti-contraceptive medicines, the Court applied similar 
reasoning: “the applicants cannot give precedence to their religious beliefs and 
impose them on others as justification for their refusal to sell such products, since 
they can manifest those beliefs in many ways outside the professional sphere.”141 
Here also the Court limited the context in which the applicants could exercise their 
religion, only this time the Court said that they were free ‘outside’ the limits imposed 
on their work context to practice their religion. 
Although the conclusion of the Court is perfectly defendable, it could have 
reached it in a more procedurally fair way, in the first place with more respect 
towards the applicant’s conviction and at least acknowledging their concerns. The 
way the Court formulated its argument seems as if it did not perceive the 
interference with the applicants’ freedom of religion.142 The Court’s statement that 
they could “manifest those beliefs in many ways outside the professional sphere” is 
painfully ignorant, first, because this would imply that freedom of religion does not 
apply to the professional sphere, which is not correct if the applicant’s right was to 
be taken seriously, and second, because the alternative suggested here by the Court 
did not show understanding of the applicants’ religious praxis or that their 
arguments had been truly listened to.  
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Both cases deal with religion as a set of independent rules from which one can 
easily cherry-pick the rules one wants to follow and not as a way of life applicable in 
and outside the private sphere.143 If the claims of the applicants had been listened to 
carefully, the Court should have been able to take in the following inescapable 
message: when removing her headscarf at the university entrance, Sahin would also 
have had to put aside her religious principles, while Pichon and Sajou would have 
struggled with leaving their principles aside whenever they put their lab coats on. 
Acknowledgment of these concerns is however missing in the Court’s decisions.  
ii. A fake alternative to securing the freedom of religion 
Religious accommodation claims in daily life settings such as work or school often 
uncover a dilemma where people are compelled to choose between exercising their 
religion and being able to participate fully in daily life activity.144  
 This dilemma, if truly understood, is not always fully recognized by the Court, 
such as in Sessa v. Italy.145 This case concerned a Jewish practicing lawyer requesting 
an adjournment of the hearing of his client, which was scheduled on a Jewish 
religious holiday. After the domestic court declined his request, he chose to 
celebrate his religious holiday and to not attend the hearing. This choice led to the 
Court’s argument that “first, it is not contested that the applicant was able to fulfill 
his religious duties”,146 insinuating that no interference with his right took place. 
Next, the Court stated that the applicant could have fulfilled his professional duties 
by finding a replacement for the hearing. There are two things going on in this 
reasoning. First, the Court represented the fact that the applicant celebrated his 
holiday as a fully free choice, while the applicant was complaining precisely about 
being compelled to make professional sacrifices if he wanted to fully practice his 
religion. Second, the Court referred to finding a replacement as a logical alternative, 
while having to look for alternatives was precisely part of the applicant’s complaint. 
Hence, the Court denied or at least did not show insight into the underlying issue at 
stake. 
 The same denial can be found in French cases concerning bans on the wearing of 
religious signs in schools, in which the Court found that “the applicants’ religious 
convictions were fully taken into account” since they were able to continue their 
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schooling through distance learning education.147 Here also the Court overlooked the 
fact that the applicants followed distance education because they were compelled to 
do so if they wanted to practice their religion. This is exactly the issue they brought 
under the Court’s scrutiny. The fact that the applicants proposed an alternative 
through the wearing of an adapted form of head covering was, however, not taken 
into account and left to the appreciation of the state. 
Homeschooling and finding someone to replace you at work seems to be the 
alternative the Court favors, while, because of the sacrifices they involve, they 
cannot really be considered alternatives for the enjoyment of the applicants’ rights. 
A procedurally fair assessment should at least involve a genuine and deep balancing 
between all parties’ interests instead of a priori undermining the claim by denying 
the issue at stake. This is a matter of the four procedural fairness criteria. It involves 
a genuine consideration of the applicants’ voices, equal treatment of all parties and 
respect and care for the applicants’ claims and rights. As will be disclosed in the next 
part, however, the Court regularly falls short with respect to this balancing principle. 
B. No balancing 
At the center of people’s perception of fairness lies the question whether 
authorities are trustworthy.148 People assess whether judges make a genuine effort 
to be fair in their case and to what extent they take the several interests into 
account. Balancing can therefore be considered an important determinant of 
perceptions of the trustworthiness of the Court. In fact, balancing is inherently 
contained in the proportionality analysis prescribed by article 9.  
In this section I will explore from a procedural fairness perspective three 
examples of how the Court fails in this balancing exercise.  
a) No motivation/non-reasoning 
In several cases the Court finds no appearance of a violation and concludes that the 
claim is manifestly ill-founded. This occurred, for example, in E.M. and Others v. 
Romania,149 where the relatives of a deceased man complained that because doctors 
had concealed his medical problems, he had been prevented from seeing a priest 
before his death and from obtaining a blessing of his civil marriage with his wife. The 
Court declared this article 9 claim inadmissible, stating that “in the light of all the 
material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its 
competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the 
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rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.”150 No additional 
motivation was provided, even though, on first sight, this claim contained an article 9 
aspect. The fact that the Court did not even explain why it considered the claim 
manifestly ill-founded did not show much respect for the applicants. Did the Court 
even examine the claim? The standard formulation used here suggests the opposite. 
Or did it consider it sufficient to examine the case under their main article 2 
complaint concerning the death of their relative as such? Or did the Court have 
legitimate reasons to come to this conclusion? If so, what were these reasons? 
Transparent motivation would give a better procedural fairness impression, namely 
that the claim was genuinely taken into account. 
The same line of reasoning can also be found in cases concerning religious claims by 
prisoners, especially in cases where prisoners ask to see a priest or to attend a 
religious service in prison.151 This kind of claim is clearly taken less seriously than 
other prisoner’s accommodation claims, such as those concerning dietary 
requirements,152 where the Court undertakes a thorough balancing exercise of the 
several interests at stake which is in strong contrast with the unmotivated (non-
)reasoning that “no appearance of a violation can be found.”153 Although the prison 
context may legitimately require a limitation of people’s rights, the Court should at 
least examine whether these limitations are legitimate in a particular case, or at the 
very least explain why in the Court’s view there is no appearance of a violation. The 
opposite does not give the impression that the Court cares about these claims.  
b) Reproducing the perspective of the state  
No balancing takes place either in cases where the Court in its reasoning 
mainly relies on the perspective and argumentation of one party, in casu the state. 
Between 2001 and 2004, the Court issued a series of decisions concerning Turkish 
military officers’ discharge from the army because of their convictions.154 They 
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allegedly held fundamentalist ideologies and some of their wives were wearing a 
headscarf, which was apparently a problem for the military authorities. It is striking 
to see how lightly the Court went over all these cases. In the more than 60 cases the 
Court used the same reasoning no matter what the facts or the applicants’ 
arguments were. In its reasoning, the Court consistently referred to the decision 
taken by the “commission of nine military officials,” to the restrictive context of the 
army, and to the fact that the applicants had by their own free will joined the 
military. The Court did not require proof of the allegations made by the authorities 
even though sometimes they were strongly refuted with proof by the applicants.155 
Neither did it make an effort to examine whether the reasons invoked for the 
discharge were compatible with the convention; instead, the Court blindly trusted 
the contested decisions made by the military bodies. 
Another illustration of this one-sided approach can be found in the famous 
cases concerning the prohibition of religious signs in France, in which the Court 
borrowed the state’s lens of secularism, through which it examined the cases. In my 
opinion, this can most problematically be observed in Dogru and Kervanci.156 
Although these cases concerned not general school bans on the wearing of religious 
signs, but bans on wearing them in sport classes, mainly because of safety reasons, 
as argued by the state, the Court extensively relied on the principle of secularism in 
order to legitimize those restrictions. The applicants’ side was not considered and 
their arguments, among which were a willingness to find alternatives, were not 
taken into account, as if the decision had already been taken before the case had 
been really well considered.  
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c) Referral to previous case law 
In other cases a lack of balancing can be found in the fact that the Court 
limits its reasoning to a reference to previous case law. Consider, for example, the 
case of Karaduman v. Turkey,157 in which a teacher from an Imam Hatip school was 
compelled to remove her headscarf during class. The Court’s decision consisted of a 
reference to earlier cases, such as Dahlab158 (concerning a primary school teacher in 
Switzerland) and Kurtulmus159 (a University professor in Turkey), but did not take 
into account that Mrs. Karaduman was a teacher of religion in a school with a 
religious philosophy. As such, the factual differences should have led to different 
considerations in a proportionality analysis, namely the fact that the circumstances 
for a religious class teacher are different from those for a general teacher. 
Nevertheless, the Court did not take any of the arguments, concerns, and rights of 
the applicant into account.  
The same can be argued concerning cases in which religious signs were seen 
as a security problem. In Phull v. France,160 a case concerning the security check at 
airports, the Court only referred to X. v. UK,161 a case involving a Sikh complaining 
about the obligation to wear a motor helmet. Yet, while the rule underpinning the 
restriction on wearing a helmet aimed at protecting the life and health of individual 
motorcyclists, the security check at airports had a broader aim of public safety. Also, 
Mr. Phull made very specific arguments, such as the proposal of alternatives to the 
removal of the turban at the security gate, which were not taken into account.162  
A more recent example is the case of Franklinbeentjes and Cefluluz da 
Floresta v. the Netherlands. Here, the Court was confronted with a complaint about 
the confiscation of forbidden products containing drugs, which were used for 
religious rituals by members of a religious group. Instead of balancing the several 
interests at stake, the court mentioned the legislation which forbade keeping such 
products and referred to earlier case law where health was accepted as one of the 
legitimate aims able to limit the freedom of religion. Although it is very 
understandable that these products are forbidden and confiscated, the Court could 
at least have acknowledged the limitation of the applicants’ rights, next to explaining 
why the confiscation did not violate the Convention. Instead, the court chose to 
ignore the applicants’ side in the case and no balancing took place.  
It is not uncommon that the Court refers to previous case law, for example to 
reiterate its general principles; even more, this is a sign of consistency across time. 
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However, this reference should not be considered a substitute for reasoning in 
another case which has its own particularities. Every individual claim should be taken 
seriously, which also implies that it merits its own assessment by the Court.  
 
Conclusion 
This article aimed at exploring procedural fairness as a standard of inclusion in the 
freedom of religion case law of the Strasbourg Court. It did so by building a 
normative bridge between social psychology research and human rights law through 
the application of the concept of procedural fairness to article 9 case law of the 
Strasbourg Court. As the psychology research convincingly shows, doing justice is not 
only about reaching good and fair decisions at a substantive level, it is also about 
doing so in a way that treats people fairly.  
In my extensive study of the article 9 case law, I uncovered procedural fairness 
flaws and made suggestions for improvement at three levels. First, I argued that the 
decision to not examine article 9 claims can sometimes in itself be problematic from 
a procedural fairness perspective when it does not show sufficient care and respect 
for the applicants’ rights and concerns. Secondly, at the surface of the case law I 
showed how some aspects of the Court’s approach towards religious applicants and 
their practices can fall short in accurately representing applicants’ convictions. I also 
showed how the Court is taking risks at the level of neutrality when using 
generalizing statements or when approaching these elements in an inconsistent way. 
Thirdly, I explained how a lack of balancing and a lack of recognition of the issue at 
stake, and of the interests and concerns of the applicant, create an impression of 
untrustworthiness. 
Based on the procedural fairness framework, I advocated for including the 
applicant’s perspective more often in the jurisprudence. In the first place, in order to 
be considered trustworthy the Court should refrain from approaching cases ‘one-
sidedly’ from the perspective of the State and instead also recognize the applicants’ 
claims and concerns and genuinely balance them accordingly with the States’ 
interests. I further argued that the Court should avoid describing applicants and their 
practices from an outsider perspective. I also suggested that when the Court literally 
reflects the applicant’s voice in its judgment, the Court should remove doubt about 
possible bias and avoid the risk of making theological assessments. However, in 
order to guarantee neutrality I strongly recommended consistency in the first place, 
whether an outsider or an applicant’s perspective is chosen. Finally, I stressed the 
importance of motivation and transparency. It is only through transparency in the 
judgment that applicants can evaluate whether their voice has been heard 
accurately, that their arguments have been taken into account and that the Court 
has genuinely made an effort to be fair in the case. Also, when the Court decides not 
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to examine a certain claim, it is essential to explain the motivation for so doing in 
order to show that the Court has taken applicants’ rights and concerns seriously. 
Only then will applicants feel respected not only as applicants but also as human 
beings.  
In sum, this article argues in favor of more inclusion of applicant believers’ 
perspectives in order to improve the level of procedural fairness in the Strasbourg 
Court’s freedom of religion adjudication. This would not only impact the applicant in 
the particular case, but might potentially have a broader societal impact, as social 
psychology research also shows. Through the use of a more inclusive approach in its 
article 9 judgments on a procedural fairness level, the Court has an opportunity to 
contribute to inclusion and social cohesion. In today’s diverse Europe with its 
sensitive debates about religion, the Court, as a supranational human rights body, 
can take up the exemplary role of a beacon of justice, neutrality and respect. This is 
an opportunity the Court should not miss. 
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PART III – IMPROVING THE LEGAL REASONING UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE ECHR. 
THREE CASE-STUDIES 
PREFACE  
In part II, a broad and comprehensive analysis of the freedom of religion 
case-law of the Strasbourg Court was conducted. It uncovered, through an in-depth 
bottom-up methodological approach, that the Court’s article 9 case-law contains 
flaws at the procedural level, and discussed the exclusionary aspects of that case-
law. Additionally, part II explored in general how procedural fairness can be 
understood in the field of freedom of religion claims and argued, on the basis of the 
analytical findings, how the Court’s case-law could accordingly be improved.  
This part, part III of the dissertation, contains three distinct case-studies in the 
domain of freedom of religion, which are complementary to the study conducted in 
part II.  
The first case-study, in chapter IV, concerns religious accommodation claims in the 
workplace. This chapter contains an in-depth analysis of cases concerning work-time 
related and dress code related requests for accommodation in the workplace. 
Contrary to the other chapters, this chapter does not start from the procedural 
fairness framework, but employs an open approach from the perspective of 
inclusion. It uncovers in detail how exclusionary patterns occur both at the 
substantive and at the procedural level. It also uncovers how both levels are closely 
intertwined. This chapter also makes suggestions for improvement of the case law 
using an ‘in-house’ comparative analysis with cases brought under other articles of 
the Convention. This chapter will be followed by an addendum, discussing important 
developments in the case law of the Court concerning accommodation claims in the 
workplace which took place after the initial publication of the chapter.  
Chapter five concerns the particular case of Suku Phull v. France, in which the Court 
issued an inadmissibility decision finding the complaint of a Sikh man who had to 
remove his turban at the airport security check manifestly ill-founded. Using a top-
down approach, this decision is analysed in depth from a procedural fairness 
perspective; the analysis uncovers serious procedural fairness flaws. In the second 
part of this chapter, suggestions for improvement are made based on the procedural 
justice framework. The case is compared to a similar case of the Canadian Supreme 
Court from which inspiration is gained. In a third part, the decision of Suku Phull v. 
France is re-written from a procedural fairness perspective and, in so doing, it is 
transformed into a judgment in which the lack of procedural fairness at the domestic 
level is criticized.  
The third and last case-study, in chapter six, concerns the debate over the face-veil 
bans and anticipates the (at the time of writing) pending case of S.A.S. v. France. The 
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study in this chapter is conducted from the perspective of procedural justice. 
Drawing on empirical knowledge, it first uncovers the serious procedural justice 
flaws at the domestic level in that the decision-making process on the face-veil ban 
in France was characterized by inaccuracy, prejudices and a lack of recognition of the 
perspective of the women concerned. Therefore, in a first normative part, Eva Brems 
and I argue for the Court to redress this situation by pointing out the procedural 
justice flaws which occurred at the domestic level. Subsequently, we argue how the 
Court should do a better job in its own reasoning from a procedural justice 
perspective when examining the claim of S.A.S. This chapter is followed by an 
addendum which discusses the Grand Chamber judgment issued in the case of S.A.S 
on the 1 July 2014. The reflection on the case will be conducted in light of the 
procedural justice arguments made in the chapter.  
The three case-studies aim to look at the Court’s article 9 case-law from a broad 
perspective. While chapter IV concerns a segment of the article 9 case-law, chapter V 
covers one particular case in-depth. Chapter VI, finally, uses an original perspective 
by anticipating a forthcoming case. Moreover, the three case-studies employ 
comparative methods inside and outside the Court’s case-law and include empirical 
research in addition to the legal critical approach. The three case-studies moreover 
expose the importance of improving the procedural aspect of the reasoning in 
freedom of religion adjudication. This aspect is important in itself, but it is also 
closely intertwined with the substantive aspect of the reasoning. 
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CHAPTER IV Religious Accommodation in the Workplace: Improving the Legal 
Reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights1 
Introduction 
Society becomes increasingly religiously diverse and this diversity inevitably 
will and should be reflected in the workplace. Employers are as a consequence more 
and more faced with requests of employees to be able to manifest their religion in 
the workplace2, since for many employee believers religion constitutes an important 
part of their life, which they also want to manifest during their time at work. 
Examples of these religious accommodation claims concern requests for being 
allowed to wear religious signs at work, for having the possibility to pray during 
working hours or to have one’s work-schedules adapted to religious requirements in 
order to be able to respect religious rules concerning, for example, the Sabbath.  
Under the right to freedom of religion, religious accommodation in the 
workplace is one of the domains with which the Strasbourg institutions have been 
confronted during the past decades. The aim of this chapter is to give a 
comprehensive insight in how the Strasbourg institutions (encompassing both the 
former European Commission of Human Rights ‘the Commission’ and the European 
Court of Human Rights ‘the Court’) have been dealing with claims concerning 
religious accommodation in the workplace.  
Two major kind of claims were discerned after a first analysis of the case-law. 
The first group of claims concern issues revolving around work time, such as requests 
for adaptations of work-schedules along individual’s religious needs or requests for 
leave on religious holidays. A second segment of the examined cases concern claims 
involving prohibitions on the wearing of religious attire in the workplace.  
The methodology employed for the selection of case-law is two-fold. The 
Commission cases were selected on the basis of literature study. Several authors 
have extensively researched the case-law of the European Commission of human 
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 This chapter is published in A test of Faith? Religious Diversity and Accommodation in the 
European Workplace, Katayoun Alidade, Marie-Claire Foblets and Jogchum Vrielink (eds.), (Ashgate, 
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The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in International Law, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 
(2003), 213 and Julie Ringelheim, Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: The European Court of 
Human Rights in Search of a Theory?, in A European Dilemma: Religion and the Public Sphere (2012), 
293. 
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Rights concerning the workplace.3 As to the cases of the Court; an extensive manual 
selection of article 9 cases concerning the workplace was conducted for the period 
between 2000 and 2010.4 Of these cases, only the ones concerning accommodation 
issues with regard to work time and religious signs were retained.5  
This chapter can be divided in two major parts. The first part consists of a 
critical analysis of the selected cases from the perspective. The second part searches 
for good practices that could inspire the Court to improve its reasoning in cases 
concerning religious accommodation claims.  
First, the cases concerning work-schedules will be discussed, the majority of 
which are decisions issued by the former Commission of Human Rights. Yet, these 
cases in general played an important role in the future case law of the Court.6 
Secondly, the cases concerning the wearing of religious attire in the workplace will 
be critically analyzed. All of these cases concern prohibitions on the wearing of 
headscarves in the workplace.7 The third part will explore how the Court can 
improve its reasoning in cases concerning religious accommodation in the 
workplace. In doing so, a comparative approach will be undertaken in search of good 
practices in other cases within the Court’s case law. A first comparison will be drawn 
with non-religious but comparable accommodation claims in the field of 
employment brought under other articles of the European Convention on Human 
Rights such as under the right to freedom of expression. A second comparison will be 
drawn with the Court’s jurisprudence in a recent landmark case, Jakobski v. Poland,8 
under article 9 ECHR concerning religious accommodation in a prison context. This 
comparative approach will be followed by concluding remarks.  
In an addendum to this chapter two recent cases concerning religious 
accommodation in the workplace issued after 2010 will be discussed. These cases 
are Sessa v. Italy9 and Eweida and Chaplin v. The UK.10 Both cases were judged after 
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 E.g. L. Vickers, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination at the Workplace (Hart Publishing 2008) 
and Carolyn Evans, Freedom of religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (2001). 
4
 The time of writing of the initial publication of this chapter. An update is written however with two 
major judgments which were issued after the publication of this chapter. See the addendum to this 
chapter. 
5
 From selected cases concerning the workplace, only those concerning accommodation claims have 
been retained. Consequently, cases concerning conflicts due to the religious conviction as such of an 
employee, such as EComHR 1 July 1997, Kalaç¸ v. Turkey, App. No. 20704/92, ECtHR 3 February 2011, 
Siebenhaar v. Germany, App. No. 18136/02, ECtHR and ECtHR 12 April 2007, Ivanova v. Bulgaria, App. 
No. 52435/99, will not be discussed since they fall outside the scope of this study. 
6
 See discussion on the case of Sessa v. Italy in the addendum attached to this chapter. 
7
 As will be discussed in the addendum, in 2013 an important case concerning the wearing of a cross 
in the workplace was issued, namely Eweida and Chaplin v. The UK. 
8
 ECHR, Jakobski v. Poland, 7 December 2010. 
9
 ECHR, Sessa v. Italy, 3 April, 2012. 
10
 ECHR, Eweida and Chaplin v. The UK, 15 January 2013. 
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the initial publication of this chapter and contain some interesting elements and 
developments. Sessa v. Italy, shows that even two decades after the initial 
(un)famous cases of the European Commission concerning work-schedules, the 
Court still employed the same restrictive reasoning. Eweida and Chaplin v. The UK, 
however, shows an important shift in the Court’s case law in the field of religious 
accommodation in the workplace, towards a more inclusive approach.  
4.1 Religion and work schedules in the workplace: no interference with the 
freedom of religion 
 
Out of the—relatively rare—cases where the Court has been confronted with 
religious accommodation claims in the workplace, one category relates to employees 
requesting a work schedule be adapted to their religious needs. Interestingly, these 
claims have been presented by members of minority religions as well as by 
individuals belonging to majority religions. For example, in Stedman11 a Christian 
employee objected to working on Sundays, and the case of X v. UK12 concerned a 
Muslim teacher asking for a readjustment of his work schedule so that he would be 
able to attend the Friday prayer in a mosque. Similarly, in Konttinen13 a member of 
the Seventh Day Adventist church wanted to respect the Sabbath on Friday 
afternoons, which made it impossible for him to work after sunset on those days. 
Also, in Kosteski v. the Former Republic of Yugoslavia,14 the applicant complained 
about the refusal of his employer to grant him leave of absence to celebrate religious 
holidays. 
In all these cases, the employees were dismissed or sanctioned by the 
employer, were forced to resign, or to opt for a part-time contract. 
4.1.1. No interference with the freedom of religion 
Except for Kosteski, none of the above-mentioned cases made it beyond the 
admissibility stage and the Strasbourg organs never found a clear interference with 
the right to freedom of religion. Two elements were important in this regard: the 
dubious position towards the question of whether or not a manifestation of religion 
was at stake (a), and the focus on the responsibility of the employee with the 
freedom to resign doctrine as well as the contractual freedom (b). 
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4.1.1.1. (No) manifestation of religious belief 
Claims of religious accommodation in the workplace will mostly be dictated by 
the wish to manifest one’s religious conviction or belief in the work sphere. Contrary 
to the cases concerning religious dress in the workplace,15 the Strasbourg organs do 
not have a clear stance towards the question whether claims concerning work 
schedules could be considered as a manifestation of religion. In X v. UK, the now-
defunct European Commission of Human Rights (“Commission”) questioned whether 
the applicant “was required by Islam to disregard his continuing contractual 
obligations vis-à-vis the ILEA” following his transfer to a school nearby a mosque, 
and whether his religion requires from him “to attend the mosque during school 
time.”16 
The way the Commission narrows the question with regard to the 
manifestation of religion is problematic. The question should not be whether Islam 
requires disregarding contractual obligations or attending a mosque during school 
time, but whether attending collective prayers in a mosque on Friday could be seen 
as a manifestation of religion and, subsequently, whether this should be protected 
under Article 9 of the Convention. Moreover, by questioning whether Islam requires 
adherents to disregard contractual obligations, the Commission also seems to 
assume that if the applicant attends the Friday prayer, he would breach his contract 
and is thus in a preliminary stage of excluding the possibility that he can exercise his 
religion within the framework of his employment contract. 
Also, in the case of Kosteski, the Court was “not persuaded” that the 
celebration of religious holidays was a manifestation of the applicant’s belief. It 
considered the fact that: 
“while it may be that this absence from work was motivated by the applicant’s 
intention of celebrating a Muslim festival it is not persuaded that this was a 
manifestation of his beliefs in the sense protected by Article 9 of the 
Convention or that the penalty imposed on him for breach of contract in 
absenting himself without permission was an interference with those rights.”17 
Although Kosteski differs from the other cases discussed in this section,18 with this 
statement the Court appears reluctant to find that a certain claim consists of a 
manifestation of religion.19 
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 Cf. infra. 
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 EComHR 12 March 1981, X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8160/78, par. 9. 
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 ECtHR 13 April 2006, Kosteski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 55170/00, 
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religious holidays, since the Former Republic of Macedonia has a “Public Holidays Act” which not only 
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Islamic holidays for citizens of Muslim faith. The underlying issue in this case is the fact that the 
applicant was not granted leave on these Holidays because—according to the employer—he did not 
prove he was of the Muslim faith. (The fact that the applicant never absented himself before on 
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The questioning position of the Court as to whether or not some claim relates 
to a manifestation of religion might be a dangerous exercise which places the 
Strasbourg judges in the role of theological scholars interpreting religious 
prescriptions.20 Moreover, this would entail the risk that only one interpretation of a 
certain religious provision would be taken into account.21 Therefore, an insider 
approach should be preferred.22 This approach would take the motivation of the 
employee-believer into account when assessing whether a manifestation of religion 
was at stake in the particular case. Since the famous case of Leyla Sahin,23 the Court 
has been inclined towards this insider approach.24 In the case of X v. UK, for example, 
this insider approach would mean that the Court should have taken into account 
that the applicant himself considered it as his religious obligation to perform Friday 
prayer collectively.25 
In Konttinen and Stedman the Commission avoided the question about the 
existence of a manifestation of religion by removing the case from the religious 
context. In Konttinen, the Commission found that the employee “as a civil servant of 
the State railways, had a duty to accept certain obligations towards his employer”26 
and that the dismissal of the applicant was not due to his religious convictions, but 
due to the fact that he refused to respect his work hours.27 It further proceeds that: 
 
“This refusal, even if motivated by his religious convictions, cannot as such be 
considered protected by Article 9 para. 1. Also, the applicant has not shown any 
pressure put on him to change religion or that he was prevented to manifest his 
religion.”28 
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The latter statement of the Commission that “the applicant has not shown … 
that he was prevented to manifest his religion” is a bit surprising. The cause of the 
conflict between the employee’s religion and his contractual obligations lies 
precisely in the fact that he wanted to respect the Sabbath and thus wanted to 
manifest his religion. The Commission’s reasoning might consequently be 
interpreted in such a way that it does not seem to recognize the Sabbath as a 
manifestation of religion. Likewise, the Commission observed in Stedman that “the 
applicant was dismissed for failing to agree to work certain hours rather than her 
religious belief as such.”29 Ignoring the element of religion in these cases seems like 
ignoring an elephant in a small room. Of course the applicants resigned or were 
dismissed because they did not agree with their work schedule, but the only reason 
they failed to agree with these conditions was because of their religious convictions. 
If this reasoning were applied in other circumstances, claims of reasonable 
accommodation would virtually never be recognized by the Court. Imagine that a 
person with a disability is dismissed because he does not arrive on time at work, as 
the building is not easily accessible despite his multiple requests to adapt the 
building to his needs. Would it be logical if a judge accepts that the disabled 
employee was dismissed because of not respecting his contractual obligations to 
arrive on time at work and that the dismissal had nothing to do with the lack of 
accommodation? Or imagine the situation where an employee asks for a 
readjustment of her work schedule so that she might breastfeed her child at specific 
times during the workday. If she were dismissed or put in a situation where—for 
her—resignation is inevitable, could the Strasbourg judge hold that she is dismissed 
only because of not being able to respect her contractual obligations and not 
because of her private life, with which no interference is consequently found? 
In sum, it can be argued that in order to provide better reasoning in cases 
where an employee-believer is confronted with resignation or dismissal in the 
workplace because of a conflict related to a religious claim such as adapted work 
schedules, the religious motivation behind the employee’s actions should be taken 
sufficiently into account. Moreover, when assessing whether a manifestation of 
religion is at stake, the insider approach of the applicant should be considered. 
4.1.1.2. Freedom to resign 
The reluctance of the Strasbourg organs towards finding that a certain claim 
concerns a manifestation of religion was not the only element that led to not finding 
an interference. A second important element is the so-called freedom to resign 
doctrine. According to the Commission, in X v. UK the Inner London Education 
Authority (ILEA) was in principle entitled to rely on the terms of the employment 
                                                          
29
 EComHR 9 April 1997, Stedman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29107/95, par. 3. 
137 
 
contract with the employee, but “the question arises whether, under Article 9 of the 
Convention, the ILEA had to give due consideration to his religious position.”30 
According to the Commission, “the applicant remained free to resign if and when he 
found that his teaching obligations conflicted with his religious duties.”31 
Paradoxically, this position, where an employee has to make a choice between his 
full-time job and the manifestation of his religion, is the situation the applicant is 
complaining about: 
 
“[It] would mean that a Muslim, who took his religious duty seriously, could 
never accept employment as a full-time teacher, but must be content with the lesser 
emoluments of part-time service, and would thus also be excluded from 
opportunities for promotion.”32 
 
In Konttinen the Commission went even further by stating that the freedom to resign 
is “the ultimate guarantee of his [the applicant’s] right to freedom of religion.”33 This 
principle was also repeated in Stedman.34 
In the three cases discussed above35 it is clear that the “freedom to resign” 
doctrine could not really be perceived as a genuine freedom of choice by the 
employees. For the employee in X v. UK, for instance, stepping over to a part-time 
contract meant a lot of disadvantages concerning pay and career opportunities.36 
Resigning would, for him, also carry heavy consequences. The argument of the 
Commission that resigning is the ultimate guarantee to the freedom of religion can 
therefore be highly criticized since it places before the applicant-employees a 
difficult dilemma between job and religion. Because of his or her religion and the 
manifestation of it, an individual will not be able to exercise the profession he or she 
wants, or will have to make extra efforts to find a job that suits his or her religious 
needs. It is clear that what the Commission considers to be a freedom will not be 
experienced by every employee in the same way, especially when an employee 
belongs to a minority religion and lives in a country where the state system—
including official holidays and days of rest—is largely organized along the precepts of 
a majority religion. In this case, the employee is, under the case law of the 
Commission, more burdened than employees belonging to the majority religion.37 
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A second element that is closely linked to the freedom to resign of the 
employee is the idea of his or her own free will when entering into a contractual 
relationship with an employer. Here, the question arises whether an employee 
distances himself from his rights by signing a contract with his employer. This is not 
the case, since the ECtHR still keeps the right to assess whether a contractual 
restriction of a fundamental right is proportional.38 A different position would lead to 
an undermining of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Convention. In other 
words, the fact that an applicant by his or her own free will places him or herself in 
this particular situation by signing a contract should not be a reason to deny a priori 
that an interference with his or her freedom of religion took place. This approach 
“casts the applicant … as the author of their own misfortune, and sees the remedy as 
lying in their own hands.”39 
Furthermore, putting all the responsibility on the side of the employee by 
stating that he or she should bear the consequences of the contract he signed by his 
own free will, starts from the assumption that he had a full choice about all the 
aspects of the contract. In X v. UK, for instance, the Commission observed that the 
applicant “of his own free will, accepted teaching obligations under his contract.” 
One could then argue that the applicant should bear the consequences of the 
contract he signed and should thus follow the regular work schedule like the other 
employees, or quit his job. This argument, however, ignores the fact that an 
individual who voluntarily signs a contract does not always have a say in its terms. 
Caroline Evans argues that “[i]n these types of situations, the Commission talks 
about people having a choice or making a ‘voluntary’ decision in a context where 
they may only have a range of unpalatable choices.”40 The Court ignores completely 
the fact that the applicant belongs to a minority religion and thus does not always 
freely make choices as we would like him to do.41 Or to put it in the words of Seglow:  
 
“matters are not so simple because, while we can hold Mr Ahmad42 
responsible for his beliefs, we cannot hold him responsible for the fact that in 
the UK Friday is a work day.”43 
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Certainly, the freedom to resign doctrine and the argument of the applicant’s free 
will to sign a contract should not be referred to in the light way of the Commission. If 
the Court would like to use this argument, that an employee remains free to resign 
and take into account that he entered into a contractual relationship by his own free 
will, this could at most be used during a proportionality analysis, but should certainly 
not lead to not finding an interference.44 This way of reasoning at the level of 
interference creates a disequilibrium disadvantaging the employee-believer. 
It is strongly suggested that as the Court proceeds to a proportionality analysis 
in cases concerning claims of religious accommodation in the workplace, all the 
interests of both the employee and employer could and should be taken into 
account. On the side of the employee, the real-life consequences of a dismissal and 
subsequent search for an alternative position should be taken into account.45 On the 
side of the employer, the feasibility of the accommodation claim should be 
examined. The existence of an alternative which is less restrictive on the employee’s 
rights is also one of the elements that could be examined.46 Vickers has proposed 
several other elements such as the nature of the job, the content of the religious 
claim and the nature of the restriction.47 An additional element which can play a role 
in the proportionality analysis is whether the employee belongs to a minority 
religion. 
Such an approach would give more attention to the situation of the employee. 
To date, the Strasbourg judges have placed the contractual obligations central in 
their reasoning. In the cases cited above, the interpretation of Article 9 of the ECHR 
was governed by these contractual obligations rather than by the religious duties of 
the employee.48 A proportionality analysis would offer a more genuine balance 
between the several interests at stake. 
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4.1.2. No discrimination on the ground of religion49 
All the applicants in the above-mentioned cases alleged discrimination on the 
ground of their religion. However, in X v. UK, Konttinen, Stedman as well as in 
Kosteski, the Strasbourg organs did not find that the measures taken (or not taken) 
were violating Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 of the ECHR. 
In X v. UK the Commission observed that the applicant did not show that he 
was treated differently than, for instance, Jewish teachers, and declared the claim 
manifestly ill-founded. The Commission apparently found no need to compare the 
applicant’s situation with teachers belonging to a majority religion or with teachers 
not having a religion. It made a very interesting statement concerning this issue: 
 
“in respect of the general question of religious and public holidays, … that, in 
most countries, only the religious holidays of the majority of the population are 
celebrated as public holidays. Thus Protestant holidays are not always public 
holidays in Catholic countries and vice versa.”50 
The Commission thus not only recognized but also normalized the fact that in most 
countries only the religious holidays of the majority are celebrated as public 
holidays.51 In Konttinen the Commission unsuccessfully tried to soften this stance 
somewhat by on the one hand acknowledging the fact “that the Finnish legislation 
on work hours provides that the weekly day of rest is usually Sunday,” but on the 
other hand it observed that this legislation does not contain any provision “which 
would guarantee to members of a certain religious community an absolute right to 
have a particular day regarded as a holy day.”52 In other words, in this case, the 
Commission rejected the discrimination argument by referring to the formally non-
discriminatory character of the Finnish legislation. However, the effect of this 
legislation is that religions which do not have Sunday as a holy day, which is the case 
for most of the minority religions, are less accommodated in the workplace.53 It is 
exactly because the applicants have to undergo the same employment system 
organized along the (religious) needs of the majority that they are restricted in the 
exercise of their freedom of religion. When a certain measure is general in 
application and in principle neutral, but causes particular hardship for certain 
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people, the question of “indirect discrimination” may arise.54 Thus, applied to the 
cases discussed above it can be concluded that the applicants in X v. UK and 
Konttinen v. Finland are indirectly discriminated against on the basis of their 
(minority) religion. 
Hence, in the landmark case Thlimmenos v. Greece, the Court also recognized 
that 
“The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights 
guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when States without an objective 
and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are 
significantly different.”55 
 
According to this reasoning, minorities could claim exceptions to general rules 
unless the state has a reasonable and objective justification for not allowing this 
exception. In the case of X v. UK this would mean that the Court would have to 
examine whether the refusal to adapt the applicant’s work schedule was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim.56 To date, in the field of religious claims in the 
workplace this principle has not been applied. However, the Court recently applied 
religious accommodation in a prison context.57 
Although these principles of indirect discrimination and differential treatment 
could be seen as “principal tools that may be used to guarantee respect for minority 
cultures,”58 they still remain unrealized in the field of employment. 
4.2. Religious attire in the workplace: interference with but no violation of the 
freedom of religion 
Until now, the issue of religious attire in the workplace was only raised before the 
ECtHR by Muslim women wearing an Islamic headscarf.59 However, it seems that the 
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Court will be confronted with other religious claims in the near future, since a case 
has recently been communicated concerning a British Christian woman wanting to 
wear a cross on the work floor.60 Under this section three cases will be discussed. 
Dahlab v. Switzerland involved a Swiss primary school teacher, while Kurtulmus v. 
Turkey and Kavakçi v. Turkey concerned, respectively, a university professor and a 
parliamentarian in Turkey. 
4.2.1. Interference with the freedom of religion 
Contrary to the adjudication concerning work hours, the Court did find that 
an interference with the right to the freedom of religion occurred in the cases of 
Dahlab, a primary school teacher, and in Kurtulmus, a university professor, both 
being prohibited from wearing a headscarf in their workplace.61 Moreover, the Court 
seems to have adopted a more insider approach when assessing whether a 
manifestation of religion is at stake. Although the Court in the case of Dahlab did not 
explicitly acknowledge that the headscarf is a manifestation of religion,62 the Court 
proceeds in Kurtulmus that 
“on the basis that the rules on dress for public servants constituted 
interference with her right to manifest her religion, as she considered that 
Muslim women have a religious duty to wear the Islamic headscarf.”63 
 
This very personal approach of the Court contrasts with the position of the 
Commission in, for instance, X v. UK where the necessity of performing the Friday 
prayer during work hours was questioned. Here the Court attaches particular 
importance to the question whether in the specific case the motivation to wear the 
headscarf is driven by the religious belief of the applicant. By applying this insider 
approach in this case and thus accepting that the underlying issue concerned a 
manifestation of religion, the Court accepts that a headscarf ban in the workplace 
entails an interference with the freedom to manifest one’s religion. 
The cases discussed under this section clearly show the importance of 
recognizing that a manifestation of religion was at stake, since the Court proceeds to 
a proportionality analysis. However, the fact that the case has reached this phase 
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does not guarantee that the reasoning under this proportionality analysis will be 
satisfactory, whatever the outcome of the case will be. 
In the next part a closer look will be taken at the Court’s reasoning in the cases 
of Dahlab and Kurtulmus where the Court did not find a violation, and Kavakçi where 
a violation was found, but not concerning the applicant’s freedom of religion. 
4.2.2. Dahlab and Kurtulmus: manifestly ill-founded 
Lucia Dahlab was a Swiss woman who converted to Islam after working for 
almost two years in a public primary school in Switzerland. After her conversion she 
started wearing the headscarf, and wore it while working in the school for 
approximately four years, and this without any objections from the school 
management, the parents or the pupils. It was only after these four years that the 
education board prohibited her from wearing a headscarf at school. 
Dahlab’s claim that the prohibition imposed on her against wearing a headscarf 
during her school activities consisted of a violation of her freedom of religion 
guaranteed by Article 9 of the ECHR was declared manifestly ill-founded and thus 
inadmissible.64 Referring to the margin of appreciation in this field,65 the Court 
concluded that the prohibition of wearing the headscarf was not unreasonable. It 
observed that the national authorities took the personal conviction of the applicant 
sufficiently into account and that they amply balanced the applicant’s freedom of 
religion against the principle of state neutrality. The Court attaches particular 
importance to the protection of the rights of others, in this case the young pupils, by 
stressing that the headscarf could have a proselytizing effect on children: 
 
“It cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some 
kind of proselytizing effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a 
precept which is laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, is 
hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It therefore appears difficult to 
reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect 
for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a 
democratic society must convey to their pupils.”66 
 
This part of the Court’s reasoning can be contrasted with its observation that for 
several years the applicant has been teaching with a headscarf 
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“without any action being taken by the head teacher or the district schools 
inspector or any comments being made by parents. That implies that during the 
period in question there were no objections to the content or quality of the teaching 
provided by the applicant, who does not appear to have sought to gain any kind of 
advantage from the outward manifestation of her religious beliefs.”67 
 
In other words, Mrs Dahlab had been teaching for approximately four years with her 
headscarf and no complaints about pressure towards the pupils were formulated, 
nor was it reported that pupils were being indirectly influenced. The reasoning 
applied by the Court is thus confusing and contradictory. On the one hand it 
recognizes that the applicant performed a good job as a teacher but on the other 
hand it depersonalizes the issue by first stating that the headscarf as such could have 
a proselytizing influence on the children—which is factually proven to be untrue—
and secondly by stating that the wearing of the headscarf is difficult to reconcile with 
“the message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-
discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their 
pupils”—which is also proven to be untrue by the above-mentioned observation. 
Consequently, a more pragmatic approach would be more appropriate in this case, 
especially since the Court claims to balance the right of the teacher to manifest her 
religion against the need to protect pupils by preserving religious harmony. The 
balancing exercise the Court is trying to make in its reasoning is incomplete. A more 
complete and fair proportionality analysis would have included the uncontested 
conduct of the applicant and the consequences a headscarf ban might have for her.68 
Instead, the case was declared manifestly ill-founded and inadmissible, which is a 
paradoxical conclusion considering the complexity of the case. 
The same “manifestly ill-founded” conclusion was reached in Kurtulmus v. 
Turkey. Contrary to Dahlab, where the argument of state neutrality plays only a 
marginal role in the Court’s reasoning, the central line of reasoning used by the 
Court in Kurtulmus is that of secularism. 
Mrs Kurtulmus, a Turkish university professor who wore a headscarf, was 
suspended from her duties and eventually dismissed on the ground that she had 
failed to comply with the dress code applicable to state officials. As in Dahlab, the 
applicant had already been wearing the headscarf for some time on the job before 
she received her first “warning.” 
In this case also, the Court granted a wide margin of appreciation to Turkey 
and accorded particular attention to the principle of state neutrality. Instead, the 
Court put forward the Turkish Kemalistic principle of secularism. The Court states 
that it is 
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“that principle, and not objections to the way a person dresses as a result of 
his or her religious beliefs, that is the paramount consideration that is underpinning 
the rules.”69 
 
This part of the Court’s reasoning shows similarities with the reasoning in 
Konttinen and Stedman,70 where the Commission did not find that the employee was 
dismissed because of his religion and the manifestation of it, but because of the 
failure to respect his contractual duties.71 Moreover, similarly to the work schedule 
cases discussed in the previous section, the Court emphasized that Mrs Kurtulmus 
had “assumed the status of a public servant of her own free will” and that  
 
“as a university lecturer, and thus a person in authority at the university and a 
representative of the State, she could not have been unaware of the rules requiring 
her not to express her religious beliefs in public in an ostentatious manner.”72 
 
The emphasis on free will and on facing the consequences of the “choice” made 
indirectly places the employee before a dilemma. Mrs Kurtulmus can indeed make 
the choice between being a professor and not being a professor. But since the dress 
code is a general rule applicable in all the public universities, this “choice” hides the 
dilemma between manifesting one’s religion on the one hand and pursuing a career 
as an academic and public servant on the other. In other words, wearing a headscarf 
a priori restricts freedom of choice of profession and career opportunities in 
Turkey,73 which is exactly the issue that the applicant is contesting in front of the 
Court. It cannot be denied that the principle of secularism is fundamental in Turkish 
society.74 The question should be whether the measure taken is proportionate in 
attaining this aim. Taking into account that the applicant teaches adult students, that 
she was allowed to obtain her PhD degree with a headscarf and that she has been 
teaching for two years with a headscarf without getting any complaint, the 
proportionality of the ban is highly debatable. However, in cases against Turkey in 
the field of religious freedom the principle of secularism plays a major role.75 
The Court concluded that the claim is manifestly ill-founded, referring to the 
arguments in the case of Dahlab, namely neutrality and the tender age of the 
children. Interestingly, the second element, namely the profile of the persons taught 
by the applicant, was not taken into account in this case. If the Court had been 
consistent in its case law, it would at least have touched upon this issue. As a 
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university professor, the applicant teaches adult students who cannot be considered 
as vulnerable as primary school children. Moreover, contrary to Dahlab, the Court 
did not mention the fact that Mrs Kurtulmus had been teaching for two years with a 
headscarf before any issue arose. Consequently, in Kurtulmus, the Court has taken 
the perspective of the applicant even less, according the principle of secularism an 
almighty weight in the balance. 
4.2.3. Kavakçi: Headscarf at the parliament 
In Kavakçi v. Turkey,76 the Court was again confronted with the headscarf in a 
workplace setting. Mrs Kavakçi was elected as a member of parliament.77 When she 
wanted to take the oath, she was forced to leave the parliament following protests 
about her Islamic headscarf. She was a member of the party Fazilet Partisi which 
openly advocated for the right to wear the headscarf. The party was subsequently 
dissolved by the Turkish Constitutional Court on the basis that it was a “centre of 
activities contrary to the principle of secularism.”78 The conduct of certain leaders 
and members of the party, including the applicant’s conduct, were taken into 
account in reaching this conclusion. The Turkish Constitutional Court stripped two 
parliamentarians, including the applicant,79 of their status of Member of Parliament 
and prohibited five members of the party, including the applicant, from becoming 
founding members, ordinary members, leaders or auditors of any other political 
party for five years.80 
Mrs Kavakçi claimed under Article 9 and Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the 
Convention that she was sanctioned because of her religious convictions and 
because of the fact that she manifested her religion by wearing the headscarf. 
The Court opted for examining the case solely under Article 3 of Protocol 1 
which guarantees the right to free elections. It noted that the temporary political 
sanctions following the dissolution of the party aimed to preserve the secular 
character of the Turkish political regime. Subsequently, it found the aim pursued to 
be legitimate. In its proportionality analysis, the Court observed that the legislation 
concerning the dissolution of political parties had a very wide scope since all the 
actions and statements made by party members could be taken into consideration to 
conclude that a party had to be dissolved, irrespective of the level of involvement of 
that member. In this case, the Court observed that the president and the vice-
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president of the party did not suffer the same sanctions as the applicant, despite the 
fact that they were in a comparable situation to the applicant. Subsequently, the 
Court concluded that the measures taken towards the applicant were not 
proportionate to the aim pursued and thus that they had been violating the 
applicant’s freedom to participate in free elections; the Court did not find it 
necessary to examine her dismissal as a parliamentarian as such. 
Although the outcome in this case was favorable for the applicant, some 
remarks can be made with regard to the line of reasoning followed by the Court. The 
most striking element in the reasoning is the absence of an assessment of a possible 
violation of the freedom of religion of the applicant. Although there was a strong link 
between the applicant’s religious freedom and the political sanctions imposed on 
her, which is also implicitly recognized by the Court through the acceptance of the 
Turkish principle of secularism as a legitimate aim, the Court clearly avoided entering 
into this discussion.81 The question whether a parliamentarian who is democratically 
elected can be prevented from taking up her function because of her headscarf 
remains unanswered.82 It is not clear whether the Court refrained from answering 
this question because it knew beforehand that it was a lost battle or because it did 
not come to a consensus on this issue. 
A first conclusion that can be drawn from the cases discussed above is the 
inconsistency in the reasoning of the Court. While in the first case much weight is 
given to the rights of others—in casu the children—this element is not mentioned in 
Kurtulmus where the principle of secularism is the main and only argument. 
Subsequently, in the third case, the Court neglects the argument linked to the 
headscarf, while this was the main argument of the applicant. A second, related 
observation is the lack of a pragmatic and “employee/applicant friendly” approach of 
the Court. Similar to the work schedule cases discussed in the previous section 
where it has been argued that more attention is paid to the contractual obligations 
and the responsibility of the applicant, the Court is also giving less weight to the 
interests of the applicant in the cases concerning religious attire in the workplace. 
4.3. Improving the Court’s legal reasoning: “good practices” in the case 
law of the ECtHR 
The title of this chapter reveals an ambitious and audacious aim: improving the 
legal reasoning of the Court in cases concerning religious accommodation in the 
workplace. The cases discussed above revealed several opportunities for 
improvement in the Court’s reasoning. 
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It is first observed that the Court shows a reluctance to find an interference in 
cases concerning religious claims in the workplace. Insofar as it found that the claims 
concerning work scheduling are related to a manifestation of a religious conviction, 
the Court does not find an interference with the freedom of religion and holds the 
opinion that the employee remains free to leave his job. Consequently, the case 
does not reach the proportionality test and the several interests at stake are not 
balanced. Secondly, in the cases concerning religious attire in the workplace, the 
Court accepts that the headscarf is a manifestation of a religious conviction and finds 
an interference with the freedom of religion. Nevertheless, at the level of the 
proportionality assessment it does not sufficiently weigh the several interests at 
stake. 
In this section, a closer look will be taken at the legal reasoning of the Court in 
other fields than the freedom of religion in search of “good practices” within the 
case law of the Court itself. The cases have been selected on the ground of factual 
similarities that can be found with the cases discussed in the previous section. The 
first kind of cases concern employees who have been dismissed or have resigned 
because of reasons related to their political ideas or facts related to their private or 
family life. Next, a comparison will be drawn with cases where religious 
accommodation claims were raised in context other than a workplace setting. 
4.3.1. Looking over the fence of Article 9 
4.3.1.1. Freedom of expression in the workplace 
The landmark case Vögt v. Germany83 shows several factual similarities with 
the cases discussed in the previous sections, but at the level of reasoning the 
different approaches taken with these cases is remarkable. Mrs Vögt was a teacher 
in a German public school, where she taught French and German courses. She was 
also a member of the DKP, a communist political party. When she became actively 
involved in this party, she was dismissed from her job as a teacher. The authorities 
argued that she failed to comply “with the duty to uphold the free democratic 
system of the country.”84 
The Court found that the dismissal interfered with the applicant’s freedom of 
expression but agreed that a duty of loyalty could be expected from a civil servant, 
so as to protect national security, prevent disorder and protect the rights of others. 
Subsequently, the Court examined whether the measure was necessary in a 
democratic society, meaning relevant and sufficient. The way in which the Court 
proceeds in this necessity test is very interesting. The Court notes that  
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“there are several reasons for considering dismissal of a secondary-school 
teacher by way of disciplinary sanction for breach of duty to be a very severe 
measure. This is firstly because of the effect that such a measure has on the 
reputation of the person concerned and secondly because secondary-school 
teachers dismissed in this way lose their livelihood, at least in principle, as the 
disciplinary court may allow them to keep part of their salary. Finally, secondary-
school teachers in this situation may find it well nigh impossible to find another job 
as a teacher, since in Germany teaching posts outside the civil service are scarce.”85 
 
Thus in this case the Court adopts a very inclusive and sensitive approach 
towards the personal situation of the employee. The Court even goes a step further 
by stating that “[c]onsequently, they will almost certainly be deprived of the 
opportunity to exercise the sole profession for which they have a calling, for which 
they have been trained and in which they have acquired skills and experience.86 
“This approach can first be contrasted to the cases where the Court states that 
the freedom to resign is the ultimate guarantee of one’s freedom of religion. In 
fact, despite the factual similarities between the cases discussed above, the 
Court at no point mentions the possibility of the applicant resigning, nor does 
the Court refer to the fact that the applicant entered in this contract by her 
own free will. On the contrary, the Court notes the consequences the 
termination of the contract would have on her. Why the Court applies the 
freedom to resign doctrine in Article 9 cases and not in Article 10 cases is not 
clear, but the reasoning in Vögt shows that leaving out this doctrine gives room 
for a proper proportionality analysis, while its application in the freedom of 
religion cases means claims are blocked at the interference level.87 Secondly, in 
this proportionality analysis the Court puts the applicant in a central position 
by taking due regard of the consequences of a dismissal and the particularities 
of the profession.”88 
 
A more specific comparison can be drawn between Vögt and Dahlab v. 
Switzerland. In Dahlab the Court acknowledges on the one hand that no critique can 
be leveled on the conduct of the applicant, but still uses the argument of 
indoctrination of the children as a red thread in its reasoning. In Vögt, we clearly see 
that the ECtHR is adopting a more pragmatic approach. Here the Court 
acknowledges, on the one hand, that there could be a risk of indoctrination of the 
pupils, but it notes, on the other hand, that “no criticism was leveled on [the 
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applicant] on this point.”89 “On the contrary, the applicant’s work at school had been 
considered wholly satisfactory by her superiors and she was held in high regard by 
her pupils, their parents, and her colleagues.”90 The Court also observes that a 
teacher is a figure of authority to pupils which implies a responsibility outside the 
school building. But in this case, no evidence was brought before the Court of such 
conduct. Finally, since the political party to which the applicant belongs was not 
banned, her activities were not illegal as such. The Court concluded that the 
arguments put forward by the government were relevant to the aim pursued, but 
not sufficient. Consequently, the dismissal of the applicant was found to be 
disproportionate. Balancing all the elements, the Court found that it was not 
sufficiently shown that the applicant in practice was causing any harm while 
exercising her rights guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. 
In sum, from Vögt several “good practices” can be deduced for cases 
concerning religious accommodation in the workplace. Instead of focusing on the 
contractual obligations and integrating a “freedom to resign” argument in its 
reasoning, thereby placing all the responsibility on the shoulders of the employee, 
the Court should also take the situation of the applicant into account. This leads to a 
more balanced reasoning of the several interests at stake, of both the employer and 
the employee. With this approach the cases concerning the accommodation of work 
schedules would at least have been examined under a proportionality analysis. A 
second good practice in Vögt is the pragmatic approach of the Court. While in 
Dahlab and Kurtulmus the Court is following a principled approach—based on 
secularism and a possible proselytizing effect of the headscarf—in Vögt the Court is 
looking at the de facto conduct of the employee, even though it also recognizes the 
potential indoctrinating effect of her political ideas. A more pragmatic approach 
would also lead to a more genuine balancing of the interests of the parties involved. 
4.3.1.2. The right to a family life and the workplace 
A. The church as employer 
  All the cases discussed above concerned private employers or the State as 
employer. A special situation occurs when a church is the employer of an individual. 
Here the religious freedom of the Church-employer could enter into conflict with the 
fundamental rights of their employees, such as their freedom of religion or their 
right to private life.91 The Court and the Commission have on a number of occasions 
had the opportunity to review such cases. In X v. Denmark92 a clergyman was faced 
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with resignation from the church when he would not abandon his practice whereby 
he obliged parents to follow five religious lessons before being able to christen their 
child. In Karlsson v. Sweden93 the applicant was found not to be qualified for the job 
as vicar since he did not want to work together with clergywomen. Similarly, in 
Williamson v. UK94 a priest complained that he was faced with dismissal since he did 
not agree with the new policy of the church allowing women to enter the 
priesthood. In all these cases, the Commission declared the cases inadmissible and 
referred to the freedom to leave the office. In fact, the arguments which the 
Commission later used in the cases concerning work hours were used for the first 
time in cases where the church was the employer: 
“Their individual freedom of thought, conscience or religion is exercised at 
the moment they accept or refuse employment as clergymen, and their right to 
leave the church guarantees their freedom of religion in case they oppose its 
teachings.”95 
However, it seems that the Court is embarking on a new line of reasoning when it 
comes to cases involving Church-employers. Recently, the Court issued two 
judgments, Obst v. Germany96 and Shüth v. Germany,97 involving respectively the 
Mormon Church and the Catholic Church as employers.98 The two cases show a 
number of similarities but are distinct nonetheless, both in the facts and in the ruling 
of the Court. Mr Obst, a member of the Mormon Church and director of the public 
relations department of the Church for Europe, was dismissed after admitting to an 
extra-marital sexual relationship. Mr Shüth, organist and chief of the choir, was 
dismissed when the Church that employed him discovered that he was expecting a 
child with a woman other than his wife, from whom he was separated. Both 
employees complained before the ECtHR about a lack of protection accorded by the 
State in their relationship with their employers. Both cases were dealt with under 
Article 8 of the ECHR. 
In Obst v. Germany the Court found that the decisions of the national 
jurisdictions which confirmed the dismissal of the applicant were not unreasonable 
since it balanced the several interests at stake. This balancing exercise required that 
the seriousness of the facts (sexual relationship with another woman while still living 
together with his wife), the important position of the applicant (director of a public 
relations department at a European level) and the enhanced duty of loyalty linked to 
his post were taken into account. 
Contrary to Obst, in Shüth v. Germany the Court did find a violation of Article 8 
of the ECHR. It observed that the several interests at stake were not sufficiently 
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balanced by the national judicial body and that a more thorough examination was 
needed. The Court also acknowledges that a Church may impose a duty of loyalty 
upon its employees, but the several interests at stake must be taken into account, 
such as the nature of the post. This balancing exercise was not undertaken by the 
national jurisdictions. Moreover, the Court refers to the limited possibilities of 
finding a new job,99 taking into account the specific training of Mr Shüth. According 
to the Court, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for him to find a new job outside 
the Church. The Court concludes that the national jurisdictions “did not balance the 
rights of the applicant and those of the church-employer as is required by the 
Convention.”100 
Although the different outcomes in the cases can lead to discussions,101 several 
“good practices” can be observed with regard to the reasoning. First, the Court does 
not drop the case at the interference level, but allows room to examine the issues 
more profoundly at the proportionality level. The argument that employees working 
for a Church remain free to leave the church is not used here. Moreover, as in Vögt, 
the Court also takes the situation of the applicant into consideration, although the 
reasoning in Shüth is more elaborate than in Obst in this regard. In my opinion, the 
Court does not convincingly show that the several interests are well balanced in 
Obst. The arguments raised in this case concern mainly the interests of the 
employer, namely the work ethics and the importance of the job. However, in this 
case the consequences of the dismissal, such as the likelihood of the applicant 
finding another job, were not taken into account. Whether or not this might lead to 
another outcome, it is at least inconsistent with the reasoning in Shüth where the 
Court firmly argues that the national jurisdictions did not balance the rights of the 
applicant and those of the Church-employer as is required by the Convention. This 
leads us to a second particularly interesting point in these cases. Even though not 
consistently applied, the way the Court stresses the importance of balancing the 
several interests of the employer and the employee at stake is, taking into account 
the previous case law involving the church as employer, striking. 
This line of reasoning is continued in a later case involving the Protestant 
church as employer, Siebenhaar v. Germany. Mrs Siebenhaar was dismissed from her 
job in a day care centre ran by the protestant church after the church found out that 
she was an active member of another religious group, the Universal Church. Thus a 
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conflict arose between the freedom of religion of the church-employer and the 
believer-employee, respectively. In its reasoning the Court took, similarly to Vögt, 
several aspects of the applicant’s life into account such as her age, the nature of the 
job and the possibility of finding another job.102 
In sum, a positive evolution can be found in the Court’s case law where a 
Church is the employer. The focus lies in balancing the interests of the employer and 
the employee respectively, whereby special attention is paid to the consequences of 
a possible dismissal for the employee. 
B. The “freedom to resign” in 2010 
In a recent case, Konstantin Markin v. Russia,103 the applicant, an army 
serviceman, claimed discrimination in the workplace on the ground of gender 
because he was not awarded parental leave on the same terms as his female 
colleagues. The applicant had lost his case at the national level. The Russian 
Constitutional Court inter alia argued that “[if] the serviceman decides to take care 
of his child himself, he is entitled to early termination of his service for family 
reasons.”104 Although formulated in a more subtle manner than, for instance, 
Konttinen v. Finland, this statement of the Russian Court is similar to the freedom to 
resign argument used by the ECtHR in the freedom of religion cases discussed in this 
chapter. However, the Strasbourg Court surprisingly reacted as follows:  
“The Court is particularly struck by the Constitutional Court’s intimation that 
a serviceman wishing to take personal care of his children was free to resign from 
the armed forces. Servicemen are thereby forced to make a difficult choice between 
nursing their new-born children and pursuing their military career, no such choice 
being faced by servicewomen.”105 
 
The Court criticizes in this case the same kind of reasoning which it adopted 
itself, namely the argument that one remains free to resign when one’s job conflicts 
with one’s freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. Here the Court also 
acknowledges that this argument puts a “difficult choice” in front of the applicant-
employee. Moreover, referring to the unique nature of the armed forces, the Court 
also takes the consequences of a possible resignation into account:  
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“It is therefore clear that, if they choose to resign from military service to be 
able to take care of their new-born children, servicemen would encounter difficulties 
in obtaining civilian posts in their areas of specialisation which would reflect the 
seniority and status that they had achieved in the armed forces.”106 
 
Consequently, this case is also an example of a “good practice.” Not only does 
the Court criticize the freedom to resign approach, but it also takes the particular 
situation of the applicant into account in a well-weighted proportionality analysis. 
The question arises whether, after taking this firm stance against a freedom to resign 
approach, the Court would still apply the freedom to resign doctrine in future cases 
in the field of the freedom of religion. 
4.3.2. Looking over the fence of the workplace: religious accommodation in 
prison 
Claims of prisoners who wish to exercise their religion during their detention 
have come before the ECtHR on a number of occasions.107 These claims mostly 
concern visits by a minister, dietary rules and the observance of prayer in prison. 
In Jakόbski v. Poland108 the Court dealt with a very interesting example of 
religious accommodation. Mr Jakόbski, detained in a Polish prison, asked on several 
occasions to be served meat-free meals in order to follow the religious dietary rules 
required by his Mahayana Buddhist religion. For a few months he was provided a “PK 
diet”—a diet that contains no pork—upon doctor’s orders, but thereafter he was put 
back on the general prison non-meat-free diet to which he objected on religious 
grounds. 
The Court first examined whether a manifestation of a religious belief is 
involved. Contrary to the government, the Court did not enter into the discussion of 
whether or not vegetarianism is really a religious dietary prescription. The Court held 
that the case fell within the scope of Article 9:  
 
“without deciding whether such decisions are taken in every case to fulfil a 
religious duty … in the present case the Court considers that the applicant’s decision 
to adhere to a vegetarian diet can be regarded as motivated or inspired by a religion 
and was not unreasonable.”109 
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This part of the reasoning is in line with the case of Leyla Sahin.110 Thus the 
Court does not judge in general whether a certain claim is related to a manifestation 
of a religious conviction, but makes the experience of the applicant central. As 
already argued, this insider approach should also be favored in cases where religious 
accommodation claims occur in the workplace. 
In this case the Court concluded that the refusal of the authorities to accommodate 
the applicant’s religious claim interfered with the applicant’s freedom of religion. 
The Court was not convinced by the argument of the Polish government that 
providing each detainee with special food would entail too many technical and 
financial difficulties:  
“Unlike in the latter case, he was not offered any alternative diet, nor was the 
Buddhist Mission consulted on the issue of the appropriate diet. The Court is not 
persuaded that the provision of a vegetarian diet to the applicant would have 
entailed any disruption to the management of the prison or to any decline in the 
standards of meals served to other prisoners.”111 
 
Jakόbski v. Poland has the potential to become a landmark case in the field of 
freedom of religion. It is the first time the Court actually accepted reasonable 
accommodation of a religious claim. The context of a prison is of course different to 
the context of employment, since in the situation of a prison, a detainee completely 
relies on the authorities. Yet the balancing exercise the Court handled in this case 
could be applied to cases in the field of the workplace as well, especially for 
complaints concerning work schedules. Both the interests of the authorities and the 
prisoner were taken into account. The Court admitted that special arrangements for 
one prisoner may have financial implications for the custodial institution, but the 
nature of the claim was not as such that this is an insurmountable problem as the 
prisoner “merely asked to be granted a vegetarian diet excluding meat products.” 
This reasoning can be compared with the “undue hardship” test used by the US 
Supreme Court112 or the Canadian Supreme Court. If the Court followed the same 
line of reasoning in workplace cases, the feasibility of accommodating a particular 
religious claim would have to be taken seriously during the proportionality 
assessment, which would also lead to a more genuine balancing of the several 
interests at stake in that context. 
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Conclusion 
The analysis outlined in this chapter makes clear that, until recently,113 the 
Strasbourg institutions offered little protection for religious accommodation claims 
in the workplace with regard to adapted work-schedules and to the wearing of 
religious attire. Their interpretation and application of the right to freedom of 
religion is in these cases manifestly restrictive and non-inclusive.  
Regarding the cases concerning work-schedules and religious holidays, it is 
remarkable that none of the article 9 claims pass beyond the interference stage. One 
underlying reason for this observation is the reluctance of the former European 
Commission of Human Rights to find that a manifestation of religion is at stake. This 
occurs when a narrow definition is applied to what consists of a manifestation of 
religion, or when the Commission frames the claim in non-religious terms. An 
example of the latter is the reasoning that a dismissal of an applicant-employee is 
not due to the applicant’s religion, but instead, to the applicant’s non-respect of the 
employment contract.  
A second cause for not finding an interference in these cases, is the so-called 
freedom to resign doctrine. Here the Commission argues that no interference with 
an employee’s right to freedom of religion takes place, as the employee remains free 
to resign. The latter is considered by the Commission as an ultimate guarantee of the 
freedom of religion. In the same line of this doctrine the Commission also refers to 
the idea that one enters by his or her own free will into the contractual relationship 
and must therefore have been aware of the accompanying consequences of this 
choice. The reluctance to find that an interference takes place undeniably leads to a 
limited protection of religious accommodation claims under article 9. 
In the cases concerning the prohibitions on wearing religious attire in the 
workplace, the Court at least finds an interference with the applicants’ right to 
freedom of religion. In so doing, a broader and more insider approach is handled 
when defining whether a certain practice can be considered a manifestation of 
religion. However, due to the application of a wide margin of appreciation in favor of 
the State, the protection of the applicants’ individual right is also limited.  
Hence, the (un)protective114 reasoning of the Strasbourg institutions in these 
cases reveals a non-inclusive approach towards a de facto religious diversity in the 
workplace. With this approach, the possibility of religious employees to successfully 
ask to be included in the workplace through a full participation with respect for their 
religious identity is seriously limited.  
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 Additionally, irrespective of whether or not accommodation should have 
been granted in the cases discussed in this chapter, the reasoning in these cases 
display several exclusionary patterns on a more procedural level in the reasoning. 
The analysis of the case-law reveals in the approach of the Strasbourg institutions a 
lack of empathy and understanding towards the applicants in that their concerns and 
their arguments are often disregarded and not taken seriously.  
First, as argued in this chapter, the reluctance to find an interference with the 
employees’ religious freedom when a conflict occurs between professional rules and 
religious dictates, mostly ignores the applicants’ concerns. When the Commission for 
example finds that the right to manifest one’s religion is not interfered with because 
a certain measure — such as a dismissal— is not due to the religious conviction but 
to the non-respect of a contractual obligation, the Commission blatantly ignores that 
the essence of the applicant’s claim and argument is exactly the fact that he or she is 
confronted with a dilemma between religious dictates and professional obligations.  
Closing the eyes for this situation is not a serious, respectful, nor inclusive 
approach towards the applicant and his or her rights. This point of view is also 
neglecting the disadvantage people belonging to religious minorities have towards 
the issue of religious accommodation in a workplace where the underlying rules are 
dominated by the Christian tradition. Indeed, religious dictates concerning the 
Sabbath or the Friday prayer are not a priori accommodated while Sunday is 
generally considered a day of rest. In the cases concerning work-schedules, the 
central issue around which the reasoning is built are the contractual obligations 
rather than the fundamental rights of the individual who is seeking a judicial solution 
before the Strasbourg institutions.  
Similarly, by granting a wide margin of appreciation in the cases concerning 
the prohibition to wear religious signs at work, the Court bans the concerns and 
arguments of the applicants to the back, all the while putting the principle of 
secularism at the fore. The applicants’ perspectives and arguments are consequently 
not truly taken into account. In one case, Kavakci v. Turkey, the article 9 claim is not 
even examined while it was at the heart of the applicant’s complaint. 
 Evidently, accommodation of religious needs will in practice not always be 
possible in the workplace. Nevertheless, concluding that accommodation is not 
possible in a particular situation is one thing. Not recognizing that an interference 
with one’s right to manifest his or her religion occurs in a context of conflict between 
professional duties and religious dictates, is another. By not finding an interference 
in these cases, the Court does not even recognize the validity of the applicants’ 
claims.115 Similarly, concluding that a ban on religious attire in the workplace is 
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 Megan Pearson, Article 9 at a Crossroads: Interference Before and After Eweida, 13 HUM. RIGHTS 
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justified while on a procedural level the applicant’s perspective and arguments in the 
case are not even truly taken into account is also problematic. It does not only make 
the right to freedom of religion void in the workplace context by the lack of 
protection and thus as a consequence the lack of accommodation of religious 
diversity, but it is also problematic because of the absence of a genuine examination 
of the claim and of the lack of empathy towards the applicants’ concerns.  
The comparative examination within the Court’s case law reveals however 
that good practices, which can serve as inspiration for improvement of these 
problematic lines of reasoning, are not far away since they can be found within the 
Court’s broader case-law. Applying them is a matter of consistency. Several 
comparable cases concerning the workplace brought under other articles and the 
case of Jakobski v. Poland concerning religious accommodation in prison, show a 
more constructive, inclusive and sensitive approach towards the concerns and 
argumentation of the applicants. As a result also, a more genuine balancing of the 
several interests at stake takes place.  
It is in the workplace that “[i]n the course of their working lives … the 
majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing 
relationships with the outside world”, as the Court stated in Niemitz v. Germany.116 
In an ideal world the workplace should also be a space where the personal (religious) 
identity of employees are allowed to be expressed and manifested. However, 
structural inclusion of one’s religious identity through accommodation will as a 
matter of fact not always be possible; the Court will not always be able to conclude 
in favor of religious employees. Yet, this does not dismiss authorities’ and courts 
from treating people in a way that shows respect for people’s religious identity and 
their particular claims and thus also to show that despite the absence of an inclusive 
solution at a structural level, people should not feel marginalized in the workplace 
and in the broader “outside world”.  
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ADDENDUM to Chapter III: A discussion of Sessa v. Italy and Eweida and Chaplin v. 
the UK  
The case law concerning religious accommodation in the workplace took an 
important turn in 2013 with the case of Eweida and others v. the UK,1 in which the 
Court moved towards a more open and inclusive approach vis-à-vis religious 
accommodation in the workplace. Until 2013, the Court’s approach towards 
workplace-related accommodation claims remained the same: non-inclusive. Indeed, 
this was confirmed in the recent case of Sessa v. Italy,2 concluded in 2012, 
concerning a conflict between professional duties and a religious holiday.  
Both cases, important in the field, will be discussed below. In this addendum, 
a critical analysis of Sessa v. Italy will be followed by an extended and critical 
appraisal of the cases of Eweida and Chaplin v. The UK concerning the visible wearing 
of a cross by Christian employees in the workplace.  
1. Sessa v. Italy: a confirmation of the Commission’s approach towards 
religious accommodation claims in the workplace 
The restrictive and non-inclusive reasoning in the context of cases concerning 
religious accommodation in the workplace remained unchanged for a long time. In a 
relatively recent case from 2012, Sessa v. Italy,3 the Court referred, in the general 
principles section, to the line of reasoning followed in the old Commission cases of 
Konttinen v. Finland4 and Stedman v. the UK 5 This reasoning included the idea that 
when a conflict between religious dictates and professional duties occur, it is a 
breach of contractual obligations rather than the religious beliefs of the applicant 
that leads to, for example, the employee’s dismissal. The former Commission several 
times found that for this reason, no interference with the applicant’s right to 
freedom of religion took place.  
Sessa v. Italy is a case concerning a Jewish practising lawyer who complained 
about the unwillingness of the Italian court authorities to reschedule a public hearing 
in the case of his client. The two proposed dates for the hearing coincided 
respectively with Yom Kippur and Souccot, which are two important Jewish religious 
holidays. Noteworthy is the fact that these dates were proposed after the 
investigating judge excused himself during a previous hearing, leading to an 
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 ECtHR, Eweida and others v. the UK, 15 January 2013. 
2
 ECtHR, Sessa v. Italy, 3 April, 2012. 
3
 Ibid, § 35. 
4
 EComHR, Konttinen v. Finland, 3 December 1996. 
5
 EComHR, Stedman v. United Kingdom, 9 April 1997. 
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adjournment of the hearing of the applicant’s client’s case.6  
The applicant complained that the Italian court’s refusal to schedule the 
hearing on another day prevented him from participating in the hearing as the 
representative of his client and as such constituted a limitation on his right to 
manifest his religion.7  
In a short, five-paragraph reasoning,8 the Court found no violation of his 
right. On the contrary, the Court even questioned, similarly to the reasoning of the 
Commission in the cases analysed in this chapter, whether an interference with 
Sessa’s right to freedom of religion really took place. The Court  
is not convinced that setting the case down for hearing on a date which 
coincided with a Jewish holiday and refusing to adjourn it to a later date 
amounted to a restriction on the applicant’s right to practise his religion 
freely.9  
Multiple reasons are advanced for this observation. The first argument put 
forward by the Court was that ‘[i]t is not disputed between the parties that the 
applicant was able to perform his religious duties’.10 Moreover, said the Court, the 
applicant ‘could have expected that his request for an adjournment would be 
refused on the basis of the statutory provisions in force and could have arranged to 
be replaced at the hearing in question to ensure that he complied with his 
professional obligations’.11 Finally, the Court, with reference to the Commission case 
of Konttinen v. Finland,12 stated that the applicant ‘did not demonstrate that 
pressure had been exerted on him to make him change his religious beliefs or to 
prevent him from manifesting his religion or beliefs’.13  
This reasoning is problematic from several perspectives. First, the Court limits 
the protection of the applicant’s right to freedom of religion by its restrictive 
interpretation of what consists of an interference with this right. The criterion of not 
being pressured to change religions is, to say the least, a very narrow understanding 
of how the right to freedom of religion can be interfered with. Furthermore, the 
Court refers to the applicant’s ability to foresee the need for a replacement at the 
hearing. The dissenting judges in the case rightly note that this appraisal can only be 
made by the applicant himself; it is not up to the Court to decide whether in this 
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particular case a replacement was a possible option.14 Moreover this reasoning 
starts a priori from the assumption that the responsibility to find a solution lies with 
the applicant and disregards whether it is possible for employers to accommodate 
their employees. 
Moreover, positing that the applicant was able to practise his religion — 
apparently because in the end he chose to celebrate his religious holiday — is an 
almost incredible denial of the issue at stake. While it is surely true that the applicant 
in the end chose to celebrate his religious holiday, his complaint related to the fact 
that in order to be able to do that, he had to make sacrifices in his professional life. 
Hence, next to the fact that the Court’s approach offers very limited 
protection to the freedom of religion through this reasoning — which leads to the 
absence of an inclusive structural approach in the field of religious diversity in the 
workplace — the way the Court ignores the arguments and concerns of the applicant 
in this case is highly problematic.  
Stating that interference was not obvious, since the applicant was able to 
celebrate his religious holiday, is a partial representation of the facts which does not 
acknowledge the fact that this choice came with a price, namely that he was not able 
to fulfill his professional duties. Moreover, this approach also ignores the central 
argument made by the applicant, which is precisely the fact that he was confronted 
with a dilemma between his religious duties and his professional obligations for 
which he was searching for a solution that made it possible to respect both.  
The perspective of the applicant is clearly missing in the reasoning. Neither 
his arguments and concerns nor his rights are taken seriously.  
Irrespective of whether or not accommodation should have been accorded in 
this particular case15 and whether a de facto inclusion was possible through a 
readjustment of the hearing calendar, the way the Court approached the case at the 
procedural level and its failure to acknowledge the applicant’s concerns and 
arguments was therefore in itself exclusionary. The applicant was not truly heard 
and his concerns were not really put into the balance. This approach failed to 
communicate to the applicant that he was being taken seriously and that his 
religious claim was valued.  
The Court also disregarded the fact that the practices of religious minorities 
                                                          
14
 See dissent by Judge Tulkens, Judge Popovic and Judge Keller attached to the case. 
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 Like the dissenters, I agree that in this case accommodation was in fact a possible option, one of the 
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have a de facto disadvantage vis-à-vis majority religious practices in a society that is 
organized along the lines of a Christian majority tradition. Indeed, the dilemma Sessa 
was faced with as a practising lawyer would never be faced by a Christian practising 
lawyer since hearings would never be scheduled on Christian holidays such as Easter 
or Christmas.  
It is not argued here that all religious holidays should a priori be incorporated 
into official calendars; however, when a conflict arises between the religious holiday 
of an employee and a professional duty, at least an effort to search for a possible 
accommodation should be undertaken, instead of bluntly blocking the claim at the 
interference level and not even recognising that a conflict occurs.  
This would not only be a more inclusive interpretation of article 9, but no 
matter whether accommodation is de facto possible, it would also communicate to 
people that they as well as their rights and concerns are valued.  
2. Eweida and Chaplin v. the UK: towards a more inclusive approach in cases 
concerning religious accommodation in the workplace 
In January 2013, the Court issued an important judgment in the field of 
religious accommodation in the workplace. The judgment in Eweida a.o. v. the 
United Kingdom16 grouped four cases together. The analysis in this section will focus 
on two of them — Eweida and Chaplin v. the UK — concerning the wearing of 
religious symbols in the workplace.17  
The first applicant, Nadia Eweida, was a Coptic Christian who worked as a 
member of the check-in staff for British Airways. When she decided to wear a cross 
visibly above her uniform, she was (after several warnings) sent home without pay.  
The second applicant, Shirley Chaplin, also a Christian, worked in a geriatric 
ward, where she used to wear a cross under her uniform. When a new uniform that 
included a V-neck was introduced, the cross she was wearing around her neck 
became visible, which was against the internal rule that members of staff could not 
wear jewellery for safety reasons. 
Both applicants complained that the prohibition against wearing their cross in 
the workplace infringed their right to manifest their religion.  
In this judgment the Court made several interesting observations at the level 
of general principles which clearly announced a shift in its reasoning in cases 
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 ECHR, Eweida and others v. the UK, 15 January 2013. 
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 The two other cases of Ladele and Mc Farlane, concern the conscientious objection of two 
employees who refused to serve same-sex couples. These cases will not be discussed, since they do 
not fall within the scope of this chapter. 
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concerning religious accommodation in the workplace. First, the Court stated that in 
order to find that a manifestation of religion was at stake, ‘the act in question must 
be intimately linked to the religion or belief’18 but ‘there is no requirement on the 
applicant to establish that he or she acted in fulfilment of a duty mandated by the 
religion in question’.19 This principle, although already applied in previous case law,20 
has now been made explicit as a general principle in the Court’s freedom of religion 
case law.21  
But the most groundbreaking part of the reasoning in this case is the fact that 
the Court distanced itself from its previous line of reasoning, in which it considered 
that having the ‘freedom to resign’ and having the opportunity to find another job 
was an ultimate guarantee of the enjoyment of one’s right, leading to the conclusion 
that no interference was at stake. Interestingly, similarly to the argument made in 
this chapter, the Court referred to the inconsistency in its own case law with regard 
to this reasoning, stating that 
the Court has not applied a similar approach in respect of employment 
sanctions imposed on individuals as a result of the exercise by them of other 
rights protected by the Convention, for example the right to respect for 
private life under Article 8; the right to freedom of expression under Article 
10; or the negative right, not to join a trade union, under Article 11.22  
As a result, the Court decided that 
[g]iven the importance in a democratic society of freedom of religion, the 
Court considers that, where an individual complains of a restriction on 
freedom of religion in the workplace, rather than holding that the possibility 
of changing job would negate any interference with the right, the better 
approach would be to weigh that possibility in the overall balance when 
considering whether or not the restriction was proportionate.23  
As was also argued in the preceding chapter, the argument that people can 
find another job can only be considered in the proportionality analysis, where the 
several interests are balanced, instead of a priori leading to a finding of non-
interference with the right to manifest a religion. This approach at least recognizes 
the limitations put on the religious freedom of the applicants. The Court here clearly 
chose a more open and balanced approach that took into account both the 
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employer’s and employee’s concerns. This, however, does not entirely change the 
Court’s reasoning, since the proportionality analysis remains, as the Court said, 
‘subject to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State’.24  
Nevertheless, now that an important threshold at the interference level has 
been taken away, the approach has become more inclusive and protective than the 
previous cases concerning religious accommodation discussed in the preceding 
chapter. Indeed, religious employees are at least given a chance to advance 
arguments that can be taken into account during the proportionality analysis. The 
right to freedom of religion has been, according to some authors, ‘revitalized’ in the 
workplace context since ‘while previously Article 9 played at most a subsidiary role, 
now it could come much more prominently to the fore in analyses’.25  
The importance of balancing the several interests at stake was made central 
in the cases of both Eweida and Chaplin. Interestingly, both cases were, however, 
decided differently. While the Court found a violation in the case of Eweida, in the 
case of Chaplin no violation was found of her right to manifest her religion. The 
Court concluded in the case of Eweida that  
a fair balance was not struck. On one side of the scales was Ms Eweida’s 
desire to manifest her religious belief. As previously noted, this is a 
fundamental right: because a healthy democratic society needs to tolerate 
and sustain pluralism and diversity; but also because of the value to an 
individual who has made religion a central tenet of his or her life to be able 
to communicate that belief to others. On the other side of the scales was the 
employer’s wish to project a certain corporate image. The Court considers 
that, while this aim was undoubtedly legitimate, the domestic courts 
accorded it too much weight. Ms Eweida’s cross was discreet and cannot 
have detracted from her professional appearance. There was no evidence 
that the wearing of other, previously authorised, items of religious clothing, 
such as turbans and hijabs, by other employees, had any negative impact on 
British Airways’ brand or image. Moreover, the fact that the company was 
able to amend the uniform code to allow for the visible wearing of religious 
symbolic jewellery demonstrates that the earlier prohibition was not of 
crucial importance.26 
There are several interesting elements in this reasoning, at both the 
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substantive and procedural levels. A first remarkable element is that the Court did 
not accept the interests of the employer, in this case the preservation of its 
corporate image, as trumping the individual’s right to manifest her religion, all the 
while accepting that this aim is ‘undoubtedly legitimate’.2728  
The classification of the cross as ‘discreet’ can, however, be considered 
problematic since this notion is rather vague. Where is the line to be drawn between 
‘discreet’ and ‘ostentatious’, as was previously noted in other cases?29 Does the 
Court not leave a window open for the limitation of more visible religious signs in the 
workplace, such as the headscarf or the turban? Of paramount importance, 
however, seems to be the fact that no evidence was advanced that the rights of 
others had been interfered with and thus it concluded that Eweida’s right had been 
violated. 
In Chaplin’s case, however, the Court did not find a violation of her right to 
manifest her religion, stating that 
as in Ms Eweida’s case, the importance for the second applicant of being 
permitted to manifest her religion by wearing her cross visibly must weigh 
heavily in the balance. However, the reason for asking her to remove the 
cross, namely the protection of health and safety on a hospital ward, was 
inherently of a greater magnitude than that which applied in respect of Ms 
Eweida. Moreover, this is a field where the domestic authorities must be 
allowed a wide margin of appreciation. The hospital managers were better 
placed to make decisions about clinical safety than a court, particularly an 
international court which has heard no direct evidence.30 
This reasoning stands in contrast with the reasoning in the case of Eweida, 
where the Court assumed that the cross was not a problem in the context of the 
corporate image, especially since no evidence was advanced that could prove the 
opposite. In Chaplin’s case, however, the Court did not require evidence from the 
hospital authorities and awarded them a broad margin of appreciation, which 
indirectly gives the impression that the Court supposes that a safety problem arises 
with religious signs in a hospital context. It might indeed be possible that jewellery 
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can be dangerous in the context of a hospital; however, why did the Court not apply 
the same reasoning as in Eweida, requiring the hospital authorities to advance proof 
of this danger and as such truly balance the several interests at stake? 
Despite these small elements of critique, it is clear that the Court’s approach 
in these cases has been, from a substantive point of view, far more protective and 
inclusive than its previous case law in the field of the workplace.  
Additionally, from the perspective of procedural fairness the cases were 
clearly more inclusive and respectful of religious employees’ concerns, their 
arguments and their right to freedom of religion. This can be seen not only in the 
strong emphasis the Court placed on the need to balance the several interests at 
stake, but also in its acknowledgment of the importance that religious manifestation 
played in the lives of the applicants. In Chaplin, although an unfavourable decision 
was reached, the Court at the same time recognised ‘the importance for the second 
applicant of being permitted to manifest her religion by wearing her cross visibly’, a 
consideration that therefore ‘must weigh heavily in the balance’.31 And in Eweida the 
Court firmly stated that the right to manifest a religion ‘is a fundamental right: 
because a healthy democratic society needs to tolerate and sustain pluralism and 
diversity; but also because of the value to an individual who has made religion a 
central tenet of his or her life to be able to communicate that belief to others’.32 As 
such, the Court recognized the central importance of the right to freedom of religion 
for an individual, and also for society, and made clear that it should be taken 
seriously.33  
These cases, although not without flaws, reflect inclusivity, especially at the 
procedural level. They not only confirm the importance of the right to freedom of 
religion, but also convey the message that the applicant’s concerns will be taken 
seriously, more so than the Court has previously done in cases concerning religious 
accommodation in the workplace.  
Is this case a turning point in the Court’s approach towards religious diversity 
under article 9? That answer is not clear-cut. It might be argued that the Court’s case 
law under article 9 is at the moment still too unpredictable. While, for example, the 
case of Jakobski v. Poland34 in 2010 seemed very promising from the perspective of 
inclusion,35 the case of Sessa v. Italy36 in 2012 showed that an inclusive approach in 
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the Court’s article 9 adjudication should not yet be taken for granted. However, the 
cases of Eweida and Chaplin certainly marked a U-turn in the case law concerning 
the workplace, in that claims will now more easily pass beyond the interference 
level. However, there is still room at the substantive level to adopt a non-inclusive 
approach by applying a wide margin of appreciation. The real test will be when the 
Court is confronted with a case concerning the accommodation of a minority 
religious practice in the workplace, such as the wearing of a headscarf, in order to 
have more clarity on the vague concept of ‘discreet’ sign that the Court has used. In 
the increasing diversity of western European society, it is probably just a matter of 
time before the Court is faced with such a case. 
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CHAPTER V Suku Phull v. France Rewritten from a Procedural Justice Perspective: 
Taking Religious Minorities Seriously* 
Introduction 
Religious manifestations have always been a complicated issue. Over the past 
decade uncountable pages have been written about the headscarf and about the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights1 concerning this topic. 2 More 
recently, a world-wide debate was held about the crucifix case Lautsi v. Italy3. The 
world press4, researchers from universities in Europe and across the Atlantic5, 
bloggers6, the Vatican7… everybody wished to have a say in the discussion. In many 
of these famous cases I would probably also judge differently and yet, this is not the 
kind of case I have chosen to rewrite.  
My choice went to Suku Phull v. France8, a case about a Sikh who was compelled to 
remove his turban at a security check in the airport and who complains that this 
single fact violates his freedom of religion. Many people might not understand why 
Mr. Phull was so much affected by having had to remove his turban, that he hired a 
lawyer and contested this situation before the domestic courts up until the Court in 
Strasbourg. Even the Court, which declared the case inadmissible, seems to consider 
this situation as an a priori clear-cut issue. It considers the claim as manifestly ill-
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founded, since security checks in airports are ‘without any doubt’ necessary to 
safeguard public safety. Of course the Court is right about that; who could disagree 
with this safety concern? In fact, I am convinced that even Mr. Phull cares about the 
safety in airports as much as I do, as much as France does and as much as the 
Strasbourg Court does.  
This is however not the question that is at stake in Mr. Phull’s case. The issue at 
stake is whether the concern of public safety required the removal of Mr. Phull’s 
turban. This question however is not addressed by the Court, even though Mr. 
Phull’s argumentation had pointed at alternative measures for safeguarding public 
safety, such as the use of a manual detector or a walk-through scanner.  
The main concern in this chapter is not to criticize the outcome of the case, but 
rather to assess the way the case was dealt with. In a first part I will present the idea 
of procedural justice. Building on empirical findings concerning the link between the 
legitimacy of courts and the acceptance of their rulings on the one hand, and the 
way they deal with applicants and their arguments on the other, some normative 
guidelines have been developed. After outlining the Suku Phull decision more 
extensively in the second section, the ruling will be checked against these procedural 
justice guidelines in the third section. In the fourth section, I will propose remedies 
for the problems that will have been identified. These include reframing the decision 
into a judgment, asking the right necessity question and proposing an alternative. 
This will be followed by some concluding remarks and by the presentation of the 
redrafted judgment of Suku Phull v. France.  
5.1. Procedural justice 
Social psychology research has revealed that in their evaluation of their 
experience with the law, people do not only care about the outcome in their case, 
but also, and even more, about the way their case is dealt with.9 Taking these 
findings seriously implies that judges should care not only about outcome fairness, 
but should pay particular attention as well to the fairness of the process as such. This 
means that the parties’ views should be taken into account, that the judge should 
act in a neutral and unbiased way, that the parties should be treated with respect 
and that the Court’s actors should show genuine care about the parties’ concerns.10 
This idea forms the starting point of the rewriting exercise I undertake in this 
chapter.  
                                                          
9
 T. Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts’, Court Review 2007-2008, vol. 44, 26-31; T. Tyler, ‘What 
Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures’, Law and 
Society Review 1988, 22:1, 121. 
10
 See infra. 
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5.1.1. Benefits of a procedural justice approach 
Since the Court system is in the first place concerned with delivering fair 
decisions and not with pleasing the parties in a case, judges might ask why they 
should care about procedural justice.11 Here are some arguments in favor of 
procedural justice in judicial procedures.12  
The findings of Tyler and his associates indicate that procedural justice “encourages 
decision acceptance and leads to positive views about the legal system”.13 Treating 
individuals fairly thus enhances the legitimacy of courts and of the law in general. 
Moreover “once the perception that legal authorities are legitimate has been 
shaped, compliance with the law is enhanced, even when it conflicts with one’s 
immediate self-interest”.14 Hence, the integration of a procedural justice approach in 
its adjudication can strengthen the Court’s position and enhance compliance with its 
judgments. Moreover, as Brems and Lavrysen argue, regardless of its impact on 
legitimacy, procedural justice should matter for human rights adjudicating bodies 
“simply because it is part of the value system they represent”.15 
The way courts treat individuals also directly impacts on the individuals themselves. 
Research in economics has revealed that trust in the legal system is an important 
non-economical factor contributing to individuals’ sense of well-being.16 Moreover, 
in search of the reasons why individuals care about fair treatment by the authorities, 
Tyler and Lind developed the group-value model that is premised “on notions of 
respect and trust between authorities and group members”.17 According to this 
model, fair treatment communicates regard for the individual whereas unfair 
treatment signals marginality and exclusion.18 Consequently, treating individuals in a 
fair manner is beneficial for social cohesion in society. People who feel respected 
consequently feel part of the society the authority is representing.19 Although this 
model applies to the relationship between a particular individual and an authority 
and despite the finding that members of both minority and majority groups care 
                                                          
11
 K. Burke and S. Leben, ‘Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction’, White paper for 
the American Judges Association, 2007, 15; T. Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts’, 26.  
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 See for a specific analysis of the importance of procedural justice for the Strasbourg Court: E. Brems 
and L. Lavrysen, ‘Procedural justice in human rights adjudication: The European Court of Human 
Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 2-5. (Forthcoming, manuscript on file with authors) 
13
 Tyler, ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts’, 27; T. Tyler, ‘Public Trust and Confidence in Legal 
Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal 
Institutions?’, Behavioral Sciences and the Law 2001, 234. 
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R. Paternoster, R. Brame, R. Bachman and L. Sherman, ‘Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of 
Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault’, Law and Society Review 1997, 169. 
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 Brems and Lavrysen. ‘Procedural justice in human rights adjudication’, 10. 
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 A. Aslam and L. Corrado, ‘The geography of well-being’, Journal of Economic Geography, 2011, pp. 
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Ibid., 337. 
19
 Y. Huo et al., ‘Testing an Integrative Model of Respect: Implications for Social Engagement and 
Well-Being’ Pers Soc Psychol Bull February 2010 vol. 36 no. 2, 200-212. 
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about procedural justice20, it can be argued that in a multicultural context procedural 
justice deserves extra attention.  
To start with, research has proven that minority members are more than average 
distrustful toward authorities such as the police and Courts.21 Overcoming this 
distrust may require a particular focus on fairness in cases dealing with applicants 
belonging to a minority group such as in the present case. Moreover, treating a 
member of a minority in an unfair manner does not only communicate information 
about the position of this applicant as suggested by the group-value model, but it 
can also have an impact on the whole minority group. In this context it is noteworthy 
to refer to the letter of Fazilet Partisi22 with which this applicant – a political party 
that had been banned in Turkey- withdrew its case from the Court. It argued inter 
alia that the Court is “not a fair tribunal” since “it rejects constantly cases introduced 
by Muslims”. Fazilet Partisi also argued that the Court “has prejudices against Islam” 
since the Court “has formulated critique towards a universal religion about which 
she has no knowledge”. Fazilet Partisi concludes that in light of the judgments held 
in the cases of Refah Partisi v. Turkey23 and Leyla Şahin v. Turkey24, “the Court has 
demonstrated to have prejudices against the Muslim community” and that therefore 
they have the conviction that they “can have no trust in the justice of this Court”.25 
When dealing with a case concerning a member of a particular group, it is useful to 
be aware of the impact the case may have on the Court’s perception within that 
group. For example, the Court’s case law concerning Sikhs has been widely debated 
in the Sikh community.26  
In conclusion, procedural justice is important for the legitimacy of the Court, for 
compliance with human rights, for social cohesion and for the well-being of 
individuals. This is applicable to both minorities and majorities. However, there are 
good reasons to pay extra attention to procedural justice in a diversity context. 
                                                          
20
Tyler, ‘Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities’, 217 (with references); Burke and Leben, 
‘Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction’, 18. 
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Tyler, ‘Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities’, 217 (with references). 
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 ECtHR, Fazilet Partisi v Turkey, 27 April 2006. 
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 ECtHR, Refah Partisi v Turkey, 31 July 2001, where the Court i.a. stated at para. 72 that “It is difficult 
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based on Sharia”. 
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 ECtHR, Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, 10 November 2005. 
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 ECtHR, Fazilet Partisi v Turkey, 27 April 2006. [Author’s translation] 
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See for example “European Court rules against the Sikh turban in French schools”, where the author 
starts with “Sikhs feel let down once again in history, now by the European Court of Human Rights 
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dignity.”. (at http://www.examiner.com/europe-policy-in-national/european-court-rules-against-the-
sikh-turban-french-schools)  
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5.1.2. The four procedural justice criteria 
In the judicial context, procedural justice or procedural fairness concerns the 
perception people have of the way they are treated by courts and by the courts’ 
actors. Empirical research has consistently shown that individuals evaluate this 
treatment according to four criteria: representation, neutrality, respect and 
trustworthiness.27  
The first criterion, representation, refers to the need of applicants to express their 
views to the Court, before a decision is taken in their case.28 This criterion is 
important irrespective of whether or not their views will influence the outcome.29 
Yet this should not be a pro forma act; the applicants’ views should be taken 
seriously and the judge should genuinely listen to them.30  
As Brems and Lavrysen argue, this criterion can be met by the Strasbourg Court by 
accurately representing the arguments of the parties in the judgment and by 
carefully examining the merits of each of the arguments.31 This is particularly 
essential when it concerns an admissibility decision as in the present case. In the 
situation where an applicant is told that his case will not be examined on the merits, 
the Court should sufficiently clarify, based on the arguments of the parties, that the 
application has been fully and sincerely considered.32  
The second criterion, neutrality, might be seen as the most obvious one for court 
actors. This criterion requires judges to be impartial, independent and unbiased. The 
decisions they take should be based on an objective assessment of facts and upon 
the rules instead of their personal opinion.33 The parties in the case should be 
treated equally, which might not always be obvious if the opposite party is a State. 
Furthermore, the equality of parties does not only matter in the framework of a 
particular case, but also in the context of the broader case-law of the Court. The 
Court should be consistent across people, over time and across cases.34 Equality 
across people requires the Court to treat all applicants in a similar respectful way, 
irrespective of their country of origin, their economical status, their ethnicity, 
etcetera. This requirement of equal treatment is especially important for members 
of minority groups.35 Equality over time and cases implies that when the Court 
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overrules a certain line in its case law, this is sufficiently explained.36 Another aspect 
of equality over cases is the consistency in the reasoning between the cases that are 
dealt with under different fundamental rights. The Court should avoid creating the 
impression that some rights are more important than others.37 Finally, in order to 
ascertain neutrality, transparency in adjudication is crucial.38  
Also important is the third criterion of respect. A good basis for a respectful 
treatment is the understanding that “people come to court about issues that are 
important to them, irrespective of the strength of their legal case”.39 Not only the 
case, but also the persons claiming a violation of their rights should be taken 
seriously, meaning that they must be respected in their dignity and always be 
treated well and politely.40 Respect can also indirectly be shown through the text of 
the judgment. In several freedom of religion cases the Court clearly fell short from 
this criterion. Stating for example that the headscarf “is hard to square with the 
principle of gender equality” and that “It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the 
wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for others 
and, above all, equality and non-discrimination”41 surely did not only affect the 
applicants who were respectively a school teacher and a university student in 
medicines, but at the same time stigmatized many women.  
Finally, the last element consists of the trustworthiness of the judge. This criterion 
involves an appraisal of the judges’ motivation; whether they are sincere and caring 
and whether they are “honest and open about the basis of their actions; are trying to 
do what is right for everyone involved; and are acting in the interests of the parties, 
not out of personal prejudices”.42 This might be reflected in a judgment when for 
example the Court does not agree with the applicant, but shows understanding 
towards the applicant’s concerns. In Lautsi for example the Court stated that “it is 
understandable that the first applicant might see in the display of crucifixes in the 
classrooms of the State school formerly attended by her children a lack of respect on 
the State's part for her right to ensure their education and teaching in conformity 
with her own philosophical convictions. Be that as it may, the applicant's subjective 
                                                          
Brems and Lavrysen. ‘Procedural justice in human rights adjudication’, 12-13. 
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perception is not in itself sufficient to establish a breach of Article 2 of Protocol 
No. 1”.43  
No empirical research has yet been done on the importance of these procedural 
justice criteria for the legitimacy and broader image of the European Court of Human 
Rights. Yet there can be little doubt about the relevance of procedural justice for the 
Court. Following Brems and Lavrysen, two levels can be discerned at which it could 
and should take procedural justice into account.44  
First, the Court should be careful to act fairly during its own proceedings. And 
secondly, the Court could also incorporate in its reasoning a procedural justice 
assessment of the way the case was dealt with at the domestic level. As Brems and 
Lavrysen argue, where small shortcomings of procedural justice are concerned, 
these should be taken into account in the proportionality analysis, whereas more 
serious shortcomings of procedural justice should lead to the finding of a violation of 
the Convention.45  
Hence the Court can set a good example by being neutral, trustworthy and 
respectful and at the same time act as a kind of watchdog over the national 
authorities’ conduct with respect to these criteria. 
5.2. Suku Phull outlined  
5.2.1. Factual background 
Mr. Suku Phull, a UK national, was stopped by security guards at the Entzheim 
airport of Strasbourg when returning to the UK from a business trip. As a practicing 
Sikh, he was wearing a turban. For inspection reasons, Mr. Phull was compelled to 
remove his turban as he was making his way through the security checkpoint prior to 
entering the departure lounge.  
Mr. Phull alleges that the obligation to remove his turban violated his right to 
freedom of religion. He argues that it was not necessary to make him remove his 
turban since he did not object to pass through the walk-through scanner, nor did he 
refuse to be checked with a hand-held detector.46  
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5.2.2. Decision 
The Court declares the case inadmissible stating that the claim is manifestly 
ill-founded.  
The reasoning consists of two parts. In the first part the Court acknowledges that an 
interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of religion took place, accepts that 
this interference was prescribed by law and finally finds that the interference 
“pursued at least one of the legitimate aims listed in the second paragraph of Article 
9 (guaranteeing public safety)”. Subsequently, the Court examines whether “the 
interference was “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety” 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 9”. 
For this necessity test, the Court refers to an earlier case, X v. the United Kingdom,47 
in which a turban-wearing Sikh who failed to comply with security regulations 
concerning the compulsory wearing of a motor helmet, alleged a violation of his 
freedom of religion. The European Commission of Human Rights (Commission) 
declared the claim manifestly ill-founded following the reasoning that “the 
obligation to wear a helmet was a necessary safety measure and that any resulting 
interference with the applicant’s freedom of religion was justified for the protection 
of health by virtue of Article 9 § 2”.48 The Court transposes this reasoning to the case 
of Phull where it concludes that Phull’s claim is manifestly ill-founded as “security 
checks in airports are undoubtedly necessary in the interests of public safety” and 
since “the arrangements for implementing them in the present case fell within the 
respondent State’s margin of appreciation, particularly as the measure was only 
resorted to occasionally”49. 
5.2.3. Suku Phull submitted to a procedural justice test 
5.2.3.1. Taking each case seriously: examination on a case by case level 
The first eye-catcher when glancing at the decision of Suku Phull is the 
shortness of the text.50 When a closer look is taken at the reasoning (or the absence 
thereof) one can only be puzzled by the brevity of the decision. This is problematic 
from the perspective of several procedural justice criteria.  
Having a voice in the proceedings is, as explained above, essential for applicants in 
their relationship with courts. It must be clear from the decision that the applicant’s 
concern has been taken seriously, and has been the subject of a genuine 
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examination. In this case however, the reasoning is minimal and mainly based on the 
reasoning in a previous case that is factually speaking not entirely comparable to the 
case of Suku Phull. Besides the fact that the applicants are both Sikhs, UK nationals 
and turban wearers, no similarities between the cases can be discerned. In fact, the 
case of Phull concerned an occasional security check, while the applicant in the case 
of X v. The UK was prevented in general to ride a motorbike due to safety 
regulations. Moreover, the safety concern in Phull affects a broad audience, whereas 
in the case of X his own health is the main concern. Such factual differences may 
lead to different outcomes in a proportionality analysis.51 The Court repeated the 
same ‘technique’ in the later case of El Morsli v. France52 in which a Muslim woman 
refused to remove her veil in a French consulate during an identity check.53 Declaring 
this case inadmissible, the Court said it saw “no raison why it would deviate”54 from 
the reasoning in Suku Phull. Reference to previous similar cases is important from a 
consistency perspective, yet this cannot be done blindly. The Court should always 
treat a case on its own merits, taking into account the particular situation of the 
applicant.  
5.2.3.2. Taking the applicant’s arguments seriously  
The most troublesome observation from a procedural justice perspective is 
the way the Court completely ignores the applicant’s argumentation. He argued that 
“there had been no need for the security staff to make him remove his turban, 
especially as he had not refused to go through the walk-through scanner or to be 
checked with a hand-held detector.”55 The relevance or adequacy of these possible 
alternatives is not addressed by the Court. The absence of an examination on this 
point is disrespectful towards the applicant and goes against the requirement of 
representation. The possible existence of less restrictive alternatives is in my opinion 
the key issue in this case, necessitating a thorough proportionality analysis in an 
examination on the merits. The question is whether public safety could be 
guaranteed without interfering with the applicant’s rights or with a less intrusive 
interference than occurred in the present case.56  
Hence, the first major adaptation in my redraft is declaring the case admissible and 
examining it on the merits. An examination on the merits and a decent 
proportionality analysis would further equality between the parties in this case, as 
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the interests of both parties would be weighed against each other. Two other 
procedural justice criteria that would be furthered by an examination on the merits 
are respect and trustworthiness. No matter what the outcome in this case might be, 
by examining it on the merits, the Court shows understanding towards the 
applicant’s position, shows that his claim is taken seriously and shows respect for his 
religious conviction.  
5.2.3.3. Taking the applicant’s religion seriously 
Ultimately this case has to be framed in a broader debate concerning religion 
and the question of accommodating religious minorities in the mainstream society. 
The Court however does not show awareness of this broader issue in the decision. 
Although it starts with recognizing that an interference with the applicant’s freedom 
of religion took place, it does not seem to acknowledge how important this 
interference could be for the applicant. In light of the procedural justice concerns 
mentioned above, it can be argued that this position does not give a caring 
impression towards the religious conviction of the applicant and at the same time of 
all Sikhs who could be in a similar situation. On the contrary, it can be argued that 
the Court is banalizing the religious concerns of the applicant, by brushing away his 
arguments rather lightly.  
Regarding this point, the case of Phull can be contrasted to the Canadian Multani57 
case concerning a pupil who was prohibited to wear his kirpan58 in school. After 
finding an infringement of the applicant’s freedom of religion, the Canadian Supreme 
Court examines in Multani whether the infringement is reasonable and can be 
justified in a free and democratic society. According to the Supreme Court, “the issue 
is whether the respondents have succeeded in demonstrating that an absolute 
prohibition is justified”.59 Obviously, this is the question that is lacking in the 
Strasbourg Court’s decision of Suku Phull. In short, the Canadian Supreme Court 
concluded that the authorities failed to demonstrate that the absolute prohibition 
minimally impairs the applicant’s rights.60 According to the Supreme Court “[an] 
absolute prohibition would stifle the promotion of values such as multiculturalism, 
diversity, and the development of an educational culture respectful of the rights of 
others”61 and it concludes that a  
“total prohibition against wearing a kirpan to school undermines the value of 
this religious symbol and sends students the message that some religious 
practices do not merit the same protection as others. On the other hand, 
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accommodating Gurbaj Singh and allowing him to wear his kirpan under 
certain conditions demonstrates the importance that our society attaches to 
protecting freedom of religion and to showing respect for its minorities. The 
deleterious effects of a total prohibition thus outweigh its salutary effects”62.  
This case is a wonderful example of how a jurisdiction can acknowledge and respect 
the religious conviction of an applicant belonging to a religious minority and frame 
the issue in a broader societal context of multiculturalism.  
With this goal in mind I start the redraft with reiterating the settled principles in the 
Court’s case law concerning the importance of religious freedom in the Convention. 
In addition to the well known principles cited in paragraphs 1-5, I introduce a new 
principle stressing the importance of accommodating religious minorities in the 
broader context of a diverse society. This is important not only “for the purpose of 
safeguarding the interests of the minorities themselves but to preserve a cultural 
diversity that is of value to the whole community”63 . (redraft para. 6)  
Having examined the decision of Suku Phull v. France through a procedural justice 
lens, I will now examine the case on the merits in the next section. Hereby, I will 
propose an alternative reasoning that takes the particular situation of the applicant 
into account and that balances the interests at stake in the proportionality analysis.  
5.2.3.4. Suku Phull v. France examined on the merits 
A. Avoiding theological assessments 
The Court does not dispute that an interference with the applicant’s freedom 
to manifest his religion was at stake.  
While the finding of an interference is undeniable in this case, the Court’s 
representation of the manifestation of religion at stake is not unproblematic. By 
stating that “the Sikh religion requires its male followers to wear a turban”, the 
Court goes one step too far. Irrespective of whether or not the turban is a strong 
obligation in Sikhism, it is not for the Court to make conclusions about this. Just like 
it would be wrong for the Court to interpret what a religion does not require from its 
followers, it is also wrong for the Court to interpret what a religion does require from 
them. The Court should refrain from walking on this theological path.64 This would 
avoid excluding from Convention protection religious practices that are unfamiliar to 
the Court,65 as well as marginalizing minority voices within religious communities.66 
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Hence, when considering a manifestation of religion, the Court should not assess on 
a general level whether or not a religion requires its adherents to follow a certain 
rule, yet should look on a case by case level whether the applicant accords authority 
to a particular requirement of his or her religion.67 This is supported moreover by the 
need for consistency in the Court’s case-law. In the cases concerning the Islamic 
headscarf the Court never stated that “since Islam requires its female followers to 
wear a headscarf, it works from the premise that an interference of the freedom of 
religion is at stake”. Instead the Court stated that since “[the applicant] considered 
that Muslim women have a religious duty to wear the Islamic headscarf”68 or since 
“the applicant said that, by wearing the headscarf, she was obeying a religious 
precept and thereby manifesting her desire to comply strictly with the duties 
imposed by the Islamic faith.”69, it would proceed on the basis that the measures 
interfered with their freedom to manifest their religion. Hence, in the headscarf 
cases, the Court developed a consistent subjective approach towards assessing 
whether a manifestation of religion is at stake70.  
In the turban cases, similar consistency is lacking. In Mann Singh v. France71, about a 
turban on a driver’s license , the Court seems to apply a subjective approach similar 
to that adopted in the headscarf case-law:  
“According to the applicant72, the Sikh faith compels its members to wear a 
turban in all circumstances. It is not only considered at the heart of their 
religion, but also at the heart of their identity. Consequently, the Court notes 
that it consists of an act motivated or inspired by a religion or a conviction.”73 
[Translation by the author]  
However, in two later cases, Jasvir Singh v. France74 and Ranjit Singh v. France75, 
concerning Sikh pupils who wanted to wear a turban at school, the Court returns to 
the ‘theological’ position it also adopted in Phull: 
“ The Court recalls that it already held that the wearing of the turban by men 
of the Sikh faith could be considered as an act “motivated or inspired by a 
religion or a religious conviction”, since the Sikh faith indeed imposes on 
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them the wearing of the turban in all circumstances”76 [Translation by the 
author] 
For the reasons mentioned above I have adopted in the redraft a subjective 
approach similar to that of Mann Singh and the headscarf jurisprudence. (Redraft 
para. 1)  
B. To accommodate or not to accommodate?  
As argued above on grounds of procedural justice, the Court is required to 
undertake a decent proportionality analysis with a sincere consideration of the 
arguments raised by the applicant about possible less restrictive alternatives. This 
requires two corrections. First the right necessity question will be asked and then a 
necessity assessment will be undertaken.  
a) Asking the right necessity question  
By affirming that a security check at the airport is without any doubt necessary in 
a democratic society, the Court repeats the le To accommodate or not to 
accommodate? gitimate aim, namely the protection of the public safety, but does 
not question whether the measure taken — obliging a Sikh passenger to remove his 
turban — is proportionate to this undisputed legitimate aim. Consequently the Court 
is asking the wrong question; the question should not be whether a security check is 
necessary, but whether in this case the public safety necessitates the applicant to 
remove his turban at the security check. (redraft para. 10) 
b) Applying the necessity test 
The necessity test implies that an interference should be relevant, sufficient and 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.77 (Redraft para. 10)  
There is no doubt that removing the turban for inspection reasons can be relevant to 
the aim pursued, which is the protection of the public safety. As a general rule, 
travellers have to remove pieces of clothing such as their jackets or shoes to 
facilitate security checks in airports. However, from a procedural justice perspective, 
it is important to acknowledge that religious headgear such as the turban cannot be 
seen as a simple piece of clothing; that might be experienced by the applicant as 
disrespectful and careless. Giving due account to this religious aspect in the 
judgement shows understanding towards the applicant. (Redraft para. 11)  
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An element that should be taken into account in the proportionality analysis is the 
margin of appreciation the Court accords to states. In this case, the Court decides 
that the way states implement their security policies falls within the margin of 
appreciation, especially since these measures occur only occasionally. Indeed, it is 
not for the Court to judge about the effectiveness of a public safety measure. I 
therefore agree with the Court that the national authorities are best placed to assess 
the situation. (redraft para. 8) Yet this does not altogether do away with the 
supervision of the Court. Hence the Court can still check whether the national 
authorities were sufficiently respecting the applicant’s religious freedom. (Redraft 
para. 8) 
As outlined above, the main issue in this case concerns the argument raised by the 
applicant about possible less restrictive alternatives.  
Several authors favour including a least restrictive alternative criterion in the 
proportionality assessment.78 The Court repeatedly applied such a test in its case-
law. In a case on solitary confinement, the Court stated that “a rigorous examination 
is called for …to determine … whether the measures taken were necessary and 
proportionate compared to the available alternatives”.79 In case on preventive 
detention of protesters the Court argued that “the commission of that offence could 
not justify an interference with the right to liberty, especially as less intrusive 
measures could have been taken”80. Another interesting example concerns a Swiss 
citizen suffering from diabetes. The applicant was acquitted from military duty and 
from civil service, but instead had to pay a tax. In this case the Court literally states 
that a measure can only be considered proportionate and necessary in a democratic 
society, when no other measure exists that is less invasive to the fundamental right 
while permitting to achieve the same aim.81 This position is less nuanced compared 
to earlier case law where the Court finds that  
“[t]he availability of alternative solutions does not in itself render the … 
legislation unjustified; it constitutes one factor, along with others, relevant 
for determining whether the means chosen could be regarded as reasonable 
and suited to achieving the legitimate aim being pursued, having regard to 
the need to strike a "fair balance". Provided the legislature remained within 
these bounds, it is not for the Court to say whether the legislation 
represented the best solution for dealing with the problem or whether the 
legislative discretion should have been exercised in another way”82.  
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Likewise, several authors argue that the existence of a less restrictive alternative 
cannot be considered sufficient in itself to conclude that a measure is 
disproportionate83, although such a finding can be seen as an indication that there 
might be a problem with the proportionate character of that measure.84 During the 
proportionality analysis due weight must also be accorded to the interests of the 
State, for which the less restrictive alternative may constitute a burden. In the case 
of Phull, France might for example have argued that accommodating Phull’s claim 
would place a too heavy burden on the authorities with regard to costs or time 
constraints.  
Similar approach is found in Canadian case-law applying the principle of reasonable 
accommodation85. The Canadian courts have repeatedly been confronted with Sikhs 
claiming accommodation of their religious practices.86 It is worth mentioning that 
the way the Canadian jurisdictions apply reasonable accommodation, is very similar 
to the necessity test applied by the Strasbourg Court.87 When an infringement with 
an individual’s rights is established, any attempt to “disregard the duty to 
accommodate must show that it is necessary, in order to achieve a legitimate and 
important legislative objective, to apply the standard in its entirety, without the 
exceptions sought by the claimant”. It must be showed that the application of a 
certain rule is a “rational means” of achieving the objective and “that no other 
means are available that would be less intrusive in relation to the rights in question 
(minimal impairment test)”. This minimal impairment test also implies an 
assessment of possible undue hardship for the supposed accommodator. Finally, as 
seen above, it must be demonstrated that “there is proportionality between the 
measure’s salutary and limiting effects”.88  
Similarly, when applying a least restrictive alternative test, the Strasbourg Court 
could take the criterion of ‘undue hardship’ into account. In fact, in a recent freedom 
of religion case, Jakόbski v. Poland89, the Court appears to apply this principle, albeit 
without using the same wording. In this case, a Buddhist prisoner claimed a violation 
of his religious freedom after his request for a diet adapted to his religious needs had 
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been refused by the authorities. The Court was not convinced that providing the 
applicant with an adapted diet would lead to a “disruption of the management of 
the prison” and consequently found a violation of article 9 ECHR.  
In Phull, the least restrictive alternative criterion cannot be applied without restraint, 
since the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation and it is consequently not for 
the Court to decide whether the proposed alternatives are appropriate in this case. 
However, the Court can still apply a marginal check. Similar to the Canadian model 
used in reasonable accommodation cases, it can be argued that since the applicant 
suggested possible less restrictive alternatives, the State can only justify the non 
adoption of the alternatives by proving in a satisfactory manner that applying these 
alternatives would not be effective for the legitimate aim pursued or would entail an 
excessive burden. In this sense I concur with the dissenting Judge Hedigan in the 
case of Jasper v. the United Kingdom who is of the opinion that “where the applicant 
can establish on a prima facie basis that such an alternative way exists, the onus 
shifts to the respondent to show why it cannot use or adapt such a way”.90 91 
(Redraft para. 13) 
However, in the present case, it seems that the domestic authorities did not even 
consider the alternatives proposed by the applicant. In that case, the Court can even 
go a step further in its assessment by applying a strictly procedural approach to the 
least restrictive alternative criterion, requiring “not per se that the least restrictive 
option be chosen but that evidence is provided that the national authorities have 
included a consideration of less restrictive alternatives in their decision-making 
process”.92 This approach was repeatedly used in the Strasbourg Court’s 
jurisprudence.93 (Redraft para 14.) 
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Consequently, in Phull, instead of assessing in concreto whether less restrictive 
alternatives are available I only examine whether the authorities sufficiently took 
alternatives into account, especially since the applicant proposed several. In 
procedural justice terms, with this way of reasoning I assess whether the domestic 
authorities took the applicant seriously. (Redraft paras. 12-14)  
In this case, it is not sufficiently proven that these alternatives were seriously 
considered by the State. Consequently, the State did not sufficiently show that the 
measure is necessary in a democratic society. Therefore, I cannot but conclude that 
France violated the applicant’s right to freedom of religion by compelling him to 
remove his turban. (Redraft para. 15) 
Conclusion 
The man who was obliged to remove his turban at a security check, the Sikh 
who could not drive without a motor helmet, and the woman who had to remove 
her Muslim headscarf while queuing for a passport in a consulate, have something in 
common: they all returned from Strasbourg with an inadmissibility decision in their 
hands and at the same time —if you allow me a guess— they possibly all went home 
with a bit less trust in the justice system or at least with a feeling of not having been 
understood.  
In this chapter I tried to demonstrate in the light of the findings of procedural justice 
research that the outcome of a case that might be seen by a majority of people as an 
a priori lost case, is not always that clear-cut if one genuinely takes the claim 
seriously and assesses the case on its own merits. But more importantly, what I tried 
to show in this chapter is that this outcome, although important, is not always the 
main concern of applicants. In fact research has consistently shown that people 
accord even more importance to the way they are treated by courts than to the 
outcome in their case. Obviously with the case of Suku Phull the Court has failed at 
this level. Not only did it dismiss Phull’s claim in an ultra short inadmissibility 
decision, but – adding insult to injury- it completely ignored the applicant’s claim 
about alternative solutions that that would not infringe his freedom.  
In my redraft I have tried to redress this situation by issuing a judgment instead of a 
decision, because if the argument of the applicant is taken seriously it becomes clear 
that the ill-foundedness of the claim is not as manifest as the Court concludes. 
Instead the proportionality analysis necessitates a thorough balancing exercise 
where possible less restrictive alternatives are taken into account.  
That public safety is an important legitimate aim is not contested. However a general 
interest should not serve as a blindfold obscuring individual freedoms. I argued that 
the Court should keep in mind that the stakes of procedural justice include its own 
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legitimacy. Finally, I argued that procedural fairness towards applicants and their 
claims is especially important in cases dealing with minorities, since it conveys a 
message to the minority group the applicant belongs to. This message involves 
understanding, respect and the place the Court accords to minorities in the 
mainstream society.  
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Rewriting Phull v. France 
 
(...) 
 
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONVENTION 
 
The applicant complained of a violation of his right to freedom of religion by the airport 
authorities. He argued that there had been no need for the security staff to make him 
remove his turban, especially as he had not refused to go through the walk-through scanner 
or to be checked with a hand-held detector. He relied on Article 9 of the Convention. 
 
(...) 
 
I. Whether there was an interference 
 
1. [Fragment deleted] Since the applicant considered himself to be under a 
religious duty to wear the turban, the Court is prepared to work on the premise that 
the disputed measure constituted interference with the applicant’s freedom to 
manifest his religion or beliefs. 
 
II. Whether the interference was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate 
aim  
 
2. [Fragment deleted] The Court further notes that the applicant did not allege 
that the measure was not “prescribed by law” and finds that it pursued at least one 
of the legitimate aims listed in the second paragraph of Article 9 (guaranteeing 
public safety).  
The Court must therefore determine whether the interference was “necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of public safety” within the meaning of the 
second paragraph of Article 9. 
 
[Paragraphs deleted] 
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III. Whether the interference was necessary in a democratic society 
(i) General principles 
 
3. The Court reiterates that, as enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within 
the meaning of the Convention. This freedom is, in its religious dimension, one of 
the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their 
conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and 
the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has 
been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. That freedom entails, inter alia, 
freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise a 
religion (see, among other authorities, Kokkinakis v. Greece, judgment of 25 May 
1993, Series A no. 260-A, p. 17, § 31, and Buscarini and Others v. San Marino [GC], 
no. 24645/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-I). 
 4. While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual conscience, it also 
implies, inter alia, freedom to manifest one’s religion, alone and in private, or in 
community with others, in public and within the circle of those whose faith one 
shares. Article 9 lists the various forms which manifestation of one’s religion or 
belief may take, namely worship, teaching, practice and observance (see, mutatis 
mutandis, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [GC], no. 27417/95, § 73, ECHR 
2000-VII). However, article 9 does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a 
religion or belief (see, among many other authorities, Kalaç v. Turkey, judgment of 
1 July 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV, p. 1209, § 27; 
Arrowsmith v. the United Kingdom, no. 7050/75, Commission’s report of 
12 October 1978, Decisions and Reports (DR) 19, p. 5; C. v. the United Kingdom, no. 
10358/83, Commission decision of 15 December 1983, DR 37, p. 142; and Tepeli 
and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 31876/96, 11 September 2001). 
6. Pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a “democratic 
society”. Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those 
of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must 
always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper 
treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position 
(see, mutatis mutandis, Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, 
judgment of 13 August 1981, Series A no. 44, p. 25, § 63, and Chassagnou and 
Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 112, ECHR 
1999-III). Indeed, in today’s pluralist society the presence of religious minorities 
becomes more visible. This is a trend that should not lead to suppression, but 
instead the individual concerns of members of these minority groups should be 
respectfully considered, not only for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of 
the minorities themselves but to preserve a cultural diversity that is of value to the 
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whole community. (see mutatis mutandis Smith and Grady v. The United Kingdom, 
para.60 and Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, § 93, ECHR 2001-
I) 
7. Pluralism and democracy must also be based on dialogue and a spirit of 
compromise necessarily entailing various concessions on the part of individuals or 
groups of individuals which are justified in order to maintain and promote the 
ideals and values of a democratic society (see, mutatis mutandis, the United 
Communist Party of Turkey and Others, cited above, pp. 21-22, § 45, and Refah 
Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others, cited above § 99).  
8. Regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the 
competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole; and in 
both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in determining the 
steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention. (See mutates 
mutandis Jakobski v. Poland, §47) The Court's task, in exercising its supervisory 
jurisdiction, is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but 
rather to review under Article 9 (art. 9) the decisions they delivered pursuant to 
their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to 
ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, 
carefully and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference 
complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether it was 
"proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued" (see mutatis mutandis Vögt v. 
Germany) Particular care is called for when examining whether the reasons 
adduced by the national authorities to justify the interference with the applicants' 
freedom to manifest their religion under Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention were 
relevant and sufficient and whether the means employed were proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued. (See Larissis v. Greece para. 70) 
9. The object of Article 9 is essentially that of protecting the individual against 
unjustified interference by the State, but that there may also be positive 
obligations inherent in an effective "respect" for the individual's freedom of 
religion (cf. mutatis mutandis the judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the Marckx case, p . 15, para . 31) . 
 
ii. Application to the present case 
 
10. The Court must determine whether the interference with the applicant’s 
freedom of religion was “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety” within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 9. The 
applicant argued that there had been no need for the security staff to make him 
remove his turban, especially as he had not refused to go through the walk-
through scanner or to be checked with a hand-held detector. Consequently, the 
Court must examine whether the removal of the turban was necessary in the 
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interest of public safety. Therefore it must determine whether the measure taken 
was appropriate for achieving this legitimate aim, whether less restrictive 
alternatives were available and whether the measure taken was proportionate to 
the aim pursued.  
11. Security checks in airports are undoubtedly necessary in the interests of public 
safety within the meaning of that provision. The Court acknowledges that the 
removal of certain clothing such as jackets, shoes or in this case headgear during 
security checks might in certain situations be relevant in the interest of public 
safety. However, the Sikh turban cannot be regarded as a simple headgear, since 
for the applicant the turban carries a religious meaning. Therefore, the authorities 
should be careful to respect the sensitivities of the situation. The mandatory 
removal of his turban constituted an interference with the applicant’s religious 
freedom.  
12. This interference must be necessary to achieve the legitimate aim pursued 
and should not be more intrusive than necessary for that purpose. (See mutatis 
mutandis Bartik v. Russia) The Court reiterates that the choice as to the most 
appropriate means of achieving this aim is in principle a matter for the domestic 
authorities, who are better placed to assess the efficiency of the available security 
techniques. (See mutatis mutates El Majjaoui & Stichting Touba Moskee v. the 
Netherlands, no. 25525/03, § 32, 20 December 2007) The authorities must balance 
the interests at stake and should make serious efforts to find solutions to attain 
the legitimate aim pursued with a minimal infringement of the individual’s 
fundamental rights. The applicant suggested two alternative measures to the 
removal of his turban, namely the manual metal detector and the walk-through 
scanner. He argued that these measures would allow a full-fledged security check 
of his turban without the need to take it off and hence without touching upon his 
religious freedom.  
13. Since the applicant proposed measures, the walk-through scanner and the 
manual metal detector, that prima facie seem to be valuable alternatives, the 
burden of proof shifts to the State who must prove that these measures are 
insufficient for guaranteeing the legitimate aim pursued or that the 
accommodation through these measures would lead to an excessive burden for 
the State. (See mutatis mutandis Jakobski v. Poland and Supreme Court of Canada, 
Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256, 2006 
SCC 6) Furthermore, even if the insufficiency of these measures would be 
established by the State, this does not exempt the State from its positive 
obligations inherent in an effective "respect" for the individual's freedom of 
religion (cf. mutatis mutandis the judgment of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the Marckx case, p. 15, para. 31) Consequently, it must be shown that 
enough efforts were undertaken by the State to accommodate the applicant’s 
religious needs.  
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14. However, the Court observes that the French authorities did not even 
consider the alternatives proposed by the applicant and that it did not convincingly 
show why these proposals were not fully considered. (See mutatis mutandis Van 
Mechelen v. The Netherlands)  
15. Having regard to the foregoing and despite the margin of appreciation left to 
the State, the Court concludes that the authorities failed to strike a fair balance 
between the right to freedom of religion of the applicant on the one hand and the 
general interest of the public safety on the other hand. Therefore, the obligation to 
remove the turban imposed on the applicant was not proven to be necessary for 
the achievement of the legitimate aim pursued.  
The Court therefore concludes that there has been a breach of Article 9 of the 
Convention. 
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CHAPTER VI - Doing Minority Justice Through Procedural Fairness: Face Veil Bans in 
Europe* 
 
(Co-authored by Saïla Ouald Chaib and Eva Brems) 
 
We all move through our lives, a lot of the time, wrapped in a 
fog of our own selfish aims and desires, seeing other people as 
mere instruments of those desires. Kant thought, plausibly, 
that we need good principles to address this ubiquitous failing. 
But we need something else as well, the habitual cultivation of 
a displacement of mind, a curious, questioning, and receptive 
demeanor that says, in effect, “Here is another human being. I 
wonder what he (or she) is seeing and feeling right now.” This 
curiosity needs to be fed by facts: for without correct historical 
and empirical information we can’t possibly answer such a 
question. But it needs something more, a willingness to move 
out of the self and to enter another world.1  
 
In the name of women’s rights, public security and social cohesion, two 
European countries, France and Belgium, have enacted laws prohibiting face 
covering in the public space, generally known as ‘burqa bans’.2 These bans have 
been strongly criticized as violations of religious freedom and discriminations on 
grounds of religion and sex.3 Complementing such substantive human rights 
critiques, this paper takes a different approach, examining the bans from the 
perspective of procedural fairness. Indeed, the French and Belgian bans are extreme 
examples of legislative processes taking place above the heads of the people 
concerned. Not only was the voice of the women concerned missing in the debates, 
even more striking was the fact that a discussion of the ban’s human rights impact 
was nearly non-existent.  
In a first section, we will refer to social psychology research to explain what 
procedural fairness encompasses and what it entails for both the judiciary and the 
legislator, particularly in a multicultural context. Next, we will demonstrate how the 
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French and Belgian authorities have neglected procedural fairness at the domestic 
level. In the third section, we will argue how the European Court of Human Rights, if 
confronted with the subject matter, might restore procedural fairness. 
6.1. Procedural Fairness and Minority Justice  
Procedural fairness or procedural justice refers to the fairness of the 
procedures by which a decision is taken or by which an outcome is arrived at in a 
case. Social psychology research has shown that in their fairness assessment of 
authorities and the law, people tend to accord more importance to procedural 
fairness than to distributive justice.4 In other words, the way people are treated by 
judges and authorities is more relevant to them than the particular outcome in their 
case or the policy decision taken. This does not mean however that the outcome is 
considered irrelevant.5 Procedural fairness and distributive justice should be seen as 
mutually strengthening approaches rather than substitutes.6  
6.1.1. Importance of Procedural Fairness  
Initially, procedural justice research focused on the question of compliance 
with the law. Tyler and his associates found that the legitimacy of an authority 
shapes compliance and that legitimacy is rooted in procedural fairness judgments.7 
Hence, the first reason for authorities to accord particular importance to procedural 
fairness is maintaining their own legitimacy and that of the law. Central to the idea 
of legitimacy is the belief that "some decision made or rule created by [the] 
authorities is 'valid' in the sense that it is 'entitled to be obeyed' by virtue of who 
made the decision or how it is made".8 As a consequence, procedural fairness also 
enhances cooperation with authorities.9 It can also be argued that when a human 
rights body such as the European Court of Human Rights is involved, the importance 
                                                          
4
 Tyler, Tom R., “Procedural Justice and the Courts”, Court Review, 44(1/2) (2008), p.26; Tyler, Tom R., 
“What is procedural justice?: Criteria used by citizens to assess the fairness of legal procedures”, Law 
and Society Review, 22 (1988), p. 121; Gangl, Amy, “Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluations of the 
Lawmaking Process”, Political Behavior, 25, 2 (2003), p. 120 (with reference to Hibbing, John R, and 
Theiss–Morse, Elizabeth, “Process Preferences and American Politics: What the People Want 
Government to Be”, The American Political Science Review 95(1) (2001), pp. 145-153. 
5
 Tyler, Tom R., “Governing amid diversity: Can fair decision-making procedures bridge competing 
public interests and values?”, Law and Society Review, 28, (1994), p. 820-821. 
6
 Brems, Eva and Lavrysen, Laurens, “Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The European 
Court of Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly, 35 (2013), p. 182. 
7
 Tyler, Tom R., Why People Obey The Law (Princeton University Press, 2006), 270. 
8
 Idem, 277. 
9
 Idem, 271. 
195 
 
of procedural justice is even more important ‘because it is part of the value system 
they represent’ and because the legitimacy of human rights law is at stake.10 
Moreover, it promotes social cohesion and individual well being. Research has 
consistently shown that “[p]eople … value fair treatment by legal authorities because 
it communicates a message about their identities— that they are respected and 
valued members of society”11 and that they can count on the authorities for 
protection, benevolence and consideration when needed.12  
Although it follows from Tyler’s research that procedural fairness is equally 
important to majority populations as to minorities13, there are several reasons to 
believe that procedural fairness is particularly crucial for minority justice. 
Firstly, overcoming minority members’ above-average distrust of authorities14 may 
require particular vigilance on procedural fairness.15 Secondly, perceptions of social 
standing in the society gain a special significance for minority members. When 
certain people, e.g. youth, minorities or people with disabilities are treated unfairly, 
authorities might be sending the signal that these groups are marginal in society.16 In 
contrast, by treating minority individuals fairly the authorities convey a message of 
inclusion among the valued members of society.  
6.1.2. Components of Procedural Fairness 
Tyler and others highlight four criteria, according to which people evaluate 
procedural fairness: participation, trustworthiness, neutrality and respect.17 
Participation, frequently called 'voice', represents the need of people to be able to 
express their own perspective, regardless of whether or not their voice will have an 
impact.18 Valuing participation requires moreover that people feel that their views 
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are genuinely considered.19 Judges can show this by referring to parties’ arguments 
in the judgment and carefully examining the merits of the case.20 When people are 
confronted with an authority with which they have less direct contact, such as a 
legislator, direct voice is less important.21 Yet that does not make participation 
irrelevant. People still expect their interests to be taken into account.22 For 
minorities this might be of additional relevance since the "underrepresentation of a 
group in the legislature (...) may reduce the group members' sense of ownership, 
increase their sense of injustice and partiality in the determination of policy, and 
dampen their obedience to authority".23  
Trustworthiness refers to authorities’ intentions. They must be sincere and caring.24 
The question at hand is whether authorities are making an effort to be fair25 and 
people will evaluate whether they “are being honest and open about the basis for 
their actions; are trying to do what is right for everyone involved, and are acting […] 
not out of personal prejudices”.26  
Neutrality requires judges to be honest and unbiased about the applicant and the 
case and to base their decision upon rules and on objective information about the 
case and on the arguments of the parties instead of personal assumptions.27 
Neutrality requires also transparency about the way decisions are taken and how the 
rules are applied.28 It also involves consistency across people, over time and across 
cases.29 For lawmakers, neutrality requires that the interests of the whole population 
are taken into account. All views should be considered and no one view should be 
granted an obvious advantage in the policy debate.30 It may be argued that 
particular caution should be paid to this when minorities are not represented in 
legislative bodies. Therefore, in our view, it is important that lawmakers be 
sufficiently informed on minorities’ interests and needs when enacting legislation 
that affects them. In fact, neutrality also requires accuracy: informed decisions based 
on accurate information.31  
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The final criterion, respect means that people‘s human dignity is not infringed and 
that authorities treat them in a polite and respectful way.32 This criterion is 
particularly relevant for individuals’ feeling of self-worth, as mentioned above.33  
6.2. Denial of Procedural Fairness at the Domestic Level  
The kick-off of the French ‘burqa ban’ process was a speech by President 
Nicolas Sarkozy on 22 June 2009, stating that face veils were not welcome in France, 
and that legislation was necessary “to protect women from being forced to cover 
their faces and to uphold France's secular values”.34 The French Parliament 
subsequently initiated an inquiry into the issue, led by MP André Gerin. The 32 
member Gerin Commission represented all parliamentary groups. It heard witnesses 
and experts, and sent out questionnaires to several French Embassies. Its January 
2010 report concluded that the face veil constituted an infringement of the three 
principles constitutive of the French Republic: liberty, equality and brotherhood. The 
majority of the commission therefore recommended that Parliament adopt a 
resolution proclaiming this, as well as a law banning the face veil in public spaces. On 
11 May Parliament unanimously adopted said resolution.35 This paved the way for 
the ban. In the summer of 2010,36 the bill passed in both houses of Parliament with 
an overwhelming majority, despite negative advice of the Council of State, which 
estimated that “no incontestable legal basis” could be provided for a general ban.37 
The Constitutional Council however declared the ban to be constitutional in October 
2010, with only a minor reservation for places of worship open to the public.38  
In Belgium, the ‘burqa ban’ debate took place at a time of severe political crisis. 
Shortly after the near-unanimous approval39 of a ban by the Chamber of 
Representatives, the government fell prematurely and Parliament was dissolved on 7 
May 2010. As the Senate had ‘evoked’40 the bill, this meant that the newly elected 
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Parliament had to start over. While political negotiations for a new coalition 
government were going on for more than a year, the ban was adopted fast, without 
referral to the Council of State for advice. This time the Senate did not evolke the 
bill, which was approved by the Chamber of Representatives with an overwhelming 
majority41. In Belgium too, the law was unsuccesfully challenged before the 
Constitutional Court, also with a minor reservation for places of worship.42  
A closer look at the processes in both countries reveals serious shortcomings with 
respect to several procedural fairness requirements. 
6.2.1. Accuracy 
Accuracy is an aspect of the neutrality of the law.43 This means simply that 
the law has to be based on information that is correct. In this respect, both the 
Belgian and French ‘burqa ban’ laws are seriously flawed. Several commentators 
have noted that in the legislative process, no evidence was adduced that would 
allow to identify the exact problem the law would remedy, nor to support the claim 
that the specific remedy – i.e. the ban- would be effective with respect to that 
problem.44 The Belgian and French legislators were rather well tuned in with 
majority sentiments vis-à-vis the face veil, yet they were working on erroneous 
assumptions concerning the profiles and experiences of women wearing the face 
veil.45 The central error is the assumption that all –or nearly all- women who wear 
the face veil are forced or pressured to do so. Since the adoption of the bans, 
empirical research based on interviews with face veil wearers in France46 and 
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Belgium47 has shown that in fact the main profile is that of women choosing to wear 
the veil as a matter of an individual spiritual journey, generally against opposition of 
their family and in many cases of their partner as well. This is consistent with 
research in the Netherlands48 and Denmark,49 that was available at the time of 
lawmaking. Moreover, an expert testified before the Gerin commission that the 
wearing of the face veil in France was a matter of ‘religious hyper-individualism’ in 
which women choose to submit to a religious rule.50 The finding that the assumption 
of coercion is wrong renders moot at least two of the arguments used by both 
legislators to justify the ban. The first is the argument based on women’s rights. If 
women are not forced to wear the veil but instead freely choose to do so, the bans 
instead of liberating women, curtail their autonomy. Moreover they strengthen 
stereotypes about Muslim women’s subordination. In both ways, the bans work 
against women’s rights. The second is the argument about social integration. When 
donning the face veil is a well-considered choice, many women will not consider 
abandoning it as a first option when confronted with the ban. They prefer instead to 
continue wearing the veil yet avoid going out in public except by car.51 For these 
women, the bans reduce social integration. Moreover, empirical research also 
questions the relevance of the third argument in the parliamentary debates, which is 
based on security concerns. It appears in fact that face veil wearers are generally 
willing to lift their veils for identity checks, in many cases even to male security 
personnel.52 
The fact that the legislators literally had no idea what they were dealing with,53 thus 
had important consequences for the impact of the ban. Disregarding essential 
evidence in the course of lawmaking is highly problematic; it is even more so when it 
concerns legislation restricting fundamental rights. In Belgium, the disregard seems 
deliberate, as Parliament insisted on moving fast, and in that spirit rejected both a 
request for the hearing of experts who could have advanced evidence, and requests 
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for an advice of the Council of State, who could have checked whether the 
proponents of the ban advanced sufficient evidence to support their arguments. In 
France however, the Gerin Commission auditioned 211 persons and produced a 658 
page report. Yet the same flaws occurred. One of the auditioned experts suggests 
that an erroneous presentation of reality may have been brought in through the 
analyses of some of his colleagues, as they were set on an ideological reading of the 
face veil and on interpreting it as a sign of domination and alienation of Muslim 
women.54 
Moreover neither the French Constitutional Council nor the Belgian Constitutional 
Court did anything to correct this flaw.55 Both had the power and the opportunity to 
require the government to advance evidence as to its correct assessment of the 
problem the legislation sought to address, and of the ban’s likelihood to remedy that 
problem. Yet, the French Council chose to only reiterate the legislator’s assumptions 
that the face veil could endanger public security and the minimal requirements of 
living together and that women wearing a face veil, “whether voluntarily or not” are 
in a situation of exclusion and inferiority that is manifestly incompatible with the 
constitutional principles of liberty and equality.56  
The Belgian Constitutional Court did a slightly better job with regard to accuracy, 
acknowledging both that no security problem involving face covering occurred yet in 
Belgium57, and that the face veil can be a manifestation of a well-considered 
choice58. Nevertheless it accepted the ban as necessary for security reasons as well 
as for reasons of gender equality. With regard to the former, the Court argued that 
the State was allowed to “anticipate” potential risks.59 As to the gender argument, 
the Court stated that regardless of free choice, the principle of gender equality 
justifies a ban on religious manifestations that are not reconcilable with the principle 
of equality between men and women.60 Thus, although the Court does bring nuance 
to the legislator’s general assumptions, these nuances do not affect the reasoning 
whatsoever. With regard to the social integration argument however, the Belgian 
Constitutional Court fully endorsed the role of speculator when stating that covering 
the face renders an essential element of a person’s individuality invisible, making life 
in society impossible.61  
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6.2.2. Neutrality/Sincerity/Transparence 
For lawmakers, the requirement of neutrality comes close to those of 
sincerity and transparence. It is about being clear on the purpose of the legislation, 
and seriously striving to best achieve that purpose. In the case of conflicting interests 
between different categories of people affected by the law, it is also about taking the 
interests of all categories equally seriously. 
Both the French and Belgian laws ban face covering in general, even though the legal 
history and the accompanying discourse make clear that they target the Islamic face 
veil specifically. The neutral wording is intended chiefly to avoid legal challenges of 
discrimination on grounds of religion. Yet it goes at the expense of sincerity and 
transparence. Both the Belgian and French legislators have been accused of 
hypocrisy for disguising the real objective of the law.62 The legislators ’desire to 
‘appear impartial and reasonable’63 extended to the parliamentary debates, where 
parliamentarians avoided as much as possible mentioning Islam. Following French 
president Sarkozy’s statement in his speech to parliament in 2009, that ‘the burqa is 
not a sign of religion, it is a sign of subservience’, politicians have gone out of their 
way to describe the face veil as a matter of culture, not religion.64 
Furthermore, commentators of the French Gerin Commission and the ensuing 
legislative process have alleged bias in the selection of the persons to be 
auditioned65 as well as in the interpretation of the information from the auditions by 
the Commission. It was noted that the final report erased the plurality of reasons 
explaining the practice of the face veil that were advanced at the Commission’s 
hearings.66 Moreover, it can be argued that parliamentarians interpreted the Gerin 
report in a selective and biased manner, as in addition to a ban, the report also 
proposed a number of positive measures related to sensitization, mediation, respect 
for diversity and the rejection of discrimination, none of which were taken up in the 
political work that followed the report.67 
The French Council of State is not beyond criticism from the angle of neutrality. It 
was the Council that came up with the novel concept of ‘non material public order’, 
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‘a minimum base of reciprocal requirements and guarantees that are essential to life 
in society and that… are so fundamental as to precondition the exercise of other 
liberties’.68 Even though the Council of State advised against the use of this concept, 
it became one of the main foundations of the ban. Critics have argued that this 
concept, also labeled ‘social public order’ is far from neutral, as it allows ‘to sweep 
away human rights whenever their manifestation is offensive to the majority of 
citizens’.69 
For courts, neutrality requires that judges act as “neutral, principled decision makers 
who make decisions based upon rules and not personal opinions.”70 This relates to 
perceptions of independence and impartiality of the judge, as well as to the equal 
treatment of all parties. In that respect, the French Constitutional Council, acting as a 
court in controlling the constitutionality of legal texts, has a problem. The Council is 
composed of political notables, including leading “conservative politicians who had 
taken vocal and often controversial stances on anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant 
campaigns and who were unlikely to obstruct a government close to their 
leanings”.71 By hardly motivating its approval of the face covering ban, the Council 
left itself “unprotected to the criticism that it is not much more than a semi-political 
organ”.72 Similar reasoning has been applied to the Belgian Constitutional Court, half 
the bench of which are former politicians, making it unlikely that it would dare 
criticize a law adopted with near unanimity.73 Although the Belgian Constitutional 
judges motivated their decision more thoroughly, the reasoning remained one-sided 
giving quasi-absolute weight to the State’s arguments instead of balancing the 
interests of all the parties. 74 
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6.2.3. Participation 
In the process of lawmaking, individuals cannot expect to be heard in 
person.75 Yet individuals belonging to a group that is directly affected/targeted by a 
law have a legitimate expectation that their side of the story is somehow on the 
table. Moreover, substantive participation requires some evidence that these 
people’s views have been considered by the decision maker.  
This is yet another procedural fairness component that has been seriously neglected 
by the French and Belgian lawmakers who banned the face veil. Empirical research in 
Belgium has shown that women wearing the face veil experience intense frustration 
at the fact that this political intervention in their lives took place without consulting 
them or researching their situation.76 Moreover, several suggested that if there had 
been a dialogue, a compromise could have been found, for example wearing a veil in 
a different colour than black to cause less offense, or taking alternative measures for 
easy identification.77 It is indeed arguable that this is a matter in which dialogue 
might lead the way to the best solution for all; or that at least dialogue should have 
been tried before resorting to the criminal law.78 
 Yet as shown above, the lawmakers were not really interested in information from 
the perspective of the face veil wearers. During the massive information gathering 
effort that was the French Gerin Commission, the idea of talking to a woman who 
wears the face veil came as an afterthought. Kenza Drider, the only face veil wearer 
who was heard by the Commission, states that she had written several letters to Mr. 
Gerin asking to appear before the Commission, and that she had to mobilize her 
media contacts in order to succeed. During her hearing, summarized in ten lines in 
the 658 page report, she had to unveil her face.79 Moreover, the Gerin report starts 
with an ‘avant-propos’, in which a member of the commission relates the one 
encounter he had with a (French) woman wearing the face veil, which was on a 
professional trip to Syria. According to the text the woman approached him because 
she wanted to explain the meaning of her face veil. The melodramatic text describes 
the scene in much detail and concludes that “the eyes of Farah from Marseille” were 
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a source of motivation for the commissioners. Yet it remains mute on the content of 
her message. 80 
This is symptomatic of the whole report, and by extension of the entire lawmaking 
process that took place: the perspective of the women concerned was systematically 
shoved off the table.81 This is all the more remarkable given the fact that both 
Belgium and France have a strong tradition of consulting with target groups in the 
run-up to lawmaking.82 The derogation from democratic custom in this specific case 
cannot go unnoticed, neither by the women themselves, nor by the population at 
large. 
6.2.4. Respect 
Treating people with respect means taking them and their concerns seriously, 
and treating them as valued members of society.83 Under this heading, at least three 
issues are cause of concern in the face veil banning process. 
The first has been called “a neo-colonial form of paternalism”.84 The Belgian and 
French legislators claim to want to liberate women wearing a face veil, yet they are 
not interested in the viewpoints of these women. They pretend to know better than 
them why they wear what they wear.85 Throughout their discourse, they picture 
these women as submitted, dependent creatures. The legislators thus deny these 
women autonomy. Moreover, the legislators dwell extensively on how the majority 
in society experience the encounter of a face veil or even the idea of a face veil, yet 
show no interest in knowing how women who wear it experience their encounters 
with others. They thus ignore the women behind the veil, denying them humanity. 
In the second place, the legislators do not take seriously the infringement they are 
creating into a fundamental right, i.e. the freedom to express one’s religion. They 
consistently downplay the religious factor, despite the fact that for most women 
who wear the face veil, the central reason for doing so is a deep religious 
commitment. Even more importantly, they go lightly about tampering with a 
fundamental right. This is evidenced most clearly in the blatant ignoring of the advice 
of the French Council of State, and in the refusal to consult the Belgian Council of 
State. In addition to the legislator, the French Constitutional Council did not appear 
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to take religious freedom seriously. It needed only one sentence to conclude that the 
face veil ban did not violate religious freedom: 
Taking into account the objectives he stated for himself as well as the nature 
of the sanction in case of breach of the rule, the legislator adopted provisions 
that guarantee a conciliation of the protection of public order and the 
protection of constitutional rights that is not manifestly disproportionate.86 
Even with the finest legal scalpel, it is hard to detect any reasoning or justification in 
these lines. This is the more striking, given the fact that the Council of State had 
earlier come to the opposite conclusion in an extensively motivated advice. The 
Constitutional Council did not even bother to brush the Council of State’s arguments 
aside. Moreover, it adds insult to injury when it stipulates an exception to the ban: in 
order not to violate religious freedom, the French ban should not apply in places of 
worship that are open to the public.87 As this statement is likewise unmotivated, we 
cannot know whether the Council is deliberately reinterpreting a religious dress 
practice to make it into part of a mosque ritual, nor on what basis it claims the 
power to do so. The same holds for the Belgian Constitutional Court, which 
stipulated the same reservation in its judgment. Thirdly, the discourse surrounding 
the introduction of the bans shows a strong tendency of ‘othering’88. Women who 
wear a face veil are not portrayed as members of the same society as those who 
encounter them on the street, and those who decide to ban the veil. Nicolas Sarkozy 
set the tone when he announced that “the burqa will not be welcome on the French 
territory” (cf. supra). This speech has been analysed as an example of 
ethnonationalism: by labeling the face veil as foreign to French identity, there is no 
acknowledgement of the possibilities of a hybrid or multilayered identity, that would 
at the same time be profoundly French and profoundly Islamic.89 Moreover, 
Sarkozy’s ‘colonial gaze’ at the face veil mobilizes the French around self-proclaimed 
French values while excluding the face veil wearers from both those values and the 
idea of Frenchness.90 Mullally noted that the Gerin Commission’s presentation of its 
proposals as ‘un accord républicain’ clearly reflects “the desire to reinforce and 
bolster a collective sense of national identity, designed to define the terms of 
belonging.”91 It deliberately targets those who symbolize otherness. Stigmatization, 
if not intentional, is at best accepted as collateral damage.92 The main purpose of the 
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ban seems to be “to reassure public opinion that the political class is ready to stand 
up for ‘our’ values in the face of ‘foreign’ threats to ‘our way of life’.”93 
6.2.5. Trust/caring 
The criterion of trust relates to the feeling among those affected by the law, 
that those who are making the law sincerely strive for justice.94 It is about the 
lawmakers showing to the people that they care. From this angle as well, the French 
and Belgian face veil bans are very problematic. 
To the extent that the lawmakers in the face veil banning process show caring, it is 
caring about the majority population, for whom the face veil may engender feelings 
of insecurity, who dislike the sight of a face veil on the street, and who see the face 
veil as a symbol denying women’s rights. The arguments advanced by both 
parliaments to ban the veil – women’s rights, security, and social cohesion – make 
sense only from the (subjective) perspective of those who do not wear the face veil. 
As argued above, for the face veil wearers the bans have reduced women’s rights, 
social integration and security. This lack of caring for the women concerned is most 
flagrant in the Belgian law, as – different from the French law – it does not include a 
stipulation against forcing a person to cover her face. While the authors of the ban 
were assuming that women wearing the face veil are coerced to do so, they 
apparently did not care enough about these women to punish the perpetrators. 
Manifestly the only problems the lawmakers cared about are those of the majority 
population. 
An even more cynical interpretation is one that does not see any evidence of sincere 
caring by the lawmakers, except for their own electoral gain. Such is the suggestion 
among commentators who point at the fact that the bans enjoyed wide popular 
support, and that those supporting them politically would surf to similar popularity 
on waves of populism and islamophobia.95  
At a more institutional level, the refusal of the Belgian lawmakers to hear experts or 
consult the Council of State, or the anti-discrimination watchdog,96 or even to 
seriously engage with any arguments against the ban,97 can be seen as evidence of 
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lack of caring, in the sense that the focus on getting a ban voted, left no room for 
even the most common efforts aimed at doing things in a proper way. It was quite 
clear that the parliamentarians did not want to have to deal with criticism. One of 
the main proponents of the ban explicitly stated that the reason for avoiding the 
Council of State was the fear that it might find inconsistencies with fundamental 
rights. In other words, in their hurry to get the ban voted, politicians did not even 
care about fundamental rights.98 
In France, the Council of State was consulted, yet the picture does not look any 
rosier. The Council crushed the proposed ban on grounds of incompatibility with 
fundamental rights. Similarly, the legal experts heard by the Gerin commission had 
warned that a general ban would be highly problematic.99 In an ‘unprecedented 
defiance of concerted legal opinion’100 however, the French parliament ignored 
these objections, and several MPs engaged in public court-bashing against the 
Council of State,101 signaling that if they cared about anything, it was not the rule of 
law or fundamental rights. 
6.3. Doing Procedural Minority Justice in Strasbourg 
As was to be expected, an application challenging the French face veil ban 
was brought before the European Court of Human rights.102 This is an opportunity 
for the Court to set the standard on procedural justice as well as substantive justice. 
In the analysis below we will explore how the Court could potentially realize the 
former. 
6.3.1. Assessing Domestic Procedural Fairness  
Throughout its case-law, the European Court of Human Rights regularly acts 
as a watchdog of domestic procedural fairness. In this respect it has evaluated 
decision making processes by domestic courts, administrations and lawmakers. It is 
noteworthy that the Court has paid attention to this in cases involving the rights of 
members of ethnic or religious minorities, even when it exercised only light scrutiny.  
In particular, in cases involving article 8 – the provision that protects a minority 
lifestyle,103 as well as dealing with numerous issues of specific relevance for 
minorities, such as housing104 and registration of ethnic identity105— the Court has 
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regularly stated that “the decision-making process leading to measures of 
interference must be fair and such as to afford due respect for the interests of the 
individual as safeguarded by Article 8.”106 Moreover, the Court emphasized the 
minority component in its famous dictum in Chapman, a case concerning a Gypsy’s 
right to live in a caravan on her land: “the vulnerable position of Gypsies as a 
minority means that some special consideration should be given to their needs and 
their different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory planning framework and in 
reaching decisions in particular cases”.107 A fine example of this, is the case of Noack 
v Germany,108 concerning the collective transfer of the —mostly minority – 
inhabitants of a village to allow for mining expansion. The Court found the complaint 
manifestly ill-founded, basing its decision mostly on the elaborate procedures at the 
domestic level. The Court noted in particular that the process “lasted several years 
and that the distinctive feature of that process was the wide debate that took place 
in the Parliament of the Land of Brandenburg and among the other leading figures in 
public life regarding the choice between three alternative lignite-mining projects.”109 
It also drew attention to the due consideration of minority concerns during the 
process: “As regards protection of the rights of the Sorbian minority, the Court notes 
that ... the Constitutional Court of the Land of Brandenburg carefully examined 
whether the legislature had understood the scope of Article 25 § 1 of the 
Constitution of the Land of Brandenburg, which protects the rights of the Sorbs, 
whether it had duly weighed the right it enshrined against other fundamental rights 
and whether the result was not disproportionate.”110 
Under article 9 – protecting religious freedom— the Court, in its famous Grand 
Chamber case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, examined the way in which the Turkish 
headscarf ban for university students was introduced. In particular, it noted that the 
university authorities explained the reasons behind the ban to the students,111 and 
that “the process whereby the regulations ...were implemented took several years 
and was accompanied by a wide debate within Turkish society and the teaching 
profession ... It is quite clear that throughout that decision-making process the 
university authorities sought to adapt to the evolving situation in a way that would 
not bar access to the university to students wearing the veil, through continued 
dialogue with those concerned”.112 Hence, the broad margin the Court left to 
national authorities to decide whether or not to ban headscarves in school, was to 
some extent compensated by a control of the domestic process. However, this type 
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of procedural fairness assessment is far from systematic in the European Court’s 
case-law. 
Following Brems and Lavrysen,113 it is submitted that the control by the European 
Court of Human Rights should always include an appreciation of the extent to which 
procedural fairness has been done at the domestic level. Serious shortcomings of 
procedural fairness in cases involving Convention rights should systematically lead to 
the finding of a violation. Smaller shortcomings should be put in the balance with the 
other elements in the overall assessment of whether an infringement constitutes a 
violation. Moreover, the degree of scrutiny exercised by the Court could be linked to 
procedural fairness criteria, in the sense that light scrutiny – granting a wide ‘margin 
of appreciation’ to domestic authorities – would not be applied in case of procedural 
fairness flaws. Moreover, in cases involving minority rights, the procedural fairness 
check should include due attention paid to minority concerns. 
Dealing with the French and/or Belgian face veil banning processes, the European 
Court of Human Rights would therefore be expected to point out the numerous and 
very serious procedural fairness shortcomings, and remind the states parties of 
proper practice. Moreover, it would have to exercise strict scrutiny at the European 
level so as to compensate for the absence of domestic procedural fairness.  
6.3.2. Doing it Right at the European Level  
In addition to setting the standard on domestic procedural fairness, we 
submit that the Court in its own work should strive for best practice in this field. This 
would both strengthen its credibility when criticizing domestic shortcomings and 
offer states parties concrete examples of procedural fairness in legal reasoning. 
Moreover, from applicants’ perspective, fair treatment by this highest body in the 
hierarchy of law can offer some compensation for procedural unfairness suffered in 
earlier stages. 
6.3.2.1. Recognizing the Applicant 
The issue of voice is crucial for the European Court’s treatment of the face 
veil case. As it examines the case from the starting point of the fundamental right at 
stake, the right holder’s perspective comes natural to the Court. Throughout its 
reasoning, the Court should take care to present sufficient and accurate information 
on her experiences and to accurately present her arguments. While the applicant’s 
perspective is centerpiece, information on the experiences of other face veil wearers 
provides a relevant contextualization. 
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Assuming that the applicant in SAS v. France corresponds to the ‘standard profile’ of 
face veil wearers in France, it is to be expected that her religious conviction is a 
crucial aspect of the insider perspective.114 The way a conviction is experienced and 
the importance accorded to it is subjective. Outsiders may not understand why a 
Sikh objects to removing his turban at a security check or why it might not be evident 
for a Muslim girl to remove her headscarf during sports classes. Similarly, outsiders 
may not understand why a woman decides to cover her face when appearing in 
public. In determining whether or not such behaviour falls under the European 
Convention, it is however the insider perspective that counts. It is not for the Court 
to determine what a religion prescribes or does not prescribe.115 Only the applicant-
believer can autonomously decide this for herself. In most of its case law, the Court 
has adopted a correct approach to this matter: the relevant question is whether the 
applicant finds a particular practice important in the context of her religion or 
belief.116  
The ECtHR recently clarified in Eweida e.o. v. the UK that “the existence of a 
sufficiently close and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief must be 
determined on the facts of each case. In particular, there is no requirement on the 
applicant to establish that he or she acted in fulfilment of a duty mandated by the 
religion in question”.117 Accordingly, the autonomy of the believer implies also that it 
does not matter whether the religious dictate she wants to follow consists of a 
minority view within her religious group.118  
Additionally, in light of the neutrality principle, the Court must refrain from making 
biased or generalizing statements about the applicant’s religious conviction or 
practice. In the past, the Court has made a number of problematic statements such 
as “the rites and rituals of many religions may harm believers’ well-being, such as, 
for example, the practice of fasting, which is particularly long and strict in Orthodox 
Christianity, or circumcision practiced on Jewish or Muslim male babies”119 or 
“wearing the Islamic headscarf could not easily be reconciled with the message of 
tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all 
teachers in a democratic society should convey to their pupils”120. Such statements 
in fact contradict the ruling that 
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“(T)the right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention 
excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether 
religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate.”121 
122 
In addition, such statements are stigmatizing123 and disrespect the plurality of 
meanings a certain religious expression can have124 as well as individual autonomy to 
choose what meaning to attach to a certain religious expression.125 Instead of taking 
part in the political debate about the meaning society imposes on the face veil the 
Court has with SAS v. France the opportunity to break the circle of prejudice and 
return to the essence of the issue at stake, namely the rights of the women 
concerned and their right to freedom of religion in particular.126  
6.3.2.2. Recognizing the Weight of the Applicant’s Right 
In the domestic debates surrounding the face veil bans the impact of the bans 
on freedom of religion was hardly put on the table. It is the Court’s task to redress 
procedural justice by considering the voice of all parties and by genuinely weighing 
the arguments against each other as prescribed by the second paragraph of article 9 
ECHR.127 Procedural fairness requires moreover that this balancing exercise is done 
in a transparent manner, clarifying the weight given to each argument, as well as the 
underlying reason. Unfortunately the Court’s adjudication in article 9 cases has often 
lacked clarity and consistency, in contrast with its case law under other provisions, 
such as freedom of expression.128 From a procedural fairness perspective, the Court 
should be careful not to create the impression that some rights are more valued 
than others.129 Although the Court describes in its case law the freedom of religion 
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as “one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and 
their conception of life”,130 in practice, the reasoning adopted in freedom of religion 
cases often shows a less understanding approach, especially when the individual 
aspect of the right is concerned.131 The Court’s case law in the headscarf cases is well 
known for its one-sided approach, heavily relying on principles put forward by the 
State such as secularism and neutrality.132 But also in other cases concerning 
religious accommodation claims the Court has often shown a lack of understanding 
of the importance of religious claims for applicants in a particular situation.133 In 
Francesco Sessa v. Italy134 for example, the Court stated that a lawyer complaining 
about the scheduling of a hearing on a Jewish holiday, should arrange for 
replacement by a colleague if his religious and professional duties enter into 
conflict.135 It did not seriously consider the possibility that the organization of the 
judicial system might accommodate respect for his religious duties. In other cases, 
such as the cases concerning security measures in public buildings – requiring taking 
off religious dress —, the Court simply refers to the importance of security measures, 
omitting to examine the necessity of the measure for security.136 This insensitive 
approach towards religious claims should be avoided by carefully considering the 
concerns of the applicant and by genuinely and thoroughly balancing the interests at 
stake. Good practices can be found in the cases, rare in their kind, of Jakobski v. 
Poland137 and Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey138 and the recent case of Eweida and others v. 
the UK139.  
6.3.2.3. Recognizing the Applicant’s Minority Position  
As argued above, procedural fairness is particularly important when a 
minority is involved. That authorities should make an extra effort to keep confidence 
of minorities, was acknowledged by the Strasbourg Court in a recent case concerning 
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racist violence towards Roma.140 When the Court examines legislation interfering 
with minority rights, it has an important corrective function of “protecting the rights 
of minority members against abuses of the majority rule by the dominant group."141 
Indeed, there is always a risk that "law-making is done on the basis of dominant 
assumptions about minority cultures and their members’ views, with the minority 
being treated as a silent interlocutor".142 When it comes to the face veil ban, the 
Court cannot overlook the fact that the discussion concerned a minority that was 
silenced in the debates.143 Moreover, face veiling women are in a particular 
vulnerable position since they consist of a small minority within the minority group 
of Muslims who are not necessarily supportive towards them.144  
Some authors argue that the debates surrounding the face veil bans were so heated, 
because women wearing a face veil represent the Islam Europe does not want to 
see.145 It cannot be denied that the face veil bans are rooted in an anti-Islamic 
climate in Europe, and that this legislation even risks reinforcing the existing 
tensions. This has been extensively documented amongst others by Amnesty 
International,146 by the former Council of Europe Commissioner for human rights 
Thomas Hammarberg,147 by the European monitoring Centre on racism and 
Xenophobia,148 and by the Organization of the Islamic Conference.149 Also, the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued a resolution on “Islam, 
Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe” in which the face veil bans were discussed as 
well.150 In the recommendation with the same name, the Assembly called on 
member states not to establish a general ban of full veiling.151 The Court should 
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recognize this “sensitive nature of the situation”152 in which hostility and 
discrimination towards Muslims is on the rise in many European countries.153 
All these factors point at the particular vulnerable position of women wearing the 
face veil in France. In addition to close attention to neutrality and balancing in the 
Court’s reasoning, they mandate specific care with respect to its discourse. Respect 
should characterize the way the Court talks about women wearing the face veil, and 
all forms of paternalism and ‘othering’ should be avoided.  
Concluding Remarks 
Procedural fairness is an important and useful concept for all types of 
situations in which individuals encounter the law. Its particular strength lies in its 
empirical basis in social psychology research, demonstrating the importance of 
procedural fairness for the legitimacy of legal authorities as well as for individual 
wellbeing. There are good reasons to state that procedural fairness merits particular 
attention in cases of minority justice. Moreover, it may be argued that best practice 
of procedural fairness is of particular importance when fundamental rights are at 
stake.  
Our examination of the far-reaching procedural fairness flaws in the parliamentary 
and judicial treatment of the Belgian and French face veil bans has shown that 
disregard of procedural fairness makes for bad and harmful law. It is bad law, 
because it is not fit to address real problems: lack of attention to participation, 
accuracy and neutrality have led to crucial errors in the identification of problems as 
well as remedies. It is moreover harmful law, because it results in stigmatization and 
violations of the very rights it proclaims to protect.  
The European Court of Human Rights is well placed to lead the way toward 
procedural fairness as a necessary twin of substantive fairness in human rights 
adjudication. While the Court’s case-law shows a number of instances in which it has 
violated crucial procedural fairness principles, it also shows a potential to play a role 
in both reviewing domestic procedural justice and leading through example. The 
upcoming face veil case of SAS v France will be an excellent opportunity for the Court 
to show both its willingness and its capacity to do so. 
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 See mutatis mutandis ECtHR, Koky and Others v. Slovakia, 12 June 2012, para. 239. 
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 See also Tulkens, Françoise, “The European Convention on Human Rights and Church-State 
Relations: Pluralism vs. Pluralism”, Cardozo Law Review 30(6) (2009), p. 2587. 
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ADDENDUM to Chapter VI- A Procedural Fairness Look at the Grand Chamber 
Judgment of S.A.S. v. France 
In our article,1 Eva Brems and I argue that in the case of S.A.S. v. France2 
concerning the French face-veil ban, the Court had an opportunity to ‘break the 
circle of prejudice’ about women wearing a face-veil. We argue that the Court should 
recognize the applicant, the weight of her right and her minority position. The first 
goal is almost fully achieved by the Court. The Court puts the applicant’s perspective 
(and with hers, the perspective of women wearing a face-veil) to the fore whenever 
it has an opportunity to do so. The Court shows respect for her choice to wear a veil 
and examines her arguments, taking into account her concerns and even the 
concerns of the broader Muslim community. In contrast, when it comes to the 
applicant’s rights, the Court fails to give them sufficient weight. By according the 
State a wide margin of appreciation in this case, despite all the arguments in the 
reasoning pointing to problematic aspects of the ban, the Court ultimately gives a 
carte blanche to the State, leaving the applicant’s concerns and interests as they are. 
This aspect of the Court’s reasoning is not only problematic from a substantive point 
of view, in that it leaves the applicant, who belongs to a minority group, 
unprotected, but it is also problematic from a procedural justice point of view. The 
main focus of this commentary will be on the second problematic aspect. 
In this addendum, first a short summary of the judgment will be given, 
followed by a critical analysis in light of the arguments made in the chapter 
preceding the addendum. The analysis will first highlight the positive procedural 
fairness aspects of the judgment and will then uncover the main problematic aspect.  
1. Summary of the judgment 
The case of S.A.S. v. France was introduced on the day of the entry into force 
of the French law banning the face-veil3 by a French citizen who wore a veil. The 
applicant stated that ‘she wore the niqab in public and in private, but not 
systematically: she might not wear it, for example, when she visited the doctor, 
when meeting friends in a public place, or when she wanted to socialise in public’.4 
She also ‘did not claim that she should be able to keep the niqab on when 
undergoing a security check, at the bank or in airports, and she agreed to show her 
face when requested to do so for necessary identity checks’.5 
Before the Court, the applicant claimed a violation of articles 3, 8, 9, 10 and 
                                                          
1
 See Chapter 6, based on Saïla Ouald Chaib and Eva Brems, ‘Doing Minority Justice Through 
Procedural Fairness: Face Veil Bans in Europe’, 2 J. Muslims Eur. (2013), 1–26. 
2
 ECtHR (GC), S.A.S. v. France, 1 July 2014.  
3
 Loi n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public. 
4
 ECtHR (GC), S.A.S. v. France, 1 July 2014, §12. 
5
 Idem, §13. 
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11 separately and in conjunction with article 14. The Court, however, found no 
violation of any of these articles. The main reasoning in the case revolved around 
article 8 (right to private life) and 9 (right to freedom of religion), which the Court 
examined together.  
 
The Court started its judgment with an examination of the two legitimate 
aims invoked by France, the first being the protection of safety and the second 
referring to ‘respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic 
society’.6 This second aim encompasses three separate values: the protection of 
gender equality, of human dignity and of the so-called principle of ‘living together’.  
1.1. Gender equality and human dignity 
From the outset, the Court made it clear that the arguments concerning 
gender equality and human dignity cannot be accepted as legitimate aims. The Court 
took the view that  
a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice that is 
defended by women – such as the applicant – in the context of the exercise 
of the rights enshrined in those provisions, unless it were to be understood 
that individuals could be protected on that basis from the exercise of their 
own fundamental rights and freedoms.7  
 
With regard to the human dignity argument the Court noted that it  
is aware that the clothing in question is perceived as strange by many of 
those who observe it. It would point out, however, that it is the expression of 
a cultural identity which contributes to the pluralism that is inherent in 
democracy.8  
 
In other words, the Court did not accept that feelings of discomfort or 
disagreement with the face-veil could lead to a ‘blanket ban on the wearing of the 
full-face veil in public places’.9 Instead, it highlighted the women’s right to choose to 
wear a veil, which the Court even described as an expression of an identity that 
contributes to pluralism.  
1.2. Public Safety 
The second aim, the protection of public safety, was accepted by the Court as 
                                                          
6
 Idem, §16. 
7
 Idem, §119. 
8
 Idem, §120. 
9
 Idem, §120. 
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a legitimate aim, but not uncritically, since it questioned whether safety reasons 
really motivated the drafters of the law. The Court noted that ‘it may admittedly be 
wondered whether the Law’s drafters attached much weight to such concerns’ and 
observed that the safety argument was clearly considered to be of secondary 
importance.10 In any event, the Court made it clear that ‘a blanket ban on the 
wearing in public places of clothing designed to conceal the face can be regarded as 
proportionate only in a context where there is a general threat to public safety’.11 
This context of a ‘general threat’ was, according to the Court, not present and 
the State had less restrictive means at its disposal which enabled it to ensure public 
safety, such as a contextual obligation to show the face in risky situations.12 
Meanwhile, as the Court noted, the women concerned were ‘obliged to give up 
completely an element of their identity that they consider important, together with 
their chosen manner of manifesting their religion or beliefs’.13 The Court therefore 
concluded that a blanket ban was manifestly disproportionate and could not be 
justified for reasons of safety.  
1.3. Living together 
The last aim, the concept of ‘living together’, is the one that received most 
attention from the Court. This does not come as a surprise since it is also the main 
aim that dominated the debates at the domestic level. The Court categorized this 
aim under the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, in particular ‘the right 
of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together easier’.14 Its 
recognition of living together as a legitimate aim did not come without scepticism 
about the ‘flexibility’ of this notion ‘and the resulting risk of abuse’.15 The Court 
                                                          
10
 Idem, §115. 
11
 Idem, §139 
12
 Idem, §139: in particular the Court argues that ‘the objective alluded to by the Government could 
be attained by a mere obligation to show their face and to identify themselves where a risk for the 
safety of persons and property has been established, or where particular circumstances entail a 
suspicion of identity fraud’. 
13
 ECtHR (GC), S.A.S. v. France, 1 July 2014, §139. 
14
 Idem, §122. 
15
 Idem, §122. The Court’s critical stance, however, remains at the surface. Several authors rightly 
criticize the Court’s acceptance of ‘vivre ensemble’ as a legitimate aim. See for example Stephanie 
Berry, ‘SAS v France: Does Anything Remain of the Right to Manifest Religion?’, 2 July 2014 on 
EJIL:Talk, (available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/sas-v-france-does-anything-remain-of-the-right-to-
manifest-religion/), where she argues that by endorsing this notion, the Court endorses an 
assimilationist position. See also Eva Brems, ‘S.A.S. v. France as a problematic precedent’, 9 July 2014, 
Strasbourg Observers, available at http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/09/s-a-s-v-france-as-a-
problematic-precedent/, where she criticizes the fact that the Court accepts this notion without 
requiring an objective basis and without questioning the reason behind ‘the perceived negative 
impact on “living together”’, which is ‘discriminatory bias’. She also points out that in this case ‘the 
“others” in the name of whose “right to live in a space of socialisation” the ban is upheld, are the very 
people who chose not to want to socialize with veiled women’. See also Erica Howard, ‘S.A.S. v 
France: Living Together or Increased Social Division?’, 7 July 2014 on Ejil:Talk, available at 
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therefore warned that it ‘must engage in a careful examination of the necessity of 
the impugned limitation’.16  
 
Although at first sight the Court indeed seems to have applied a ‘careful 
examination’, since it deeply scrutinized the several arguments of the applicant and 
even of the third party interveners,17 ultimately it gave carte blanche to the State by 
uncritically according it a wide margin of appreciation. As a consequence, no 
violation was found of article 8 and 9 ECHR.  
Not surprisingly, the Court received much criticism of its reasoning in this 
case.18 19 Most of this criticism mainly and rightly refers to the lack of protection 
offered by the Court, calling the endorsement of the principle of ‘living together’ a 
‘problematic precedent’20 and asking what ‘remain[s] of the right to manifest 
religion’.21 
In the folowing sections, the Court’s reasoning will be critically assessed 
mainly from a procedural fairness point of view in light of the arguments made in the 
article co-authored by Eva Brems and myself, on which the previous chapter (chapter 
6) is based. It will analyse how the Court approached the applicant and her concerns 
and how the Court’s reasoning can be interpreted from the perspective of respect 
for the applicant’s right to freedom of religion.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
http://www.ejiltalk.org/s-a-s-v-france-living-together-or-increased-social-division/, who argues that 
the Court insufficiently acknowledges the polarizing character of the ban instead of leading to ‘living 
together’.  
16
 ECtHR (GC), S.A.S. v. France, 1 July 2014, §122. 
17
 See infra under 3. 
18
 Susan S M Edwards, ‘No Burqas We’re French! The Wide Margin of Appreciation and the ECtHR 
Burqa Ruling’, 26 Denning Law J. (2014), 246–260. See for example Stephanie Berry, ‘SAS v France: 
Does Anything Remain of the Right to Manifest Religion?’, 2 July 2014 on EJIL:Talk, (available at 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/sas-v-france-does-anything-remain-of-the-right-to-manifest-religion/); Eva 
Brems, ‘S.A.S. v. France as a problematic precedent’, 9 July 2014, Strasbourg Observers, available at 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/09/s-a-s-v-france-as-a-problematic-precedent/; Erica 
Howard, ‘S.A.S. v France: Living Together or Increased Social Division?’, 7 July 2014 on Ejil:Talk, 
available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/s-a-s-v-france-living-together-or-increased-social-division/; and 
Saïla Ouald Chaib and Lourdes Peroni, ‘S.A.S. v. France: Missed Opportunity to Do Full Justice to 
Women Wearing a Face Veil’, 3 July 2014, Strasbourg Observers, available at 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/03/s-a-s-v-france-missed-opportunity-to-do-full-justice-to-
women-wearing-a-face-veil/; Lucy Vickers, ‘Conform or be confined: S.A.S. v France’, 8 July 2014, 
OXHRH, available at http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/conform-or-be-confined-s-a-s-v-france/; Mark L. 
Movsesian, ‘European Human Rights Court to France: Do Whatever You Want’, 3 July 2014, available 
at http://clrforum.org/2014/07/03/european-human-rights-court-to-france-do-whatever-you-want/ 
(all articles were last accessed on 25 March 2015). 
19
 On the blog Strasbourg Observers, a poll was organized in which readers could vote for the best and 
worst judgment issued in 2014. S.AS. v. France topped the list of worst judgments. See: 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/02/12/the-results-are-in-poll-on-best-and-worst-ecthr-
judgment-of-2014 (last accessed 26 March 2015). 
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 Eva Brems, ‘S.A.S. v. France as a problematic precedent’, 9 July 2014, Strasbourg Observers, 
available at http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/09/s-a-s-v-france-as-a-problematic-precedent/. 
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 Stephanie Berry, ‘SAS v France: Does Anything Remain of the Right to Manifest Religion?’, 2 July 
2014 on EJIL:Talk, (available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/sas-v-france-does-anything-remain-of-the-
right-to-manifest-religion/). 
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2. Voice of women wearing a face-veil finally heard  
It cannot be denied that, despite the fact that the outcome in this case was 
an anticlimax, which will be discussed in the next section, the Court did some 
ground-breaking work in its approach to the applicant. Until now, cases concerning 
Muslim women have often lacked recognition of and respect for their concerns.22 
The Court’s remark about the Islamic headscarf in Dahlab v. Switzerland,23 for 
example, became (in)famous, the Court stated that  
it cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some 
kind of proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women 
by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court 
noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It therefore 
appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the 
message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-
discrimination that all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their 
pupils. 
 
Although this position was only reiterated in the case of Leyla Sahin v. 
Turkey,24 the Court has never implicitly or explicitly distanced itself from this 
position. What is more, in most cases concerning religious symbols the concerns of 
the applicant are not sufficiently recognized.25 The analysis below will reveal a 
different approach by the Court, in that it stresses the autonomy of the applicant 
and shows respect for her choices and also clearly takes her arguments and concerns 
into account. From a procedural justice perspective, this indicates that the Court 
shows respect, gives the applicant a voice and cares about her concerns. However, 
as will be demonstrated in the next section, there is a gap between recognition and 
truly taking the voice and concerns into consideration. 
                                                          
22
 A selection of the criticism of the Court’s case law concerning Islamic veiling can be found here: 
Anastasia Vakulenko, ‘“Islamic headscarves” and the European Convention on Human Rights: an 
intersectional perspective’, 16 Soc. Leg. Stud., (2007), 183–199; Peter Cumper, ‘“Taking Religion 
Seriously?” Human Rights and Hijab in Europe - Some Problems of Adjudication’, 24 Journa of Law 
and Religion (2008), 599; Nusrat Choudhury, ‘From the Stasi Commission to the European Court of 
Human Rights: L’Affaire du Foulard and the Challenge of Protecting the Rights of Muslim Girls’, 16 
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, (2007), 199–296; Tom Lewis, ‘What not to Wear: Religious 
Rights, the European Court, and the Margin of Appreciation’, 56 Int. Comp. Law Q., (2008), 395–414, 
‘The “Islamic Scarf” in the European Court of Human Rights’, 7 Melb. J. Int’l L., (2006), 52–73; Eva 
Brems, ‘Above Children’s Heads. The Headscarf Controversy in European Schools from the Perspective 
of Children's Rights’, 14 Int. J. Child. Rights (2006), 119–136. 
23
 ECtHR, Dahlab v. Switzerland, 15 February 2001. 
24
 ECtHR (GC), Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, 10 November 2005. 
25
 Cf. supra Chapter 3. 
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2.1. Respect for the applicant’s autonomy 
Following the State’s objection to recognizing that wearing the face-veil could 
be considered a manifestation of religion, the Court reiterated its principle that the 
State’s duty of neutrality entails that no legitimacy assessment can be made of 
religious beliefs and the way they are expressed.26 Similarly to its reasoning in the 
judgment of Eweida and others v. the UK,27 the Court stated that  
[i]t cannot … be required of the applicant either to prove that she is a 
practising Muslim or to show that it is her faith which obliges her to wear the 
full-face veil. Her statements suffice in this connection, since there is no 
doubt that this is, for certain Muslim women, a form of practical observance 
of their religion and can be seen as a “practice” within the meaning of Article 
9 § 1 of the Convention. The fact that it is a minority practice … is without 
effect on its legal characterisation.28 
The Court clearly started from the autonomy of the applicant, with respect 
for her choices. This is not only the case in its assessment whether a manifestation of 
religion was at stake, but recurs in different parts of the judgment. In its assessment 
of gender equality as a legitimate aim, the Court referred to the wearing of the face-
veil as ‘a practice that is defended by women’.29 In its proportionality assessments 
concerning the argument of the protection of safety, the Court referred to the 
‘impact on the rights of women who wish to wear the full-face veil for religious 
reasons’ and the fact that ‘they are thus obliged to give up completely an element of 
their identity that they consider important, together with their chosen manner of 
manifesting their religion or beliefs’.30 Under its proportionality analysis concerning 
the aim of ‘living together’, the Court put the applicant’s choice at the centre: ‘the 
ban has a significant negative impact on the situation of women who, like the 
applicant, have chosen to wear the full-face veil for reasons related to their 
beliefs’.31 Further, in its assessment of the fine imposed on the women, the Court’s 
understanding was that ‘the idea of being prosecuted for concealing one’s face in a 
public place is traumatizing for women who have chosen to wear the full-face veil 
for reasons related to their beliefs’.32 Finally, in its conclusion the Court once more 
noted the impact of the ban in preventing women ‘from expressing their personality 
and their beliefs by wearing the full-face veil in public’.33 As mentioned earlier, this 
approach is a clear departure from the Court’s previous case law, in which it 
                                                          
26
 ECtHR, SAS v. France, 1 July 2014, §55. 
27
 ECtHR, Eweida and others v. UK, 15 January 2013. 
28
 ECtHR, SAS v. France, 1 July 2014, §56. (emphasis added.) 
29
 Idem, §119. Emphasis added. 
30
 Idem, §139. Emphasis added.  
31
 Idem, §146. Emphasis added. 
32
 Idem, §152. However, hereafter comes the observation that the level of the fine is only ‘the lightest 
that could be envisaged’, which somehow weakens the seriousness of this argument. 
33
 Idem, §153. Emphasis added. 
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expresses in generalizing terms value-judgments on the wearing of the headscarf by 
Muslim women, disregarding their own autonomous choices.34 In addition, by 
applying an approach which explicitly and regularly emphasises the autonomy of the 
women concerned, the Court took a clearly different position from the approach 
expressed in the domestic debates, which were held in stereotyping terms and the 
voices of the women concerned were insufficiently heard. Instead, the Court gave 
the women a voice and put respect back on the map in a debate where this was 
often lacking.  
2.2. Recognition for the applicant’s concerns  
The Court not only showed respect for the autonomy of the applicant, but 
also acknowledged her concerns and the harm she suffered because of the ban. This 
was already clear in the Court’s reasoning on the safety argument,35 where the Court 
pointed to the effect of the ban on women who are ‘obliged to give up completely 
an element of their identity that they consider important, together with their 
chosen manner of manifesting their religion or beliefs’.36 The Court further found it 
‘understandable that the women concerned may perceive the ban as a threat to 
their identity’37 and that it prevented them from ‘expressing their personality and 
belief’.38 One of the main harmful consequences of the ban, as interpreted by the 
Court, was the threat to their identity. This not only showed recognition for the 
applicant’s concerns in an empathic way (the Court understands), but also clearly 
assessed the issue from the applicant’s point of view (it was not only an interference 
with her rights, but her identity and personality were at stake). The Court could 
instead have stated that the ban was interfering with her rights in that she was 
limited in expressing and manifesting her belief. However, it chose to bring her deep 
personal concern to the fore, namely the important impact the ban had on her and 
the way she perceived it. This deep understanding and acknowledgment of the 
applicant’s concerns has not been seen in cases concerning Muslim women. It is as if 
the Court was saying, we hear you and understand you!  
The Court additionally acknowledged the problematic way in which the 
debates had been held, as voiced by different third party interveners.39 The Court 
noted that it ‘is very concerned’ by the indications that ‘certain Islamophobic 
                                                          
34
 Lucia Dahlab was a school teacher and Leyla Sahin a medical student and yet the Court referred to 
the headscarf as a symbol that was ‘imposed on women’.  
35
 Cf supra 1.2. 
36
 ECtHR, SAS v. France, 1 July 2014, §139. 
37
 Idem, §146. 
38
 Idem, §153. 
39
 Idem, §149, reference to observations of the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University and of the 
non-governmental organisations Liberty and Open Society Justice Initiative.  
222 
 
remarks marked the debate which preceded the adoption of the Law’.40 It pointed 
out the risk this entailed ‘of contributing to the consolidation of the stereotypes 
which affect certain categories of the population and of encouraging the expression 
of intolerance, when it has a duty, on the contrary, to promote tolerance’.41 Thus, 
the Court expressed its concern not just for the applicant’s interests, but also for the 
broader society. Indeed, one of the main critiques voiced about this ban concerns its 
polarizing effect.42  
The Court also specifically addressed the broader Muslim community, 
mentioning that it ‘is also aware that the Law of 11 October 2010, together with 
certain debates surrounding its drafting, may have upset part of the Muslim 
community, including some members who are not in favour of the full-face veil 
being worn’.43  
It is interesting to see that the Court did not limit itself to a discussion of the 
law banning the face-veil, but also brought the debate preceding the ban into the 
picture. The Court clearly wanted to communicate a broader message in this case 
that was addressed not only to the particular applicant, but also to other women 
wearing a face-veil (we respect your autonomy and we understand your concerns), 
to the Muslim community (we realize the ban and the debate is upsetting for you) 
and to society (be careful not to stereotype and polarize).  
It is noteworthy, moreover, that the Court acknowledged the concerns of the 
proponents of the ban too, which is also important from a procedural fairness point 
of view. For example, the Court stated that it: 
is aware that the clothing in question is perceived as strange by many of 
those who observe it. It would point out, however, that it is the expression of 
a cultural identity which contributes to the pluralism that is inherent in 
democracy.44 
From a procedural justice point of view, it is important that the Court also 
recognized the concerns people have against full-facial veils.  
 
The Court’s deep recognition of the applicant’s concern is, however, 
somehow weakened at the end of the judgment. When talking about the fine 
imposed by the ban, the Court stated that it should ‘be taken into account that the 
sanctions provided for by the Law’s drafters are among the lightest that could be 
envisaged, because they consist of a fine at the rate applying to second-class petty 
offences (currently 150 euros maximum), with the possibility for the court to impose, 
                                                          
40
 Idem, §149. 
41
 Idem, §149. 
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 E.g. Erica Howard, ‘S.A.S. v France: Living Together or Increased Social Division?’, 7 July 2014 on 
Ejil:Talk, available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/s-a-s-v-france-living-together-or-increased-social-
division/ 
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 ECtHR, SAS v. France, 1 July 2014, §148. 
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in addition to or instead of the fine, an obligation to follow a citizenship course’.45 
Hence, while it first acknowledged that ‘[i]t is certainly understandable that the idea 
of being prosecuted for concealing one’s face in a public place is traumatising for 
women who have chosen to wear the full-face veil for reasons related to their 
beliefs’,46 with this statement the Court minimized the consequences of the ban for 
the applicant.  
 
Nevertheless, it is very clear from the text of the judgment that the Court 
offered a platform for the applicant by representing her side of the story and the 
personal harm that she suffered not only from the ban itself, but also from the 
debates surrounding it. This recognition is essential, especially in light of the lack of it 
in the domestic debates, but also in light of the Court’s case law concerning the 
manifestation of religion through the wearing of religious signs.  
2.3. Right to freedom of religion (still) not taken seriously  
Besides a deep recognition of the concerns of the applicant, it is remarkable 
how the Court carefully examined the arguments made by the applicant (and some 
of the intervening non-governmental organisations). This should be self-evident, of 
course, but it is not always standard practice in article 9 case law, as illustrated in 
chapter 3 of this dissertation.47 The most important arguments can shortly be listed 
as follows. 
The Court first agreed that the number of women wearing a face veil was 
very small and as a consequence noted that ‘[i]t may thus seem excessive to respond 
to such a situation by imposing a blanket ban.’48  
Secondly, the Court acknowledged, as noted earlier, the negative impact of 
the ban on the women concerned since the ban ‘may have the effect of isolating 
them and restricting their autonomy, as well as impairing the exercise of their 
freedom to manifest their beliefs and their right to respect for their private life’.49  
Thirdly, the Court mentioned that a ‘large number of actors, both 
international and national, in the field of fundamental rights protection have found a 
blanket ban to be disproportionate’.50  
                                                          
45
 Idem, §152. This statement is not convincing from a substantive point of view, since as Brems also 
argues, this line of reasoning ignores the fact that it is the criminalization of women and the 
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 Idem, §152. 
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 See supra Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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 ECtHR, SAS v. France, 1 July 2014, §145. 
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 Idem, §146. 
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 Idem, §147. 
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As noted earlier, the Court acknowledged, in fourth and fifth points, the 
observations made by third party interveners in taking into account the impact of 
the ban on the broader Muslim community, as noted earlier,51 and voiced its concern 
about the risk of stereotyping effects resulting from the debates surrounding the 
ban.52  
The Court thus clearly examined the arguments in detail and agreed overall 
that the ban was disproportionate in relation to the small number of women 
wearing a veil and that it affected these women deeply. After these five convincing 
arguments, the ‘inevitable conclusion’ seems to be that a breach of article 9 would 
be found.53 Yet, the Court decided otherwise. 
The Court’s approach to the applicant’s arguments showed a willingness to 
recognize the issue at stake, but does it also show a willingness to fully examine the 
case? The Court ultimately decided that France should be granted a wide margin of 
appreciation in the matter, noting that ‘the respondent State is seeking to protect a 
principle of interaction between individuals, which in its view is essential for the 
expression not only of pluralism, but also of tolerance and broadmindedness without 
which there is no democratic society’54 and concluding that ‘[i]t can thus be said that 
the question whether or not it should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in public 
places constitutes a choice of society’.55 The Court added that ‘[i]n such 
circumstances, the Court has a duty to exercise a degree of restraint in its review of 
Convention compliance, since such review will lead it to assess a balance that has 
been struck by means of a democratic process within the society in question’,56 and 
further that ‘in matters of general policy, on which opinions within a democratic 
society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the domestic policy-maker should 
be given special weight’.57  
This conclusion is in the first place problematic at a substantive level, 
especially from the perspective of people belonging to minority groups.58 
                                                          
51
 Idem, §153. Cf supra 2.2. 
52
 Idem, §149. 
53
 See Lucy Vickers, ‘Conform or be confined: S.A.S. v France’, 8 July 2014, OXHRH, available at 
http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/conform-or-be-confined-s-a-s-v-france/; and also Saïla Ouald Chaib and 
Lourdes Peroni, ‘S.A.S. v. France: Missed Opportunity to Do Full Justice to Women Wearing a Face 
Veil’, 3 July 2014, Strasbourg Observers, available at http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/03/s-a-
s-v-france-missed-opportunity-to-do-full-justice-to-women-wearing-a-face-veil/ 
54
 ECtHR, SAS v. France, 1 July 2014, §153. 
55
 Idem, §153. 
56
 Idem, §154. Emphasis added. 
57
 Idem, §154. 
58
 It makes the right to freedom of religion void for people in a minority position since ultimately their 
right is subjected to ‘the choice of society’. The reasoning also starts from the assumption that 
measures taken through a democratic process should not be assessed and thus assumes that the 
result of a democratic process is by definition valid, which ignores that the minority position of people 
are de facto disadvantaged and that the Court should, especially in this kind of case, be more careful. 
For a more detailed analysis of the problematic aspects from a substantive point of view, see Saïla 
Ouald Chaib and Lourdes Peroni, ‘S.A.S. v. France: Missed Opportunity to Do Full Justice to Women 
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Additionally, from a procedural justice point of view this ‘move’ of the Court in the 
conclusion is disturbing.  
Although the Court initially gave the applicant a voice, approached the issue 
at stake with respect and showed care and understanding vis-à-vis her concerns, the 
way in which the Court ultimately proceeded in the conclusion brushed away all the 
arguments it found valid against the ban and replaced them by a wide margin of 
appreciation for the State. It is as though the Court collected several weights on its 
way to the conclusion, on the side both of the applicant and of the State, but in the 
end forgot to put them in the scale in order to balance them. Instead, it assumed 
that the State put these weights in its own balance, while earlier in the judgment, 
the Court clearly pointed to important flaws in the ban and the debate surrounding it 
at the domestic level. It is indeed defensible that the Court should accord a margin 
to states to decide how they fulfil their national policies, including in religious 
matters. However, this does not take away the Court’s right, even duty, to check 
whether the several interests have really been weighed in the scale at the domestic 
level, and whether the applicant’s concerns have truly been taken into account. The 
fact that this did not happen in the matter of the face veil was blatantly clear, which 
should have led to a narrower margin of appreciation.  
 
A true procedural justice stance and true respect for the applicant’s right to 
freedom of religion requires not only recognition of her arguments and concerns, 
but also a true consideration of her voice. In this judgment the Court indeed listens 
to the applicant’s voice and concerns and does so excellently. However, listening and 
acknowledging are not sufficient; the Court should also have been more consequent 
in its approach and should have truly taken these observations into consideration 
when deciding the case. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Wearing a Face Veil’, 3 July 2014, Strasbourg Observers, available at 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/03/s-a-s-v-france-missed-opportunity-to-do-full-justice-to-
women-wearing-a-face-veil/. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has sought to examine what role the European Court of Human 
Rights can play in the religiously diverse context of Western Europe through the way 
it deals with religious claims brought under the right to freedom of religion 
protected by article 9 ECHR. It advances the thesis that in terms of inclusion, 
attention should be paid not only to the substantive aspect of the reasoning, but also 
to the procedural aspect. In this general conclusion I will look back at the main 
findings of this dissertation and reflect on the suggestions I make for improvement in 
the case law. Finally, I will explore possible fields of study for future research.  
Introduction 
If your work schedule conflicts with your religious duty to respect the Sabbath, the 
possibility of resigning from your job is the ultimate guarantee of your right to 
freedom of religion. There is no appearance of a violation of your right when you are 
not able to see a priest in prison. And when you can listen to the Sunday mass 
through the walls of your prison cell, no limitation of your right can be discerned. If 
you are expelled from school because you wear a headscarf or a turban, you can still 
follow home schooling. In any event, you are expelled from school not because of 
your religious conviction, but because you infringed the school regulations. 
Moreover, it cannot be denied that the headscarf is a symbol which is not 
reconcilable with principles such as gender equality and respect.  
 These statements all represent certain lines of reasoning advanced by the Court in 
cases concerning religious claims, in particular with regard to claims for the 
accommodation of religious needs. Without any doubt these statements reflect a 
narrow, non-inclusive interpretation of the fundamental human right to freedom of 
religion. It does not therefore come as a surprise that, despite the important work it 
has generally done for human rights protection in Europe, the Court has been widely 
criticized for its approach in these cases. The Court has been criticized for not 
offering sufficient protection to the right to manifest a religion and for interpreting 
the right in a restrictive and non-inclusive way, especially in cases in which people 
belonging to minority groups are involved. This is also confirmed by the extensive 
research on the Court’s case law in cases concerning religious accommodation claims 
in the workplace I conducted in chapter IV of this dissertation. In that chapter I 
uncovered how until recently the Court (and the former Commission of Human 
Rights) offered very little protection to people requesting accommodation of 
religious needs in the workplace. The analysis shows in particular how many claims 
do not make it beyond the interference level and how in other cases a wide margin 
of appreciation accorded to the State leads to a de facto absence of protection for 
the applicants, who in the majority of the cases belong to minority groups. However, 
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chapter IV also uncovered how the problematic aspects in the cases examined often 
occur at a procedural level. The reasoning in these cases, but also in the statements I 
mention in the previous paragraph, in essence show a lack of understanding and 
empathy for the applicants and a lack of recognition of the applicants’ concerns. A 
comparison with the reasoning in other cases brought under other articles, for 
example under freedom of expression, revealed that the Court’s approach can be 
different and more inclusive towards the applicants. 
In this thesis, I started with a multi-layered view of inclusion, encompassing both 
inclusion at a structural or substantive level and inclusion at a more subjective level. 
Structural inclusion refers to actual inclusion, for example through the 
accommodation of particular religious needs. With the subjective level of inclusion I 
refer to peoples’ feeling of inclusion – the feeling of belonging to the group or, more 
generally, to society. As social psychology research shows, these feelings can be 
encouraged when people receive the message that they are considered valued and 
respected members of society. Therefore, complementing the already existing 
critique of the Court’s article 9 adjudication from a substantive view on inclusion, I 
advocate for more attention to be paid to the subjective aspect of inclusion as well.  
In the religiously diverse context of Western-Europe this is particularly important. In 
chapter I, I sketched the societal context in which religious claims must be viewed. 
On the one hand, a growth in the diversity of the religious population can be 
observed in Western Europe. On the other, a decline in religiosity is also observed. 
Secularism, for example, is clearly on the rise. In this highly diverse context, 
conflicting views and needs are a logical consequence and it will never be possible to 
meet everyone’s expectations. In particular, it is impossible to accommodate all the 
diverse religious needs in daily aspects of public life, such as in schools and 
workplaces. However, despite the fact that peoples’ needs will structurally not 
always be included, it is still possible to communicate to them that despite this 
impossibility, they are still considered valued members of society. Therefore, this 
dissertation posits that in the context of the Court this means that even though it 
cannot always rule in favour of the accommodation of religious applicants, the Court 
can still try to communicate an inclusive message through the way it treats the 
applicants and their cases at the procedural level. In cases concerning religious 
accommodation claims, this is particularly important, since accommodation claims, 
as argued in this study, inherently concern claims for inclusion in daily aspects of 
public life with respect for the personal identity. These claims are, moreover, mostly 
made by applicants belonging to minority groups.  
Additionally, chapter I also showed that debates on religious issues are often 
sensitive and held in a polarizing and confrontational way, creating divisions 
between ‘us’ v. ‘them’. Not only do religious and non-religious views collide, but 
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several reports show also that anti-Muslim sentiments are on the rise. In this context 
particular attention to exclusionary patterns is therefore highly recommended. For 
the Court, this means that in religious freedom cases and especially in cases 
concerning religious minorities, who are in particular subjected to confrontational 
debates, the Court should make an extra effort to reflect on how it can communicate 
an inclusive message through its decisions and judgments.  
The sensitivity surrounding debates about religious issues is a challenge for the 
Court, as could be witnessed in the much debated recent cases of Lautsi v. Italy, both 
by a Chamber and the Grand Chamber of the Court. I acknowledge therefore that 
the Court’s position entails difficulty when it comes to religion-related claims. 
However, being a supranational human rights body, I consider the Court has a 
particular responsibility in cases concerning disadvantaged groups. Indeed, freedom 
of religion claims are often made by people belonging to minority groups, who are, 
by definition, more likely to be marginalized in society. I argue therefore that the 
Court should be particularly careful in this kind of cases, not only to protect them at 
a substantive level in accordance with the ECHR, but also to treat them in an 
inclusive way. Therefore, despite the difficult position, I consider that the Court is in 
a privileged position in which it has an opportunity to exercise a corrective function 
both towards structural exclusionary patterns at the domestic level and also towards 
the inherent power imbalances present in debates on religion at the domestic level. 
Indeed, the Court has an opportunity to offer a platform where everyone is heard 
and respected equally, in contrast to the way debates are held in society, and it can 
also function as a beacon of justice, neutrality and trust where people’s rights and 
concerns are at the centre of attention.  
Against this background, I decided to focus my attention in this dissertation mainly 
on the procedural aspect of the Court’s reasoning in article 9 cases, rather than on 
the substantive aspect. This means that the central question concerns how the Court 
treats religious applicants, their claims and their rights in the article 9 case law. I 
found inspiration in social psychology research on procedural justice, which shaped 
the framework in which I undertook the critical case law analysis. Additionally, it also 
inspired me in my normative arguments made in favour of improvement of the 
Court’s article 9 adjudication. 
1. Procedural justice: towards a complementary inclusive approach in 
freedom of religion adjudication  
In Part II of the dissertation, I offer a framework through which the procedural 
aspect of the Court’s case law can be examined. I rely on the social psychology 
research on procedural justice or procedural fairness, which refers to the fairness of 
the process of decision making rather than the fairness of the outcome. In this 
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dissertation I built on the work of Tyler, an eminent scholar in the socio-
psychological field of procedural justice research, and the work of Brems and 
Lavrysen, who have applied this research in the context of human rights 
adjudication, in particular in the context of the Strasbourg Court. In this dissertation I 
deepened their framework in the context of the Court’s jurisprudence under article 
9.  
Through his empirical research, Tyler advances four procedural fairness criteria 
which are found to be particularly relevant in the context of courts: voice, neutrality, 
respect and trustworthiness. These criteria entail that people want to be heard by 
the Court and they want their voice to be taken seriously. Secondly, they also expect 
judges to be impartial and that their case is treated in an unbiased way. Thirdly, 
people want to be treated with dignity and respect. Finally, they value the 
trustworthiness of courts. They evaluate whether the court is treating them and 
their claim in a caring and genuine manner and is making a true effort to be fair in 
their case.  
These criteria are found to be particularly relevant for people’s perception of the 
legitimacy of courts. I argued therefore, concurring with Brems and Lavrysen, that 
taking procedural justice into account, meaning treating people in a fair, neutral and 
respectful manner, is particularly relevant for the Strasbourg Court in keeping and 
strengthening its position as the pivotal human rights institution in Europe. 
Additionally, I stressed the relevance of securing legitimacy in light of the fact that 
the Court can be considered a representative and the guardian of human rights 
norms and rights in Europe; perceptions of the European Court of Human Rights can 
therefore have an impact on peoples’ perception of human rights.  
A central finding of procedural justice research is that in their evaluation of 
authorities, among them the courts, people care more about procedural fairness 
than about outcome fairness. This means that the way the Court treats people and 
their cases is of crucial importance for the level of trust people will hold in the Court. 
Procedural fairness can thus play a role in avoiding the alienation of people from the 
protection of the Court. I argued that this finding is particularly important in a 
diversity context with regard to people belonging to minority groups in that in 
general they are considered to be less trustful than people belonging to majority 
groups. Additionally, especially in the context of human rights protection, it is 
important that people keep faith in the Court so that they take the step of bringing 
before the Court their claims in search of human rights protection. Since people 
belonging to religious minority groups are more likely to be confronted with 
limitations on their human right to freedom of religion, it is particularly important 
that they keep seeking protection from the Court and that the Court does not 
alienate them. 
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Moreover, a very important segment of procedural justice research is the 
examination of the motivations behind people’s procedural justice assessments. 
Why do people care about procedural justice more than about outcome justice? And 
why does this aspect in particular shape their views on the legitimacy of authorities? 
The answer offered through the empirical findings of social psychology research is in 
essence the following: people care about being treated fairly, respectfully and in a 
caring and unbiased way because it makes them feel good. It increases their feelings 
of self-worth since they feel they are considered to be valued members of society. 
And as the research shows, this observation is universally applicable, no matter what 
background people have. It is essentially a human need to be recognized, to be 
listened to and to be respected. The importance of applying high procedural fairness 
standards is applicable to all claims and all applicants. However, I argue strongly that 
this finding should encourage the Court even more to pay particular attention to 
procedural fairness standards in cases concerning religious minorities. I argue from 
the perspective of inclusion that the Court should, especially in their cases, avoid 
acting in a procedurally unfair or disrespectful manner, since this communicates to 
them that they are marginal members of the group, and thus of society. Of course no 
one should receive this message, but since minorities are by definition more prone 
to marginalization from society, and are de facto often disadvantaged, it is of 
fundamental importance that the Court should avoid sending exclusionary messages 
to these people through procedurally unfair treatment. 
I also highlighted the Court’s exemplary function in applying high procedural fairness 
standards. As Brems and Lavrysen also argue, procedural fairness should, 
irrespective of the benefits it entails for the Court’s legitimacy, matter to the Court 
because in essence, procedural fairness is part of the value system the Court 
represents. Respect, neutrality and trustworthiness are values that the Court, as a 
human rights institution, should by definition apply. Moreover, as Chapter I brought 
to light, in the principles accompanying its judgments and decisions in article 9 case 
law, the Court also refers to principles comparable to those that procedural justice 
research advances. Examples are the Court’s reference to the State’s duty of 
neutrality and impartiality, the importance of dialogue and the responsibility to 
make an effort in the search for a balance between competing interests. Expecting 
this behaviour from States, the Court should at least lead by example by applying 
high procedural fairness standards in its own case law.  
As argued in chapter I, the Court should be aware of the important role it can play in 
Europe, since although it rules only in particular cases, the messages it sends and the 
principles it sets influence debates at the domestic level. Moreover, I also argue that 
through individual cases the Court reaches a broader group of people who identify 
with the case. The inclusive or exclusive messages it sends through its case law will 
as a consequence also have an impact on them. In short, this means that when the 
232 
 
Court makes biased statements, such as its (in)famous statements on the headscarf, 
this has an impact on the way the headscarf is discussed at the domestic level and it 
also has an impact on other people who identify with the applicant in the case, for 
example other women wearing a headscarf. In this sense, the case of S.A.S. v. France, 
concerning the debate on the face-veil, was an important test case in which, as 
Brems and I argued in the article included in chapter VI, the Court had an 
opportunity to break the circle of prejudice about women wearing a face-veil, which 
it did, as I discussed in the addendum to chapter VI. 
Hence, the concept of procedural fairness offers a lot of potential for the Strasbourg 
Court, especially when it comes to the protection and inclusion of religious 
minorities. The procedural justice criteria formed the basis on which I built my 
normative framework, through which the procedural aspects of the Court’s 
reasoning are examined. In the next section, I will discuss the main findings of my 
analysis.  
2. A broad and deep analysis of the article 9 case law through a procedural 
justice lens: the results  
In this dissertation, I submitted the Court’s article 9 case law to a thorough analysis, 
using different methodologies. In Chapter III, all the cases since the reform of the 
Court in November 1998 up to the date of publication of the Grand Chamber 
judgment in the case of S.A.S. v. France in July 2014 were covered. The cases were 
analysed in an inductive way, inspired by the qualitative data analysis method of 
grounded theory. The analysis was conducted in different steps. First, the cases were 
approached in an open general manner, asking three questions: How does the Court 
approach the applicant? How does it deal with religious claims? And finally how does 
it deal with the applicant’s right to freedom of religion? At a second level, the results 
that emerged from this first-level analysis were examined through a procedural 
justice lens. In contrast, Chapter V starts with one case in particular: Suku Phull v. 
France. The case is examined in depth from a procedural justice perspective, using a 
direct deductive approach. The procedural justice criteria are in this chapter 
immediately applied to the case. Chapter VI anticipates what was at the time of 
writing the forthcoming case of S.A.S. v. France. It starts with an analysis of 
procedural justice flaws at the domestic level and argues how the Court should deal 
with these flaws in its decision, but also how the Court could do a better job in its 
own reasoning. Chapter IV concerns a specific segment of the case law (of both the 
Strasbourg institutions), namely cases concerning religious accommodation claims in 
the workplace. These cases were analysed not directly from a procedural justice 
perspective but in a broader way, which also included an examination of the 
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substantive aspects of the reasoning. Nevertheless, this case study uncovered 
procedural fairness flaws similar to those analysed in the other chapters. 
Several procedural justice flaws could be discerned at different levels across the case 
law. A first aspect of the article 9 case law which I considered problematic is the 
decision taken by the Court in some cases not to examine an article 9 claim. In some 
cases the Court decides not to examine article 9 separately since it has already 
examined the claim under another article. In other cases, the Court decides to 
examine the applicant’s claim under one article alone. Mostly this happens in cases 
where the claim does not fall under the scope of article 9 or because examination 
under article 9 would be similar to examination under the other article. However, 
this is not always the case. In some cases the article 9 aspect was at the heart of the 
claim, such as in the case of Kavakci v. Turkey, discussed in depth in chapter IV. In 
such cases, the non-examination is problematic from a perspective of representation 
and consideration of the applicant’s argument. I argued therefore that the Court 
should not lightly decide not to examine the article 9 claim. 
At a second level I examined from a procedural justice angle how the Court names 
the applicant and the religious practice at stake. Both chapter III and chapter V 
uncover the inconsistency in the way the Court refers to the applicant’s religious 
background and to the religious practice involved. With regard to the religious 
background of the applicant, the Court sometimes refers to it from the applicant’s 
perspective, meaning in literal terms how the applicant identifies him or herself (e.g. 
the applicant considers himself a Sikh), while in other cases, the Court states from an 
outsider perspective which religion the applicant professes (e.g. the applicant is a 
Sikh). Also, sometimes the Court uses adjectives or mentions additional information 
about the religious background, while in other cases it does not (e.g. the applicant is 
a practising Sikh). With regard to the description of religious practice, the same 
inconsistency was observed. Whereas sometimes the Court describes the religious 
practice from an insider perspective, in other cases the Court uses general wording 
stating that a certain religion prescribes a certain practice. The inconsistency in its 
approach as to whether an insider or outsider angle is used leads to confusion about 
whether or not the applicant described him or herself in this particular way or 
whether the Court is adding its own view. Additionally, with regard to religious 
practice, when using generalizing terms instead of describing the practice from 
individual’s perspective, the Court risks entering the theological realm, which is 
problematic from a neutrality point of view. In some cases the Court expresses value 
judgments on certain practices, which of course cannot be acceptable from the 
perspective of respect and neutrality. It is therefore suggested that the Court take an 
applicant approach, using an insider perspective, always referring to the applicant 
and to the religious practice in the applicant’s own words. This ensures that the 
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applicant’s voice is accurately represented and that the Court remains absolutely 
neutral.  
At a third level, the level of the actual examination of the claims, I uncovered several 
procedural justice flaws. Firstly, I exposed a line of reasoning which contains a lack of 
acknowledgment of the issue at stake. This occurs when the Court reframes the 
issue at stake in the case by shifting the focus to the interests of the State (e.g. not 
the religion, but the principle of secularism is at stake), locating responsibility for the 
issue with the applicant (e.g. not the religion but the applicant’s conduct is the 
problem), or by shifting the focus of attention to the applicant’s choices (e.g. the 
applicant knows the rules, she should thus have known that she would not be able to 
manifest her religion). I argued that this approach fails to take the issue at stake, and 
thus also the applicant’s concerns, seriously. A second line of reasoning problematic 
at the level of the actual examination of the claim refers to possible alternatives at 
the disposal of the applicant. I exposed in my analysis how these proposed 
alternatives are actually false, since they are either non-comparable (e.g. listening to 
mass through the prison walls instead of attending it or being free, within the limits 
imposed, to manifest a religion) or in reality a compromise of the freedom of religion 
(e.g. the applicant’s religious conviction was fully taken into account since they 
followed home-schooling education). I argued that these lines of reasoning show a 
lack of representation of the applicant’s voice, that the issue at stake is not 
recognized and the concerns of the applicant are not sufficiently taken into account. 
Finally, I uncovered how the Court fails in some cases to conduct a thorough and 
genuine examination of the case. In many cases it simply states that no appearance 
of a violation can be found and often does not motivate that decision. In some cases 
the Court limits its reasoning to a reproduction of the arguments of the State and in 
other cases by referring to previous case law, such as in the case of Suku Phull v. 
France, discussed in chapter V. I argue in favour of always motivating the decisions 
taken and of also properly putting the interests of the applicant in the balancing 
scale. This approach would be considered more respectful and caring towards the 
applicant.  
In sum, the analysis of the case law displayed several serious and less serious 
procedural fairness flaws. The approach taken in this dissertation is, however, not 
only a critical-analytical one, but is also aimed to be normative-constructive in the 
sense that I also wanted to advance techniques to improve the Court’s article 9 
reasoning. I made general suggestions for improvement in chapter III and more 
specific suggestions in chapters V and VI (together with Eva Brems), applying them in 
concreto to particular cases. In the next section I group the main suggestions I made 
throughout the several chapters. 
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3. Towards more inclusivity IN the Court’s article 9 adjudication 
In essence, the procedural fairness flaws I discovered in the case law analysis reveal 
a failure to take the applicant’s perspective into account. Whether at the level of 
representation of the arguments, at the level of description of religious practice and 
background, at the level of balancing or at the level of deciding whether a claim 
should or should not be examined, ultimately all these flaws expose a neglect of the 
applicant’s perspective in the Court’s reasoning.  
I therefore advocate for a better inclusion of the applicant in the text of the 
judgment. The suggestions for improvement in the Court’s article 9 case law, which 
are spread across chapters III, V and IV, can be grouped as follows. 
First, I advocate for a more inclusive approach in the way the applicant and the 
religious practice is described. I argue that this would ensure that the applicant’s 
religious background and practice are accurately represented in an unbiased way. 
This entails that the Court should absolutely abstain from expressing value 
judgments on applicant’s religious practices. The Court should also avoid making 
generalizing statements about religious practices and should be consistent and 
neutral in the way it describes the applicant’s religious background and practices. I 
therefore recommend taking an insider perspective when describing the applicant’s 
background and the religious practice at stake. This would involve the Court 
reproducing the way the applicant refers to these elements and by preference 
literally also formulating it in a way which makes clear that the wording used 
comprises the literal words of the applicant.  
Next, I argue in favour of taking the applicant more seriously, which involves taking a 
more inclusive approach to the applicant’s religious concerns. This includes 
ensuring that minimization of their concerns are avoided, that their arguments are 
listened to and taken into account, that the real issue at stake is acknowledged and 
that the applicant’s concerns are genuinely taken into account.  
Finally, I argue in favour of a more inclusive approach towards the applicant’s 
rights. I advocate for taking the applicant’s right to freedom of religion more 
seriously, which involves ensuring that religious claims are examined when they 
belong to the core of the applicant’s case, that the interests at stake are 
appropriately balanced, that every case is examined on its own instead of simply 
referring to previous case law and that every decision is motivated properly.  
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4. Some positive reflections 
 
The entry point of my research for this dissertation was to examine the case law 
critically and to make constructive suggestions for improvement where needed. 
Additionally, I would like to highlight some positive observations that came to the 
surface during my research.  
First, as I show in chapter IV some techniques which can lead to an improvement of 
the case law under article 9 need not be searched for far away, since they already 
occur within the Court’s adjudication, mostly under other articles. Additionally, 
inspiration can also be drawn from the general principles the Court relies on in 
freedom of religion case law. This means that the implementation of a better 
approach at the procedural level does not in itself consist of a revolutionary new 
technique, since the Court already applies more inclusive techniques in other 
segments of its case law. Secondly, also from a practical perspective of incorporating 
a better procedurally fair approach into its reasoning, the fact that procedural 
fairness criteria are universally valued should make it easier to apply than techniques 
which are not universally valued or accepted or even understood (e.g. the technique 
of reasonable accommodation). A third important positive finding is that in the 
course of my research term, I observed some positive changes in the Court’s article 9 
adjudication. The cases of Eweida v. the UK and S.A.S. v. France, for example, which I 
discussed at length in the addendums to chapters III and VI respectively, although 
not free from shortcomings, demonstrate a procedurally fairer approach than in the 
case law preceding them. However, the case of S.A.S. v. France at the same time also 
makes clear that procedural justice involves not only recognition of the concerns of 
the applicant, but also a true consideration of the applicant’s perspective in the 
reasoning. I also think that although these cases are signals of change in the Court’s 
freedom of religion reasoning, it is still too early to draw general conclusions about 
new trends in the Court’s article adjudication. 
5. Towards more inclusivity THROUGH the Court’s article 9 adjudication?  
Chapter I referred to the letter of withdrawal of Fazilet Partizi v. Turkey, in which the 
applicants mentioned that they were withdrawing their application from the Court’s 
jurisdiction since they no longer trusted the Court. I highlighted how in their 
arguments they referred to procedural fairness aspects, such as the lack of respect 
and bias the Court displayed, according to them, in previous cases. This position 
seems to confirm the findings of procedural justice research and also to point to 
procedural justice flaws I discerned in the Court’s case law. However, I am aware 
that I cannot generalize this example.  
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I started the research for my dissertation partly from the motivation to examine the 
role the Court can play in the diverse context of Western Europe through its article 9 
adjudication. I advanced the thesis that the Court should be more attentive to the 
procedural aspect of its reasoning, that is, to the way it approaches the applicants 
and their cases; by contrast, this means that the focus should not be only on the 
outcome. I found that enhancing the inclusion of the applicant in its reasoning would 
strengthen the level of procedural fairness in its article 9 case law. In my normative 
framework I also referred to procedural justice research which shows how 
procedural fairness influences peoples’ perception of the legitimacy of courts and 
the fact that procedural justice is much valued because it communicates inclusion to 
people. I also argued, concurring with Brems and Lavrysen, that procedural fairness 
should be applied because it is part of the values inherent in the human rights 
framework. However, in the normative framework offered in chapter II, I also 
reflected on the potential of procedural justice in a religiously diverse context. Based 
on the widely confirmed findings of procedural justice research, I introduced the 
concept of procedural justice as a potential tool for furthering feelings of inclusion or 
at least avoiding feelings of exclusion by people in society, especially when they 
belong to a minority group. I argued that the Court can, through its case law, have a 
direct impact on the applicant, but also an indirect impact on a broader group of 
people who identify with the applicant, through the message the Court sends in its 
judgment. In other words, when the Court uses biased statements in its case law, 
this communicates exclusion and marginalisation not only to the applicant but also 
to a broader community identifying with the applicant. I also argue that the Court 
can potentially have an indirect impact on domestic authorities by leading by 
example, influencing through the level of procedural fairness in its own case law. In 
other words, when the Court uses biased statements in its own case law, such as 
that the headscarf is not reconcilable with the values of respect and equality, it gives 
the impression to authorities that they can do the same. On the other hand, when 
the Court applies a respectful approach towards the applicant, such as in the case of 
S.A.S. v. France, the Court can potentially encourage others to approach women 
wearing a face-veil in a different way.  
However, although the general research on procedural justice is strong and the 
procedural justice findings have been confirmed many times, as I mentioned in 
chapter I, I unfortunately do not have empirical information on the effect of 
procedural justice at the level of the Court. This kind of information would be 
extremely interesting as I will argue in the next section. 
238 
 
6. Looking to the future 
Through my work I hope to raise awareness of the exclusionary effect courts can 
have at a more subjective level of inclusion, meaning the impact they can have on 
people’s feelings of inclusion (additional to a maximum effort to ensure structural 
inclusion). I hope to encourage more research on this aspect of reasoning in fields 
concerning diversity matters. Through the research methods I applied, I also hope to 
encourage researchers in law studies to build bridges between disciplines, not only 
at the theoretical and conceptual level, but also at the level of methodology. Finally, 
I hope that the concept of procedural fairness receives more prominent attention, 
not only in the academic world, but also in being taken up by practitioners, both (and 
preferably first) at the domestic level and also at the level of the Court. 
Additionally, the research conducted for this dissertation confronted me with some 
reflections on issues that need further examination at the level of the European 
Court of Human Rights. I will mention three potential questions and/or issues that 
merit further research which could offer more insight into the process of decision 
making and the role of different actors involved in it. 
1. What happens after the publication of the judgment? 
First, following the observations in this dissertation on the procedural aspect of the 
Court’s reasoning, it would be interesting to complement the analytical observations 
and normative arguments made with empirical analysis. Potential questions that 
could be asked to potential respondents are the following: How do applicants react 
to the judgment they receive in their case? How do they experience the decision 
making process of the Court? What were their views of the Court before and after 
they received the decision in their case? What are their expectations of the Court? 
What are the reactions of other people who are not a party in the case, but who 
identify with the applicants, when they are confronted with the judgments of the 
Court? And even, what impact does the level of fairness demonstrated by the Court 
have on the decision making process at the domestic level? Also, what are the 
lawyers’ experiences of the Court system? How do they perceive procedural fairness 
at the Court? The last question brings me to a second field that deserves deeper 
examination. 
2. What happens before the judgment is written? 
This dissertation is written with the aim of giving an insight in the article 9 case law 
and to make constructive suggestions for its improvement. As is traditionally done in 
legal scholarship examining the Court’s case law, the Court and thus also the Court’s 
judges are the first addressees of our reflections and criticism. However, good 
reasoning and good judgments are not only dependent on good reasoning written by 
the judges and on a good application of the rights protected by the Convention. 
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Good judgments also depend of good cases. And with good cases I do not mean 
cases that should not reach the Court; instead, by ‘good cases’ I refer to the quality 
of the file submitted to the Court. When I argue for an accurate representation of 
the applicant and for taking the applicant’s concerns into account, a question that 
arises is to what extent were these concerns well formulated in the application to 
the Court? And to what extent does the quality of the application also influence the 
quality of the Court’s approach at the procedural level? Additionally, I also wonder 
how the files/applications are translated by the Court’s lawyers and judges into the 
final decisions. Do procedural justice (and other) shortcomings in the judgments 
result from a lack of quality in the files or is to a certain extent some degree of 
quality lost in translation by the time they are incorporated into the judgment? 
Should consideration be given to drafting guides or manuals to make available to 
potential lawyers or applicants who want to submit a case to the Court, with very 
concrete suggestions about how an application could best be written and what 
information should be explained clearly?  
3. Which judgments will never be written?  
I saved the most important question I have for last. While conducting the research 
for my dissertation, focussing on procedural fairness in the reasoning of the Court’s 
case law and on aspects of trust in the Court, I realized that one of the main 
limitations a critical-analytical appraisal of case law involves is the fact that I was 
limited by the fact that as a lawyer I could only analyse the cases which exist. I can 
only analyse judgments which are issued and published in cases brought before the 
Court. But what about the cases that are not brought before the Court? How many 
claims, issues and disputes do not reach the Court? How many limitations on the 
right to freedom of religion encountered by people belonging to minority groups do 
not reach the Court? When we look at the numbers mentioned in the quantitative 
part of chapter I and when we compare them to the widespread debates proceeding 
in society and the numerous reports of NGOs which contain devastating numbers 
concerning discrimination against religious minorities, I wonder how it is that the 
Court does not receive more claims from religious minorities. It would therefore be 
enriching to have widespread empirical research done across European countries to 
gain information about the level of trust people have in the Court and to what extent 
they are familiar with its existence and the work it does. In that research it would be 
particularly interesting to include people belonging to both minority and majority 
groups.  
For now, I can only hypothesize about possible reasons. Is the small number of cases 
due to the fact that justice is already done at the domestic level? This, I can only 
hope! Or is it because the Court is still not well enough known amongst Europeans, 
especially when they belong to minority groups? In that case, what can be done to 
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facilitate access to the Court? Or is it because people do not believe in the justice 
delivered by the Court? I sincerely hope this is not a reason, but if it is, I hope my 
work might contribute to change in a positive direction. 
 
  
241 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abramst, Kathryn, ‘Hearing the Call of Stories’, 79 California Law Review 971–1052 
(2012) 
Ahdar, Rex, ‘Is Secularism Neutral?’, 26 Ratio Juris 404–429 (2013) 
Ahdar, Rex, ‘The Vulnerability of Religious Liberty in Liberal States’, 4 Religion and 
Human Rights 177–195 (2009) 
Alexis, Gwendolyn Yvonne, ‘Not Christian , but Nonetheless Qualified : The Secular 
Workplace - Whose Hardship?’, 3 Journal of Religion and Business Ethics 1–25 (2011) 
Alidadi, Katayoun, ‘Reasonable accommodations for religion and belief: Adding value 
to article 9 ECHR and the european union’s anti-discrimination approach to 
employment?’, 37 European Law Review 693–715 (2012) 
Alidadi, Katayoun and Foblets, Marie-Claire, ‘Framing Multicultural Challenges In 
Freedom Of Religion Terms. Limitations of Minimal Human Rights for Managing 
Religious Diversity in Europe’, 30 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 460–488 
(2012) 
Alouane, Rim-Sarah, ‘The Practice of Religion in the French Public and Private 
Workplace: in Search of an Elusive Balance’ in Katayoun Alidadi, Marie Claire Foblets 
and Jogchum Vrielink (eds.), A Test of Faith? Religious Diversity and Accommodation 
in the European Workplace, ( Ashgate, 2012), 205-244 
Ambrus, Mónika, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Standards of Proof in 
Religion Cases’, 8 Religion and Human Rights 107–137 (2013),  
Amghar, Samir et al., European Islam. Challenges for Public Policy and Society (2007) 
Amghar, Samir, ‘Le “niqab” pour s’affirmer?’, 2 January 2010, at http://www.ceras-
projet.org/index.php?id=4196. (Consulted on 31/10/2012) 
Amghar, Samir, ‘Niqab, quels sens pour celles qui le portent?’, 40 Le Monde des 
Religions (2010) 
Amnesty International, ‘Choice and Prejudice: Discrimination against Muslims in 
Europe’ (2012) 
Amiraux, Valérie, ‘The “illegal covering” saga: what’s next? Sociological 
perspectives’, 19 Social Identities 794–806 (2013),  
Anagnostou, Dia, ‘The Strasbourg Court, Democracy and the Protection of 
Marginalised Individuals and Minorities’, in Anagnostou, Dia and Psychogiopoulou, 
242 
 
The European Court of Human Rights and the Rights of Marginalised Individuals and 
Minorities in National Context, (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), 1-26. 
An-Na’im, Abdullahi A., ‘The interdisciplinarity of human rights’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Human Rights Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 97-113 
Arrigo, Bruce A., ‘Psychology and the Law: The Critical Agenda for Citizen Justice and 
Radical Social Change’, 20 Justice Quarterly 399–444 (2003)  
Aslam, Aqib and Corrado, Luisa, ‘No Man is an Island : the Inter-personal 
Determinants of Regional Well-Being in Europe’, (2007), available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/cam/camdae/0717.html 
Aslam, Aqib and Corrado, Luisa, ‘The geography of well-being’, 12 Journal of 
Economic Geography 627–649 (2011)  
Bader, Veit, ‘Post-secularism or liberal democratic constitutionalism?’, 5 Erasmus 
Law Review 5–26 (2012) 
Bader, Veit et al., ‘Religious diversity and reasonable accommodation in the 
workplace in six European countries: An introduction’, 13 International Journal of 
Discrimination and the Law 54–82 (2013) 
Baer, Susanne, ‘A closer look at law: human rights as multi-level sites of struggles 
over multi-dimensional equality’, 6 Utrecht Law Review 56–76 (2010) 
Bakalis, Chara and Edge, Peter, ‘Taking due account of religion in sentencing’, 29 
Legal Studies 421–437 (2009)  
Barras, Amélie, ‘Transnational Understandings of Secularisms and Their Impact on 
the Right to Religious Freedom—Exploring Religious Symbols Cases at the UN and 
ECHR’, 11 Journal of Human Rights 263–279 (2012)  
Bazeley, Patricia, Qualitative Data Analysis with Nvivo (SAGE, 2013) 
Bazeley, Patricia, Qualitative Data Analysis: Practical Strategies, (SAGE, 2013) 
Beaman, Lori G., ‘“It was all slightly unreal”: What ’ s Wrong with Tolerance and 
Accommodation in the Adjudication of Religious Freedom?’, 23 Canadian Journal of 
Women and the Law 442–463 (2011) 
Bennoune, Karima, ‘Secularism and human rights: a contextual analysis of 
headscarves, religious expression, and women’s equality under international law’, 45 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 367 (2007) 
Bloom, Pazit Ben-Nun et al., ‘Globalization, Threat and Religious Freedom’, Political 
Studies 1–19 (2013) 
243 
 
Benfquih, Yousra and Ouald Chaib, Saïla, ‘Religious signs in public schools: Belgian 
Council of State shows judicial bravery’, Strasbourg Observers, 4 November 2014, at 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/11/04/religious-signs-in-public-schools-
belgian-council-of-state-shows-judicial-bravery/ (Last accessed on 30 April 2015) 
Bernard, Harvey Russell, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches (Sage, 2006) 
Bernstein, Richard J., ‘Introduction : Reasoning about Fairness and Unfairness in Law, 
Philosophy, and Political Theory’, 73 Social research 571–573 (2006) 
Berry, Stephanie, ‘SAS v France: Does Anything Remain of the Right to Manifest 
Religion?’, 2 July 2014 on EJIL:Talk, (available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/sas-v-france-
does-anything-remain-of-the-right-to-manifest-religion/) 
Besson, Samantha, ‘Gender Discrimination under EU and ECHR Law: Never Shall the 
Twain Meet?’, 8 Human Rights Law Review 647–682 (2008) 
Bhabha, Faisal, ‘Between Exclusion and Assimilation : Experimentalizing 
Multiculturalism’, 54 Mcgill Law Journal (2009) 
Bhuta, Nehal, ‘Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human 
Rights’, 113 South Atlantic Quarterly 9–35 (2014) 
Bielefeldt, Heiner, ‘Freedom of Religion or Belief--A Human Right under Pressure’, 1 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1–21 (2012)  
Bielefeldt, Heiner, ‘Misperceptions of Freedom of Religion or Belief’, 35 Human 
Rights Quarterly 33–68 (2013) 
Binte Ismail, Nur Syahidah, ‘Ban of the Burqa in France’, 3 Ignite 15–27 (2011) 
Birks, Melanie and Mills, Jane, Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide (SAGE 
Publications, 2011)  
Blaauw, Derick and Anmar, Prestorius, ‘The determinants of subjective well-being in 
South Africa - An exploratory enquiry’, 6 Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 
179–194 (2013) 
Blackwood, Leda et al., ‘I know who I am, but who do they think I am? Muslim 
perspectives on encounters with airport authorities’, 36 Ethnic and Racial Studies 1–
19 (2012)  
Blader, Steven L., ‘What determines people’s fairness judgments? Identification and 
outcomes influence procedural justice evaluations under uncertainty’, 43 Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 986–994 (2007)  
244 
 
Blader, Steven L and Tyler, Tom R., ‘A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice : 
Defining the Meaning of a “ Fair ” Process’, 29 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 747–758 (2003) 
Boestead, Kathryn, ‘The French Headscarf Law Before the European Court of Human 
Rights’, 16 J. Transnat’l L. and Pol’y 167–196, (2007) 
Borghée, Maryam, Le voile intégral en France: Sociologie d’un paradoxe, (Editions 
Michalon, 2012)  
Borststorff, Patricia C. and Cunningham, Brent J., ‘An Investigation of the Religious 
Accommodation Education Gap: Corporate and Workforce Misconceptions and 
Ignorance Abound’, 2 American Journal of Business and Management 266–274 
(2013)  
Bosset, Pierre and Foblets, Marie-Claire, ‘Accomodating Diversity in Quebec and 
Europe: Different Legal Concepts, Similar Result?’ in Institutional Accommodation 
and the Citizen: Legal and Political Interaction in a Pluralist Society (Council of Europe 
Publishing 2009), 37-66. 
Bouchard, Gérard and Taylor, Charles, Consultation Commission on Accommodation 
Practices Related to Cultural Differences “Building the Future: A Time for 
Reconciliation”, Full Report, Quebec, 2008 
Boyle, Kevin, ‘Human Rights , Religion and Democracy : The Refah Party Case’, 1 
Essex Human Rights Review 1–16 (2004) 
Brems, Eva, ‘Human Rights: Minimum and Maximum Perspectives’, 9 Human Rights 
Law Review 349–372 (2009)  
Brems, Eva, The approach of the European Court of Human Rights to Religion, in Die 
Rechtsstellung des Menschen im Völkerrecht 130 
Brems, Eva, ‘Diversity in the Classroom: The Headscarf Controversy in European 
Schools’, 31 PEACE and CHANGE , 117–131 (2006) 
Brems, Eva, ‘Conflicting Human Rights: An exploration in the Context of the Right to 
a Fair Trial in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms’, 27 Human Rights Quarterly 294–326 (2005) 
Brems, Eva, ‘Human rights as a framework for negotiating protecting cultural 
differences An exploration in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’, 
in Foblets et al. (eds.), Cultural diversity and the law : state responses from around 
the world, (Francqui Scientific Library, 2010) 
Brems, Eva, Janssens, Yaiza, Lecoyer, Kim, Ouald Chaib, Saïla, Vandersteen, Victoria 
and Vrielink, Jogchum, ‘The Belgian ‘burqa ban’ confronted with insider realities’ in 
245 
 
Eva Brems (ed.), The experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014), 77-114. 
Brems, Eva (ed.), The experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2014)  
Brems, Eva, ‘Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident Voices 
in Human Rights Discourse’, 19 Human Rights Quarterly 136–164 (1997) 
Brems, Eva, ‘Above Children’s Heads. The Headscarf Controversy in European 
Schools from the Perspective of Children’s Rights’, 14 The International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 119–136 (2006) 
Brems, Eva, et al., ‘Le port de signes religieux dans l’espace public: vérité à 
Strasbourg, erreur à Genève?’, Journal des Tribunaux 602–603 (2012) 
Brems, Eva and Lavrysen, Laurens, ‘Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: 
The European Court of Human Rights’, 35 Human Rights Quarterly 176–200 (2013) 
Brems, Eva, ‘S.A.S. v. France as a problematic precedent’, 9 July 2014, Strasbourg 
Observers, available at http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/09/s-a-s-v-france-
as-a-problematic-precedent/  
Bribosia, Emmanuelle et al., ‘Reasonable Accommodation for Religious Minorities : A 
Promising Concept for European Antidiscrimination Law?’, 17 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 137–161 (2010) 
Bribosia, Emmanuelle and Rorive, Isabelle, ‘Le voile à l’école: Une Europe divisée’, 60 
Rev. trim. dr. h. 952–983 (2004) 
Bringer, Joy D. et al., ‘Using Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software to 
Develop a Grounded Theory Project’, 18 Field Methods 245–266 (2006)  
Bringer, Joy D. et al., ‘Maximizing transparency in a doctoral thesis1: the complexities 
of writing about the use of QSR*NVIVO within a grounded theory study’, 4 
Qualitative Research 247–265 (2004) 
Burke, Kevin and Leben, Steven, ‘Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public 
Satisfaction.’, A White Paper of the American Judges Association (2007) 
Calo, Zachary R, ‘Pluralism, Secularism and the European Court of Human Rights’, 26 
J. Law Relig. 101-120 (2010) 
Cane, Peter et al. (eds.), Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
246 
 
Césari, Jocelyne, ‘Islamic Minorities’ Rights in Europe and in the USA’, in Aluffi, 
Roberta and Zincone, Giovanna, The legal treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe, 
(Peeters, 2004) 11-30 
Cipriani, Roberto, ‘What can the Social Sciences Teach us About the Relationships 
Between Cultural Identity, Religious Identity, and Religious Freedom?’ in Glendon 
and Hans (eds.), Universal Rights in a World of Diversity The Case of Religious 
Freedom, (The Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. Vatican City, 2011) 
Carens, Joseph H., ‘Two Conceptions of Fairness: A Response to Veit Bader’, 25 
Political Theory 814–820 (1997) 
Casey, Pamela and Rottman, David B., ‘Therapeutic jurisprudence in the courts’, 18 
Behavioral sciences and the law 445–457 (2000) 
Chakraborti, Neil and Zempi, Irene ‘The veil under attack: Gendered dimensions of 
Islamophobic victimization’, 18 International Review of Victimology (2012) 
Charmaz, Kathy, Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through 
Qualitative Analysis (Sage, 2006) 
Choudhury, Nusrat, ‘From the Stasi Commission to the European Court of Human 
Rights: L’Affaire du Foulard and The Challenge of Protecting the Rights of Muslim 
Girls’, 16 Colum. J. Gender and L. 199–296 (2007) 
Clay-warner, Jody, ‘Perceiving Procedural Injustice : The Effects of Group 
Membership and Status’, 64 Social Psychology Quarterly 224–238 (2001) 
Cohn, Ellen S. et al., ‘Distributive and procedural justice in seven nations’, 24 Law 
and human behavior 553–79 (2000)  
Collins, Hugh, ‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion’, 66 Modern Law Review 
16–43 (2003) 
Corrado, Luisa, ‘Happy Danes are here again’, 17 Apr 2007, available at 
http://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/happy-danes-are-here-again  
Corrado, Luisa, ‘In pursuit of happiness’, 1 April 2007, available at 
http://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/in-pursuit-of-happiness 
Corso, Lucia, ‘Should Empathy Play any Role in the Interpretation of Constitutional 
Rights?’, 27 Ratio Juris 94–115 (2014) 
Cotterrell, Roger, ‘Socio-Legal Studies, Law Schools, and Legal and Social Theory’, 
Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 126/2012, (2012), 
247 
 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154404 (last 
accessed on 30 May 2015)  
Craig, Elizabeth, ‘From Security To Justice ? The Development Of A More Justice-
Oriented Approach To The Realisation Of European Minority Rights Standards’, 30 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 41–65 (2012) 
Crenshaw, Kimberle, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics’, U. Chi. Legal F. 139–168 (1989) 
Cumper, Peter and Lewis, Tom (eds.), Religion, Rights And Secular Society, (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2012) 
Cumper, Peter and Lewis, Tom, ‘Introduction: freedom of religion and belief-the 
contemporary context’, in Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis (eds.), Religion, Rights And 
Secular Society, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012), 1–16 
Cumper, Peter and Lewis, Tom, ‘“Taking Religion Seriously?” Human Rights and Hijab 
in Europe - Some Problems of Adjudication’, 24 J.L. and Religion 599–627 (2008) 
Danchin, Peter G., ‘Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human 
Rights’, 32 Michigan Journal of International Law 60 (2011) 
Danchin, Peter G., ‘The evolving jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the protection of religious minorities’, in in Elizabeth A. Cole and Peter G. 
Danchin (eds.), Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe 
(Columbia University Press, 2002), 192-221 
Danchin, Peter G., ‘The Emergence and Structure of Religious Freedom in 
International Law Reconsidered’, 23 Journal of Law and Religion 455–534 (2008) 
Darley, John, et al, ‘Psychological Jurisprudence’, 14 in James R.P. Ogloff, Taking 
Psychology and Law into the Twenty-First Century 35–59, (Springer, 2004) 
Davie, Grace, ‘Understanding religion in Europe: a continually evolving mosaic’, in 
Peter Cumper and Tom Lewis (eds.), Religion, Rights And Secular Society, (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2012). 
Davie, Grace, Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing Without Belonging (John Wiley 
and Sons, 1994) 
Davie, Grace, 'From Believing without Belonging to Vicarious Religion. Understanding 
the patterns of religion in Modern Europe' in Detlef Pollack and Daniel V. A. Olson 
(eds.), The Role of Religion in Modern Societies, (Routledge, 2008) 
248 
 
Davies, Haydn, ‘Problems of Perception in the European Court of Human Rights: A 
Matter of Evidence?’, 3(2) St. John's Journal of International and Comparative Law. 
169-209 (2012) 
Davis, Britton, ‘Lifting the Veil: France’s New Crusade’, 34 B.C.Int’l and Comp.L.Rev. 
(2011) 
de Beco, Gauthier, ‘Le droit au respect de la vie privée dans les relations de travail au 
sein des sociétés religieuses - l’approche procédurale de la Cour européenne des 
droits de l'homme’, 86 Rev. trim. dr. h. 375–393 (2011)  
David De Cremer and Den Ouden, Nathalie Den Ouden, ‘“When passion breeds 
justice”: Procedural fairness effects as a function of authority’s passion”, 39 
European Journal of Social Psychology 384–400 (2009) 
De Hert, Paul and Somers, Stefan, ‘Principles of National Constitutionalism Limiting 
Individual Claims in Human Rights Law: Constitutionalism and the Balance between 
National and International Legal Reform’, 7 Vienna Online Journal on International 
Constitutional Law (2013)  
Delgrange, Xavier, ‘Quand la burqa passé à l’Ouest, la Belgique per-elle le Nord?’, in 
Roy, Olivier and Koussens, David (eds.), Quand la burqa passé à l’Ouest. Enjeux 
éthiques, politiques et juridiques, (Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2013) 
Delgrange, Xavier, ‘La loi "anti-burqa" comme symptom’, 74 Politique-Revue des 
débats (2012) 
Dembour, Marie-Bénédicte, Who Believes in Human Rights? (Cambridge University 
Press, 2006)  
Donoho, Douglas Lee, ‘Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: 
Developing a jurisprudence of Diversity within Human Rights’, 15 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 
391 (2001). 
Durham, Cole, ‘Introduction’, in Durham, Cole, et al. (eds.), Islam, Europe and 
Emerging Legal Issues, (Ashgate, 2012) 1–15 
Durham, Cole, et al. (eds.), Islam, Europe and Emerging Legal Issues, (Ashgate, 2012) 
Eck, Diana L., ‘From Diversity to Pluralism, On Common Ground: World Religions in 
America’ (2013) available at http://pluralism.org/encounter/challenges 
Edge, Peter Edge, ‘Religious rights and choice under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, Web JCLI (2000) 
249 
 
Edwards, Susan S M, ‘No Burqas We’re French! The Wide Margin of Appreciation and 
the ECtHR Burqa Ruling’, 26 Denning Law Journal 2014 246–260 (2014) 
Ely, John Heart, Democracy and Distrust, (Harvard University Press, 1980) 
ENAR, ‘Shadow Report 2011 / 12 on Racism in Europe : Key findings on Muslim 
communities and Islamophobia’, 1–3 (2012) 
EUMC, Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, 2006 at 
http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Manifestations_EN.pdf 
Evans, Carolyn, ‘Religious Freedom in European Human Rights Law: The Search for a 
Guiding Conception’, in Mark Janis and Carolyn Evans (eds.), Religion in International 
Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 385–400 
Evans, Carolyn, ‘Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of 
Human Rights: Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture’, 26 Journal of Law and Religion 
321–343 (2010) 
Evans, Carolyn, ‘The “Islamic Scarf” in the European Court of Human Rights’, 7 Melb. 
J. Int’l L. 52–73 (2006) 
Evans, Carolyn, ‘Introduction’, in Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans, and Zoe Robinson (eds.), 
Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context, (Cambridge University 
Press,2011), 1–15 
Evans, Carolyn, Freedom of religion under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 2001) 
Evans, Carolyn and Hood, Anna, ‘Religious Autonomy and Labour Law: A Comparison 
of the Jurisprudence of the United States and the European Court of Human Rights’, 
1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 81–107 (2012)  
Evans, Carolyn and Thomas, Christopher A., ‘Church-State Relations in the European 
Court of Human Rights’, BYU L. Rev. 699–726 (2006) 
Evans, Malcolm, ‘From Cartoons to Crucifixes: Current Controversies concerning the 
Freedom of Religion and the Freedom of Expression before the European Court of 
Human Rights’, 26 Journal of Law and Religion 345–370 (2010) 
Evans, Malcolm, ‘Neutrality in and after Lautsi v. Italy’, in Jeroen Temperman (ed.): 
The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public 
School Classroom, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012)  
Evans, Malcolm, ‘Advancing Freedom of Religion or Belief: Agendas for Change’, 1 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 5–14 (2011)  
250 
 
Evans, Malcolm, ‘Freedom of religion and the European Convention on Human 
Rights: approaches, trends and tensions’, in Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans and Zoe 
Robinson (eds.), Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context (Cambridge 
University Press,2011), 291–315 
Evans, Malcolm, A manual on the wearing of religious symbols in public areas, 
(Council of Europe, 2009) 
Factor, Roni, et. al, ‘Procedural justice, minorities, and religiosity’, Police Practice and 
Research: An International Journal (2014) 
Fallon, Richard H. Jr., ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution’, 118 Harvard Law Review 
1787–1853 (2004)  
Ferrari, Silvio, ‘Islam and the Western European Model of Church and State 
Relations’, in Wasif Shadid and Van Koningsveld, Pieter, Religious Freedom and the 
Neutrality of the State: The Position of Islam in the European Union (Peeters 
Publishers, 2002) 6–19 
Ferrari, Silvio, ‘The Strasbourg Court and Article 9 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights: A Quantitative’, in Jeroen Temperman (ed.): The Lautsi Papers: 
Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom, 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 13–34 
Ferrari, Silvio, ‘Islam in Europe: An introduction to Legal Problems and Perspectives’, 
in Aluffi, Roberta and Zincone, Giovanna, The legal treatment of Islamic Minorities in 
Europe, (Peeters, 2004) 1-10. 
Flango, Victor E, ‘Is Procedural Fairness Applicable to All Courts ?’, 47 Court Review: 
The Journal of the American Judges Association 92–95 (2011) 
Foblets, Marie-Claire and Alidadi, Katayoun, ‘The RELIGARE Report: Religion in the 
context of the European Union: Engaging the Interplay between Religious Diversity 
and Secular Models’ in Marie Claire Foblets, Katayoun Alidadi, Jorgen Nielsen and 
Zeynep Yanasmayan (eds.), Belief, Law and Politics. What Future for a Secular 
Europe? (Ashgate, 2014) 
Fokas, Effie, ‘Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe : Mobilizations in the 
Shadow of European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence’, 4 
Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1–21 (2015) 
Fournier, Pascale, ‘Headscarf and burqa controversies at the crossroad of politics, 
society and law’, 19 Social Identities 689–703 (2013)  
Fox, Dennis R., ‘Psycholegal scholarship’s contribution to false consciousness about 
injustice’, 23 Law and human behavior 9–30 (1999)  
251 
 
Fox, Dennis R., ‘Psychological jurisprudence and radical social change’, 48 American 
Psychologist 234–241 (1993)  
Fox, Dennis R., ‘Where is the proof that law is a good thing?’, 17 Law and human 
behavior 257–258 (1993)  
Gangl, Amy, ‘Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluations of the Lawmaking Process’, 
25 Political Behavior 119–149 (2003)  
Gavison, Ruth, and Nahshon Perez, ‘Days of Rest in Multicultural Societies: Private, 
Public, Seperate?’ In Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans, and Zoe Robinson (eds.), Law and 
Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context, (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
186–213 
Gabizon, Cécilia, ‘Sarkozy : “la burqa n'est pas la bienvenue”’, Le Figaro, 26 June 
2009, http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2009/06/23/01002-20090623ARTFIG00055-
sarkozy-la-burqa-n-est-pas-la-bienvenue-.php  
Gerards, Janneke, ‘Inadmissibility Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: 
A Critique of the Lack of Reasoning’, 14 Human Rights Law Review 148–158 (2014)  
Gérin, André, ‘Rapport d’information fait en application de l’article 145 du règlement 
au nom de la mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le 
territoire national’, 26 January 2010 
Ghanea, Nazila, ‘Are Religious Minorities Really Minorities?’, 1 Oxford Journal of Law 
and Religion 57–79 (2012)  
Gibson, James L. and Caldeira, Gregory A., ‘The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal 
Institutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice’, 39 American 
Journal of Political Science 459–489 (1995) 
Gibson, Nicholas, ‘Faith in the Courts: Religious Dress and Human Rights’, 1 
Cambridge Law Journal 657–697 (2007) 
Glendon, Mary Ann, ‘Religious Freedom in the 21st Century. Old biases, Fresh 
Challenges, New Frontiers’, in Glendon and Hans (eds.), Universal Rights in a World 
of Diversity The Case of Religious Freedom, (The Pontifical Academy of Social 
Sciences. Vatican City, 2011), 651–664 
Greacen, John M., ‘Social Science Research on Procedural Justice: What are the 
Implications for Judges and Courts’, 47 Judges’ Journal (2008)  
Greer, Steven, ‘Towards a Socio-Iegal Analysis of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, in Madsen, Mikael R. and Verschraegen Gert, Making Human Rights 
Intelligible: Towards a Sociology of Human Rights 149–171 (Hart, 2013) 
252 
 
Gregory, Raymond F., Encountering Religion in the Workplace. The Legal Rights and 
Responsibilities of Workers and Employers, (Cornell University Press, 2011)  
Grillo, Ralph and Shah, Prakash, ‘Reasons to Ban? The Anti-Burqa Movement in 
Western Europe’, MMG Working Papers (2012) to be found at 
http://www.mmg.mpg.de/publications/working-papers/2012/wp-12-05/ 
Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe, ‘Living Together: Combining 
Diversity and Freedom in 21st-centry Europe’ (Council of Europe, 2011)  
Gunn, Jeremy, ‘Religious Symbols in Public Schools: The Islamic Headscarf and the 
European Court of Human Rights’, in Durham, Cole, et al. (eds.), Islam, Europe and 
Emerging Legal Issues, (Ashgate, 2012), 112–145 
Gunn, Jeremy, ‘The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in 
International Law’, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 189–216 (2003) 
Gunn, Jeremy, ‘Deconstructing proportionality in limitations analysis’, 19 Emory Int’l 
L. Rev. 465–498 (2005) 
Gürsel, Esra D., ‘The Distinction Between the Freedom of Religion and the Right to 
Manifest Religion: A Legal Medium to Regulate Subjectivities’, 22 Social and Legal 
Studies 377–393 (2013)  
Gürsel, Esra D., ‘Regulating Women’s Bodies in the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights’, in Reilly, Niamh and Scriver, Stacey, Religion, Gender, and 
the Public Sphere 155–167 (Routledge, 2013) 
Gutmann, Amy, ‘The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics’, 22 Philosophy 
and public Affairs 171–206 (1993) 
Hammarberg, Thomas, Human Rights In Europe: No Grounds For Complacency 
(Council of Europe, 2011) 
Harris, David et al, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, (Oxford 
University Press, 2009).  
Hasisi, Badi and Weisburd, David, ‘Going beyond Ascribed Identities: The Importance 
of Procedural Justice in Airport Security Screening in Israel’, 45 Law and Society 
Review 867–892 (2011)  
Henderson, Lynne, ‘Legality and Empathy’, 85 Michigan Law Review 1574–1653 
(1987) 
Hennette-Vauchez, Stéphanie, ‘La burqa, la femme et l’Etat’, Raison Publique (2010) 
at http://www.raison-publique.fr/article317.html. (Last accessed: 31/10/2012) 
253 
 
Henrard, Kristin, ‘Duties of Reasonable Accommodation in Relation to Religion and 
the European Court of Human Rights: A Closer Look at the Prohibition of 
Discrimination, the Freedom of Religion and Related Duties of State Neutrality’, 5 
Erasmus Law Review 59–77 (2012) 
Henrard, Kristin, The Ambiguous Relationship Between Religious Minorities and 
Fundamental ( Minority ) Rights (Boom Eleven International, 2011) 
Henrard, Kristin, ‘The Building Blocks for an Emerging Regime for the Protection of a 
Controversial Case of Cultural Diversity: The Roma’, 10 Int’l J. on Minority and Group 
Rts. 183–2001 (2004) 
Henrard, Kristin, ‘A patchwork of “succesful” and “missed” synergies in the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR’, in Kristin Henrard and Dunbar (eds.), Synergies in 
Minority Protection. European and International Law Perspective, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 314–364 
Henrard, Kristin, ‘A critical appraisal of the margin of appreciation left to states 
pertaining to 'church-state relations' under the jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights’ in Katayoun Alidadi, Marie Claire Foblets and Jogchum Vrielink 
(eds.), A Test of Faith? Religious Diversity and Accommodation in the European 
Workplace, ( Ashgate, 2012), 59-86 
Hertzke, Allen D., The Future of Religious Freedom: Global Challenges (Oxford 
University Press, 2013)  
Hervieu, Nicolas, ‘Un nouvel équilibre européen dans l’appréhension des convictions 
religieuses au travail’, in Lettre « Actualités Droits-Libertés » du CREDOF, 24 January 
2013, at http://wp.me/p1Xrup-1wU  
Heuer, Larry, ‘Disability and Procedural Fairness in the Workplace’, in Wiener, 
Richard L. and Willborn, Steven L. (eds.), Disability and Aging Discrimination, 
(Springer New York, 2011), 205-233 
Hibbing, John R. and Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth, ‘Process Preference and American 
Politics : What the People Want Government to Be’, 95 American Political Science 
Review (2001) 
Hirschl, Ran and Shachar, Ayelet, ‘The New Wall of Separation: Permitting Diversity, 
Restricting Competition’, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 2535–2559 (2009) 
Hollander-Blumoff, Rebecca,’ The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal 
Courts’, 63 Hastings Law Journal 127–178 (2011) 
Hoodfar, Homa, ‘The Veil in Their Minds and On Our Heads: The Persistence of 
Colonial Images of Muslim Women’, 22 RFR/DFR 5–18 
254 
 
Høstmælingen, Njål, ‘The Hijab in Strasbourg : Clear Conclusions , Unclear 
Reasoning’, in Durham, Cole, et al. (eds.), Islam, Europe and Emerging Legal Issues, 
(Ashgate, 2012), 89–109 
Hough, Mike et al., ‘Trust in justice and the procedural justice perspective: Editors’ 
introduction’, 8 European Journal of Criminology 249–253 (2011)  
Howard, Erica, Law and the Wearing of Religious Symbols. European bans on the 
wearing of religious symbols in education, (Routledge, 2012) 
Howard, Erica, ‘S.A.S. v France: Living Together or Increased Social Division?’, 7 July 
2014 on Ejil:Talk, available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/s-a-s-v-france-living-together-
or-increased-social-division/  
Huq, Aziz, ‘Defend Muslims, Defend America’, NYT, 19 June 2011, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/opinion/20huq.html?_r=0 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Discrimination in the Name of Neutrality. Headscarf Bans for 
Teachers and Civil Servants in Germany’, (2009). (Available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/germany0209_webwcover.pdf) 
Huo, Yuen J., ‘Is Pluralism a Viable Model of Diversity? The Benefits and Limits of 
Subgroup Respect’, 9 Group Processes and Intergroup Relations 359–376 (2006) 
Huo, Yuen J., ‘Procedural justice and social regulation across group boundaries: does 
subgroup identity undermine relationship-based governance?’, 29 Personality and 
social psychology bulletin 336–48 (2003) 
Huo, Yuen J., ‘Testing an integrative model of respect: implications for social 
engagement and well-being’, 36 Personality and social psychology bulletin 200–12 
(2010) 
Huo, Yuen J., et al., ‘Superordinate identification, subgroup identification, and justice 
concens: Is separatism the problem; is assimilation the answer?’, 7 Journal of 
Psychological Science 40–45 (1996) 
Hunter-Henin, Myriam, ‘Why the French Don’t Like the Burqa: Laïcité, national 
Identity and Religious Freedom’, 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(2012) 
Iheukwumere, Emmanuel O., ‘Judicial Independence and the Minority Jurist: The 
Shining Example of Chief Justice Robert N.C. Nix, Jr.’, 78 Temple Law Review 379–404 
(2013) 
Jackson, Jonathan et al., ‘Why do People Comply with the Law? Legitimacy and the 
Influence of Legal Institutions’, 52 British Journal of Criminology 1051–1071 (2012) 
255 
 
Jahangir, Asma, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief’, 
A/HRC/13/40 (Human Rights Council, 2009), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/religion/docs/A-HRC-13-40.pdf 
Joppke, Christian, ‘Limits of Restricting Islam: The French Burqa Law of 2010’, 
(conference paper) at http://rps.berkeley.edu/content/limits-restricting-islam-
french-burqa-commission 
Joppke, Christian, Veil. Mirror of Identity, (Polity Press, 2009) 
Kamal, Jilan, ‘Justified Interference with Religious Freedom: The European Court of 
Human Rights and the Need for Mediating Doctrine Under Article 9(2)’, 46 Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 667–708 (2014) 
Kayaoglu, Turan, ‘Trying Islam: Muslims before the European Court of Human 
Rights’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 1–20 (2014)  
Kislowicz, Howard, ‘Law, Religion, and Feeling Included/Excluded: Case Studies in 
Canadian Religious Freedom Litigation’, Canadian Journal of Law and Society 1–26 
(2015-Forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2560449 
Klandermans, Bert et al., ‘Embeddedness and Identity : How Immigrants Turn 
Grievances into Action’, 73 American Sociological Review 992–1012 (1990) 
Knights, Samantha, ‘Approaches to Diversity in the Domestic Courts: Article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights’, in Shah, P. and Grillo, R., Legal Practice and 
Cultural Diversity (Ashgate, 2010) 283-298 
Koh, Hea Jin, ‘Yet I Shall Temper So Justice with Mercy Procedural Justice in 
Mediation and Litigation’, 28 Law and Psychology Review 169–176 (2004)  
Koltay, Andras, Europe and the Sign of the Crucifix: On the Fundamental Questions 
of the Lautsi and Others v. Italy case, in in Jeroen Temperman (ed.): The Lautsi 
Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School 
Classroom, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) 355–382 
Krivenko, Ekaterina Yahyaoui, ‘The Islamic Veil and its Discontents: How Do They 
Undermine Gender Equality’, 7 Religion and Human Rights 11–29 (2012) 
Laborde, Cecile, ‘State paternalism and religious dress code’, 10 International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 398–410 (2012).  
Langlaude, Sylvie, ‘Indoctrination, Secularism, Religious Liberty, and the ECHR’, 55 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 929–944 (2006)  
256 
 
Larsson, Göran and Spielhaus, Riem, ‘Narratives of Inclusion and Exclusion: Islam and 
Muslims as a Subject of European Studies’, 2 Journal of Muslims in Europe 105–113 
(2013) 
Leane, Geoffrey W.G., ‘Rights of ethnic Minorities in Liberal Democracies: Has France 
Gone too far in Banning Muslim Women from wearing the Burka?’, 33 HRQ (2011) 
Leigh, Ian, ‘Balancing Religious Autonomy and Other Human Rights under the 
European Convention’, 1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 109–125 (2012).  
Lenard, Patti Tamara, ‘What Can Multicultural Theory Tell Us about Integrating 
Muslims in Europe?’, 8 Political Studies Review 308–321 (2010) 
Lenard, Patti Tamara, Trust, Democracy, and Multicultural Challenges (Penn State 
Press, 2012) 
Lerner, Pablo and Rabello, Alfredo Mordechai, ‘The Prohibition of Ritual Slaughtering 
(Kosher Shechita and Halal) and Freedom of Religion of Minorities’, 22 Journal of Law 
and Religion 1–62 (2007) 
Letsas, George, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and its Legitimacy’, 
SSRN eLibrary 1–24 (2012), http://ssrn.com/paper=2021836 
Leung, Kwok et al., ‘Realpolitik versus Fair Process: Moderating Effects of Group 
Identification on Acceptance of Political Decisions’, 92 Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 476–489 (2007) 
Leventhal, Gerald S., ‘What should be done with equity theory? New approaches in 
to the study of fairness in social relationships’, in Kenneth Gergen, Martin S. 
Greenberg and Richard H. Willis (eds.), Social exchange: Advances in theory and 
research (Springer, 1977) 
Levi, Margaret et al., ‘Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs’, 53 
American Behavioral Scientist 354–375 (2009) 
Levi, Margaret, ‘A State of Trust’, in Braithwaite, Valerie and Levi, Margaret, Trust 
and Governance 77–101 (Russel Sage, 2003) 
Lewis, Tom, ‘What not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court, and the 
Margin of Appreciation’, 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 395–414 
(2008) 
Lind, E. Allan and Tyler, Tom R., The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (Springer, 
1988) 
257 
 
Lind, E. Allan, Tyler, Tom R. and Huo, Yuen J., ‘Procedural Context and Culture : 
Variation in the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments’, 73 J. Pers. Soc. 
Psychol. (1997), 
Lindholm, Tore, ‘The Strasbourg Court Dealing with Turkey and the Human Right to 
Freedom of Religion or Belief : An Assessment in Light of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey’, in 
Durham, Cole, et al. (eds.), Islam, Europe and Emerging Legal Issues, (Ashgate, 2012) 
149–168 
Lindkvist, Linde, ‘The Politics of Article 18: Religious Liberty in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights’, 4 Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, 
Humanitarianism, and Development 429–447 (2013) 
Loenen, Titia, ‘Framing Headscarves and Other Multi-Cultural Issues as Religious, 
Cultural, Racial or Gendered: The Role of Human Rights Law’, 30 Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 414–430 (2012) 
Loenen, Titia, ‘Safeguarding Religious Freedom and Gender Equality. The Case For 
and Against Uniform European Human Rights Standards’, in Reilly, Niamh and 
Scriver, Stacey, Religion, Gender, and the Public Sphere 155–167 (Routledge, 2013) 
136–142 
Loenen, Titia et al., ‘Human rights law as a site of struggle over multicultural conflicts 
Comparative and multidisciplinary perspectives’, 6 Utrecht Law Review 0–16 (2010) 
Louis, Winnifred R. et al., ‘Social Justice and Psychology: What Is, and What Should 
Be’, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 1–14 (2013) 
Maclure, Jocelyn and Taylor, Charles, Laïcité é liberté de conscience (La Découverte, 
2010) 
MacCoun, Robert J., ‘Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of 
Procedural Fairness’, 1 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 171–201 (2005) 
McKinnon, Sara L., The discursive formation of gender in women’s gendered claims to 
U.S. asylum, (UMI Dissertation Publishing, 2008) 
Madsen, Mikael Rask and Verschraegen, Gert, ‘Making Human Rights Intelligible : An 
Introduction to a Sociology of Human Rights’, in Madsen, Mikael Rask and 
Verschraegen, Gert (eds.) Making Human Rights Intelligible: Towards a Sociology of 
Human Rights (Hart, 2013) 1–22 
Mancini, Susanna, ‘The Crucifix Rage: Supranational Constitutionalism Bumps 
Against the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty’, 6 European Constitutional Law Review 
6–27 (2010) 
258 
 
Marshall, Jill, ‘Conditions for Freedom? European Human Rights Law and the Islamic 
Headscarf Debate’, 30 Human Rights Quarterly 631–654 (2008) 
Marshall, Jill, Personal Freedom through Human Rights Law? (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2009) 
Marshall, Helen, ‘What do We do when we code data?’, 2 Qualitative Research 
Journal 56-70 (2002) 
Martínez-Torrón, Javier, ‘Islam in Strasbourg : Can Politics Substitute for Law?’, in 
Durham, Cole, et al. (eds.), Islam, Europe and Emerging Legal Issues, (Ashgate, 2012) 
19–61 
Martínez-Torrón, Javier, The ( Un ) protection of Individual Religious Identity in the 
Strasbourg Case Law, 1 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 1–25 (2012) 
Martínez-Torrón, Javier, ‘Limitations on Religious Freedom in the Case Law of the 
European Court of Human Rights’, 19 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 587–636 (2005) 
MbBride, Jeremy, ‘Proportionality and the European Convention on Human Rights’, 
in Ellis, Evelyn (ed.), The principle of proportionality in the Laws of Europe, (Hart, 
1999), 23-35. 
McGoldrick, Dominic, ‘Accommodating Muslims in Europe: From Adopting Sharia 
Law to Religiously Based Opt Outs From Generally Applicable Laws’, 9 Human Rights 
Law Review 603–645 (2009) 
McGoldrick, Dominic, ‘Multiculturalism and its Discontents’, 5 Human Rights Law 
Review 27–56 (2005) 
McGoldrick, Dominic, ‘Religion in the European public square and in European public 
life: Crucifixes in the classroom?’, 11 Human Rights Law Review 451–502 (2011) 
Melton, Gary B., ‘The law is a good thing (psychology is, too): Human rights in 
psychological jurisprudence’, 16 Law and Human Behavior 381–398 (1992) 
Miles, Matthew B. et al., Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook (SAGE 
Publications, 2013) 
Modood, Tariq, ‘Moderate Secularism, Religion as Identity and Respect for Religion’, 
81 Political Quarterly 4–14 (2010 
Moe, Christian, ‘Refah Revisited: Strasbourg’s Construction of Islam’, in Durham, 
Cole, et al. (eds.), Islam, Europe and Emerging Legal Issues, (Ashgate, 2012) 235–271 
Moghaddam, Fathali M., ‘The Staircase to Terrorism’, 60 American Psychologist 161–
169 (2005) 
259 
 
Moors, Annelies, ‘Minister Donner as Mufti: New developments in the Dutch ‘burqa 
debates’’, September 2011, at 
http://religionresearch.org/martijn/2011/09/21/minister-donner-as-mufti-new-
developments-in-the-dutch-%E2%80%98burqa-debates%E2%80%99/. (Last accessed 
31/10/2012) 
Moors, Annelies, ‘Gezichtssluiers; Draagsters en Debatten’, 2009, at http://www.e-
quality.nl/assets/e-quality/dossiers/Moslimas/Onderzoek%20Gezichtssluiers%20 
draagsters%20en%20debatten.pdf 
Mortelmans, Dimitri, Kwalitatieve analyse met Nvivo (Acco, 2011)  
Movsesian, Mark L., ‘European Human Rights Court to France: Do Whatever You 
Want’, 3 July 2014, available at http://clrforum.org/2014/07/03/european-human-
rights-court-to-france-do-whatever-you-want/ (all articles were last accessed on 25 
March 2015) 
Mullally, Siobhan, ‘Civic Integration, Migrant Women and the Veil: at the Limits of 
Rights?’, 74 The Modern Law Review (2011) 
Murdoch, Jim, Freedom of thought, Conscience and Religion (Council of Europe, 
2007) 
Murphy, Kristina and Tyler, Tom R., ‘Procedural justice and compliance behaviour : 
the mediating role of emotions’, 668 European Journal of Social Psychology 652–668 
(2008) 
Nalborczyk, Agata S., ‘The perception among Muslim minorities of host European 
countries: influence of legal status and citizenship’, 20 Global Change, Peace and 
Security 59–69 (2008).  
Nanwani, Shaira, ‘The Burqa Ban: An Unreasonable Limitation on Religious Freedom 
or a Justifiable Restriction?’, 25 Emory International Law Review (2011) 
Nathwani, Niraj, ‘Religious Cartoons and Human Rights - A Critical Legal Analysis of 
the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights on the Protection of Religious 
Feelings and Its Implications in the Danish Affair Concerning Cartoons of the Prophet 
Muhammad’, 4 European Human Rights Law Review 488–507 (2008) 
Nathwani, Niraj, ‘Islamic Headscarves and Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the 
Relevant Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’, 25 Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights (2007)  
Nussbaum, Martha, ‘Reinventing the Civil Religion: Comte, Mill, Tagore’, 54 Victorian 
Studies 7–34 (2011) 
260 
 
Nussbaum, Martha, The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in 
an Anxious Age (Harvard University Press, 2012)  
O’Connell, Rory, ‘Cinderella comes to the Ball: Art 14 and the right to non-
discrimination in the ECHR’, 29 Legal Studies 211–229 (2009) 
Okin, Susan Moller, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton University Press, 
1999) 
Open Society Foundations, ‘Unveiling the Truth; Why 32 Muslim Women Wear the 
Full-Face Veil in France’, 2011, at http://www.soros.org/publications/unveiling-truth-
why-32-muslim-women-wear-full-face-veil-france 
Ouald Chaib, Saïla and Peroni, Lourdes, ‘Jakόbski v. Poland: is the Court opening the 
door to reasonable accommodation?’, 8 December 2010 at 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2010/12/08/jak%CF%8Cbski-v-poland-is-the-court-
opening-the-door-to-reasonable-accommodation/  
Ouald Chaib, Saïla and Peroni, Lourdes, “Sessa v. Italy: A Dilemma Majority Religion 
Members Will Probably Not Face” available at 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/04/05/francesco-sessa-v-italy-a-dilemma-
majority-religion-members-will-probably-not-face/ 
Ouald Chaib, Saïla and Peroni, Lourdes, ‘S.A.S. v. France: Missed Opportunity to Do 
Full Justice to Women Wearing a Face Veil’, 3 July 2014, Strasbourg Observers, 
available at http://strasbourgobservers.com/2014/07/03/s-a-s-v-france-missed-
opportunity-to-do-full-justice-to-women-wearing-a-face-veil/ 
Parker, M. Todd, ‘The Freedom to Manifest Religious Belief: An Analysis of the 
Necessity Clauses of the ICCPR and the ECHR’, 17 Duke J. Comp. and Int’l L. 91–130 
(2006) 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Resolution 1743 ‘Islam, 
Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe’ (Council of Europe, 2010) 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), Resolution 1743 (2010) 
Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe (Council of Europe, 2010) 
Paternoster, Raymond et al., ‘Do Fair Procedures Matter - The Effect of Procedural 
Justice on Spouse Assault’, 31 Law and Society Review (1997)  
Pearson, Megan, ‘Article 9 at a Crossroads: Interference Before and After Eweida’, 13 
Human Rights Law Review 1–23 (2013) 
Pei, Sally, ‘Unveiling Inequality: Burqa Bans and Nondiscrimination Jurisprudence at 
the European Court of Human Rights’, 122 The Yale Law Journal 1089–1102 (2013) 
261 
 
Pentassuglia, Gaetano, ‘Evolving Protection of Minority Groups: Global Challenges 
and the Role of International Jurisprudence’, 11 International Community Law 
Review 185–218 (2009) 
Peroni, Lourdes, ‘Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom (Part I): Taking Freedom 
of Religion More Seriously’, 17 January 2013 at 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/01/17/eweida-and-others-v-the-united-
kingdom-part-i-taking-freedom-of-religion-more-seriously/ (last accessed on 16 
March 2015).  
Peroni, Lourdes and Timmer, Alexandra, ‘Vulnerable groups: The promise of an 
emerging concept in European Human Rights Convention law’, 11 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 1056–1085 (2013) 
Peroni, Lourdes, ‘Deconstructing “Legal” Religion in Strasbourg’, Oxford Journal of 
Law and Religion 1–23 (2013) 
Peroni, Lourdes, ‘Religion and culture in the discourse of the European Court of 
Human Rights: the risks of stereotyping and naturalising’, 10 International Journal of 
Law in Context 195–221 (2014)  
Peroni, Lourdes, ‘Minorities before the European Court of Human Rights. Democratic 
Pluralism Unfolded’, in Boulden, Jane and Kymlicka, Will (eds.), International 
Approaches to Governing Ethnic Diversity, 25-50 (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2015) 
Petkoff, Peter, ‘Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public 
International Law with a Particular Reference to the Jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights’, 7 Religion and Human Rights 183–214 (2012) 
Plesner, Ingvill Thorson, ‘The European Court of Human Rights: Between 
Fundamentalist and Liberal Secularism’, in Durham, Cole, et al. (eds.), Islam, Europe 
and Emerging Legal Issues, (Ashgate, 2012) 63–74 
Quinn, Paul and De Hert, Paul, ‘Self respect — A “Rawlsian Primary Good” 
unprotected by the European Convention on Human Rights and its lack of a coherent 
approach to stigmatization?’, International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 1–
35 (2013) 
Radacic, Ivana, ‘Religious Symbols in Educational Institutions: Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights’, 7 Religion and Human Rights 133–149 (2012) 
Radacic, Ivana, ‘Gender Equality Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights’, 19 European Journal of International Law 841–857 (2008) 
Rambo, Lewis R and Haar Farris, Matthew S., ‘Psychology of Religion: Toward a 
Multidisciplinary Paradigm’, 61 Pastoral Psychol 711–720 (2012) 
262 
 
Richardson, James T., ‘Managing minority religious and ethnic groups in Australia: 
Implications for social cohesion’, 60 Social Compass 579–590 (2013) 
Richardson, James T., ‘Social Justice and Minority Religions : A Sociological 
Introduction’, 12 Social Justice Research 241–252 (1999) 
Richardson, James T., ‘The Sociology of Religious Freedom : A Structural and Socio-
Legal Analysis’, 67 Sociology of Religion 271–294 (2006) 
Ringelheim, Julie, ‘Adapter l’entreprise à la diversité des travailleurs: la portée 
transformatrice de la non-discrimination’, 1 European journal of Human Rights 57–
82 (2013) 
Ringelheim, Julie, ‘Minority Rights in a Time of Multiculturalism--The Evolving Scope 
of the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities’, 10 Human 
Rights Law Review 1–30 (2010) 
Ringelheim, Julie, ‘Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: The European Court of 
Human Rights in Search of a Theory?’, in Lorenzo Zucca and Camil Ungureanu (eds.), 
Law, State and Religion in the New Europe. Debates and Dilemmas, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) 283–304 
Ringelheim, Julie, Diversité culturelle et droits de l’homme. La protection des 
minorités par la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme (Bruylant, 2006) 
Romero, Alicia Cebada, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Religion: Between 
Christian Neutrality and The Fear of Islam’, 11 NZJPIL 75–102 (2013) 
Rorive, Isabelle, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European 
Answer’, 30 Cardozo Law Review 2669–2698 (2009) 
Rottman, David B. and Tomkins, Alan, ‘Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts: 
What Public Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges’, 36 Court Review: The Journal of the 
American Judges Association 24–31 (1999) 
Ruiz Vieytez, Eduardo J., ‘The evolution of institutional cultures: migrant’s access to 
services and rights’, in Institutional accommodation and the citizen: legal and 
political interaction in a pluralist society (Trends in social cohesion n°21) (Council of 
Europe, 2010)  
Saldana, Johnny, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (SAGE, 2012) 
Saroglou, Vassilis et al., ‘Host society’s dislike of the Islamic veil: The role of subtle 
prejudice, values, and religion’, 33 International Journal of Intercultural Relations 
419–428 (2009) 
263 
 
Scharffs, Brett G., ‘The Role of Judges in Determining the Meaning of Religious 
Symbols’, in Durham, Cole, et al. (eds.), Islam, Europe and Emerging Legal Issues, 
(Ashgate, 2012) 35–58 
Schokkenbroek, Jeroen, Toetsing Aan De Vrijheidsrechten Van Het Europees Verdrag 
Tot Bescherming Van De Rechten Van De Mens (W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 1996) 
Schulhofer, Stephen et al., ‘American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies 
and the Procedural Justice Alternative’, 101 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
335–374 (2011) 
Scott, Joan W., The Politics of the Veil (Princeton University Press, 2010) 
Seglow, Jonathan, ‘Theories of Religious Exemptions, in Diversity in Europe: 
Dilemmas of Diffential Treatment in Theory and Practice’ in in Gideon Calder and 
Emanuela Ceva (eds.) Diversity in Europe. Dilemmas of Differential Treatment in 
Theory and Practice (Routledge 2011)  
Shachar, Ayelet, ‘State, Religion, and the Family: The New Dilemmas of Multicultural 
Accommodation’, in Rex Ahdar and Nicholas Aroney (eds.) Shari’a in the West 
(Oxford University Press, 2010) 
Shachar, Ayelet, ‘On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability’, 28 Political Theory 
64–89 (2010) 
Shachar, Ayelet, ‘Two Critiques of Multiculturalism’, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 253–298 
(2002) 
Shachar, Ayelet, ‘The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies : Sharing the Pieces of 
Jurisdictional Authority’, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 385–426 (2010) 
Shachar, Ayelet, Multicultural Jurisdiction. Cultural Differences and Women's Rights, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001)  
Shively, Kim, ‘Religious Bodies and the Secular State: The Merve Kavakci Affair’, 1 
Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 46–72 (2005) 
Simmons, William Paul, Human Rights Law and the Marginalized Other (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011) 
Small , Mark A., ‘Legal Psychology and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’, 37 Saint Louis 
University Law Journal 675–700 (1992)  
Small , Mark A., ‘Advancing psychological jurisprudence’, 11 Behavioral Sciences and 
the Law 3–16 (1993) 
264 
 
Smith, Heather J. and Tyler, Tom R., ‘Justice and power: When will justice concerns 
encourage the advantaged to support policies which redistribute economic 
resources and the disadvantaged to willingly obey the law?’, 26 European Journal of 
Social Psychology 171–200 (1996) 
Smith, Heather J. and Tyler, Tom R., ‘Choosing the Right Pond: The Impact of Group 
Membership on Self-Esteem and Group-Oriented Behavior’, 33 Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 146–170 (1997) 
Smith, Heather J. et al., ‘The Self-Relevant Implications of the Group-Value Model: 
Group Membership, Self-Worth, and Treatment Quality’, 34 Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology 470–493 (1998) 
Solum, Lawrence B., ‘Procedural Justice’, 78 Southern California Law Review 181–322 
(2004)  
Sottiaux, Stefan and Van der Schyff, Gerhard, ‘Methods of International Human 
Rights Adjudication: Towards a More Structured Decision-Making Process for the 
European Court of Human Rights’, 31 Hastings Int’l and Comp. L. Rev. 115–156 
(2008) 
Starks, Helene and Brown Trinidad, Susan, ‘Choose your method: a comparison of 
phenomenology, discourse analysis, and grounded theory’, 17 Qualitative health 
research 1372–1380 (2007) 
Sullivan, Winnifred Fallers, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton 
University Press, 2011)  
Sunshine, Jason and Tyler, Tom R., ‘The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in 
Shaping Public Support for Policing’, 37 Law and Society Review 513–548 (2003) 
Sunstein, Cass R., ‘Two Conceptions of Procedural Fairness’, 73 Social Research 619–
646 (2006) 
Temperman, Jeroen, ‘Introduction’, in Jeroen Temperman (ed.): The Lautsi Papers: 
Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom, 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012)  
Temperman, Jeroen, ‘State Neutrality in Public School Education : An Analysis of the 
Interplay Between the Neutrality Principle , the Right to Adequate Education, 
Children’s Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief, Parental Liberties, and the Position 
of Teachers, 32 Human Rights Quarterly 865–897 (2010) 
Temperman, Jeroen, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Classroom’, in The Lautsi 
Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School 
Classroom, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012)143–176 
265 
 
Ten Napel, Hans-Martien and Theissen, Florian, ‘The European Court of Human 
Rights on Religious Symbols in Public Institutions – A Comparative Perspective: 
Maximum Protection of the Freedom of Religion through Judicial Minimalism?’, in 
Ferrari, Silvio and Cristofori, Rinaldo (eds.), Law and Religion in the 21st Century, 
(Ashgate, 2010) 
Thibaut, John and Walker, Laurens, ‘A theory of procedure’, 66 California Law Review 
541–566 (1978) 
Thibaut, John and Walker, Laurens, Procedural justice. A psychological analysis. 
(Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1975) 
Tulkens, Francoise, ‘European Convention on Human Rights and Church-State 
Relations Pluralism vs. Pluralism’, 30 Cardozo Law Review (2008) 
Tyler, Tom R., ‘Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure’, 35 International Journal of 
Psychology 117–125 (2000) 
Tyler, Tom R., ‘Governing amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking 
Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government’, 28 Law and Society Review 809–831 
(1994)  
Tyler, Tom R., ‘The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group Value 
Model’, 57 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 830–838 (1989) 
Tyler, Tom R., ‘Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and 
to Legal Authorities’, 25 Law and Social Inquiry 983–1019 (2000) 
Tyler, Tom R., ‘Public trust and confidence in legal authorities: What do majority and 
minority group members want from the law and legal institutions?’, 19 Behavioral 
sciences and the law 215–35 (2001)  
Tyler, Tom R., ‘Procedural Justice and the Courts’, 44 Court Review: The Journal of 
the American Judges Association 26–31 (2007) 
Tyler, Tom R., ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law’, 30 
Crime and Justice: A Review of Research (2003)  
Tyler, Tom R., ‘Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation’, 57 Annual 
review of psychology 375–400 (2006)  
Tyler, Tom R., Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press, 2006) 
Tyler, Tom R., ‘Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective 
on Civil Procedure Reform’, 45 American Journal of Comparative Law (1997)  
266 
 
Tyler, Tom R., ‘Procedural justice, identity and deference to the law: What shapes 
rule-following in a period of transition?’, 61 Australian Journal of Psychology 32–39 
(2009)  
Tyler, Tom R., ‘What Is Procedural Justice - Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the 
Fairness of Legal Procedures’, 22 Law and Society Review 103–135 (1988) 
Tyler, Tom R., and Blader, Steven L., ‘The group engagement model: procedural 
justice, social identity, and cooperative behavior’, 7 Personality and social psychology 
review 349–61 (2003)  
Tyler, Tom R. et al., Social justice in a diverse society (Westview Press, 1997)  
Tyler, Tom R. and Darley, John M., ‘Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public 
Views about Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When 
Formulating Substantive Law’, 28 Hofstra Law Review 707–739 (2000)  
Tyler, Tom R., et al., ‘Understanding why the justice of group procedures matters: A 
test of the psychological dynamics of the group-value model’, 70 Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 913–930 (1996) 
Tyler Tom R. and Huo, Yuen J., Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with 
the Police and Courts (Russel Sage, 2002)  
Tyler Tom R. and Mitchell, Gregory, ‘Legitimacy and the Empowerment of 
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion 
Rights’, 43 Duke Law Journal 703–815 (1993) 
Tyler, Tom R. and Rasinki, Kenneth, ‘Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and 
The Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson’, 25 
Law and Society Review 621–630 (1991) 
Tyler, Tom R. et al., ‘Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism Policing: 
A Study of Muslim Americans’, New York University Public Law and Legal Theory 
Working Papers, Paper 182 (2010) 
Vakulenko, Anastasia, ‘Gender Equality as an Essential French Value: The Case of 
Mme M’, 9 Human Rights Law Review 143 (2009) 
Vakulenko, Anastasia, ‘“Islamic headscarves” and the European Convention on 
Human Rights: an intersectional perspective’, 16 Social and Legal Studies 183–199 
(2007) 
Vakulenko, Anastasia, Islamic Veiling in Legal Discourse (Routledge, 2012)  
267 
 
Vakulenko, Anastasia, ‘Islamic Dress in Human Rights Jurisprudence: A Critique of 
Current Trends’, 7 Human Rights Law Review 717–739 (2007)  
Valenta, Markha, ‘Pluralist Democracy or Scientist monocracy? Debating Ritual 
Slaughter’, 5 Erasmus Law Review 27–41 (2012) 
Van De Heyning, Catherine, ‘Hoofddoeken in de Vlaamse scholen : zoektocht naar 
middle ground’, 5 Sampol 49–58 (2010) 
van der Schyff, Gerhard, ‘Ritual Slaughter and Religious Freedom in a Multilevel 
Europe: The Wider Importance of the Dutch Case’, Oxford Journal of Law and 
Religion 1-27 (2013)  
Van der Schyff, Gerhard and Overbeeke, Adriaan, “Exercising religious freedom in 
the public space: a comparative and European Convention analysis of general burqa 
bans”, E.C.I. Review 7(3) (2011) 
Van Dijk, Pieter, et. al, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Kluwer, 2006) 
Vandrooghenbroeck, Sébastien, La proportionnalité dans le droit de la Convention 
européenne des droits de l'Homme. Prendre l'idée simple au sérieux, (FUSL/Bruylant, 
2001) 
van Sasse van Ysselt, Paul, ‘Over het verbod op het dragen van een gezichtssluier en 
van andere gelaatsbedekkende kleding’, 1 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 
2010 
Ventura, Marco, ‘The changing civil religion of secular Europe’, 41 The Geo. Wash. 
Int’l L. Rev. 947–961 (2010) 
Ventura, Marco, ‘Dynamic Law and Religion in Europe. Acknowledging Change. 
Choosing Change’, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013/91 (2013) 
Ventura, Marco, ‘Law and Religion Issues in Strasbourg and Luxembourg: The Virtues 
of European Courts’, Kick-off Meeting Conference Paper, European University 
Institute, (2011) Available at 
http://www.eui.eu/Projects/ReligioWest/Documents/events/conferencePapers/Ven
tura.pdf 
 
Vickers, Lucy, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging Hierarchy?’, 
12 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 280–303 (2010)  
Vickers, Lucy, Religious Freedom, Religious Discrimination and the Workplace (Hart 
Publishing, 2008) 
268 
 
Vickers, Lucy, ‘Conform or be confined: S.A.S. v France’, 8 July 2014, OXHRH, 
available at http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/conform-or-be-confined-s-a-s-v-france/ 
Warren, Roger K, ‘Public Trust and Procedural Justice’, Court Review 12–16 (2000) 
Weis Bentzon, Agnete et al., Pursuing grounded theory in law: South-North 
experiences in developing women’s law (Mond Books, 1998)  
Wiener, Richard L., ‘Law and Psychology: Beyond Mental Health and Legal 
Procedure’, 37 Saint Louis University Law Journal 499–502 (1992)  
Winet, Evan D., ‘Face-Veil Bans and Anti-Mask Laws: State Interests and the Right to 
Cover the Face’, 35 Hastings Int’l and Comp. L. Rev. (2012) 
Winick, Bruce J., ‘The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence’, 3 Psychology, 
Public Policy, and Law 184–206 (1997) 
Witteveen, Willem, ‘Montesquieu en het boerkaverbod’, 20 May 2010, at 
http://njblog.nl/2010/05/20/montesquieu-en-het-boerkaverbod/ 
Woehrling, José, ‘L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable et l’adaptation de la 
société à la diversité religieuse’, 43 McGill L.J. (1998) 
Wortley, Scot and Owusu-Bempah, Akwasi, ‘Unequal Before the Law: Immigrant and 
Racial Minority Perceptions of the Canadian Criminal Justice System’, 10 Journal of 
International Migration and Integration / Revue de l’integration et de la migration 
internationale 447–473 (2009)  
Zoethout, Carla M., ‘Ritual Slaughter and the Freedom of Religion: Some Reflections 
on a Stunning Matter’, 35 Human Rights Quarterly 651–672 (2013),  
Zoethout, Carla M., ‘Rethinking Adjudication under the European Convention’, in 
Jeroen Temperman (ed.): The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious 
Symbols in the Public School Classroom, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012)  
  
269 
 
LIST OF CASES 
The cases are represented in a chronological order. 
 
Cases of the European Commission of Human Rights 
EComHR, X v. Denmark, Application No. 7374/75, 8 March 1976. 
EComHR, X v. United Kingdom, Application No. 8160/78, 12 March 1981. 
EComHR, Karlsson v. Sweden, Application No. 12356/86, 12 April 1989. 
EComHR, Williamson v. United Kingdom, Application No. 27008/95, 17 May 1995. 
EComHR, Konttinen v. Finland, Application No. 24949/94, 3 December 1996. 
EComHR, Stedman v. United Kingdom, Application No. 29107/95, 9 April 1997. 
 
ARTICLE 9 
ECtHR, Kokkinakis v. Greece, Application no. 14307/88, 25 May 1993. 
ECtHR, Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, Application No. 24645/94, 18 February 
1999. 
ECtHR, Martins Casimiro and Cerveira Ferreira v. Luxembourg, Application No. 
44888/98, 27 April 1999. 
ECtHR, Chassagnou and Others v. France, Application No. 25088/94 28331/95 
28443/95, 29 April 1999. 
ECtHR, Aydar v. Turkey, Application No. 32207/96, 4 May 1999. 
ECtHR, Sipahioglu v. Turkey, Application No. 31245/96, 11 May 1999. 
ECtHR, Arslan v. Turkey, Application No. 23462/94, 8 July 1999. 
ECtHR, Baskaya and Okcuoglu v. Turkey, Application No. 23536/94 24408/9, 8 July 
1999. 
ECtHR, Ceylan v. Turkey, Application No. 23556/94, 8 July 1999. 
ECtHR, Gerger v. Turkey, Application No. 24919/94 , 8 July 1999.  
ECtHR, Okcuoglu v. Turkey, Application No. 24246/94, 8 July 1999.  
270 
 
ECtHR, Polat v. Turkey, Application No. 23500/94, 8 July 1999. 
ECtHR, Josephides v. Turkey, Application No. 21887/93, 24 August 1999. 
ECtHR, Saltuk v. Turkey, Application No. 31135/96, 24 August 1999. 
ECtHR, Kubiszyn v. Poland, Application No. 37437/97, 21 September 1999. 
ECtHR, C.R. v. Switzerland , Application No. 40130/98, 14 October 1999. 
ECtHR, Riera Blume and Others v. Spain, Application No. 37680/97, 14 October 1999. 
ECtHR, Grande Oriente Ditalia De Palazzo Giustiniani v. Italy, Application No. 
35972/97, 21 October 1999. 
ECtHR, Pannulo and Forte v. France, Application No. 37794/97, 23 November 1999. 
ECtHR, Freedom and Democracy Party Ozdep v. Turkey, Application No. 23885/94, 8 
December 1999. 
ECtHR, Serif v. Greece, Application No. 38178/97, 14 December 1999. 
ECtHR, Gluchowski and Atures v. France, Application No. 44789/98, 14 December 
1999. 
ECtHR, Viel v. France, Application No. 41781/98, 14 December 1999. 
ECtHR, Alnashif and Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 50963/99, 16 December 
1999. 
ECtHR, Sahiner v. Turkey, Application No. 29279/95, 11 January 2000. 
ECtHR, Ari v. Turkey, Application No. 29281/95, 11 January 2000. 
ECtHR, Keskin v. Turkey, Application No. 40156/98, 45035/98, 9 March 2000.  
ECtHR, K.S. v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 45035/98, 7 March 2000. 
ECtHR, Kohn v. Germany, Application No. 47021/99, 23 March 2000. 
ECtHR, Altin v. Turkey, Application No. 39822/98, 6 April 2000. 
ECtHR, Thlimmenos v. Greece, Application No. 34369/97, 6 April 2000. 
ECtHR, I.S. v. Bulgaria, Application No. 32438/96, 6 April 2000. 
ECtHR, Acimovic v. Croatia, Application No. 48776/99, 30 May 2000. 
ECtHR, Andelkovic v. Croatia, Application No. 48773/99, 30 May 2000. 
271 
 
ECtHR, Sadak and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 25144/94, 26149/95, 26150/95, 
26151/95, 26152/95, 26154/95, 27100/95, 27101/95, 26153/95 and 30 May 2000. 
ECtHR, Feldek v. The Slovak Republic, Application No. 29032/95, 15 June 2000. 
ECtHR, Skordas v. Greece, Application No. 48895/99, 15 June 2000. 
ECtHR, Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, Application No. 27417/95, 27 June 2000. 
ECtHR, Indelicato v. Italy, Application No. 31143/96, 6 July 2000. 
ECtHR, Nikishina v. Russia, Application No. 45665/99, 12 September 2000. 
ECtHR, Glaser v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 32346/96, 19 September 2000. 
ECtHR, Zana v. Turkey, Application No. 32346/96, 19 September 2000. 
ECtHR, Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 41340/98, 41342/98, 
41343/98 and 41344/98, 3 October 2000. 
ECtHR, Marsali v. Turkey, Application No. 40077/98, 19 October 2000. 
ECtHR, Sanles Sanles Contre Lespagne , Application No. 48335/99, 26 October 2000. 
ECtHR, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, Application No. 30985/96, 26 October 2000. 
ECtHR, J.L. v. Finland, Application No. 32526/96, 16 November 2000. 
ECtHR, Sahin v. Turkey, Application No. 42605/98, 5 December 2000. 
ECtHR, Piss v. France, Application No. 46026/99, 16 January 2001. 
ECtHR, Zaoui v. Switzerland, Application No. 41615/98, 18 January 2001. 
ECtHR, Perincek and Le Parti Des Travailleurs v. Turkey, Application No. 46669/99, 23 
January 2001. 
ECtHR, Alnashif and Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 50963/99, 25 January 2001. 
ECtHR, Pitkevich v. Russia, Application No. 47936/99, 8 February 2001. 
ECtHR, Yazar and Others Contre La Turkey, Application No. 42713/98, 13 February 
2001. 
ECtHR, Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey, Application No. 50692/99, 15 February 2001. 
ECtHR, Dahlab v. Switzerland, Application No. 42393/98, 15 February 2001. 
ECtHR, Cserjes v. Hungary , Application No. 45599/99, 5 April 2001. 
272 
 
ECtHR, Ancel Farrugia Migneco v. Malta, Application No. 61473/00, 12 April 2001. 
ECtHR, Kosteski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia, Application No. 
55170/00, 3 May 2001. 
ECtHR, Cyprus v. Turkey, Application No. 25781/94, 10 May 2001. 
ECtHR, Katani and Others v. Germany, Application No. 67679/01, 31 May 2001. 
ECtHR, Alujer Fernandez and Caballero Garcia v. Spain, Application No. 53072/99, 14 
June 2001. 
ECtHR, Sanchez Navajas v. L’Espagne, Application No. 57442/00, 21 June 2001. 
ECtHR, Saniewski v. Poland, Application No. 40319/98, 26 June 2001. 
ECtHR, Johannische Kirche Peters v. Germany , Application No. 41754/98, 10 July 
2001. 
ECtHR, Feldek v. Slovakia, Application No. 29032/95, 12 July 2001. 
ECtHR, Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 
41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 31 July 2001. 
ECtHR, Bruno v. Sweden, Application No. 32196/96, 28 August 2001. 
ECtHR, Lundberg v. Sweden, Application No. 36846/97, 28 August 2001. 
ECtHR, N.F. v. Italy, Application No. 37119/97, 2 August 2001. 
ECtHR, Erdem v. Turkey, Application No. 26328/95, 11 September 2001. 
ECtHR, Tepeli and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 31876/96, 11 September 2001. 
ECtHR, Pichon and Sajous v. France, Application No. 49853/99, 2 October 2001. 
ECtHR, A.C. v. Turkey, Application No. 37960/97, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Aras v. Turkey, Application No. 32322/96, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Ates v. Turkey, Application No. 35081/97, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Balcik v. Turkey, Application No. 34479/97, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Baskaya v. Turkey, Application No. 38591/97, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Beyzadeoglu v. Turkey, Application No. 38917/97, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Buyukkirabali v. Turkey, Application No. 38590/97, 9 October 2001. 
273 
 
ECtHR, Can v. Turkey, Application No. 9 36196/97, October 2001. 
ECtHR, Corbaci v. Turkey, Application No. 9 32359/96, October 2001. 
ECtHR, Dalgic v. Turkey, Application No. 36198/97, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Demirhan v. Turkey, Application No. 38603/97, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Genel v. Turkey, Application No. 9 36200/97, October 2001. 
ECtHR, Gezer v. Turkey, Application No. 35069/97, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, H.K. v. Turkey, Application No. 32443/96, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Inkaya and Others v. Turkey , Application No. 31990/96, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Kose v. Turkey, Application No. 36594/97, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Mogulkoc v. Turkey, Application No. 36595/97, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Sen v. Turkey, Application No. 38601/97, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Tanal v. Turkey, Application No. 38592/97, 9 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Multiplex and Smailagic v. Croatia, Application No. 58112/00, 18 October 
2001. 
ECtHR, Devlin v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 29545/95, 30 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Pichon and Sajous v. France, Application No. 49853/99, 2 October 2001. 
ECtHR, Bozhilov v. Bulgaria, Application No. 41978/98, 21 November 2001. 
ECtHR, Metropolitan Church Of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, Application No. 
45701/99, 13 December 2001. 
ECtHR, The Supreme Holy Council Of The Muslim Community v. Bulgaria, Application 
No. 39023/97, 13 December 2001. 
ECtHR, Apuhan v. Turkey, Application No. 36193/97, 5 March 2002. 
ECtHR, Davuter v. Turkey, Application No. 38918/97, 5 March 2002. 
ECtHR, Demir v. Turkey, Application No. 32323/96, 5 March 2002. 
ECtHR, Fidan v. Turkey, Application No. 34537/97, 5 March 2002. 
ECtHR, Karaca v. Turkey, Application No. 38920/97, 5 March 2002. 
ECtHR, Kiratoglu v. Turkey, Application No. 35829/97, 5 March 2002. 
274 
 
ECtHR, Tan v. Turkey, Application No. 35976/97, 5 March 2002. 
ECtHR, Uludag v. Turkey, Application No. 35856/97, 5 March 2002. 
ECtHR, Zulfikaroglu v. Turkey, Application No. 38930/97, 5 March 2002. 
ECtHR, Karkin v. Turkey, Application No. 43928/98, 12 March 2002. 
ECtHR, Yazar and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 22723/93, 22724/93 and 
22725/939 April 2002. 
ECtHR, Pretty v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 2346/02, 29 April 2002. 
ECtHR, Isik v. Turkey, Application No. 39071/97, 4 May 2002. 
ECtHR, Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft E.V. V. Germany, Application No. 53871/00, 
12 May 2002. 
ECtHR, Zarakolu v. Turkey, Application No. 37062/97, 12 May 2002. 
ECtHR, Zarakolu v. Turkey No 2, Application No. 52780/99 , 12 May 2002. 
ECtHR, Kahramanyol v. Turkey, Application No. 38385/97, 4 June 2002. 
ECtHR, Tahta v. Turkey, Application No. 39068/97, 4 June 2002. 
ECtHR, Usta v. Turkey, Application No. 39070/97, 4 June 2002. 
ECtHR, Case Of Sadak and Others v. Turkey No. 2, Application No. 25144/94, 
26149/95, 26150/95, 26151/95, 26152/95, 26153/95, 26154/95, 27100/95 and 
27101/95, 11 June 2002. 
ECtHR, Case Of Alnashif v. Bulgaria, Application No. 50963/99, 20 June 2002. 
ECtHR, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Application No. 44774/98, 2 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Tekin v. Turkey, Application No. 41556/98, 2 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Maestri v. Italy, Application No. 39748/98, 4 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Cevik v. Turkey, Application No. 39443/98, 9 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Cinar v. Turkey, Application No. 39334/98, 9 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Dogruer v. Turkey, Application No. 39332/98, 9 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Gokdogan v. Turkey, Application No. 39333/98, 9 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Kati v. Turkey, Application No. 39323/98, 9 July 2002. 
275 
 
ECtHR, Meral v. Turkey, Application No. 39336/98, 9 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Murphy v. Ireland, 44179/98, Application No. 9 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Ozcan v. Turkey, 39337/98, Application No. 9 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Rezek v.Czech Republic, Application No. 46166/99, 9 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Sengulec v. Turkey, Application No. 39331/98, 9 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Ozler v. Turkey, Application No. 25753/94, 11 July 2002. 
ECtHR, Karademirci and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 37096/97 and 37101/97, 3 
September 2002. 
ECtHR, Sincar and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 46281/99, 19 September 2002. 
ECtHR, Andreou Papi v. Turkey, Application No. 16094/90, 26 September 2002. 
ECtHR, Asproftas v. Turkey, Application No. 16079/90, 26 September 2002. 
ECtHR, Olymbiou v. Turkey, Application No. 16091/90, 26 September 2002. 
ECtHR, Petrakidou v. Turkey, Application No. 16081/90, 26 September 2002. 
ECtHR, Protopapa v. Turkey, Application No. 16084/90, 26 September 2002. 
ECtHR, Strati v. Turkey, Application No. 16082/90, 26 September 2002. 
ECtHR, Vrahimi v. Turkey, Application No. 16078/90, 26 September 2002. 
ECtHR, Acarca v. Turkey, Application No. 45823/99, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Aksoy v. Turkey, Application No. 45376/99, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Balci v. Turkey, Application No. 48718/99, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Baspinar v. Turkey, Application No. 45631/99, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Dagli v. Turkey, Application No. 45373/99, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Dal and Ozen v. Turkey, Application No. 45378/99, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Duman v. Turkey, Application No. 42788/98, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Gundogdu v. Turkey, Application No. 47503/99, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Kayseri v. Turkey, Application No. 46643/99, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, O.O. v. Turkey, Application No. 42137/98, 3 October 2002. 
276 
 
ECtHR, Once v. Turkey, Application No. 45627/99, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Ozcan v. Turkey, Application No. 44199/98, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Ozdas v. Turkey, Application No. 45555/99, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Pektas v. Turkey, Application No. 39682/98, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Soysever v. Turkey, Application No. 39826/98, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Yuguruk v. Turkey, Application No. 47500/99, 3 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Siboni v. France, Application No. 58953/00, 8 October 2002. 
ECtHR, G.G. v. Italy, Application No. 34574/97, 10 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Sadik Amet and Others v. Greece, Application No. 64756/01, 10 October 
2002. 
ECtHR, Dicle Pour Le Parti De La Democratie Dep v. Turkey, Application No. 
34685/9725141/94, 12 October 2002. 
ECtHR, Case Of Agga v. Greece No. 2, Application No. 50776/99 and 52912/99, 17 
October 2002. 
ECtHR, Varli Yakmaz Irgat Yagmur Soylu Sola Koceroglu Kilicarslan and Gurkey v. 
Turkey, Application No. 57299/00, 17 October 2002.  
ECtHR, Lazzarini and Ghiacci v. Italy, Application No. 7 November 2002. 
ECtHR, Dicle v. Turkey, Application No. 34685/97, 14 November 2002. 
ECtHR, Iera Moni Profitou Iliou Thiras v. Greece, Application No. 32259/02, 21 
November 2002. 
ECtHR, Vergos v. Greece, Application No. 65501/01, 21 November 2002. 
ECtHR, Erdogan v. Turkey, Application No. 47130/99, 28 November 2002. 
ECtHR, Gunes v. Turkey, Application No. 53968/00, 28 November 2002. 
ECtHR, Kucuk v. Turkey, Application No. 56004/00, 29 November 2002. 
ECtHR, Molla Housein v. Greece, Application No. 63821/00, 12 December 2002. 
ECtHR, Sofianopoulos Spaidiotis Metallinos and Kontogiannis v. Greece, Application 
No. 1988/02 1997/02 1977/02, 12 December 2002. 
ECtHR, Zengin v. Turkey, Application No. 46928/99, 12 December 2002. 
277 
 
ECtHR, Akbulut v. Turkey, Application No. 45624/99, 6 February 2003. 
ECtHR, Galanis v. Greece, Application No. 69333/01, 6 February 2003. 
ECtHR, Guler and Caliskan Contre La Turkey, Application No. 52746/99, 6 February 
2003. 
ECtHR, Imam v. Greece, Application No. 63719/00, 6 February 2003. 
ECtHR, Karabouyiouklou v. Greece, Application No. 63824/00, 6 February 2003. 
ECtHR, Ouzoun v. Greece, Application No. 6 63976/00, February 2003.  
ECtHR, Toutziar v. Greece, Application No. 63949/00, 6 February 2003  
ECtHR, Refah Partisi The Welfare Party and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 
41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 13 February 2003.  
ECtHR, Sijakova and Others v. The Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia, 
Application No. 67914/01, 6 March 2003 
ECtHR, Razaghi v. Sweden, Application No. 64599/01, 11 March 2003 
ECtHR, Gorgulu v. Germany, Application No. 74969/01, 20 March 2003 
ECtHR, Deli Hatzoglou v. Greece, Application No. 67754/01, 3 April 2003 
ECtHR, Kehagia v. Greece, Application No. 67115/01, 3 April 2003  
ECtHR, Porter v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 15814/02, 8 April 2003 
ECtHR, Poltoratski v. Ukraine, Application No. 38812/97, 29 April 2003  
ECtHR, Kuznetsov v. Ukraine, Application No. 39042/97, 29 April 2003 
ECtHR, Poltoratskiy v. Ukraine, Application No. 38812/97, 29 April 2003  
ECtHR, Lovasz v. Hungary, Application No. 62730/00, 3 May 2003  
ECtHR, Guzel Contre La Turkey, Application No. 65849/01, 10 June 2003  
ECtHR, Garaudy v. France, Application No. 65831/01, 24 June 2003  
ECtHR, Aydar v. Turkey, Application No. 32207/96, 1 July 2003  
ECtHR, Reyhan v. Turkey, Application No. 38422/97, 3 July 2003  
ECtHR, Socialist Party of Turkey (STP) and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 
26482/95, 12 November 2003  
278 
 
ECtHR, Kohls v. Germany, Application No. 72719/01, 13 November 2003  
ECtHR, Özdemir v. Turkey, Application No. 492/02, 20 November 2003  
ECtHR, Palau-Martinez v. France, Application No. 64927/01, 16 December 2003  
ECtHR, Önen v. Turkey, Application No. 32860/96, 10 February 2004  
ECtHR, Maestri v. Italy, Application No. 39748/98, 17 February 2004  
ECtHR, Varli and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 57299/00, 18 March 2004  
ECtHR, Silay v. Turkey, Application No. 8691/02 , 6 April 2004  
ECtHR, Ozupek and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 60177/00, 27 April 2004. 
ECtHR, Sirin v. Turkey, Application No. 47328/99, 27 April 2004. 
ECtHR, Karakaya v. Turkey, Application No. 62619/00, 4 May 2004. 
ECtHR, Arac v. Turkey, Application No. 69037/01, 22 June 2004. 
ECtHR, Vergos v. Greece, Application No. 65501/01, 24 June 2004. 
ECtHR, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Application No. 44774/98, 29 June 2004. 
ECtHR, Sert v. Turkey, Application No. 47491/99, 8 July 2004. 
ECtHR, Ikincisoy v. Turkey, Application No. 26144/95, 27 July 2004. 
ECtHR, Öz v. Turkey, Application No. 49346/99, 3 September 2004. 
ECtHR, Guliyev and Ramazanov v. Azerbaijan, Application No. 34553/02, 9 
September 2004. 
ECtHR, Kuznetsov and Others v. Russia, Application No. 184/02, 9 September 2004. 
ECtHR, M.G. v. Turkey, Application No. 11103/03, 16 September 2004. 
ECtHR, Patrikeyev v. Russia, Application No. 68493/01, 21 September 2004. 
ECtHR, Gallico v. Italy, Application No. 53723/00, 23 September 2004. 
ECtHR, Düzgören v. Turkey, Application No. 56827/00, 28 September 2004. 
ECtHR, Vatan v. Russia, Application No. 47978/99, 7 October 2004. 
ECtHR, Yakovlev v. Russia, Application No. 72701/01, 19 October 2004. 
ECtHR, Folgero and Others V. Norway, Application No. 15472/02, 26 October 2004. 
279 
 
ECtHR, Szabo v. Sweden, Application No. 28578/03, 26 October 2004. 
ECtHR, Church Of Scientology Moscow and Others v. Russia, Application No. 
18147/02, 28 October 2004. 
ECtHR, Gunduz v. Turkey, Application No. 59997/00, 9 November 2004. 
ECtHR, Bulski V. Pologne, Application No. 46254/99 and 31888/02, 30 November 
2004. 
ECtHR, Supreme Holy Council Of The Muslim Community v. Bulgaria, Application No. 
39023/97, 16 December2004. 
ECtHR, Phull v. France, Application No. 35753/03, 11 January 2005. 
ECtHR, Karademirci and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 37096/97 and 37101/97, 
25 January 2005. 
ECtHR, Turan v. Turkey, Application No. 879/02, 27 January 2005. 
ECtHR, Koc v. Turkey, Application No. 39862/02, 1 February 2005. 
ECtHR, Fairfield Others v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 24790/04, 8 March 
2005. 
ECtHR, Office Culturel De Cluny v. France, Application No. 1002/02, 22 March 2005. 
ECtHR, Democracy and Change Party and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 39210/98 
and 39974/98, 26 April 2005. 
ECtHR, Öcalan v. Turkey, Application No. 46221/99, 12 May 2005. 
ECtHR, Tig v. Turkey, Application No. 8165/03, 24 May 2005. 
ECtHR, Aydin and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 46231/99, 26 May 2005. 
ECtHR, Siz v. Turkey, Application No. 895/02, 26 May 2005. 
ECtHR, Emek Partisi and Senol v. Turkey, Application No. 39434/98, 31 May 2005. 
ECtHR, Tanyar and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 74242/01, 7 June 2005. 
ECtHR, Kuzin v. Russia, Application No. 22118/02, 9 June 2005. 
ECtHR, Kimlya and Others v. Russia, Application No. 76836/01 and 32782/03, 9 June 
2005. 
ECtHR, Carmuirea Spirituala A Musulmanilor Din Republica Moldova v. Moldova, 
Application No. 12282/02, 14 June 2005. 
280 
 
ECtHR, Mclure v. Turkey , Application No. 71859/01, 5 July 2005. 
ECtHR, Milan v. France, Application No. 7549/03, 5 July 2005. 
ECtHR, Religionsgemeinschaft Der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, Application 
No. 40825/98, 5 July 2005. 
ECtHR, Jones v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 42639/04, 13 September 2005. 
ECtHR, Tas v. Turkey, Application No. 23710/02, 13 September 2005. 
ECtHR, Affaire Esidir and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 54814/00, 11 October 
2005. 
ECtHR, F.L. v. France, Application No. 61162/00, 3 November 2005. 
ECtHR, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Application No. 44774/98, 10 November 2005. 
ECtHR, Balsyte-Lideikiene v. Lithuania, Application No. 72596/01, 24 November 2005. 
ECtHR, Witzsch v. Germany, Application No. 7485/03, 13 December 2005. 
ECtHR, Kenar v. Turkey, Application No. 67215/01, 1 December 2005. 
ECtHR, Paturel v. France, Application No. 54968/00, 22 December 2005. 
ECtHR, Insan Haklari Dernegi and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 40305/98, 12 
January 2006. 
ECtHR, Ulke v. Turkey, Application No. 39437/98, 24 January 2006. 
ECtHR, Kose and 93 Others v. Turkey, Application No. 26625/02, 24 January 2006. 
ECtHR, Kurtulmus v. Turkey, Application No. 65500/01, 24 January 2006. 
ECtHR, Birdal v. Turkey, Application No. 53047/99, 31 January 2006. 
ECtHR, Kat Insaat Ticaret Kollektif Sirketi Ismet Kamis Ve Ortaklari v. Turkey, 
Application No. 74495/01, 31 January 2006,. 
ECtHR, Yazar v. Turkey, Application No. 58709/00, 31 January 2006. 
ECtHR, Arabadjiev and Stavrev v. Bulgaria, Application No. 7380/02, 14 February 
2006. 
ECtHR, Z. and T. v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 27034/05, 28 February 2006. 
ECtHR, D. v. Poland, Application No. 8215/02, 14 March 2006. 
ECtHR, Evaldsson and Others v . Sweden, Application No. 75252/01, 28 March 2006. 
281 
 
ECtHR, Kosteski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia, Application No. 
55170/00, 13 April 2006. 
ECtHR, Fazilet Partisi and Kutan v. Turkey, Application No. 1444/02, 27 April 2006. 
ECtHR, Deschomets v. France, Application No. 31956/02, 16 May 2006. 
ECtHR, Arslan v. Turkey, Application No. 31320/02, 1 June 2006. 
ECtHR, Lehtjar v . Estonia, Application No. 11713/05, 26 June 2006. 
ECtHR, Öllinger v. Austria, Application No. 76900/01, 29 June 2006. 
ECtHR, Agga v. Greece n° 3, Application No. 32186/02, 13 July 2006. 
ECtHR, Agga v. Greece n° 4, Application No. 33331/02, 13 July 2006. 
ECtHR, Konrad v. Germany, Application No. 35504/03, 11 September 2006. 
ECtHR, Arac v. Turkey, Application No. 9907/02, 19 September 2006. 
ECtHR, Ucma v. Turkey, Application No. 15071/03, 3 October 2006. 
ECtHR, The Moscow Branch Of The Salvation Army v. Russia, Application No. 
72881/01, 5 October 2006. 
ECtHR, L.L. v. France, Application No. 7508/02, 10 October 2006. 
ECtHR, Yüksektepe v. Turkey, Application No. 62227/00, 24 October 2006. 
ECtHR, Kavak v. Turkey, Application No. 69790/01, 9 November 2006. 
ECtHR, Rancic v. Slovenia, Application No. 59441/00, 9 November 2006. 
ECtHR, Parry v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 42971/05, 28 November 2006. 
ECtHR, Igors Dmitrijevs v. Latvia, Application No. 61638/00, 30 November 2006. 
ECtHR, Nolan and K. v. Russia, Application No. 2512/04, 30 November 2006. 
ECtHR, Ben El Mahi and Others v. Denmark, Application No. 5853/06, 11 December 
2006. 
ECtHR, Kuznetsov and Others v. Russia, Application No. 184/02, 11 January 2007. 
ECtHR, Druzenko and Others v. Ukraine, Application No. 17674/02 and 39081/02, 15 
January 2007. 
ECtHR, Pantoulias v. Greece, Application No. 38841/04, 18 January 2007. 
282 
 
ECtHR, Evaldsson and Others v. Sweden, Application No. 75252/01, 13 February 
2007. 
ECtHR, Benli v. Turkey, Application No. 65715/01, 20 February 2007. 
ECtHR, Biserica Adevarat Ortodoxa Din Moldova v. Moldova, Application No. 952/03, 
27 February 2007. 
ECtHR, Spampinato v. Italy, Application No. 23123/04, 29 March 2007. 
ECtHR, Karaduman v. Turkey, Application No. 41296/04, 3 April 2007. 
ECtHR, Yilmaz v. Turkey, Application No. 37829/05, 3 April 2007. 
ECtHR, Kavakci v. Turkey, Application No. 71907/01, 5 April 2007. 
ECtHR, Church Of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, Application No. 18147/02, 5 April 
2007. 
ECtHR, Kapitonovs v. Latvia, Application No. 16999/02, 5 April 2007. 
ECtHR, Morkunas v. Lithuania, Application No. 29798/02, 5 April 2007. 
ECtHR, Ivanova v. Bulgaria, Application No. 52435/99, 12 April 2007. 
ECtHR, Ulusoy and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 34797/03, 3 May 2007. 
ECtHR, Members Of The Gldani Congregation Of Jehovahs Witnesses and Others v. 
Georgia, Application No. 71156/01, 3 May 2007.  
ECtHR, Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, Application No. 77703/01, 14 June 
2007. 
ECtHR, Bicer v. Turkey, Application No. 3224/03, 3 July 2007. 
ECtHR, Achmadov and Bagurova v. Sweden, Application No. 34081/05, 10 July 2007. 
ECtHR, Yildirim v. Turkey, Application No. 25327/02, 11 September 2007. 
ECtHR, Griechische Kirchengem v. Germany, Application No. 52336/99, 18 
September 2007. 
ECtHR, Dautaj v. Switzerland, Application No. 32166/05, 20 September 2007. 
ECtHR, Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, Application No. 1448/04, 9 October 2007. 
ECtHR, Glas Nadezhda Eood and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria , Application No. 
14134/02, 11 October 2007. 
ECtHR, Otomanski v. Poland, Application No. 4612/03, 16 October 2007. 
283 
 
ECtHR, Tlemsani v. Luxembourg, Application No. 27132/06, 18 October 2007. 
ECtHR, Perry v. Latvia, Application No. 30273/03, 8 November 2007. 
ECtHR, Schiavone v. Italy, Application No. 65039/01, 13 November 2007. 
ECtHR, Ismailova v. Russia, Application No. 37614/02, 29 November 2007. 
ECtHR, Kuolelis Bartosevicius and Burokevicius v. Lithuania, Application No. 
74357/01, 26764/02 and 27434/02, 19 February 2008. 
ECtHR, Alexandridis v. Greece, Application No. 19516/06, 21 February 2008. 
ECtHR, Borisov and Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 62193/00, 26 February 2008. 
ECtHR, El Morsli v. France, Application No. 15585/06, 4 March 2008. 
ECtHR, Blumberg v. Germany, Application No. 14618/03, 18 March 2008. 
ECtHR, Mincheva v. Bulgaria, Application No. 21558/03, 6 May 2008. 
ECtHR, Müller v. Germany, Application No. 12986/04, 20 May 2008. 
ECtHR, Treptow v. Romania, Application No. 30358/03, 20 May 2008  
ECtHR, Jedlickova v. Czec Republic, Application No. 32415/06 and 32216/07, 3 June 
2008. 
ECtHR, Religionsgemeinschaft Der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, Application 
No. 40825/98, 31 July 2008. 
ECtHR, Leela Forderkreis E.V. and Others v. Germany, Application No. 58911/00, 6 
November 2008. 
ECtHR, Mann Singh v. France, Application No. 24479/07, 13 November 2008. 
ECtHR, Bzns Edinen v. Bulgaria, Application No. 28196/04, 2 December 2008. 
ECtHR, Dogru v. France, Application No. 27058/05, 4 December 2008. 
ECtHR, Kervanci v. France, Application No. 31645/04, 14 December 2008. 
ECtHR, Kartal and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 29768/03, 16 December 2008. 
ECtHR, Bozcaada Kimisis Teodoku Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi Vakfi v. Turkey , Application 
No. 22522/03, 28903/03, 28904/03, 28906/03, 28907/03, 28908/03, 28909/03 and 
28910/03, 19 December 2008. 
ECtHR, Holy Synod Of The Bulgarian Orthodox Church Metropolitan Inokentiy and 
Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 412/03 35677/04, 22 January 2009. 
284 
 
ECtHR, Nolan and K. v. Russia, Application No. 2512/04, 12 February 2009. 
ECtHR, Lajda and Others v. Czech Republic, Application No. 20984/05, 3 March 2009. 
ECtHR, Ozmen v. Turkey, Application No. 4545/05, 3 March 2009. 
ECtHR, Gutl v. Austria, Application No. 49686/99, 12 March 2009. 
ECtHR, Löffelmann v. Austria , Application No. 42967/98, 12 March 2009. 
ECtHR, Lang v. Austria, Application No. 49686/99, 19 March 2009. 
ECtHR, Masaev v. Moldova, Application No. 6303/05, 12 May 2009. 
ECtHR, Vraniskoski V. The Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia, Application No. 
37973/05, 26 May 2009. 
ECtHR, Association Solidarite Des Francais v. France, Application No. 26787/07, 16 
June 2009. 
ECtHR, Aktas v. France, Application No. 43563/08, 30 June 2009. 
ECtHR, Bayrak v. France, Application No. 14308/08, 30 June 2009. 
ECtHR, Gamaleddyn v. France, Application No. 18527/08, 30 June 2009. 
ECtHR, Ghazal v. France, Application No. 29134/08, 30 June 2009. 
ECtHR, Jasvir Singh v. France, Application No. 25463/08, 30 June 2009. 
ECtHR, Ranjit Singh v. France, Application No. 30 27561/08, 30 June 2009. 
ECtHR, Sharkunov and Mezentsev v. Russia, Application No. 75330/01, 2 July 2009. 
ECtHR, Mirolubovs and Others v. Latvia, Application No. 798/05, 15 September 2009. 
ECtHR, Nikolaos-Nikodimos Tsarknias v. Greece, Application No. 24598/06, 24 
September 2009. 
ECtHR, Kimlya and Others v. Russia, Application No. 76836/01 and 32782/03, 1 
October 2009. 
ECtHR, Matterne v. Germany, Application No. 4041/06, 6 October 2009. 
ECtHR, Bayatyan v. Armenia, Application No. 23459/03, 27 October 2009. 
ECtHR, Lautsi v. Italy, Application No. 30814/06, 3 November 2009. 
ECtHR, Kin v. Ukraine, Application No. 19451/04, 17 November 2009. 
285 
 
ECtHR, Friend and Others v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 16072/06 and 
27809/08, 24 November 2009. 
ECtHR, Skugar and Others v. Russia, Application No. 40010/04, 3 December 2009. 
ECtHR, Koppi v. Austria, Application No. 33001/03, 10 December 2009. 
ECtHR, Butan v. Roumanie, Application No. 34644/02, 5 January 2010. 
ECtHR, Belyaev and Digtyar v. Ukraine, Application No. 16984/04 and 9947/05, 12 
January 2010. 
ECtHR, Sinan Isik v. Turkey, Application No. 21924/05, 2 February 2010. 
ECtHR, Pylnev v. Russia, Application No. 3038/03, 9 February 2010. 
ECtHR, Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 41135/98, 23 February 
2010. 
ECtHR, Tasdemir v. Turkey, Application No. 38841/07, 23 February 2010. 
ECtHR, Dimitras and Others v. Greece, Application No. 42837/06, 3237/07, 3269/07, 
35793/07 and 6099/08, 3 June 2010. 
ECtHR, Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and Others v. Russia, Application No. 302/02, 
10 June 2010. 
ECtHR, Grzelak v. Poland, Application No. 7710/02, 15 June. 
ECtHR, M.K. v. Poland, Application No. 24200/07, 7 September 2010. 
ECtHR, Bozcaada Kimisis Teodoku Rum Ortodoks Kilisesi Vakfi v. Turkey, Application 
No. 37991/03, 37994/03 and 32552/05, 14 September 2010. 
ECtHR, Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 25446/06, 14 September 
2010. 
ECtHR, Association Les Temoins De Jehovah v. France, Application No. 8916/05, 21 
September 2010. 
ECtHR, Balenovic v. Croatia, Application No. 28369/07, 30 September 2010. 
ECtHR, Sevastyanov v. Russia, Application No. 75911/01, 14 October 2010. 
ECtHR, Ali v. Romania, Application No. 20307/02, Application No. 9 November 2010. 
ECtHR, Jakóbski v Poland, Application No. 18429/06, 7 December. 
286 
 
ECtHR, Savez crkava “Riječ života” and Others v. Croatia, Application No. 7798/08, 9 
December 2010. 
ECtHR, Case Of Odonoghue and Others v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 
34848/07, 14 December 2010. 
ECtHR, Chrysostomos Ii v. Turkey, Application No. 66611/09, 4 January 2011. 
ECtHR, Herrmann v. Germany, Application No. 9300/07, 20 January 2011. 
ECtHR, Affaire Boychev and Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 77185/01, 27 January 
2011. 
ECtHR, Affaire Siebenhaar v. Germany, Application No. 18136/02, 3 February 2011. 
ECtHR, Affaire Wasmuth v. Germany, Application No. 12884/03, 17 February 2011. 
ECtHR, Lautsi and Others v. Italy, Application No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011. 
ECtHR, Catana v. Romania, Application No. 10473/05, 30 March 2011. 
ECtHR, Srbic v. Croatia, Application No. 4464/09, 21 June 2011. 
ECtHR, Ouardiri v. Switzerland, Application No. 65840/09, 28 June 2011. 
ECtHR, Association Les Temoins De Jehovah v. France, Application No. 8916/05, 30 
June 2011. 
ECtHR, Sotirov and Others v. Bulgaria, Application No. 13999/05, 5 July 2011. 
ECtHR, Kraczkiewicz and Others v. Russia, Application No.  
15120/10, 13626/11 and 17883/10, 5 July 2011. 
ECtHR, Bayatyan v. Armenia, Application. No. 23459/03, 7 July 2011. 
ECtHR, Kovac v. Croatia, Application No. 49910/06, 23 August 2011. 
ECtHR, Dojan and Others v. Germany, Application No. 319/08, 13 September 2011. 
ECtHR, Dimitras and Others v. Greece n°2, Application Nos. 34207/08 and 6365/09, 3 
November 2011. 
ECtHR, Ercep v. Turkey, Application No. 43965/04, 22 November 2011. 
ECtHR, Soukroma Zakladni Skola Cesta K Uspechu V Praze S.R.O. and Obcanske 
Sdruzeni Skc. Republique Tcheque, Application No. 8314/10, 22 November 2011. 
ECtHR, Bukharatyan v. Armenia, Application No. 37819/03, 10 January 2012. 
287 
 
ECtHR, Tsaturyan v. Armenia, Application No. 37821/03, 10 January 2012. 
ECtHR, Feti Demirtas v. Turkey, Application No. 5260/07, 17 January 2012. 
ECtHR, Kovalkovs v. Latvia, Application No. 35021/05, 31 January 2012. 
ECtHR, Sessa Francesco v. Italy, Application No. 28790/08, 3 April 2012. 
ECtHR, Bulgaru v. Roumanie, Application No. 22707/05, 15 May 2012. 
ECtHR, Sociedad Anonima Del Ucieza v. Espagne, Application No. 38963/08, 29 May 
2012. 
ECtHR, Savda v. Turkey, Application No. 42730/05, 12 June 2012. 
ECtHR, E.M. and Others v. Romania, Application No. 20192/07, 12 June 2012. 
ECtHR, Hizb Uttahrir and Others v. Germany, Application No. 12 June 2012. 
ECtHR, Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij v. The Netherlands, Application No. 
31098/08, 10 July 2012. 
ECtHR, Tarhan v. Turkey, Application No. 9078/06, 17 July 2012. 
ECtHR, Fusu Arcadie and Others v. The Republic Of Moldova, Application No. 
22218/06, 17 July 2012. 
ECtHR, Ásatrúarfélagið v. Iceland, Application No. 22897/08, 18 September 2012. 
ECtHR, Jehovas Zeugen In Osterreich v. Austria, Application No. 25 September 2012. 
ECtHR, Schilder v. The Netherlands, Application No. 2158/12, 16 October 2012. 
ECtHR, Lawniczak v. Poland, Application No. 22857/07, 23 October 2012. 
ECtHR, Kawiecki v. Poland, Application No. 23 October 2012. 
ECtHR, Dimitras and Others v. Greece, Application Nos. 44077/09, 15369/10 and 
41345/10, 8 January 2013. 
ECtHR, Juma Mosque Congregation and Others v. Azerbaijan, Application No. 
15405/04, 8 January 2013. 
ECtHR, Sukyo Mahikari France v. France, Application No. 41729/09, 08 January 2013. 
ECtHR, Eweida and Others v. The United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 48420/10, 
59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, 15 January 2013. 
ECtHR, Association Cultuelle Du Temple Pyramide v. France, Application No. 
50471/07, 31 January 2013. 
288 
 
ECtHR, Association Des Chevaliers Du Lotus Dor v. France, Application No. 50615/07, 
31 January 2013. 
ECtHR, Eglise Evangelique Missionnaire and Salaun v. France, Application No. 
25502/07, 31 January 2013. 
ECtHR, Enache v. Romania, Application No. 16986/12, 5 February 2013. 
ECtHR, Rupprecht v. Spain, Application No. 9 February 2013. 
ECtHR, Austrianu v. Romania, Application No. 16117/02, 12 February 2013. 
ECtHR, Vojnity v. Hungary, Application No. 29617/07, 12 February 2013. 
ECtHR, Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia, Application No. 26261/05 and 
26377/06, 14 March 2013. 
ECtHR, Iorga and Moldovan v. Romania, Application No. 15350/05 and 19452/05, 9 
April 2013. 
ECtHR, Muradi and Alieva v. Sweden, Application No. 11243/13, 25 June 2013. 
ECtHR, Pavlides and Georgakis v. Turkey, Application No.  
9130/09 and 9143/09, 2 July 2013. 
ECtHR, Sindicatul Pastorul Cel Bun v. Romania, Application No. 2330/09, 9 July 2013. 
ECtHR, Baciu v. Romania, Application No. 76146/12, 17 September 2013. 
ECtHR, Asquini and Others v. Italy, Application No. 10009/06, 5 November 2013 
ECtHR, Vartic v. Romania No. 2, Application No. 14150/08, 17 December 2013. 
ECtHR, Buldu and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 14017/08, 3 June 2014. 
ECtHR, Biblical Centre Of The Chuvash Republic v. Russia, Application No. 33203/08, 
12 June 2014. 
ECtHR, Fernandez Martinez v. Spain, Application No. 56030/07, 12 June 2014. 
ECtHR, Krupko and Others v. Russia, Application No. 26587/07, 26 June 2014. 
ECtHR, Magyar Kereszteny Mennonita Egyhaz and Others v. Hungary, Application 
No. 70945/11 23611/12 26998/12 41150/12 41155/12 41463/12 41553/12 
54977/12 56581/12, 8 April 2014. 
ECtHR, The Church Of Jesus Christ Of Latterday Saints v. The United Kingdom, 
Application No. 7552/09, 4 March 2014. 
289 
 
ECtHR, Fränklin-Beentjes and Cefluluz Da Floresta v. The Netherlands, Application No. 
28167/07, 6 May 2014. 
ECtHR, Glinski v. Poland, Application No. 59739/08, 11 February 2014. 
ECtHR, Korkmaz and Others v. Turkey, Application No. 64200/13, 25 March 2014. 
ECtHR, Paroisse Greco-Catholique Prunis v. Romania, Application No. 38134/02, 8 
April 2014. 
ECtHR, Representation Of The Union Of Councils For Jews In The Former Soviet Union 
and Union Of Jewish Religious Organisations in Ukraine v. Ukraine, Application No. 
13267/05, 1 April 2014. 
ECtHR, S.A.S. v. France, Application No. 43835/11, 1 July 2014. 
ECtHR, Zaman v. France, Application No. 8013/12, 17 June 2014. 
 
OTHER ARTICLES 
ECtHR, Niemetiez v. Germany, 16 December 1992, Application No. 13710/88, par. 29 
ECtHR Vögt, v. Germany, Application No. 45553/06, 26 September 1995 
ECtHR, Buckley v. UK, Application No. 20348/92, 25 September 1996. 
ECtHR, Smith and Grady v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 33985/96 and 
33986/96, 27 September 1999. 
ECtHR (GC), Jasper v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 27052/95, 16 February 
2000 
ECtHR (GC), Chapman v. UK, Application No. 27238/95, 18 January 2001. 
ECtHR, Khudoyorov v. Russia, Application No. 6847/02, 8 November 2005. 
ECtHR, Ramirez Sanchez v. France, Application No. 59450/00, 4 July 2006. 
ECtHR, Bartik v. Russia, Application No. 55565/00, 21 December 2006 
ECtHR, Glor v. Switzerland, Application No. 13444/04, 30 April 2009 
ECtHR, Ciubotaru v. Moldova, Application No. 27138/04, 27 April 2010. 
ECtHR, Obst v. Germany, Application No. 425/03, 23 September 2010.  
ECtHR, Schüth v. Germany, Application No. 1620/03, 23 September 2010. 
290 
 
ECtHR, Konstantin Markin v. Russia, Application No. 30078/06, 7 October 2010. 
ECtHR, Schwabe and M.G. v. Germany, Application No. 8080/08 and 8577/08, 1 
December 2011. 
ECtHR, Koky and Others v. Slovakia, Application No. 13624/03, 12 June 2012 
 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
 
Canada 
Supreme Court of Canada, Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, 1 
S.C.R. 256, 2006 SCC 6. 
Can. Trib., Nijjar v. Canada 3000 Airlines Limited, T497/1498 (1999) 
 
Belgium 
Belgian Constitutional Council, 6 December 2012, no. 145/2012  
 
France 
French Constitutional Council, 7 October 2010, no. 2010-613 DC 
Conceil d’Etat, ‘Etude relative aux possibilités juridiques d’interdiction du port du 
voile integral’, Rapport Assemblée générale plénière, 25 March 2010. 
 
  
291 
 
SUMMARY IN ENGLISH 
The effect courts can have in a diversity context should not be underestimated. From 
a perspective of inclusion their primary task is evidently to examine whether 
structural inclusion can be achieved, but additionally courts can also play an inclusive 
role at a more subjective level, through the messages they communicate to people. 
When courts use disrespectful or biased language, or when they do not take the 
voice of people into account, this in itself can communicate exclusion, irrespective of 
the actual decision taken. The present work aimed at raising awareness for this 
procedural aspect of adjudication. In fact, social psychology research on procedural 
justice convincingly shows that people do not only care about outcomes in their 
cases, but also, and even more, about the way this outcome is reached. The level of 
fairness of treatment does not only significantly impact people’s evaluation of the 
courts, but it also has an influence on people’s feeling of inclusion in the group.     
This procedural perspective on inclusion is particularly relevant in the context of 
Western Europe, where the religious landscape is undeniably becoming increasingly 
diverse. A diversity of views unavoidably contains a potential for conflicts or at least 
debates and discussions concerning religious, political or other views. In itself, these 
debates are signs of a healthy democracy. However, when it comes to religion, 
debates tend to be sensitive and polarizing and the voices of the people concerned 
are very often ignored. Courts, including the European Court of Human Rights, could 
therefore play an important role in ensuring social cohesion and the inclusion of all 
individuals in society. As a matter of fact, religious diversity in society will and does 
increasingly find its way to judicial bodies.  
This dissertation examines which role the European Court of Human Rights could 
play in this religiously diverse context and how it can best deal with religious claims 
in its own case law, in particular in the field of the right to freedom of religion. The 
focus in this dissertation mainly lies with the procedural fairness aspect of the case-
law and it accordingly tries to be complementary to the vast body of literature 
dealing with the substantive aspect of the freedom of religion case-law of the 
Strasbourg Court. At an analytical level, this work examined how the Court deals 
with religious applicants, with their religious claims and with their right to freedom 
of religion. At a normative level, this dissertation aimed at making constructive 
suggestions for improvement of the case-law. At a methodological level, it examined 
the case-law as broadly and deeply as possible, exploring different perspectives and 
innovative methodologies for the analytical process inspired by social science 
methods. 
The analysis of the case-law reveals that the Court’s article 9 jurisprudence contains 
several flaws from a procedural fairness angle; both in the way the Court approaches 
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the applicants, the applicants’ religious claims and the right to freedom of religion. 
Often the perspective of the applicants is clearly missing in the Court’s article 9 
judgments, their arguments are not truly taken into account and sometimes the 
reasoning employed shows a lack of neutrality towards certain religious practices. At 
the same time, the research conducted in this dissertation also reveals that the 
solutions for improvement of the case-law are not far away. In fact, inspiration can 
be drawn from the Court’s own case-law in fields other than freedom of religion, 
where the Court displays good practices of procedural fairness. Also, applying high 
procedural fairness standards would be a consistent application of the principle of 
pluralism for which the Court advocates in its general principles accompanying 
freedom of religion cases. This dissertation argues for more inclusivity in the article 9 
case-law of the Court. This entails a more inclusive approach in the way the applicant 
and his or her religious practice is described in the text of the judgment, but it also 
includes a more inclusive approach towards the applicant’s religious concerns and 
towards the right to freedom of religion. This can be achieved when taking the 
arguments and the applicants’ perspectives more into account, when acknowledging 
the concerns at stake and when avoiding to make generalizing statements on certain 
religious practices. This dissertation also reflects on whether the Court could play an 
inclusive role through the way it deals with article 9 claims. It is suggested that 
treating applicants in a neutral, respectful and caring way does not only have an 
impact on one applicant in a particular case, but that through its case-law the Court 
could have a much broader impact by communicating that no matter which religious 
background one has and no matter whether it is possible to find inclusive structural 
solutions for people’s religious needs, people should always be treated with respect 
and in an unbiased way and their claims and concerns should be taken seriously.  
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SAMENVATTING IN HET NEDERLANDS 
De invloed die rechtbanken kunnen hebben in een context van diversiteit kan niet 
worden onderschat. Vanuit het oogpunt van inclusie is de eerste evidente taak van 
rechterlijke instanties om te onderzoeken of structurele inclusieve oplossingen 
mogelijk zijn. Daarbovenop, kunnen rechtbanken echter ook op een meer 
subjectieve niveau een inclusieve rol spelen door de manier waarop ze met bepaalde 
claims omgaan. Wanneer rechters weinig respectvol of bevooroordeelde taal 
gebruiken of wanneer ze de stem of het perspectief van verzoekers niet in 
aanmerking nemen, dan kan dit in zichzelf een uitsluitend effect hebben, ongeacht 
de uitkomst van de zaak. Dit proefschrift heeft als doel om dit procedureel aspect 
van het rechtsprekend proces onder de aandacht te brengen. Zoals 
sociaalpsychologisch onderzoek over procedurele rechtvaardigheid (procedural 
justice) breed heeft aangetoond, zijn mensen niet enkel bezig met de uitkomst in 
hun zaak wanneer ze naar het gerecht stappen, maar hechten ze ook veel belang aan 
de wijze waarop ze behandeld worden. Zoals dat onderzoek aantoont, heeft dat 
laatste niet enkel een impact op de wijze waarop mensen het rechtssysteem 
evalueren, maar het heeft ook een impact op de wijze waarop ze zichzelf in de groep 
zien, op hun gevoel van inclusie in de groep. 
Dit procedurele perspectief t.o.v. inclusie is in het bijzonder relevant in de context 
van het religieus divers diverse landschap in West-Europa. Een diversiteit aan 
standpunten en wereldbeelden brengt inherent conflicten, discussies en debatten 
met zich mee; wat een normaal gegeven is in een democratie. Wanneer het echter 
gaat over religieuze diversiteit en debatten rond religie in de maatschappij, dan valt 
het op dat deze debatten meestal gevoelig liggen en polariserend werken en dat 
hierbij de stemmen van de mensen om wie het gaat wel eens genegeerd worden. 
Rechtbanken en hoven, waaronder het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens, 
zouden in deze context een belangrijke rol kunnen spelen in het nastreven van 
sociale samenhang en in het waarborgen van maatschappelijke inclusie t.o.v. 
iedereen in de maatschappij.  
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt welke rol het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens 
zou kunnen spelen in deze religieus diverse context en hoe ze het best zou kunnen 
omgaan met religieuze claims in haar eigen rechtspraak betreffende het recht op 
vrijheid van religie. De focus ligt hierbij vooral op het procedureel aspect van de 
rechtspraak, dit is de wijze waarop het Hof omgaat met religieuze claims, eerder dan 
toe te spietsen op de uitkomsten in de zaken rond vrijheid van religie. In die zin 
tracht dit werk complementair te zijn aan de reeds bestaande uitgebreide literatuur 
rond vrijheid van religie in de context van het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van 
de Mens. Vanuit analytisch perspectief heeft dit proefschrift onderzocht hoe het 
Mensenrechtenhof omgaat met religieuze verzoekers, met hun religieuze claims en 
294 
 
met het recht op vrijheid van religie. Op een normatief niveau, maakt dit proefschrift 
concrete voorstellen ter verbetering van de rechtspraak van het Hof. Op 
methodologisch vlak, ten slotte, heeft het getracht om de rechtspraak zo breed en zo 
diep mogelijk te onderzoeken, hierbij werd inspiratie geput uit analytische 
methodologie gebruikt in de sociale wetenschappen.  
De analyse van de vrijheid van religie jurisprudentie van het Hof brengt verschillende 
tekortkomingen vanuit het perspectief van procedurele rechtvaardigheid naar de 
oppervlakte. Zo ontbreekt onder meer het perspectief van de verzoeker heel vaak uit 
de redenering in vrijheid van religie zaken en zijn de argumenten niet altijd in 
aanmerking genomen. Bovendien tonen sommige arresten een gebrek aan 
neutraliteit t.o.v. sommige religieuze praktijken. Tegelijk toont het onderzoek ook 
aan dat technieken voor verbetering van de rechtspraak niet noodzakelijk ver 
moeten worden gezocht. Een comparatieve analyse toont bijvoorbeeld goede 
praktijken in de jurisprudentie van het Hof onder andere artikels van het EHRM. 
Bovendien vloeit een inclusieve houding uit de principes die het Hof zelf voorschrijft 
in haar vrijheid van religie rechtspraak.  
Dit proefschrift roept op tot meer inclusie in de artikel 9 rechtspraak van het 
Europees Hof voor de rechten van de Mens. Dit houdt in dat het Hof een inclusievere 
houding zou moeten hebben tegenover verzoekers, hun religieuze claims en hun 
recht op vrijheid van religie, door onder andere meer rekening te houden met de 
argumenten en het perspectief van de verzoekers, door erkenning te tonen voor hun 
bezorgdheden en door te vermijden om generaliserende uitspraken te doen. Dit 
proefschrift reflecteert ook over de al dan niet inclusieve rol die het Hof zou kunnen 
spelen via haar rechtspraak rond vrijheid van religie. Het argumenteert dat wanneer 
verzoekers op een neutrale, respectvolle en oprechte manier behandeld worden, dit 
niet enkel een impact heeft op de verzoeker in de bepaalde zaak, maar het een veel 
bredere impact kan hebben op de samenleving. Door de wijze waarop het Hof 
verzoekers en hun religieuze claims behandelt, communiceert het immers dat 
ongeacht welke religieuze achtergrond iemand heeft, en ongeacht of er al dan niet 
structurele inclusieve oplossingen voorhanden zijn voor bepaalde religieuze noden, 
de religieuze claims steeds ernstig moeten worden genomen en met het nodige 
respect en neutraliteit behandeld moeten worden.  
 
  
295 
 
 
  
296 
 
 
  
297 
 
 
  
298 
 
 
  
299 
 
 
  
300 
 
 
